Fri 2010-10-08 21:11 EDT

4ClosureFraud Posts Lender Processing Services Mortgage Document Fabrication Price Sheet >> naked capitalism

Yves Smith

...document fabrication is widespread in foreclosures. The reason is that the note, which is the borrower IOU, is the critical instrument to establishing the right to foreclose in 45 states (in those states, the mortgage, which is the lien on the property, is a mere ``accessory'' to the note). The pooling and servicing agreement, which governs the creation of mortgage backed securities, called for the note to be endorsed (wet ink signatures) through the full chain of title...Evidence is mounting that for cost reasons, starting in the 2004-2005 time frame, originators like Countrywide simply quit conveying the note. We are told this practice was widespread, probably endemic. The notes are apparently are still in originator warehouses. That means the trust does not have them (the legalese is it is not the real party of interest), therefore it is not in a position to foreclose on behalf of the RMBS investors. So various ruses have been used to finesse this rather large problem...We finally have concrete proof of how widespread document fabrication was...This revelation touches every major servicer and RMBS trustee in the US...The story that banks have been trying to sell has been that document problems like improper affidavits are mere technicalities. We've said from the get go that they were the tip of the iceberg of widespread document forgeries and fraud...

4ClosureFraud Posts Lender Processing Services Mortgage Document Fabrication Price Sheet; naked capitalism.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Fri 2010-07-16 14:41 EDT

Guest Post: Why Goldman Could Pull It Off

David Fiderer

The weaknesses in the S.E.C.'s case against Goldman were always obvious. At the end of the day, an investor who bought Abacus 2007 AC-1 was buying a static portfolio of risks....If you were a sophisticated investor who had done his due diligence, you didn't need to be told that the deal was designed to fail...If you actually reviewed the performance of mortgage backed securities held by the CDO, and understood how cash flow waterfalls and delinquency triggers worked, then you could see that subordinate tranches being insured for the benefit of Goldman were already worthless when the CDO closed. You could also figure out that the rating agencies had deliberately delayed announcing downgrades of the RMBS within the CDO, in order to keep the markets and the deal flow moving...The risk to Goldman was that more of its dirty laundry would be exposed...[but] the S.E.C. shows little appetite for digging deeper, especially since its new COO of the Enforcement Division is a 30-year-old kid from Goldman.

dropped; Goldman; Guest Post; long; pull; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Mon 2010-04-19 10:52 EDT

SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud On Subprime Mortgages, Paulson & Co. Implicated

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Goldman, Sachs & Co. and one of its vice presidents for defrauding investors by misstating and omitting key facts about a financial product tied to subprime mortgages as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter. The SEC alleges that Goldman Sachs structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that hinged on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Goldman Sachs failed to disclose to investors vital information about the CDO, in particular the role that a major hedge fund played in the portfolio selection process and the fact that the hedge fund had taken a short position against the CDO.

Co; fraud; implications; Paulson; SEC charged Goldman Sachs; subprime-mortgage; Zero Hedge.

The Economic Populist - Speak Your Mind 2 Cents at a Time Sun 2010-02-07 18:20 EST

Is Residential Real Estate a Ticking Time Bomb?

...First is the latest SIGTARP report saying the Government has become the mortgage market with U.S. taxpayers shouldering the risk. From the SIGTARP report we have a 100% government mortgage market at this point...Fannie and Freddie now have an unlimited bailout and it is estimated they have lost $400 billion dollars. The plan is to purchase $1.25 trillion mortgage backed securities from these two GSEs until the end of March...The number of homeowners who are strategically walking away from their mortgages is up to 10% this year...All of the above free money, the government pouring in trillions of dollars to prop up the housing market. Yet while price declines have slowed, prices are still declining and the above simply cannot go on forever. In fact one thing isn't going on forever. The Fed will stop buying MBSes at the end of March, 2010. So, when our government created illusion does pop, do we then have the real housing bubble implosion?

economic populist; Mind 2 Cents; residential real estate; speaking; ticking time bomb; Time.

Calculated Risk Wed 2009-11-25 11:38 EST

Fannie Mae: $18.9 Billion Loss, Requests Another $15 Billion

CalculatedRisk

Press Release: Fannie Mae Reports Third-Quarter 2009 Results Fannie Mae (FNM/NYSE) reported a net loss of $18.9 billion in the third quarter of 2009, compared with a loss of $14.8 billion in the second quarter of 2009. ... Third-quarter results were largely due to $22.0 billion of credit related expenses, reflecting the continued build of the company's combined loss reserves and fair value losses associated with the increasing number of loans that were acquired from mortgage backed securities trusts in order to pursue loan modifications. ... As a result, on November 4, 2009, the Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) submitted a request for $15.0 billion from Treasury on the company's behalf.

15; 18; 9; Calculated Risk; Fannie Mae; losses; requesting.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

John P. Hussman

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

Goldman left foreign investors holding the subprime bag | McClatchy

Greg Gordon

Goldman sold more than $57 billion in risky mortgage-backed securities during a 14-month period in 2006 and 2007, including nearly $39 billion issued from mortgages it purchased. Meanwhile, the firm peddled billions of dollars in complex deals, many of them tied to subprime mortgages, in the Caymans and other offshore locations...Goldman's traders also made huge bets that those securities would lose value by buying insurance-like contracts, called credit-default swaps, with private parties. Beginning early in 2007, they bought swaps on a London-based exchange.

Goldman left foreign investors holding; McClatchy; subprime bag.

Thu 2009-10-01 10:14 EDT

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS): A System Designed to Create the Mortgage Back Security Bubble. >> Dr. Housing Bubble Blog

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS)...claims to be a privately-held company and their function is keeping track of a confidential electronic registry of mortgages and the modifications to servicing rights and ownership of the loans. However, if you dig deeper into MERS and their shareholders you will find the same crony bankers...shareholders include AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, WaMu, CitiMortgage, Countrywide, GMAC, Guaranty Bank, and Merrill Lynch...MERS allowed for the mortgage backed security business to explode since it allowed mortgages to be shipped off to Wall Street to be minced into tiny tranches and sold off by the big investment banks...MERS is a front for the mortgage and banking industry. It is claimed as a system of convenience but in reality, it is nothing more than the grease to lube up the housing bubble...what is significant about the Kansas Supreme Court finding has to do with the actual legal ownership of the note and deed especially when it comes to foreclosure...MERS is a straw man...provides ``an opaque veil that clouds not only the actual real ownership of the promissory note, but title to the property.''

created; Dr. Housing Bubble Blog; MER; mortgage; mortgage Electronic Registration System; security bubble; Systems designed.

Bank-Implode! Sun 2009-09-20 12:22 EDT

Bank-Implode! >> Blog Archive >> Exclusive -- Wells Fargo's Commercial Portfolio is a ticking time bomb

In order to sort through the disaster that is Wells Fargo's (quote: WFC) commercial loan portfolio, the bank has hired help from outside experts to pour over the books... and they are shocked with what they are seeing. Not only do the bank's outstanding commercial loans collectively exceed the property values to which they are attached, but derivative trades leftover from its acquisition of Wachovia are creating another set of problems for the already beleaguered San Francisco-based megabank...According to sources currently working out these loans at Wells Fargo, when selling tranches of commercial mortgage-backed securities below the super senior tranche, Wachovia promised to pay the buyer's risk premium by writing credit default swap contracts against these subordinate bonds...should the junior tranches eventually default, then the bank is on the hook.

bank implode; blogs Archive; exclusive; ticking time bomb; Wells Fargo's commercial portfolio.

Wed 2009-04-01 00:00 EDT

Zero Hedge: PIMCO Holds Almost $120 Billion In MBS

86% invested in mortgage-backed securities

120; MBS; Pimco Holdings; Zero Hedge.

Wed 2008-08-06 00:00 EDT

Business Spectator - Apocalypse NAB

National Australia Bank's small portfolio of US residential mortgage-backed securities marked down 90%; CDO price discovery

Apocalypse NAB; Business Spectator.

Tue 2008-05-13 00:00 EDT

Interfluidity :: Counterparty of last resort?

Fed purchasing mortgage-backed securities; Will Fed have contingent liabilities, counterparty exposures?

counterparty; Interfluidity; resort.