dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

assets Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

3 trillion asset bank appendage (1); Abandoning Toxic Asset Purchases (1); accumulate dollar assets (1); accumulate dollar-denominated assets (1); accumulate U.S. assets (1); aggregate asset prices (1); allow asset (1); America assets (1); American assets (3); asset appreciation (1); asset backed (6); Asset Backed Commercial Paper (1); Asset base (2); asset class gold (1); asset Deflation (2); Asset deflation destroyed (1); asset losses thrust (1); asset market (10); Asset Price Bubbles (2); asset price inflation (7); asset price stabilization (1); asset prices left (1); asset prices plummeted (1); asset side (1); asset swaps (1); asset trends really relevant (1); asset valuations (2); asset-backed CDOs deemed worthless (1); asset-based economy (1); asset-liability matches (1); assets backed Securities (3); assets bubble (11); assets classes (7); Assets coupled (1); assets created (3); assets denominated (2); assets increased (2); assets managed (4); assets portfolios (1); assets price (33); assets purchase (2); assets rise (3); assets rose (1); assets sold (2); assets valued (6); bad assets (7); Bad Bank Assets (3); Bad Bank Assets Proposal (1); balance sheet assets (1); banks assets (7); Bogus Asset Regurgitation Facility (1); broader Commercial Paper shadow asset class (1); bubble assets (1); Buy Treasuries/Bad Bank Assets (1); capital asset pricing model (1); change net financial assets (1); China Sovereign Wealth Fund Openly Admits Asset Bubble Addressed (1); China's asset markets (1); China's dollar denominated reserve assets (1); Chinese central bank assets (1); collapsing asset prices triggered capital outflows (1); deflate asset (1); destroy net financial assets denominated (1); devaluation assets (1); directly buying assets (1); distort asset prices (3); dodgy asset (3); dollar assets (5); dollar financial assets (1); dollar-denominated assets (2); EBITDA/total assets (1); encourage asset managers (1); essentially stealing interest bearing assets (1); falling asset (2); falling asset prices (1); falling asset values (1); Fed accepting asset-based bonds (1); Federal Reserve Assets Increase (1); financial assets (19); financial assets create (2); fixing asset prices (1); fleeing U.S. assets (1); Foreign Asset (1); Freddie Mac increases Level 3 assets (1); Freddie Mac reports negative net assets (1); Fund asset (2); Goldman level 3 assets rise (2); Goldman Sachs hawking government asset sales (1); government merely swapping assets (1); Greek assets denominated (1); hiding dodgy assets (1); high asset prices (1); illiquid assets (2); Improved Toxic Assets (1); increase asset prices (1); incremental assets (1); inducing asset bubbles (1); interest bearing assets (2); Janet Yellen's asset price bubble remarks (1); Lehman's Bad Assets (1); Level 3 assets (5); Level 3 bank assets increase ominously (1); liquidity Asset (1); Maiden Lane III assets (1); marketers values drive asset values (1); Markets believed asset prices (1); massive American assets (1); money risks fueling asset bubbles (1); Mortgage Asset Markets (2); moving dodgy assets (1); Mysterious Shadow Assets (2); nationwide debt-financed asset price bubble (1); Net Asset (2); Net Asset Values (1); net financial assets (5); net financial assets created (1); non-government sectors whereby net financial assets enter (1); non-standard assets (1); obtaining toxic assets (1); offloads toxic assets (1); postulates rate cut permits funding asset-backed CP rollovers (1); preserving historically inflated asset valuations (1); prevent asset overpricing (1); private sector financial assets created (1); productive manufacturing assets (1); questionable assets (1); reinforced asset deflation (1); removing toxic assets (1); reserves Asset (2); resource assets (1); RiseNet Interest Margins Show Modest ImprovementIndustry Assets Decline (1); rising asset values (1); Riskiest Assets Rise (1); risky assets (4); risky assets held (1); s assets (2); safe assets (1); shadows assets (3); sham institutions holding predominantly toxic assets (1); shift assets (1); shitty asset crisis (1); specific asset classes (1); speculative asset markets (1); Sprott Asset Management says (1); spur asset-price inflation (1); Structured asset (1); supporting asset prices (1); SVB Asset Management (1); tal assets (1); targeted assets prices (1); total assets (3); Toxic Assets (16); toxic bank assets (1); toxic waste assets (1); toxic-asset-free banks (1); transfer bad assets (1); treasury assets (4); trouble assets (5); Troubled Asset Relief Program (4); U. S. assets (2); underlying assets (3); Various Chinese asset bubbles (1); vast dodgy assets (1); Wall Street's toxic asset waste pile (1); way assets (1); welcome asset-price inflation (1); worthless assets merely (1); worthlessness assets (3); xic assets (1).

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Sun 2010-10-10 11:56 EDT

The Federal Reserve's Relevance Test - Project Syndicate

...as investors look outside the US for higher yield, the flood of money out of the dollar has bid up exchange rates in emerging markets around the world. Emerging markets know this, and are upset -- Brazil has vehemently expressed its concerns -- not only about the increased value of their currency, but that the influx of money risks fueling asset bubbles or triggering inflation. The normal response of emerging-market central banks to bubbles or inflation would be to raise interest rates -- thereby increasing their currencies' value still more. US policy is thus delivering a double whammy on competitive devaluation -- weakening the dollar and forcing competitors to strengthen their currencies...

Federal Reserve's Relevance Test; Project Syndicate.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-09-30 08:22 EDT

Why Backstopping Repo is a Bad Idea

The normally sound Gillian Tett of the Financial Times endorses an idea that is both dangerous and unnecessary, namely, government backstopping of the system of short-term collateralized lending called repo, for ``sale with agreement to repurchase.''...But the real problem is that the only securities that were once considered to be suitable were those of the very highest quality, namely Treasuries. The real problem is in widening the market beyond that. If you have absolutely impeccable collateral, you don't care if your counterparty goes belly up if you aren't at risk of losses on the assets you hold...the real problem is the use of low quality collateral...why would we possibly WANT a system that might down the road encourage the pledging of less than stellar instruments as repo?...we need to go back and look hard at why the need for repo has risen since 2001, and how much is related to legitimate activity. The fact that it grew much more rapidly than the economy overall suggests not...official efforts should proceed...to shrink the repo market (as we've recommended for a market that has contributed to the growth of repo, credit default swaps)...our efforts NOT to restrain banks leads to a tremendous tax on all of us...a banking industry that creates global crises is negative value added from a societal standpoint. It is purely extractive...

Backstopping Repo; Bad Ideas; naked capitalism.

Rajiv Sethi Mon 2010-09-20 10:04 EDT

An Extreme Version of a Routine Event

The flash crash of May 6 has generally been viewed as a pathological event, unprecedented in history and unlikely to be repeated in the foreseeable future...far from being a pathological event, the flash crash was simply a very extreme version of a relatively routine occurrence...the flash crash can provide us with insights into the more general dynamics of prices in speculative asset markets...The crash revealed with incredible clarity how (as James Tobin observed a long time ago) markets can satisfy information arbitrage efficiency while failing to satisfy fundamental valuation efficiency...Aside from scale and speed, one major difference between the flash crash and its more routine predecessors was the unprecedented cancellation of trades...this was a mistake: losses from trading provide the only mechanism that currently keeps the proliferation of destabilizing strategies in check...

extreme version; Rajiv Sethi; routine event.

billy blog Mon 2010-09-20 09:39 EDT

The consolidated government -- treasury and central bank

...The notion of a consolidated government sector is a basic Modern Monetary Theory starting point and allows us to demonstrate the essential relationship between the government and non-government sectors whereby net financial assets enter and exit the economy without complicating the analysis unduly. This simplicity leads to many insights all of which remain valid as operational options when we add more detail to the model...the mainstream macroeconomics obsession with central bank independence is nothing more than an ideological attack on the capacity of government to produce full employment which also undermines our democratic rights...The vertical transactions which add to or drain the monetary base that I have outlined here are transactions between the government and the non-government sector... These transactions are thus unique -- they change net financial assets in the economy. All the transactions between private sector entities have no effect on the net financial assets in the economy at any point in time...

Billy Blog; central bank; consolidated government; Treasury.

Fri 2010-09-17 19:26 EDT

Memo to Obama: time to break the refinance strike by the big banks

...The Obama Administration and the Fed have taken the position that the crisis affecting the U.S. economy and the financial sector is slowly ending. In fact, the largest banks remain profoundly troubled by bad assets on their books as well as claims against these same banks for assets sold to investors. By allowing banks to ``muddle along'' and heal these wounds using low interest rates provided by the Fed, the Obama Administration is embracing a policy of deflation that has horrible consequences for U.S. workers and households...the Obama Administration has been providing political cover for the Fed to conduct a massive, reverse Robin Hood scheme, moving trillions of dollars in resources from savers and consumers to the big banks and their share and bond holders...the Obama Administration should use the power provided in the Dodd-Frank legislation to force an accelerated cleanup of bad assets and to mandate refinancing and principal reductions for performing loans with viable borrowers...President Obama also needs to focus on the growing competitive problem in the U.S. mortgage sector...now dominated by a cozy oligopoly of Too Big To Fail banks (TBTF)...Why is there no antitrust investigation of the top banks by the Department of Justice?...

big banks; break; memo; Obama; refinance strike; Time.

The Baseline Scenario Wed 2010-09-08 10:36 EDT

Irish Worries For The Global Economy

...Ireland's difficulties arose because of a massive property boom financed by cheap credit from Irish banks. Ireland's three main banks built up loans and investments by 2008 that were three times the size of the national economy; these big banks (relative to the economy) pushed the frontier in terms of reckless lending. The banks got the upside, and then came the global crash...Today roughly one-third of the loans on the balance sheets of major banks are nonperforming...The government responded to this with what are currently regarded as ``standard'' policies in Europe and America. It guaranteed all the liabilities of banks and began injecting government funds to keep these financial institutions afloat. It bought the most worthless assets from banks, paying them government bonds in return. Ministers have promised to recapitalize banks that need more capital. Despite or perhaps because of this therapy, financial markets are beginning to see Ireland as Europe's next Greece...Until very recently, Ireland was seen as Europe's poster child of prudent reforms...The ultimate result of Ireland's bank bailout exercise is obvious: one way or another, the government will have converted the liabilities of private banks into debts of the sovereign (that is, Irish taxpayers), yet the nation probably cannot afford these debts...The idea that Ireland, Greece or Portugal can cut spending and grow out of overvalued exchange rates with still large budget deficits, while servicing all their debts and building more debt, is proving -- not surprisingly -- wrong...

Baseline Scenario; global economy; Irish worries.

Money Game Wed 2010-09-01 10:53 EDT

Why Ben Bernanke's Next Round Of Quantitative Easing Will Be Another Huge Flop

There is perhaps, no greater misunderstanding in the investment world today than the topic of quantitative easing [QE]. After all, it sounds so fancy, strange and complex. But in reality, it is quite a simple operation...The Fed simply electronically swaps an asset with the private sector. In most cases it swaps deposits with an interest bearing asset...The theory behind QE is that the Fed can reduce interest rates via asset purchases (which supposedly creates demand for debt) while also strengthening the bank balance sheet (which entices them to lend). Unfortunately, we've lived thru this scenario before and history shows us that neither is actually true. Banks are never reserve constrained and a private sector that is deeply indebted will not likely be enticed to borrow regardless of the rate of interest...The most glaring example of failed QE is in Japan in 2001. Richard Koo refers to this event as the ``greatest monetary non-event''...Since Ben Bernanke initiated his great monetarist gaffe in 2008 there has been almost no sign of a sustainable private sector recovery. Mr. Bernanke's new form of trickle down economics has surely fixed the banking sector (or at least bought some time), but the recovery ended there. ..The hyperventilating hyperinflationists and those investors calling for inevitable US default are now clinging to this QE story as their inflation or default thesis crumbles before their very eyes...With the government merely swapping assets they are not actually ``printing'' any new money. In fact, the government is now essentially stealing interest bearing assets from the private sector and replacing them with deposits...now that the banks are flush with excess reserves this policy response would in fact be deflationary - not inflationary...

Ben Bernanke's; Huge Flop; Money game; Quantitative Easing.

billy blog Tue 2010-08-31 18:22 EDT

Monetary policy under challenge ... finally

The central bankers have been meeting in Wyoming over the weekend as part of the annual Economic Symposium organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City...some notable presentations...suggest that key central bankers are starting to realise that the economic crisis in not over and the fiscal-led recovery is slowing and that monetary policy alone cannot provide the solution. Moreover, one leading central banker [BOE deputy Charles Bean] indicated that monetary policy is not a suitable tool for controlling longer term problems such as price bubbles in specific asset classes. This view challenges the basis of the mainstream macroeconomics consensus that has dominated the policy debate for 30 odd years and culminated in the worst financial and economic crisis in 80 years. It is certanly a welcome trend in a debate which is typically flooded with ideological input from the mainstream macroeconomics profession....

Billy Blog; challenges; final; monetary policy.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Wed 2010-08-25 10:47 EDT

Illinois Teachers' Retirement System Enters The Death Spiral: AIG Wannabe's Go-For-Broke Strategy Fails As Pension Fund Begins Liquidations

Two few months ago we disclosed how the Illinois Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) was doing all it can to become the next AIG. In addition to, or maybe precisely due to, its deplorable fundamental condition, which can be summarized as being 61% underfunded on its $33.7 billion in assets, with a performance record of down $4.4 billion in 2009 and 5% in 2008, the fund, courtesy of a detailed analysis by Alexandra Harris of the Medill Journalism school at Northwestern, was found to be on its way to trying to become a veritable self-made TBTF: as was described then, "TRS is largely on the risky side of the contracts, selling and writing OTC derivatives, including credit default swaps,..."

AIG Wannabe's Go; Broke Strategy Fails; Death Spiral; dropped; Illinois teacher; long; Pension Fund Begins Liquidations; Retirement System Enters; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

Wed 2010-08-25 08:41 EDT

2008 Bailout Counter-Factual | The Big Picture

...My disagreement with the Zandi-Blinder report is not its theoretical underpinnings -- it is by definition a hypothetical counter-factual. Rather, it is the counter-factual Blinder/Zandi chose to use: ``What would the economy look like now if we had done nothing?'' Instead, I propose a better counter-factual: ``What if we had done the right thing, instead of nothing -- or the wrong thing?''...In my counter factual, the bailouts did not occur. Instead of the Japanese model, the US government went the Swedish route of banking crises: They stepped in with temporary nationalizations, prepackaged bankruptcies, and financial reorganizations; banks write down all of their bad debt, they sell off the paper. In the end, the goal is to spin out clean, well financed, toxic-asset-free banks into the public markets...One by one, we should have put each insolvent bank into receivership, cleaned up the balance sheer, sold off the bad debts for 15-50 cents on the dollar, fired the management, wiped out the shareholders, and spun out the proceeds, with the bondholders taking the haircut, and the taxpayers on the hook for precisely zero dollars. Citi, Bank of America, Wamu, Wachovia, Countrywide, Lehman, Merrill, Morgan, etc. all of them should have been handled this way...

2008 Bailout Counter-Factual; Big Picture.

Tue 2010-08-24 20:34 EDT

Is Bank of America Hiding an Insolvency Problem From The Public? | MFI-Miami

...My contact told me that Bank of America is selling off their servicing rights on loans they serviced for other investment houses and they are selling off their trustee rights they hold in their name, Countrywide's name and LaSalle Bank's name to Deutsche Bank. What they can't sell to other banks they are selling to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac...On the surface this looks like Bank of America is having a liquidity problem but then buried deep in the Asian edition of the Wall Street Journal last week was an article that the Blackstone Group was taking over Bank of America's Asian Real Estate Fund. This would indicate this much more than Bank of America having a liquidity problem. This would indicate that Bank of America has turned into the SS Titanic...My source was even bold enough to say that executives are planning on Bank of America being out of business by the end of the year. They are waiting for someone to buy their branch network before making the news of their pending demise public...while the mainstream media was distracted by the Gulf oil spill, Bank of America could go about liquidating their assets and no one would be the wiser.

America Hiding; bank; insolvency problem; MFI-Miami; public.

Tue 2010-08-24 20:21 EDT

Gonzalo Lira: How Hyperinflation Will Happen

Right now, we are in the middle of deflation. The Global Depression we are experiencing has squeezed both aggregate demand levels and aggregate asset prices as never before. Since the credit crunch of September 2008, the U.S. and world economies have been slowly circling the deflationary drain...For its part, the Federal Reserve has been busy propping up all assets--including Treasuries--by way of ``quantitative easing''...But this Fed policy--call it ``money-printing'', call it ``liquidity injections'', call it ``asset price stabilization''--has been overwhelmed by the credit contraction...the next step down in this world-historical Global Depression which we are experiencing will be hyperinflation...Hyperinflation is the loss of faith in the currency. Prices rise in a hyperinflationary environment just like in an inflationary environment, but they rise not because people want more money for their labor or for commodities, but because people are trying to get out of the currency. It's not that they want more money--they want less of the currency: So they will pay anything for a good which is not the currency...Treasuries are now the New and Improved Toxic Asset...there will be a commodities burp: A slight but sudden rise in the price of a necessary commodity, such as oil...asset managers will sell Treasuries...right before a largish Treasury auction. So Bernanke and the Fed will buy Treasuries, in an effort to counteract the sell-off and maintain low yields...The Fed's buying of Treasuries will occur in such a way that it will encourage asset managers to dump even more Treasuries...It will be a flash panic...By the end of that terrible day, commodites of all stripes--precious and industrial metals, oil, foodstuffs--will shoot the moon...if it doesn't happen this fall, it'll happen next fall, without question before the end of 2011...

Gonzalo Lira; happened; Hyperinflation.

PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM Mon 2010-08-23 19:11 EDT

SAY IT AIN'T SO JOHN....

I am saddened to say that John Hussman is worried about inflation and default in the USA. I guess the inflationistas and defaultiastas have made a substantial mid-season pick-up. Unfortunately, however, Mr. Hussman makes all the same claims that have driven these worrywarts astray for so many years. Specifically, Mr. Hussman is now discussing the inevitable ``collapse'' of the U.S. dollar due to Quantitative Easing...There is substantial historical evidence showing that QE is nothing more than an asset swap and has little to no impact on the real economy, inflation rates or currencies. Japan is again the best historical precedent...there is a long-term threat of inflation or that we have attempted to paper over many of our mistakes, however, there is very strong evidence showing that QE will not be the cause of a collapse in the dollar...

ain't; John; PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM; says.

Mon 2010-08-23 11:11 EDT

Hussman Funds - Valuing Foreign Currencies: Currency is both a means of payment and a store of value. [2000-09-22]

Any currency is both a means of payment and a store of value. So when you try to determine what it's worth, you have to consider both what it can buy in terms of goods, and what it can earn if you hold it as an asset. An exchange rate is just the price of a currency...If you look at a currency as a means of exchange...you can get a reasonable idea of the "long term" tendency of the currency by tracking the movements of price indices in two countries. This is what traders refer to as the "Purchasing Power Parity" (PPP) value of the exchange rate...But PPP is only a tendency that holds loosely over the long term. Over the short term, there's another important factor: interest rates...anytime long term interest rates, after inflation (i.e. real interest rates) are expected to be higher in the foreign country than in the U.S., the foreign currency will be above PPP...

2000-09-22; currency; Hussman Funds; meaning; payment; store; valued; Valuing Foreign Currencies.

Jesse's Café Américain Mon 2010-08-16 16:09 EDT

Chris Whalen: Nothing Has Changed Because It's The Fraud and Corruption, Stupid

...The dirty little secret of the Dodd-Frank legislation is that by failing to curtail the worst abuses of the OTC market in structured assets and derivatives, a financial ghetto that even today remains virtually unregulated, the Congress and the Fed are effectively even encouraging securities firms to act as de facto exchanges and thereby commit financial fraud. Allowing securities firms to originate complex structured securities without requiring SEC registration is a vast loophole that Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) deliberately left open for their campaign contributors on Wall Street. But it must be noted these same firms have a captive, client relationship with the Fed and other regulators as well, thus a love triangle may be the most apt metaphor...a recent key supervisory officer appointment by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY)...choice of Sarah Dahlgren as Head of Supervision...Ms Dahlgren has been at the center of many of the Federal Reserve's most embarrassing failures in the area of bank supervision and in particular with respect to the failure of American International Group (AIG)...

change because; Chris Whalen; corruption; fraud; Jesse's Café Américain; Stupid.

Mon 2010-08-16 13:54 EDT

Could The US Become Another Ireland? >> The Baseline Scenario

As Greece acts in an intransigent manner, refusing to act decisively despite deep fiscal difficulties, the financial markets look on Ireland all the more favorably. Ireland is seen as the poster child for prudent fiscal adjustment among the weaker eurozone countries...Ireland's perceived ``success'' is partly due to its draconian fiscal cuts...Ireland's difficulties arose because of a massive property boom financed by cheap credit from Irish banks...Today roughly 1/3 of the loans on the balance sheets of banks are non-performing or ``under surveillance''...The government...guaranteed all the liabilities of banks and then began injecting government funds...it is planning to buy the most worthless assets from banks and pay them government bonds in return. Ministers have also promised to recapitalize banks than need more capital. The ultimate result of this exercise is obvious: one way or another, the government will have converted the liabilities of private banks into debts of the sovereign (i.e., Irish taxpayers)...The government is gambling that GDP growth will recover to over 4% per year starting 2012 -- and they still plan further major expenditure cutting and revenue increasing measures each year until 2013...The latest round of bank bailouts (swapping bad debts for government bonds) dramatically exacerbates the fiscal problem...

Baseline Scenario; Becomes; Ireland.

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-08-05 20:20 EDT

Do Deficits Matter? Foreign Lending to the Treasury

...a US current account deficit will be reflected in foreign accumulation of US Treasuries, held mostly by foreign central banks...While this is usually presented as foreign ``lending'' to ``finance'' the US budget deficit, one could just as well see the US current account deficit as the source of foreign current account surpluses that can be accumulated as treasuries...most public discussion ignores the fact that the Chinese desire to run a trade surplus with the US is linked to its desire to accumulate dollar assets...all of the following are linked...the willingness of Chinese to produce for export, the willingness of China to accumulate dollar-denominated assets, the shortfall of Chinese domestic demand that allows China to run a trade surplus, the willingness of Americans to buy foreign products, the (relatively) high level of US aggregate demand that results in a trade deficit, and the factors that result in a US government budget deficit...I am not arguing that the current situation will go on forever, although I do believe it will persist much longer than most commentators presume...there are strong incentives against the sort of simple, abrupt, and dramatic shifts often posited as likely scenarios...I expect that the complexity as well as the linkages among balance sheets ensure that transitions will be moderate and slow...

credit writedowns; deficits matter; foreign lending; Treasury.

China Financial Markets Tue 2010-08-03 14:48 EDT

The capital tsunami is a bigger threat than the nuclear option

...China's ``nuclear option'', which has generated a great deal of nervousness among investors and policy-making circles in the US, is a myth, and what the US should be much more concerned about is its diametric opposite -- a tsunami of capital flooding into the country...All the major capital exporting countries...are eager to maintain and even increase their capital exports. But the balance of payments must balance, and all that exported capital must be imported somewhere else...As net capital exporters try desperately to maintain or increase their capital exports, and deficit Europe sees net capital imports collapse, the only way the world can achieve balance without a sharp contraction in the capital-exporting countries is if US net capital imports surge. And at first they will surge. Foreigners...will buy more dollar assets, including USG bonds, than before...the US trade deficit will inexorably rise as Germany, Japan and China try to keep up their capital exports and as European capital imports drop...This tsunami will bring with it a corresponding surge in the US trade deficit and, with it, a rise in US unemployment. It will also force the US Treasury to increase the fiscal deficit as more of the jobs created by its spending leak abroad...in the past massive capital recycling has usually been very good for asset markets. Might we see a surge in the US asset markets, at least until next year when Congress starts getting tough on the trade deficit?...

bigger threat; capital tsunami; China Financial Markets; nuclear option.

Tue 2010-08-03 14:34 EDT

Rajiv Sethi: The Economics of Hyman Minsky [2009-12-03]

There has been a resurgence of interest in the economic writings of Hyman Minsky over the past few years, and for good reason...Minsky's theoretical framework combines a cash-flow approach to investment with a theory of financial instability...expectations of financial tranquility are self-falsifying. Stability, as Minsky liked to put it, is itself destabilizing...An essential feature of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is that a long period of sustained stability gives rise to changes in financial practices which are not conducive to the persistence of stable growth...A sustained period of stability gives rise to optimistic expectations and a rise in speculative financing...if a large number of investments which are prompted by the availability of speculative finance are found to be inept, so that immediate cash flows are significantly lower than expected, then the need for short-term refinancing becomes acute while at the same time banks are less willing to roll over existing debt. A sharp rise in short-term interest rates occurs which can lead to present value reversals, a rush towards liquidity, a plunge in the prices of illiquid assets, both real and financial, and a corresponding drop in new investments...described as a credit crunch, a state of financial distress, or a financial crisis...

2009-12-03; economic; Hyman Minsky; Rajiv Sethi.

Wed 2010-07-28 10:55 EDT

Economics: No, America lacks the necessary commitment to stimulus | The Economist

...the US today is suffering from a balance sheet recession, a very rare ailment which happens only after the bursting of a nationwide debt-financed asset price bubble. In this type of recession, the private sector is minimising debt instead of maximising profits because the collapse in asset prices left its balance sheets in a serious state of excess liability and in urgent need of repair...fiscal stimulus becomes indispensible in a balance sheet recession. Moreover, the stimulus must be maintained until private sector deleveraging is over...When the deficit hawks manage to remove the fiscal stimulus while the private sector is still deleveraging, the economy collapses and re-enters the deflationary spiral. That weakness, in turn, prompts another fiscal stimulus, only to see it removed again by the deficit hawks once the economy stabilises. This unfortunate cycle can go on for years if the experience of post-1990 Japan is any guide. The net result is that the economy remains in the doldrums for years, and many unemployed workers will never find jobs in what appears to be structural unemployment even though there is nothing structural about their predicament...

America lacked; economic; Economist; necessary commitments; stimulus.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-07-22 10:17 EDT

Do sovereign debt ratios matter?

...No aspect of history seems to repeat itself quite as regularly as financial history. The written history of financial crises dates back at least as far back as the reign of Tiberius, when we have very good accounts of Rome's 33 AD real estate crisis...we have only begun the period of sovereign default. The major global adjustments haven't yet taken place and until they do, we won't have seen the full consequences of the global crisis...there is no threshold debt level that indicates a country is in trouble. Many things matter when evaluating a country's creditworthiness...there are at least five important factors in determining the likelihood that a country will be suspend or renegotiate certain types of debt...With inverted debt, the value of liabilities is positively correlated with the value of assets, so that the debt burden and servicing costs decline in good times (when asset prices and earnings rise) and rise in bad times...Inverted debt structures leave a country extremely vulnerable to debt crises...

China Financial Markets; sovereign debt ratios matter.

Minyanville Fri 2010-07-16 14:43 EDT

Intel Shows the 'Financialization' of Corporate America

To quote the company's own earnings headline: "Intel Reports Best Quarter Ever."While not taking anything away from the company's ability to deliver I'd strongly encourage readers to look at Intel's (INTC) balance sheet. To these eyes it's filled with financial assets...few have paid attention to what I term the "financialization" of corporate balance sheets, in which productive manufacturing assets have been increasingly replaced by various financial instruments, derivatives, and goodwill...because so much of corporate balance-sheet space is now a function of credit and market risk, financialization has created much tighter correlations to financial institutions than many currently think...And with corporate balance sheets more and more laden with financial instruments, it isn't just going to be product innovation that drives what earnings are ahead for companies like Intel.

Corporate America; Financial; Intel shows; Minyanville.

Fri 2010-06-18 10:37 EDT

Monetary Economics Review

Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth, W. Godley and M. Lavoie, Palgrave/Macmillan, London, 2007...Acknowledging the existence of a complex institutional structure that includes households, firms, banks and governments (sometimes separated from the Central Bank), "our aspiration is to introduce a new way in which an understanding can be gained as to how these very complicated systems work as a whole"...the "new way" referred above is currently known as Stock-Flow Consistent modelling (SFC)...The main bid of Godley and Lavoie (G&L, from now on) is to show (successfully, one could note) that the SFC models make it necessary to fully articulate an accounting structure, avoiding "black holes", gaining in consistency, accuracy, and providing a common framework for the comparison of different models...one gets really convinced that it is the type of approach that makes it possible to analyse a great number of elements and complexities of the real world, as much as one wishes!...G&L adopt an institutional classification (households, firms, banks, government and the central bank). All the models presented in the book start with a "balance sheet" matrix, where all the assets and liabilities of each sector are described...

Monetary Economics Review.

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-06-03 17:56 EDT

Guest Post: The 2004 Fed Transcripts: A Methodical, Diabolical Destruction of America's "Wealth"

The Federal Reserve releases transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings with a five-year lag (as required by law, the Fed would like to burn them). Transcripts for 2004 meetings were released on April 30, 2010...FOMC transcripts in 2004 confirm the Fed was afraid of markets...The FOMC seemed most concerned that higher rates might interfere with the carry trade. In the sad tale of The Financialization of the United States, the carry trade deserves a chapter...By 2004, the carry trade was a mammoth enterprise of hedge funds and banks. The too-big-to-fail banks were, by now, leveraging their own internally managed hedge funds, managing their own proprietary trading desks, and also lending to highly leveraged hedge funds. Leverage, and, the belief that access to rising levels of credit would never end, pushed up asset values on bank balance sheets -- whether real estate, bonds, stocks, or private-equity. This increased the banks' lending capacity which encouraged banks to lend more...Markets believed asset prices would only go up for many silly reasons. Belief in the Greenspan Put may have been the silliest but also the most influential...Federal Reserve Governor Donald Kohn...told his confreres that Federal Reserve policy was to distort asset prices. He also said this was deliberate and desirable. In other words, distorted asset prices were not an unfortunate consequence of such-and-such Fed policy. The Fed's goal was to distort asset prices...Consumer spending exceeded consumer income...This strategy of fixing asset prices at an artificially high rate to fool the American people into spending money they did not have was diabolical...The manipulation of markets and of the American people has grown worse under Bernanke's chairmanship...

2004 Fed Transcripts; America's; credit writedowns; Diabolical Destruction; Guest Post; Method; wealth.

Thu 2010-06-03 17:42 EDT

World Order, Failed States and Terrorism, Part 3: The Business of Private Security

...Social order is the main component of domestic security. Social security is the foundation of social order. Henry J Aaron of the Brookings Institution calls the US Social Security system "the great monument of 20th-century liberalism". Privatization of social security is not a solution; it is an oxymoron. It merely turns social security into private security. Neo-liberal economics theory promotes as scientific truth an ideology that is irrationally hostile to government responsibility for social programs. Based on that ideology, neo-liberal economists then construct a mechanical system of rationalization to dismantle government and its social programs in the name of efficiency through privatization. Privatization of social security is a road to government abdication, the cause of failed statehood...In the era of financial globalization, nations are faced with the problem of protecting their economies from financial threats. The recurring financial crises around the world in recent decades clearly demonstrated that most governments have failed in this critical state responsibility. The economic benefits associated with the unregulated transfer of financial assets, such as cash, stocks and bonds, across national borders are frequently not worth the risks, as has been amply demonstrated in many countries whose economies have been ravaged by external financial forces. Cross-border capital flows have become an increasingly significant part of the globalized economy over recent decades. The US depends on it to finance its huge and growing trade deficit. More than $2.5 trillion of capital flowed around the world in 2004, with more than $1 trillion flowing into just the US. Different types of capital flows, such as foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and bank lending, are driven by different investor motivations and country characteristics, but one objective stands out more than any other: capital seeks highest return through lowest wages. The United States is not only losing jobs to lower-wage economies, the inflow of capital also forces stagnant US wages to fall in relation to rising asset values.

business; failed state; Part 3; private security; terror; World ordering.

Tue 2010-06-01 18:24 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirit of debate ... my reply Part 2

Today, I offer Part 2 of my responses to the comments raised in the debate so far...Modern monetary theory does not use the term ``money'' in the same way as the mainstream because it creates instant confusion. As Scott said ``Money is always someone's liability, so better to be precise about whose liabilities we are talking about than saying money.'' That is why we emphasis fully understanding the asset-liability matches that occur in monetary systems. And that leads you to realise that transactions between government and non-government create or destroy net financial assets denominated in the currency of issue whereas transactions within the non-government sector cannot create net financial positions...So modern monetary theorists prefer to concentrate on what is going on with balance sheets after certain flows have occured rather than narrowly defining some financial assets as money and others not...There is no doubt that the non-government institutions can increase credit. Some slack analysts call this an increase in money. But the accurate statement is that, as a matter of accounting it increases the (in Scott's words) ``the quantity of financial assets and financial liabilities 1 for 1 in the non-govt sector. So, with private credit, there is BY DEFINITION no NET increase in private sector financial assets created.'' Once we understand that and note that typically the non-government sector seeks to net save in the currency of issue then modern monetary theory tells you that the public sector must run a deficit to underwrite this desired net saving or else see an output gap widen...Who is in control is an interesting question. Clearly, the government cannot directly control the money supply which renders much of the analysis in mainstream macroeconomics textbooks as being irrelevant. The Monetarists via Milton Friedman persuaded central banks to adopt monetary targetting in the 1980s and it failed a few years later -- miserably...Then you might like to consider it from the other angle -- a government which accepts responsibility for full employment can ``finance'' the saving desires of the non-government sector by increasing its deficit up to the level warranted by the spending gap (left by the full employment non-government savings)...Orthodox macroeconomic theory struggles with the idea of involuntary unemployment and typically tries to fudge the explanation by appealing to market rigidities (typically nominal wage inflexibility). However, in general, the orthodox framework cannot convincingly explain systemic constraints that comprehensively negate individual volition. The modern monetary framework clearly explicates how involuntary unemployment arises. The private sector, in aggregate, may desire to spend less of the monetary unit of account than it earns. In this case, if this gap in spending is not met by government, then unemployment will occur. Nominal (or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless they somehow eliminate the private sector desire to net save and increase spending...to maintain high levels of employment and given that the public generally desire to hold some reserves of fiat money, the government balance will normally have to be in deficit...modern monetary theory demonstrates that if you want the non-government sector to net save...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply Part 2; Spirit.

Tue 2010-06-01 17:29 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirt of debate ... my reply

...Steve Keen and I agreed to foster a debate about where modern monetary theory sits with his work on debt-deflation. So yesterday his blog carried the following post, which included a 1000-odd word precis written by me describing what I see as the essential characteristics of modern monetary theory. The discussion is on-going on that site and I invite you to follow it if you are interested. Rather than comment on all the comments over on Steve's site, I decided to collate them here (in part) and help develop the understanding that way. That is what follows today... We distinguish the horizontal dimension (which entails all transactions between entities in the non-government sector) from the vertical dimension (which entails all transactions between the government and non-government sector)...A properly specified model will show you emphatically that the horizontal transactions between household, firms, banks and foreigners (which is the domain of circuit theory) have to net to zero even if asset portfolios are changing in composition. For every asset created there will be a corresponding liability created at the same time...you will make errors if there is not an explicit understanding that in an accounting (stock-flow) consistent sense all these transaction will net to zero. In adopting this understanding you might abstract from analysing the vertical transactions that introduced the high-powered money in the first place, but never deny its importance in setting the scene for the horizontal transactions to occur. I think the differences between Steve's models and modern monetary theory are two-fold. First, I do not think that Steve's model is stock-flow consistent across all sectors. By leaving out the government sector (even implicitly) essential insights are lost that would avoid conclusions that do not obey basic and accepted national accounting (and financial accounting) rules. This extends to how we define money. Second, I think Steve uses accounting in a different way to that which is broadly accepted. It might be that for mathematical nicety or otherwise this is the chosen strategy but you cannot then claim that your models are ground in the operational reality of the fiat monetary system we live in. I have no problem with abstract modelling. But modern monetary theory is firmly ground in the operational reality and is totally stock-flow consistent across all sectors. If we used the same definitions and rendered Steve's model stock-flow consistent in the same way as modern monetary theory then Steve's endogenous money circuits would come up with exactly the same results as the horizontal dimensions in modern monetary theory. His results might look a bit different in accounting terms but most of the message he wishes to portray about the dangers of Ponzi stages in the private debt accumulation process would still hold.

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply; spirt.

Tue 2010-06-01 16:23 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirit of debate ...

Readers of my blog often ask me about how modern monetary theory sits with the views of the debt-deflationists (and specifically my academic colleague Steve Keen). Steve and I have collaborated in the last few days to foster some debate between us on a constructive level with the aim of demonstrating that the common enemy is mainstream macroeconomics and that progressive thinkers should target that school of thought rather than looking within...hopefully, this initiative will broaden the debate and bring more people up to speed on where the real enemy of full employment lies...The modern monetary system is characterised by a floating exchange rate (so monetary policy is freed from the need to defend foreign exchange reserves) and the monopoly provision of fiat currency. The monopolist is the national government. Most countries now operate monetary systems that have these characteristics...the monetary unit defined by the government has no intrinsic worth...The viability of the fiat currency is ensured by the fact that it is the only unit which is acceptable for payment of taxes and other financial demands of the government.The analogy that mainstream macroeconomics draws between private household budgets and the national government budget is thus false. Households, the users of the currency, must finance their spending prior to the fact. However, government, as the issuer of the currency, must spend first (credit private bank accounts) before it can subsequently tax (debit private accounts)... Taxation acts to withdraw spending power from the private sector but does not provide any extra financial capacity for public spending...As a matter of national accounting, the federal government deficit (surplus) equals the non-government surplus (deficit). In aggregate, there can be no net savings of financial assets of the non-government sector without cumulative government deficit spending...contrary to mainstream economic rhetoric, the systematic pursuit of government budget surpluses is necessarily manifested as systematic declines in private sector savings...Unemployment occurs when net government spending is too low. As a matter of accounting, for aggregate output to be sold, total spending must equal total income (whether actual income generated in production is fully spent or not each period). Involuntary unemployment is idle labour unable to find a buyer at the current money wage. In the absence of government spending, unemployment arises when the private sector, in aggregate, desires to spend less of the monetary unit of account than it earns. Nominal (or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless they somehow eliminate the private sector desire to net save and increase spending. Thus, unemployment occurs when net government spending is too low to accommodate the need to pay taxes and the desire to net save...Unlike the mainstream rhetoric, insolvency is never an issue with deficits. The only danger with fiscal policy is inflation which would arise if the government pushed nominal spending growth above the real capacity of the economy to absorb it...government debt functions as interest rate support via the maintenance of desired reserve levels in the commercial banking system and not as a source of funds to finance government spending...there is no intrinsic reason for...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; Spirit.

zero hedge Mon 2010-05-24 16:38 EDT

Presenting What Could Be The Oddest Capital Flow Observation In History

It is no secret that the last few weeks saw massive liquidations along all asset classes. The result was a huge outflow across almost all products: Loans, HY Bonds, Municipals, Commodities... all a typical reaction to broad based liquidations. However, note we said "almost" - one class that actually posted a $6.2 billion inflow was equities. Yet not is all as it seems: peeking underneath the hood indicates that the bulk of this inflow, or $10.3 billion, had to do with inflow into ETFs... or rather, just one ETF - the SPY, accounting for $10.1 billion. Did someone prop up the entire equity market last week by massively pushing capital into the most liquid equity proxy available?...

History; Oddest Capital Flow Observation; presenter; Zero Hedge.

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