dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

borrowing Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

allow mortgage borrowers (1); America's troubled borrowers (1); better borrowers (1); borrow beyoned (1); borrow cheaply (1); borrowed money collapsed (1); borrowed public money (1); borrower IOU (3); borrower left standing (1); Borrower Underwater (1); borrower's (3); borrower's mortgage (1); borrower's prospects (1); borrower/homeowner (4); borrowers face foreclosure (1); borrowers regardless (1); borrowers Short (1); borrowing costs (2); borrowing risks (1); Borrows Later (1); borrows money (7); caused borrowing (1); checking borrowers (1); consumer borrowing falls (1); cosmetically lower borrowing costs (1); credit-worthy borrowers (3); deceived borrowers (1); defaults come because borrowers (1); delinquent borrower's home (1); Foreign Borrowing Petard (1); frothy because super low dollar borrowing rates (1); fund sovereign borrowing (1); gave borrowers (1); government borrowing (4); hedge funds borrow money (1); just means borrowing (1); just merrily borrowing (1); make sure borrower/homeowners obtain (1); make sure borrowers (2); mean borrowing amounts remained stable (1); means borrow (2); potential borrowers (1); quit borrowing (1); real borrowing (1); Really Borrowing (1); reduced government Borrowing (1); total borrowing (1); troubling Borrowers (2); uncreditworthy borrowers (1); viable borrowers (1); violated borrowers (1).

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naked capitalism Sun 2010-10-10 12:54 EDT

FUBAR Mortgage Behavior: Florida Banks Destroyed Notes; Others Never Transferred Them

...But to give readers the latest report of modern FUBAR, mortgage edition, let us continue with the sorry saga of ``Where's My Note?'' For the benefit of newbies, what everyone calls a mortgage actually has two components: the note, which is the borrower IOU, and the mortgage (in some states, it's called a deed of trust) which is the lien on the property. In 45 states, the mortgage is a mere accessory to the note; you must be the real party of interest in the note in order to foreclose. The pooling and servicing agreement, which governs who does what when in a mortgage securitization, requires the note to be endorsed (just like a check, signed by one party over to the next), showing the full chain of title...The endorsements also have to be wet ink; no electronic signatures permitted. I've had a lot of anecdotal evidence to support the idea that these procedures, which were created in the early days of mortgage securitizations, were simply not observed on a widespread, if not a universal basis...

Florida Banks Destroyed Notes; FUBAR Mortgage Behavior; naked capitalism; transfer.

Fri 2010-10-08 21:57 EDT

A Mammoth One in Five Borrowers Will Default <<; Real Estate Prices & Mortgages on HousingStory.net

A leading mortgage analyst predicts over 11 million homeowners will default and lose their home if the government fails to take more radical intervention. Amherst Securities Group LP, one of the most respected names in mortgage research, has trumpeted an ambitious call-to-government arms in its October mortgage report. ``The death spiral of lower home prices, more borrowers underwater, higher transition rates (to default), more distressed sales and lower home prices must be arrested.''...

borrowing; default; HousingStory; mammoth; mortgage; net; real estate prices.

Fri 2010-10-08 21:53 EDT

MERS 101

MERS - Mortgage Electronic Registration Inc. - holds approximately 60 million American mortgages and is a Delaware corporation whose sole shareholder is Mers Corp. MersCorp and its specified members have agreed to include the MERS corporate name on any mortgage that was executed in conjunction with any mortgage loan made by any member of MersCorp...Thus in place of the original lender being named as the mortgagee on the mortgage that is supposed to secure their loan, MERS is named as the ``nominee'' for the lender who actually loaned the money to the borrower. In other words MERS is really nothing more than a name that is used on the mortgage instrument in place of the actual lender. MERS' primary function, therefore, is to act as a document custodian. MERS was created solely to simplify the process of transferring mortgages by avoiding the need to re-record liens -- and pay county recorder filing fees -- each time a loan is assigned. Instead, servicer's record loans only once and MERS' electronic system monitors transfers and facilitates the trading of notes...MersCorp was created in the early 1990's by the former C.E.O.'s of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Indy Mac, Countrywide, Stewart Title Insurance and the American Land Title Association... MERS, as has clearly been proven in many civil cases, does not hold any promissory notes of any kind. A party must have possession of a promissory note in order to have standing to enforce and/or otherwise collect a debt that is owed to another party. Given this clear-cut legal definition, MERS does not have legal standing to enforce or collect on the over 60 million mortgages it controls and no member of MERS has any standing in an American civil court. MERS has been taken to civil courts across the country and charged with a lack of standing in reposession issues. When the mortgage debacle initially, and inevitably, began, MERS always routinely brought actions against defaulting mortgage holders purporting to represent the owners of the defaulted mortgages but once the courts discovered that MERS was only a front organization that did not hold any deed nor was aware of who or what agencies might hold a deed, they have routinely been denied in their attempts to force foreclosure. In the past, persons alleging they were officials of MERS in foreclosure motions, purported to be the holders of the mortgage, when, in fact, they not only were not the holder of the mortgage but, under a court order, could not produce the identity of the actual holder. These so-called MERS officers have usually been just employees of entities who are servicing the loan for the actual lender. MERS, it is now widely acknowledged by the courts, has no legal right to foreclose or otherwise collect debt which are evidenced by promissory notes held by someone else...

MERS 101.

Fri 2010-10-08 21:27 EDT

Bank of America Suspends Foreclosures in All States >> naked capitalism

...The robo signing of affidavits was clearly done across all sorts of court actions. As we indicated, the bogus affidavits are used in all foreclosures in judicial states; they aver various things about the plaintiff's indebtedness, including the plaintiff's ownership of the debt that are integral to the process. Providing an improper affidavit is considered to be a fraud on the court...affidavit abuses are mere symptoms of much deeper problems with the mortgage securitizations. Why, pray tell, are law firms and servicers engaging in false representations and widespread document forgeries? It is because, as we have stressed, they made a botch of getting the notes (the borrower IOU) into the trusts, and simple fixes don't work, hence the need to create a phony document trail. The Bank of America suspension of foreclosures in all states appears to be a tacit admission that the problems are as pervasive as we have suggested...

America suspends foreclosures; bank; naked capitalism; state.

Fri 2010-10-08 21:11 EDT

4ClosureFraud Posts Lender Processing Services Mortgage Document Fabrication Price Sheet >> naked capitalism

...document fabrication is widespread in foreclosures. The reason is that the note, which is the borrower IOU, is the critical instrument to establishing the right to foreclose in 45 states (in those states, the mortgage, which is the lien on the property, is a mere ``accessory'' to the note). The pooling and servicing agreement, which governs the creation of mortgage backed securities, called for the note to be endorsed (wet ink signatures) through the full chain of title...Evidence is mounting that for cost reasons, starting in the 2004-2005 time frame, originators like Countrywide simply quit conveying the note. We are told this practice was widespread, probably endemic. The notes are apparently are still in originator warehouses. That means the trust does not have them (the legalese is it is not the real party of interest), therefore it is not in a position to foreclose on behalf of the RMBS investors. So various ruses have been used to finesse this rather large problem...We finally have concrete proof of how widespread document fabrication was...This revelation touches every major servicer and RMBS trustee in the US...The story that banks have been trying to sell has been that document problems like improper affidavits are mere technicalities. We've said from the get go that they were the tip of the iceberg of widespread document forgeries and fraud...

4ClosureFraud Posts Lender Processing Services Mortgage Document Fabrication Price Sheet; naked capitalism.

Mon 2010-09-20 18:49 EDT

What happened to US interbank lending in the financial crisis?

Many commentators have argued that interbank lending froze following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This column presents evidence from the fed funds market that, while rates spiked and loan terms became more sensitive to borrower risk, mean borrowing amounts remained stable on aggregate. It seems likely that the market did not expand to meet additional demand for funds.

Financial Crisis; happened; Interbank Lending.

Mon 2010-09-20 10:14 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Fictional Reserve Lending And The Myth Of Excess Reserves

...1) Lending comes first and what little reserves there are (if any) come later. 2) There really are no excess reserves. 3) Not only are there no excess reserves, there are essentially no reserves to speak of at all. Indeed, bank reserves are completely "fictional". 4) Banks are capital constrained not reserve constrained. 5) Banks aren't lending because there are few credit worthy borrowers worth the risk. ...concern that excess reserves will lead to lending and inflation is totally unfounded in theory and practice. Fractional Reserve Lending is really Fictional Reserve Lending. In practice, the major constraints to lending are insufficient capital and willingness of credit worthy borrowers to seek loans.

excess reserves; Fictional Reserve Lending; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; myth.

Mon 2010-09-20 09:49 EDT

Escaping the Sovereign Debt Trap

...Debt forces individuals into financial slavery to the banks, and it forces governments to relinquish their sovereignty to their creditors, which in the end are also private banks, the originators of all non-cash money today. In Great Britain, where the Bank of England is owned by the government, 97% of the money supply is issued privately by banks as loans. In the U.S., where the central bank is owned by a private consortium of banks, the percentage is even higher. The Federal Reserve issues Federal Reserve Notes (or dollar bills) and lends them to other banks, which then lend them at interest to individuals, businesses, and local and federal governments...n the past there have been successful models in which the government itself issued the national currency, whether as paper notes or as the credit of the nation. A stellar example of this enlightened approach to money and credit was the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, which operated successfully as a government-owned bank for most of the 20th century. Rather than issuing ``sovereign debt'' -- federal bonds indebting the nation to pay at interest in perpetuity -- the government through the Commonwealth Bank issued ``sovereign credit,'' the credit of the nation advanced to the government and its constituents... The Commonwealth Bank was able to achieve so much with so little because both its first Governor, Denison Miller, and its first and most ardent proponent, King O'Malley, had been bankers themselves and knew the secret of banking: that banks create the ``money'' they lend simply by writing accounting entries into the deposit accounts of borrowers...Today there is renewed interest in reviving a publicly-owned bank in Australia on the Commonwealth Bank model. The United States and other countries would do well to consider this option too.

escape; Sovereign Debt Trap.

Fri 2010-09-17 19:26 EDT

Memo to Obama: time to break the refinance strike by the big banks

...The Obama Administration and the Fed have taken the position that the crisis affecting the U.S. economy and the financial sector is slowly ending. In fact, the largest banks remain profoundly troubled by bad assets on their books as well as claims against these same banks for assets sold to investors. By allowing banks to ``muddle along'' and heal these wounds using low interest rates provided by the Fed, the Obama Administration is embracing a policy of deflation that has horrible consequences for U.S. workers and households...the Obama Administration has been providing political cover for the Fed to conduct a massive, reverse Robin Hood scheme, moving trillions of dollars in resources from savers and consumers to the big banks and their share and bond holders...the Obama Administration should use the power provided in the Dodd-Frank legislation to force an accelerated cleanup of bad assets and to mandate refinancing and principal reductions for performing loans with viable borrowers...President Obama also needs to focus on the growing competitive problem in the U.S. mortgage sector...now dominated by a cozy oligopoly of Too Big To Fail banks (TBTF)...Why is there no antitrust investigation of the top banks by the Department of Justice?...

big banks; break; memo; Obama; refinance strike; Time.

naked capitalism Wed 2010-09-08 17:27 EDT

Economic consequences of speculative side bets -- The case of naked CDS

...We argue that the existence of naked credit default swaps has significant effects on the terms of financing, the likelihood of default, and the size and composition of investment expenditures. And we identify three mechanisms through which these broader consequences of speculative side bets arise: collateral effects, rollover risk, and project choice...the existence of zero-sum side bets on default has major economic repercussions. These contracts induce investors who are optimistic about the future revenues of borrowers, and would therefore be natural purchasers of debt, to sell credit protection instead. This diverts their capital away from potential borrowers and channels it into collateral to support speculative positions. As a consequence, the marginal bond buyer is less optimistic about the borrower's prospects, and demands a higher interest rate in order to lend. This can result in an increased likelihood of default, and the emergence of self-fulfilling paths in which firms are unable to rollover their debt, even when such trajectories would not arise in the absence of credit derivatives. And it can influence the project choices of firms, leading not only to lower levels of investment overall but also in some cases to the selection of riskier ventures with lower expected returns...

Case; economic consequences; naked capitalism; Naked CDS; speculative side bets.

Money Game Wed 2010-09-01 10:53 EDT

Why Ben Bernanke's Next Round Of Quantitative Easing Will Be Another Huge Flop

There is perhaps, no greater misunderstanding in the investment world today than the topic of quantitative easing [QE]. After all, it sounds so fancy, strange and complex. But in reality, it is quite a simple operation...The Fed simply electronically swaps an asset with the private sector. In most cases it swaps deposits with an interest bearing asset...The theory behind QE is that the Fed can reduce interest rates via asset purchases (which supposedly creates demand for debt) while also strengthening the bank balance sheet (which entices them to lend). Unfortunately, we've lived thru this scenario before and history shows us that neither is actually true. Banks are never reserve constrained and a private sector that is deeply indebted will not likely be enticed to borrow regardless of the rate of interest...The most glaring example of failed QE is in Japan in 2001. Richard Koo refers to this event as the ``greatest monetary non-event''...Since Ben Bernanke initiated his great monetarist gaffe in 2008 there has been almost no sign of a sustainable private sector recovery. Mr. Bernanke's new form of trickle down economics has surely fixed the banking sector (or at least bought some time), but the recovery ended there. ..The hyperventilating hyperinflationists and those investors calling for inevitable US default are now clinging to this QE story as their inflation or default thesis crumbles before their very eyes...With the government merely swapping assets they are not actually ``printing'' any new money. In fact, the government is now essentially stealing interest bearing assets from the private sector and replacing them with deposits...now that the banks are flush with excess reserves this policy response would in fact be deflationary - not inflationary...

Ben Bernanke's; Huge Flop; Money game; Quantitative Easing.

Tue 2010-08-24 19:48 EDT

California Court Rules: MERS Can't Foreclose, Citibank Can't Collect - Mandelman Matters

...if a foreclosing party in California, that is not the original lender, claims that payment is due under the note, and that they have the right to foreclose on the basis of a MERS assignment, they're wrong... based on this opinion. The bottom line is that MERS has no authority to transfer the note because it never owned it, and that's a view that even seems to be supported by MERS' own contract, which says that ``MERS agrees not to assert any rights to mortgage loans or properties mortgaged thereby''...some lawyers believe that this ruling is relevant to borrowers across the country as well, because the court cited non-bankruptcy cases related to the lack of authority of MERS, and because this opinion is consistent with prior rulings in Idaho and Nevada Bankruptcy courts on the same issue...

California court ruled; Citibank; collections; foreclose; Mandelman Matters; MER.

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products Thu 2010-08-19 16:16 EDT

Grecian Derivative

...In the 1990s, Japanese companies and investors pioneered the use of derivatives to hide losses...Since then, the use of derivatives to disguise debt and arbitrage regulations and accounting rules has increased...Italy used a currency swap against an existing Yen 200 billion bond ($1.6 billion) to lock in profits from the depreciation of the Yen. The swap was done at off-market rates...the swap was really a loan where Italy had accepted an off-market unfavourable exchange rate and received cash in return...A key element of the recent Greek debt problems has been the use of derivative transactions to disguise the true level of its borrowing...More recently, similar structures have emerged in Latvia...This follows a series of revelation regrading the use of derivatives by municipal authorities in the U.S., Italy, German, Austria and France where complex bets on interest rates were used to provide funding or cosmetically lower borrowing costs. Many of these transactions resulted in substantial losses and are now in dispute...Normal commercial transactions can be readily disguised using derivatives exacerbating risks and reducing market transparency. Current proposals to regulate derivatives do not focus on this issue...

fears; financial products; Grecian Derivative; loath; Satyajit Das's Blog.

billy blog Sat 2010-08-07 20:01 EDT

The government is the last borrower left standing

Remember back last year when the predictions were coming in daily that Japan was heading for insolvency and the thirst for Japanese government bonds would soon disappear as the public debt to GDP ratio headed towards 200 per cent? Remember the likes of David Einhorn...who was predicting that Japan was about to collapse -- having probably gone past the point of no return. This has been a common theme wheeled out by the deficit terrorists intent on bullying governments into cutting net spending in the name of fiscal responsibility. Well once again the empirical world is moving against the deficit terrorists as it does with every macroeconomic data release that comes out each day...On July 22, 2010, Richard Koo appeared before the Committee and presented his testimony...his views have resonance with the main perspectives offered by MMT although he does get some things wrong. His recent testimony is one of the better commentaries on the current economic problems but probably fell on deaf (or dumb) ears at the hearing. Koo told the hearing that there are recessions and then there are depressions. The correct policy response must differentiate correctly between these two economic episodes...

Billy Blog; borrower left standing; government.

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-07-29 17:00 EDT

James Montier does MMT

It seems that a lot of analysts have caught onto the MMT framework popularized by the late economist Wynne Godley and made topical in this downturn by Rob Parenteau of the Richebacher Letter...Now, it's James Montier's turn...He concluded: ``There is a danger the proposed fiscal tightening in the eurozone will lead to further deflation and economic collapse. The Spanish government faces what Mr Parenteau calls ``the paradox of public thrift'': the less it borrows, the more it will end up owing. It is unfortunate that it has taken a severe global recession to vindicate Prof Godley's macroeconomic analysis. If economic policymakers start to pay more attention to financial balances, they might forestall the next crisis. European politicians might also understand the potentially dreadful consequences of their new-found frugality.'' ...A downward shift in the government's net fiscal deficit means a downward shift in the private sector's net fiscal surplus -- totally doable except for this little thing called debt in places like Spain, the US, Ireland or the UK. Moreover, the savings rate is already incredibly low in countries like the U.S. and the U.K. If the government tries to pare its fiscal deficit, the result will not be less private sector savings to meet the lower public sector deficit, but rather lower aggregate demand and a larger deficit -- that's the paradox of thrift...

credit writedowns; James Montier; MMT.

Jesse's Café Américain Sun 2010-07-25 09:33 EDT

China: The US Is "Insolvent and Faces Bankruptcy"

The common thought amongst even reasonably educated and economically literate Americans is that China is 'stuck with US Treasuries' and has no choice, so it must perform within the status quo and do as the US wishes, or face a ruinous decline in their reserve holdings of US Treasuries...Guan Jianzhong, chairman of Dagong Global Credit Rating, told the Financial Times...``The US is insolvent and faces bankruptcy as a pure debtor nation but the rating agencies still give it high rankings'' Mr Guan said. ``Actually, the huge military expenditure of the US is not created by themselves but comes from borrowed money, which is not sustainable.''

China; faces bankruptcy; insolvent; Jesse's Café Américain.

naked capitalism Sat 2010-07-24 16:34 EDT

Summer Rerun: ``Unwinding the Fraud for Bubbles''

This post first appeared on March 27, 2007. ...Telling the difference between the victims and the victimizers, the predators and the prey, and the fraudulent and the defrauded, is getting a lot harder when you have borrowers not required to make down payments able to lie about their incomes in order to buy a home the seller is overpricing in order to take an illegal kickback. The lender is getting defrauded, but the lender is the one who offered the zero-down stated-income program, delegated the drawing up of the legal documents and the final disbursement of funds to a fee-for-service settlement agent, and didn't do enough due diligence on the appraisal to see the inflation of the value. Legally, of course, there's a difference between lender as co-conspirator and lender as mark, utterly failing to exercise reasonable caution, but it's small comfort when the losses rack up. With tongue only partially in cheek, I'm about to suggest a third category of fraud: Fraud for Bubbles...My theory of the Fraud for Bubbles is, in a nutshell, that it isn't that lenders forgot that there are risks. It is that the miserable dynamic of unsound lending puffing up unsustainable real estate prices, which in turn kept supporting even more unsound lending, simply masked fraud problems sufficiently, and delayed the eventual ``feedback'' mechanisms sufficiently, that rampant fraud came to seem ``affordable.'' So many of the business practices that help fraud succeed--thinning backoffice staff, hiring untrained temps to replace retiring (and pricey) veterans, speeding up review processes, cutting back on due diligence sampling, accepting more and more copies, faxes, and phone calls instead of original ink-signed documents--threw off so much money that no one wanted to believe that the eventual cost of the fraud would eat it all up, and possibly more...

bubble; fraud; naked capitalism; summer reruns; unwinds.

Sat 2010-07-24 16:13 EDT

Disequilibria: A Constant State Of Instability >> The Shadow Banking System

What we saw from mid-2007 through early-2009 was a run on the shadow banking system. There were two primary channels by which the shadow banking system operated: the Money Market/Commercial Paper Channel and the Repo Channel...we have largely unregulated [money market funds (MMMFs)] taking deposits (largely withdrawable on demand and usually checkable) and making the equivalent of loans, in other words, acting as banks. Except that the MMMFs were not subject to much in the way of prudential regulation beyond some broad parameters that dictated what investments they could buy, did not have access to FDIC deposit insurance, and did not have lender of last resort access to the Fed's discount window. They were a disaster waiting to happen...Repos also became a very popular mechanism for raising funds in the pre-crisis days, with MMMFs becoming large buyers of repos (lenders) and the broker dealers becoming both buyers and sellers (borrowers and lenders)...during the crisis...the classic maturity mismatch situation...concerns about the quality of commercial paper...triggered by the collapse of Lehman...Without the traditional protection of deposit insurance and lender of last resort financing by the Fed, it turned into a full blown panic...Any meaningful financial reform must bring the shadow banking system out of the shadows. It must be treated as banking, and its institutions regulated as banks...

constant state; Disequilibria; instability; Shadow banks Systems.

New Deal 2.0 Thu 2010-07-22 15:54 EDT

The Summer(s) of Our Discontent

Virtually every profile on Larry Summers tells us that he is one of the most brilliant economists of his generation...Only Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan played a more important role than Summers in promoting the deregulation and lax oversight that laid the foundations for the current crisis...the latest FT defense reflects Summers's fundamental lack of understanding of modern money. Contrary to his view, the late 90s surpluses was not the reason for that period's prosperity. The surpluses are what ended the prosperity. And until the public understands this, we should expect no fundamental improvement in economic policymaking from the Obama Administration...he violates one of Abba Lerner's key laws of functional finance: a government's spending and borrowing should be conducted ``with an eye only to the results of these actions on the economy, and not to any established traditional doctrine about what is sound and what is unsound.'' In other words, Lerner believed that the very idea of what good fiscal policy means boils down to what results you can get -- not some arbitrary notion of ``fiscal sustainability''...The government budget surplus meant by identity that the private sector was running a deficit. Households and firms were going ever farther into debt, and they were losing their net wealth of government bonds. Growth was a product of a private debt bubble, which in turn fuelled a stock market and real estate bubble, the collapse of which has created the foundations for today's troubles...

0; discontent; new dealing 2; s; summer.

Wed 2010-07-21 10:28 EDT

I Would Do Anything For Stimulus, But I Won't Do That (Wonkish) - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com

...there's a school of thought which says that deficits are never a problem, as long as a country can issue its own currency. The most prominent advocate of this view is probably Jamie Galbraith, but he's not alone...OK, I don't think that's right. To spend, the government must persuade the private sector to release real resources. It can do this by collecting taxes, borrowing, or collecting seignorage by printing money. And there are limits to all three. Even a country with its own fiat currency can go bankrupt, if it tries hard enough...

com; NYTimes; Paul Krugman Blog; stimulus; wonkish.

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