dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

later Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

50 years later (1); blunders Arun later added (1); Borrows Later (1); coming later (2); days later Johnson submitted (1); debt later story (1); decade later (1); economy later proved (1); later date (1); later sound (1); Lateral thinking (1); weeks later (1); years later (5).

Fri 2010-10-08 21:02 EDT

Kudlow Gets Into Foreclosuregate in [Market-Ticker]

...The REMICs - the foundational conduits for all this paper - are to a large degree defective. I bet some of Fannie and Freddie's are too. Many notes were not conveyed, and in the states where recordation is necessary, most of them weren't recorded either. Many of these original notes are known to be sitting with the originator, never endorsed over and in some cases shipped overseas or deliberately destroyed. For all intents and purposes they're gone, because once the MBS closes they can't be put in later on...

Foreclosuregate; Kudlow; Market Ticker.

Mon 2010-09-20 10:14 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Fictional Reserve Lending And The Myth Of Excess Reserves

...1) Lending comes first and what little reserves there are (if any) come later. 2) There really are no excess reserves. 3) Not only are there no excess reserves, there are essentially no reserves to speak of at all. Indeed, bank reserves are completely "fictional". 4) Banks are capital constrained not reserve constrained. 5) Banks aren't lending because there are few credit worthy borrowers worth the risk. ...concern that excess reserves will lead to lending and inflation is totally unfounded in theory and practice. Fractional Reserve Lending is really Fictional Reserve Lending. In practice, the major constraints to lending are insufficient capital and willingness of credit worthy borrowers to seek loans.

excess reserves; Fictional Reserve Lending; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; myth.

Thu 2010-08-05 19:31 EDT

Nassim Nicholas Taleb: The Regulator Franchise, or the Alan Blinder Problem

...former regulators and public officials who were employed by the citizens to represent their best interests can use the expertise and contacts acquired on the job to benefit from glitches in the system upon joining private employment...the more complex the regulation, the more bureaucratic the network, the more a regulator who knows the loops and glitches would benefit from it later, as his regulator edge would be a convex function of his differential knowledge. This is a franchise...

Alan Blinder Problem; Nassim Nicholas Taleb; Regulator Franchise.

Wed 2010-07-21 10:26 EDT

Professor Jamie Galbraith's testimony to Deficit Commission | Angry Bear

1. Clouds Over the Work of the Commission. ... 2. Current Deficits and Rising Debt were Caused by the Financial Crisis. ... 3. Future Deficit Projections are Generally Based on Forecasts which Begin by Assuming Full Recovery, but this Assumption is Highly Unrealistic. ... 4. Having Cured the Deficits with an Unrealistic Forecast, CBO Recreates them with Another, Very Different, but Equally Unrealistic Forecast. ... 5. The Only Way to Reduce Public Deficits is to Restore Private Credit. ... 6. Social Security and Medicare "Solvency" is not part of the Commission's Mandate. ... 7. As a Transfer Program, Social Security is Also Irrelevant to Deficit Economics. ... 8. Markets are not calling for Deficit Reduction; Now or Later. ... 9. In Reality, the US Government Spends First & Borrows Later; Public Spending Creates a Demand for Treasuries in the Private Sector. ... 10. The Best Place in History (for this Commission) Would be No Place At All.

Angry Bear; deficit Commission; Professor Jamie Galbraith's testimony.

New Deal 2.0 Mon 2010-07-12 16:51 EDT

The Unlearned Lesson of the 1987 Crash

Henry Liu revisits the stock market crash of 1987 to dispel free market fundamentalism and the neo-conservative lust for deregulation...The Federal Reserve's actions under Greenspan in 1987 led market participants to conclude that the Fed would emphasize domestic market objectives with accommodative monetary stance, if necessary at the cost of a further decline in the dollar. By year-end, the dollar's value had fallen 21% against the yen and 14% against the mark from its levels at the time of the Louvre Accord while Greenspan, the wizard of bubble-land, was on his way to being hailed as the greatest central banker in history. Two decades later, by 2007, the Greenspan put was called by the market and trillions of dollars were lost.

0; 1987 crash; new dealing 2; unlearned lessons.

Tue 2010-06-01 18:24 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirit of debate ... my reply Part 2

Today, I offer Part 2 of my responses to the comments raised in the debate so far...Modern monetary theory does not use the term ``money'' in the same way as the mainstream because it creates instant confusion. As Scott said ``Money is always someone's liability, so better to be precise about whose liabilities we are talking about than saying money.'' That is why we emphasis fully understanding the asset-liability matches that occur in monetary systems. And that leads you to realise that transactions between government and non-government create or destroy net financial assets denominated in the currency of issue whereas transactions within the non-government sector cannot create net financial positions...So modern monetary theorists prefer to concentrate on what is going on with balance sheets after certain flows have occured rather than narrowly defining some financial assets as money and others not...There is no doubt that the non-government institutions can increase credit. Some slack analysts call this an increase in money. But the accurate statement is that, as a matter of accounting it increases the (in Scott's words) ``the quantity of financial assets and financial liabilities 1 for 1 in the non-govt sector. So, with private credit, there is BY DEFINITION no NET increase in private sector financial assets created.'' Once we understand that and note that typically the non-government sector seeks to net save in the currency of issue then modern monetary theory tells you that the public sector must run a deficit to underwrite this desired net saving or else see an output gap widen...Who is in control is an interesting question. Clearly, the government cannot directly control the money supply which renders much of the analysis in mainstream macroeconomics textbooks as being irrelevant. The Monetarists via Milton Friedman persuaded central banks to adopt monetary targetting in the 1980s and it failed a few years later -- miserably...Then you might like to consider it from the other angle -- a government which accepts responsibility for full employment can ``finance'' the saving desires of the non-government sector by increasing its deficit up to the level warranted by the spending gap (left by the full employment non-government savings)...Orthodox macroeconomic theory struggles with the idea of involuntary unemployment and typically tries to fudge the explanation by appealing to market rigidities (typically nominal wage inflexibility). However, in general, the orthodox framework cannot convincingly explain systemic constraints that comprehensively negate individual volition. The modern monetary framework clearly explicates how involuntary unemployment arises. The private sector, in aggregate, may desire to spend less of the monetary unit of account than it earns. In this case, if this gap in spending is not met by government, then unemployment will occur. Nominal (or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless they somehow eliminate the private sector desire to net save and increase spending...to maintain high levels of employment and given that the public generally desire to hold some reserves of fiat money, the government balance will normally have to be in deficit...modern monetary theory demonstrates that if you want the non-government sector to net save...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply Part 2; Spirit.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-05-20 15:44 EDT

Germany's Short Selling Bans: Prudence, Populism or Bank Protection?

...Now why do the Germans in particular feel a tad nervous? Well, Germany, like the UK and Switzerland, has a banking system so large relative to its economy that it cannot credibly backstop it if it goes seriously off the rails. The problem is more acute in Germany because it does not control its own currency (as it cannot simply throw whatever it takes at the banks and if need be, ``print'' later; by contrast, the risk to the UK and Swiss banking system comes from its banks' foreign currency exposures)...The bailout plan shifted risk from the periphery to the core of Europe, and the core, upon examination, does not look too solid. Prepare yourself for a rough ride.

Banks Protected; Germany's short-selling ban; naked capitalism; population; prudence.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Wed 2010-04-21 12:11 EDT

Geithner and the NY Fed Accused of Willfully Ignoring Fraud and Covering Up Lehman's Bad Assets by Senior Regulator During the S&L Crisis

Inquiring minds are digging into a 27 page statement made by William Black before the Financial Services committee. Black is an Associate Professor of Economics and Law, at the University of Missouri...[According to Black,] Lehman's underlying problem that doomed it was that it was insolvent because it made so many bad loans and investments. It hid its insolvency through the traditional means -- it refused to recognize its losses honestly...The FRBNY knew that Lehman was engaged in fraud designed to overstate its liquidity and, therefore, was unwilling to loan as much money to Lehman. The FRBNY did not, however, inform the SEC, the public, or the OTS (which regulated an S&L that Lehman owned) of the fraud...The relevant issue was never: can Lehman be saved? The relevant issue, one that the SEC and the Fed appear never to have even asked, was: how can we stop Lehman from serving as a vector spreading the epidemic of liar's loans? They should have asked themselves that question -- and acted -- no later than 2001.

Cover; Geithner; L Crisis; Lehman's Bad Assets; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; NY Fed Accused; s; senior regulators; Willfully Ignoring Fraud.

Fri 2010-04-02 10:36 EDT

Archein: Krugman as Failure

...I'd like to direct you to a scathing, sniveling little review, Krugman wrote fifteen years ago on Bill Greider's most excellent "One World Ready or Not". Greider's book documents the ravaging of the American middle-class caused by the processes of corporate globalization. Krugman counters with a ludicrous little tale about hot dogs, and then proceeds to defend it pushing all the pop-economic theory of the day, by so doing, an economist was bestowed with money and pats on the head from the mega-corporate boardrooms, you know, like the money Paul was paid working for Enron. According to the Nobel Laureate, replacing good paying steel jobs with McDonald's jobs was just great. Now today, fifteen years later, Mr. Krugman's contradicting what he's been saying his entire career, while Greider, no back page of the NYT for him, was right along...Mr. Krugman represents the most serious problem this republic currently faces, power has lost all accountability. From the top of government, to media, to finance, to our large corporations, we've seen spectacular failure, and no one held accountable. It's a lot bigger problem than the fact Paul Krugman is really a very silly man.

Archein; failure; Krugman.

Tue 2010-03-09 18:13 EST

Gandhi's Seven Blunders - and then some

A few weeks before he was assassinated, Gandhi the Mahatma had a conversation with his grandson Arun. He handed Arun a talisman upon which were engraved "Seven Blunders," out of which, said Gandhi, grows the violence that plagues the world. The blunders were: Wealth without work. Pleasure without conscience. Knowledge without character. Commerce without morality. Science without humanity. Worship without sacrifice. Politics without principles. Gandhi called these disbalances "passive violence," which fuels the active violence of crime, rebellion, and war. He said, "We could work till doomsday to achieve peace and would get nowhere as long as we ignore passive violence in our world." To his grandfather's list of seven blunders Arun later added an eighth: Rights without responsibilities. Gandhi gave the list to Arun in 1947. Almost 50 years later the blunders have been institutionalized, built into our corporations, our governments, our very culture. Not only are we no longer embarrassed by them; we actively practice them. In some of them we even take pride...

blunders; Gandhi s.

Sun 2010-01-31 11:43 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: The Stock Market Has Never Been This (Intermediate-Term) Overbought - October 19, 2009

In reviewing the status of the market late last week, the condition of the data was something of an anomaly in that regard. On the valuation front, stocks are presently overvalued, but to levels that we've observed at least several times in history. The anomaly relates to market action, where we can no longer find a single historical instance where stocks were more overbought on the combination of short- and intermediate-term measures we respond to most strongly. Indeed, only one instance comes close, which is November 28, 1980...the peak of the furious advance in S&P 500 driven by enthusiasm over "less bad" economic news, though with little proven economic strength. It was the last day of the 1980 bull market. The economy later proved to have been in a short lull within a double-dip recession, taking stocks to their final lows in 1982...One of the notable features of extreme overbought conditions is that investors rarely have much opportunity to get out...

2009; Hussman Funds; intermediate term; October 19; Overbought; stock market; weekly market comments.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard - Finance and business comments Thu 2010-01-07 19:00 EST

Global bear rally of 2009 will end as Japan's hyperinflation rips economy to pieces

The contraction of M3 money in the US and Europe over the last six months will slowly puncture economic recovery as 2010 unfolds, with the time-honoured lag of a year or so. Ben Bernanke will be caught off guard, just as he was in mid-2008 when the Fed drove straight through a red warning light with talk of imminent rate rises -- the final error that triggered the implosion of Lehman, AIG, and the Western banking system. As the great bear rally of 2009 runs into the greater Chinese Wall of excess global capacity, it will become clear that we are in the grip of a 21st Century Depression -- more akin to Japan's Lost Decade than the 1840s or 1930s, but nothing like the normal cycles of the post-War era. The surplus regions (China, Japan, Germania, Gulf ) have not increased demand enough to compensate for belt-tightening in the deficit bloc (Anglo-sphere, Club Med, East Europe), and fiscal adrenalin is already fading in Europe. The vast East-West imbalances that caused the credit crisis are no better a year later, and perhaps worse. Household debt as a share of GDP sits near record levels in two-fifths of the world economy. Our long purge has barely begun.

2009; Ambrose Evans Pritchard; Business Comment; ending; finance; Global Bear Rally; Japan's hyperinflation rips economy; pieces.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Mon 2009-12-21 19:32 EST

Fictional Reserve Lending And The Myth Of Excess Reserves

...The chart shows an unprecedented amount of excess reserves, almost $1.2 trillion. According to Money Multiplier Theory (MMT) and Fractional Reserve Lending, this amount may be lent out as much as 10 times over and when it does, massive inflation will result. The above hypotheses regarding "Excess Reserves" are wrong for five reasons. 1) Lending comes first and what little reserves there are (if any) come later. 2) There really are no excess reserves. 3) Not only are there no excess reserves, there are essentially no reserves to speak of at all. Indeed, bank reserves are completely "fictional". 4) Banks are capital constrained not reserve constrained. 5) Banks aren't lending because there are few credit worthy borrowers worth the risk.

excess reserves; Fictional Reserve Lending; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; myth.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Fri 2009-12-18 09:52 EST

China Faces Crash Scenario

Problems in China continue to mount. Money supply is growing rampantly out of control, property prices are in a bubble, exports are weak, commodity speculation is pervasive, and GDP growth is more of a mirage than real...I side with Andy Xie who states ``China's asset markets are a Ponzi scheme''...Various Chinese asset bubbles are guaranteed to pop, but as I have said many times, the timing of such events is unknown. In this case however, I am more apt to believe sooner, rather than later.

China Faces Crash Scenario; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

Tue 2009-12-01 22:52 EST

Harvard ignored warnings about investments - The Boston Globe

It happened at least once a year, every year. In a roomful of a dozen Harvard University financial officials, Jack Meyer, the hugely successful head of Harvard's endowment, and Lawrence Summers, then the school's president, would face off in a heated debate. The topic: cash and how the university was managing - or mismanaging - its basic operating funds. Through the first half of this decade, Meyer repeatedly warned Summers and other Harvard officials that the school was being too aggressive with billions of dollars in cash, according to people present for the discussions, investing almost all of it with the endowment's risky mix of stocks, bonds, hedge funds, and private equity. Meyer's successor, Mohamed El-Erian, would later sound the same warnings to Summers, and to Harvard financial staff and board members. ... But the warnings fell on deaf ears, under Summers's regime and beyond. And when the market crashed in the fall of 2008, Harvard would pay dearly, as $1.8 billion in cash simply vanished. Indeed, it is still paying, in the form of tighter budgets, deferred expansion plans, and big interest payments on bonds issued to cover the losses.

Boston Globe; Harvard ignored warnings; investment.

zero hedge Wed 2009-11-25 11:52 EST

Albert Edwards Calls For The Next Black Swan: Expect Yuan Devaluation Following Deep 2010 Downturn

With everyone and their grandmother screeching that it is about time for China to inflate the renminbi, despite that such an action would be economic and social suicide for the world's most populous country, SocGen's Albert Edwards once again stalks out the Black Swan in left field and posits the contrarian view de jour: China will aggressively devalue the yuan following a deep 2010 downturn coupled with escalating trade wars. As Edwards says: "I think the next 18 months will see major ructions in the financial markets. The consequences of a double-dip back into recession next year require some lateral thinking. If the carry trade unwind results in a turbo-charged dollar, any collapse in the China economic bubble will be doubly destructive to commodity prices.

Albert Edwards Calls; Black Swan; Deep 2010 downturn; Expect Yuan Devaluation; Zero Hedge.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

How Goldman secretly bet on the U.S. housing crash | McClatchy

In 2006 and 2007, Goldman Sachs Group peddled more than $40 billion in securities backed by at least 200,000 risky home mortgages, but never told the buyers it was secretly betting that a sharp drop in U.S. housing prices would send the value of those securities plummeting. Goldman's sales and its clandestine wagers, completed at the brink of the housing market meltdown, enabled the nation's premier investment bank to pass most of its potential losses to others before a flood of mortgage defaults staggered the U.S. and global economies. Only later did investors discover that what Goldman had promoted as triple-A rated investments were closer to junk...

Goldman Secretly Bet; McClatchy; U.S. housing crash.

Harper's Magazine Thu 2009-11-19 10:20 EST

An Object Lesson in Governmental Failure: Derivatives reform

If you want to understand why Congress seems completely incapable of checking the power of Wall Street, look back to a hearing on the Hill last October 7, and the subsequent events surrounding it...he House Financial Services Committee hosted a panel on reform of the market for derivatives,...the committee, headed by Congressman Barney Frank (D-Wall Street), invited a panel of eight guests who were distinguished by their uniformly pro-industry positions...In response to complaints from Americans for Financial Reform, which represents hundreds of consumer groups and labor unions, the committee issued an invitation--the night before the hearing was held -- to Rob Johnson of the Roosevelt Institute. For the committee, the last minute inclusion of Johnson -- a former managing director at Bankers Trust Company and former economist at the Senate Banking Committee and Senate Budget Committee -- apparently constituted sufficient balance...About five days later Johnson submitted his full testimony to the committee, to be included on its website along with the statements of the other eight panelists...the committee's general counsel would not allow posting of the testimony because Johnson had not submitted it during the hearing. (Of course, since Johnson had been invited at the last minute it was impossible for him to fulfill this pointless requirement.)

Derivatives reform; Governmental Failure; Harper's Magazine; object lessons.

zero hedge Sun 2009-10-11 16:17 EDT

€300 Million Later: Deutsche Bank's Invoice On The Remains Of The Jefferson Smurfit Group

...in a span of 10 years, DB has made almost half a billion dollars while the underlying assets have deteriorated so much that the American business has had to file for Chapter 11, while the remainder is stuck picking up the pieces at a deplorable return to shareholders.

Deutsche Bank's Invoice; Jefferson Smurfit Group; later; remains; Zero Hedge; €300.

Thu 2009-10-01 17:56 EDT

98489 -- Landmark National Bank v. Kesler -- Leben -- Kansas Court of Appeals

Landmark National Bank brought a suit to foreclose its mortgage against Boyd Kesler and joined Millennia Mortgage Corp. as a defendant because a second mortgage had been filed of record for a loan between Kesler and Millennia. In a foreclosure suit, it is normal practice to name as defendants all parties who may claim a lien against the property. When neither Kesler nor Millennia responded to the suit, the district court gave Landmark a default judgment, entered a journal entry foreclosing Landmark's mortgage, and ordered the property sold so that sale proceeds could be applied to pay Landmark's mortgage. But Millennia apparently had sold its mortgage to another party and no longer had interest in the property by this time. Sovereign Bank filed a motion to set aside the judgment and asserted that it now held the title to Kesler's obligation to pay the debt to Millennia. And another party, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), also filed a motion to set aside the judgment and asserted that it held legal title to the mortgage, originally on behalf of Millennia and later on behalf of Sovereign. Both Sovereign and MERS claim that MERS was a necessary party to the foreclosure lawsuit and that the judgment must be set aside because MERS wasn't included on the foreclosure suit as a defendant. The district court refused to set aside its judgment. The court found that MERS was not a necessary party and that Sovereign had not sufficiently demonstrated its interest in the property to justify setting aside the foreclosure. ...The district court properly determined that MERS was not a contingently necessary party in Landmark's foreclosure action. The district court also was well within its discretion in denying motions from MERS and Sovereign to intervene after a foreclosure judgment had been entered and the foreclosed property had been sold. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

98489; appealing; Kansas court; Kesler; Landmark National Bank; leben.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-09-22 11:32 EDT

Guest Post: If Credit is Not Created Out of Excess Reserves, What Does That Mean?

We've all been taught that banks first build up deposits, and then extend credit and loan out their excess reserves. But critics of the current banking system claim that this is not true, and that the order is actually reversed...Steve Keen explained that 25 years of research shows that creation of debt by banks precedes creation of government money, and that debt money is created first and precedes creation of credit money...monetary reformers like Ellen Brown argue that the entire banking system is based upon a fraud. Specifically, she and other monetary reformers argue that the banks have intentionally spread the false reserves-and-credit first, loans-and-debt later story to confuse people into thinking that the banks are better capitalized than they really are and that the Federal Reserve is keeping better oversight than it really is...Monetary reformers argue that the government should take the power of money creation back from the private banks and the Federal Reserve system.

created; credit; excess reserves; Guest Post; meaning; naked capitalism.

zero hedge Sun 2009-08-30 15:00 EDT

Was Morgan Stanley Compromised By Project Mayhem?

One of the key headlines these days has been the unmasking of what has been dubbed the biggest identity theft and credit card fraud case in history, allegedly spearheaded by one Albert Gonzalez, who in 2003 was involved in a comparable scheme however upon being caught, promptly became an informant for the Secret Service and turned over 30 of his hacking buddies. Six years later it is he this time who is in the hot seat, together with most of his associates, including one 25 year old Stephen Watt, who supposedly was the creator of the credit card sniffer software used to hack into over 130 million of various credit cards for merchants such as TJX, Dave And Busters and 7-Eleven, which numbers were subsequently sold for hefty sums...

Morgan Stanley Compromised; Project Mayhem; Zero Hedge.

Fri 2008-03-21 00:00 EDT

Urban Dictionary: bear stearned

1. to crash, to collapse, to plummit, to fail; 2. The rapid loss of confidence in one's capabilities from one's traditionally supportive network of friends, customers, etc. 3. Buying an item and then realizing a week later it is worth 3.33% of what you paid for it.

Bear Stearns; Urban Dictionary.