naked capitalism Sun 2010-10-10 12:54 EDT

FUBAR Mortgage Behavior: Florida Banks Destroyed Notes; Others Never Transferred Them

...But to give readers the latest report of modern FUBAR, mortgage edition, let us continue with the sorry saga of ``Where's My Note?'' For the benefit of newbies, what everyone calls a mortgage actually has two components: the note, which is the borrower IOU, and the mortgage (in some states, it's called a deed of trust) which is the lien on the property. In 45 states, the mortgage is a mere accessory to the note; you must be the real party of interest in the note in order to foreclose. The pooling and servicing agreement, which governs who does what when in a mortgage securitization, requires the note to be endorsed (just like a check, signed by one party over to the next), showing the full chain of title...The endorsements also have to be wet ink; no electronic signatures permitted. I've had a lot of anecdotal evidence to support the idea that these procedures, which were created in the early days of mortgage securitizations, were simply not observed on a widespread, if not a universal basis...

Florida Banks Destroyed Notes; FUBAR Mortgage Behavior; naked capitalism; transfer.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Fri 2010-10-08 19:33 EDT

Will We Have Hyperinflation In America?

I have been reading a lot lately about the coming hyperinflation in America. Among those I've read are Mr. Shadowstats John Williams, John Hussman, Jim Quinn, commentators on Zero Hedge, and Mr. Gloom Doom and Boom himself Marc Faber. My favorite philosopher, Nassim Taleb has also taken up the hyperinflation case. And I didn't forget Jim Rogers, Peter Schiff, and others...Will hyperinflation happen here? It is possible but unlikely and improbable...There are economic and political reasons why I don't think hyperinflation would occur...none of the economic or political factors required to set off hyperinflation are present. A careful analysis of theory, fact, and history leads me to conclude that inflation/stagflation is our future. It is quite a leap of fancy to say we are certain to have hyperinflation.

America; dropped; Hyperinflation; long; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Post Keynesian Perspective Thu 2010-09-30 08:12 EDT

Would Keynes have endorsed Modern Monetary Theory/Neochartalism?

Lord Keynes

...what would Keynes have thought of neochartalism/modern monetary theory (MMT)? MMT developed from Abba Lerner's theory of functional finance, as well as G. F. Knapp's theory of chartalism, as propounded in his book The State Theory of Money...MMT tells us that the government is the monopoly issuer of its own currency. Hence the government is not revenue-constrained. Taxes and bond issues do not finance government spending. No entity with the power to create and destroy money at will requires anyone to ``fund'' its spending. Having said this, one must immediately say that, even though deficits are not ``financially'' constrained in the normal sense, they do face real constraints in the inflation rate, exchange rate, available resources, capacity utilization, labour available (= unemployment level), and external balance...My discussion is based on the fundamental article by David Colander on this subject...``Lerner approached Keynes and asked: `Mr. Keynes, why don't we forget all this business of fiscal policy, public debt and all those things, and have some printing presses.' Keynes, after looking around the room to see that no newspaper reporters could hear, replied: `It's the art of statesmanship to tell lies but they must be plausible lies.' ''...

21st century; endorsed Modern Monetary Theory/Neochartalism; Keynes; Post Keynesian Perspective; social democracy.

billy blog Wed 2010-09-29 10:15 EDT

Budget deficits do not cause higher interest rates

Bill Mitchell

...An often-cited paper outlining the ways in which budget deficits allegedly push up interest rates is -- Government Debt -- by Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998 -- subsequently published in a book in 1999). This paper was somewhat influential in perpetuating the mainstream myths about government debt and interest rates...Their depiction of...Ricardian equivalence...alleges that: ``the choice between debt and tax finance of government expenditure is irrelevant...[because]...a budget deficit today...[requires]...higher taxes in the future...'' ...I have dealt with this view extensively...Ignoring the fact that the description of a government raising taxes to pay back a deficit is nonsensical when applied to a fiat currency issuing government, the Ricardian Equivalence models rest [on] several key and extreme assumptions about behaviour and knowledge. Should any of these assumptions fail to hold (at any point in time), then the predictions of the models are meaningless. The other point is that the models have failed badly to predict or explain key policy changes in the past. That is no surprise given the assumptions they make about human behaviour. There are no Ricardian economies. It was always an intellectual ploy without any credibility to bolster the anti-government case that was being fought then (late 1970s, early 1980s) just as hard as it is being fought now...So where do the mainstream economists go wrong? At the heart of this conception is the [pre-Keynesian] theory of loanable funds...where perfectly flexible prices delivered self-adjusting, market-clearing aggregate markets at all times...Mankiw claims that this ``market works much like other markets in the economy''...[assuming] that savings are finite and the government spending is financially constrained which means it has to seek ``funding'' in order to progress their fiscal plans. The result competition for the ``finite'' saving pool drives interest rates up and damages private spending. This is what is taught under the heading ``financial crowding out''...Virtually none of the assumptions that underpin the key mainstream models relating to the conduct of government and the monetary system hold in the real world...When confronted with increasing empirical failures, the mainstream economists introduce these ad hoc amendments to the specifications to make them more realistic...The Australian Treasury Paper [used advanced econometric analysis to find that] domestic budget deficits do not drive up interest rates. The long-run effect...is virtually zero. The short-run effect is zero!...toss out your Mankiw textbooks...

Billy Blog; budgets deficit; caused higher Interest rate.

Clusterstock Sat 2010-09-04 11:16 EDT

Your Textbooks Lied To You: The Money Multiplier Is A Myth

The following comes from an excellent new paper from the Fed. The paper describes the myth of the money multiplier and is an absolute must read for anyone who is trying to fully understand the current environment. It turns much of textbook economics on its head and describes in large part why the bank rescue plan and the idea of banks being reserve constrained is entirely wrong: ``Simple textbook treatments of the money multiplier give the quantity of bank reserves a causal role in determining the quantity of money and bank lending and thus the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This role results from the assumptions that reserve requirements generate a direct and tight linkage between money and reserves and that the central bank controls the money supply by adjusting the quantity of reserves through open market operations. Using data from recent decades, we have demonstrated that this simple textbook link is implausible in the United States for a number of reasons...bank loan supply does not respond to changes in monetary policy through a bank lending channel, no matter how we group the banks...''

ClusterStock; Money Multiplier; myth; textbook lying.

New Deal 2.0 Fri 2010-09-03 18:57 EDT

The Real Lesson from the Great Depression: Fiscal Policy Works!

Marshall Auerback

...At the outset of the Great Depression, economic output collapsed, and unemployment rose to 25 per cent. Influenced by his ``liquidationist'' Treasury Secretary, Andrew Mellon, then President Hoover made comparatively minimal attempts to deploy government fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand...This all changed under FDR...The government hired about 60 per cent of the unemployed in public works and conservation projects that planted a billion trees, saved the whooping crane, modernized rural America, and built such diverse projects as the Cathedral of Learning in Pittsburgh, the Montana state capitol, much of the Chicago lakefront, New York's Lincoln Tunnel and Triborough Bridge complex, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the aircraft carriers Enterprise and Yorktown...once the Great Depression hit bottom in early 1933, the US economy embarked on four years of expansion that constituted the biggest cyclical boom in U.S. economic history. For four years, real GDP grew at a 12% rate and nominal GDP grew at a 14% rate. There was another shorter and shallower depression in 1937 largely caused by renewed fiscal tightening (and higher Federal Reserve margin requirements)...

0; Fiscal policy worked; Great Depression; new dealing 2; Real Lesson.

Thu 2010-08-26 09:23 EDT

Jingle mail in Jersey from Hyatt Hotels ... | footnoted.com

If you're in Princeton, New Jersey, anytime soon, swing by the Hyatt Regency Princeton. With the Hyatt Hotels (H) quarterly report filed yesterday, it has become a symbol of the financial crisis... Like households across the country, one of Hyatt's subsidiaries ``did not have sufficient cash flow to meet interest payment requirements under its mortgage loan'' on the property, in this case a 347-room hotel with a restaurant, bar and comedy club, just a mile from [Princeton University]....``When hotel cash flow became insufficient to service the loan,'' the company said in the filing, ``HHC notified the lender that it would not provide assistance.'' In other words, Hyatt decided to walk away -- the equivalent of ``jingle mail''...

com; Footnote; Hyatt hotel; Jersey; Jingle Mail.

Mon 2010-08-23 11:03 EDT

A Program for Monetary Reform, the 1939 Document | Economic Stability

Paul H. Douglas, Irving Fisher, et. al

[pdf download] ...Our own monetary policy should likewise be directed toward avoiding inflation as well as deflation, and in attaining and maintaining as nearly as possible full production and employment. ...[100% Reserve System] Since the fractional reserve system hampers effective control by the Monetary Authority over the volume of our circulating medium it is desirable that any bank or other agency holding deposits subject to check (demand deposits) be required to keep on hand a dollar of reserve for every dollar of such deposit, so that, in effect, deposits subject to check actually represent money held by the bank in trust for the depositor.

1939 document; Economic stability; Monetary Reform; program.

Jesse's Café Américain Mon 2010-08-16 16:09 EDT

Chris Whalen: Nothing Has Changed Because It's The Fraud and Corruption, Stupid

Jesse

...The dirty little secret of the Dodd-Frank legislation is that by failing to curtail the worst abuses of the OTC market in structured assets and derivatives, a financial ghetto that even today remains virtually unregulated, the Congress and the Fed are effectively even encouraging securities firms to act as de facto exchanges and thereby commit financial fraud. Allowing securities firms to originate complex structured securities without requiring SEC registration is a vast loophole that Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) deliberately left open for their campaign contributors on Wall Street. But it must be noted these same firms have a captive, client relationship with the Fed and other regulators as well, thus a love triangle may be the most apt metaphor...a recent key supervisory officer appointment by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY)...choice of Sarah Dahlgren as Head of Supervision...Ms Dahlgren has been at the center of many of the Federal Reserve's most embarrassing failures in the area of bank supervision and in particular with respect to the failure of American International Group (AIG)...

change because; Chris Whalen; corruption; fraud; Jesse's Café Américain; Stupid.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-08-06 19:34 EDT

Auerback: The Real Reason Banks Aren't Lending

Marshall Auerback

...there is a widespread belief that government fiscal stimulus has run up against its ``limits'' on the grounds of ``fiscal sustainability'' and the need to retain ``the confidence of the markets''. Consequently, goes this line of reasoning, as private credit conditions improve the private sector must pick up the baton of growth where the public sector leaves off. If this proves insufficient, there is room for an expansion of monetary policy via ``quantitative easing``...The premise is that the central bank floods the banking system with excess reserves, which will then theoretically encourage the banks to lend more aggressively in order to chase a higher rate of return. Not only is the theory plain wrong, but the Fed's fixation on credit growth is curiously perverse, given the high prevailing levels of private debt...credit growth follows creditworthiness, which can only be achieved through sustaining job growth and incomes. That means embracing stimulatory fiscal policy, not ``credit-enhancing'' measures per se, such as quantitative easing, which will not work. QE is based on the erroneous belief that the banks need reserves before they can lend and that this process provides those reserves. But as Professor Scott Fullwiler has pointed out on numerous occasions, that is a major misrepresentation of the way the banking system actually operates...We would like to see the Obama Administration at least begin to make the case that fiscal stimulus, whether via tax cuts or direct public investment, is still required to generate more demand and employment...deficit cutting per se, devoid of any economic context, is not a legitimate goal of public policy for a sovereign nation. Deficits are (mostly) endogenously determined by the performance of the economy. They add to private sector income and to net financial wealth. They will come down as a matter of course when the economy begins to recover and as the automatic stabilizers work in reverse...

Auerback; Lends; naked capitalism; real reason Bank.

Tue 2010-08-03 15:02 EDT

Economics of Contempt: Anatomy of Lehman's Failure, and the Importance of Liquidity Requirements

Remember the Lehman Examiner's Report? The 4000+ page report by the court-appointed examiner was lauded for a couple of weeks after it was released, and then largely forgotten. The media and blogosphere quickly moved on to the next outrage-du-jour...Well, I did not forget about it, and thanks to the uptick in flights -- and thus reading time -- in the last few months, I can now credibly claim to have read....well, not every single word in the Examiner's Report (some appendices are just pages of CUSIPs), but all of the substantive sections...Anton Valukas and the lawyers at Jenner & Block who wrote the Examiner's Report did a masterful job. I was, and continue to be, in awe of the quality and comprehensiveness of the report...think I have a pretty good handle on what went wrong at Lehman, and why it failed...they were misrepresenting their liquidity pool. In a huge way...the brazenness of their misrepresentation was shocking...Including the clearing-bank collateral in its liquidity pool was not only inappropriate, but also aggressively deceptive...Lehman was also including in its liquidity pool non-central bank eligible CLOs and CDOs. And they had the audacity to mark these CLOs and CDOs at 100 (par) for purposes of the liquidity pool, even though JPMorgan's third-party pricing vendor marked them at 50--60...

Anatomy; contempt; economic; important; Lehman's failure; liquidity requirements.

Credit Writedowns Fri 2010-07-30 15:30 EDT

Subversive Economists

The economic research staff at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has been busy. Last week we wrote about the New York Fed's Staff Report No. 458 , which discussed the shadow banking system in the United States. Today we refer to two other new reports: Staff Report No. 457 , entitled ``Resolving Troubled Systemically Important Cross-Border Financial Institutions: Is a New Corporate Organizational Form Required?'', and Staff Report No. 463 , ``The Central-Bank Balance Sheet as an Instrument of Monetary Policy.'' After reviewing them, we are left to conclude that these three papers demonstrate that the research staff at the New York Fed is perhaps the most subversive group of working economists currently on the government payroll....The combination of these three papers seems to suggest that the Federal Reserve is conducting a serious re-evaluation of its traditional role in the new financial landscape. No. 458 acknowledges that the shadow banking system is huge, but largely beyond the regulatory reach--and backstopping help--of the Fed. No. 457 suggests that the complexity of a large, modern financial institution is not only a challenge for managers, but is also a challenge for regulators. It is a cri de coeur for simplicity. And No. 463 breaks new ground by explicitly including central bank balance sheet management as a part of the monetary policy model...

credit writedowns; Subversive Economists.

naked capitalism Sat 2010-07-24 16:34 EDT

Summer Rerun: ``Unwinding the Fraud for Bubbles''

Tanta at Calculated Risk

This post first appeared on March 27, 2007. ...Telling the difference between the victims and the victimizers, the predators and the prey, and the fraudulent and the defrauded, is getting a lot harder when you have borrowers not required to make down payments able to lie about their incomes in order to buy a home the seller is overpricing in order to take an illegal kickback. The lender is getting defrauded, but the lender is the one who offered the zero-down stated-income program, delegated the drawing up of the legal documents and the final disbursement of funds to a fee-for-service settlement agent, and didn't do enough due diligence on the appraisal to see the inflation of the value. Legally, of course, there's a difference between lender as co-conspirator and lender as mark, utterly failing to exercise reasonable caution, but it's small comfort when the losses rack up. With tongue only partially in cheek, I'm about to suggest a third category of fraud: Fraud for Bubbles...My theory of the Fraud for Bubbles is, in a nutshell, that it isn't that lenders forgot that there are risks. It is that the miserable dynamic of unsound lending puffing up unsustainable real estate prices, which in turn kept supporting even more unsound lending, simply masked fraud problems sufficiently, and delayed the eventual ``feedback'' mechanisms sufficiently, that rampant fraud came to seem ``affordable.'' So many of the business practices that help fraud succeed--thinning backoffice staff, hiring untrained temps to replace retiring (and pricey) veterans, speeding up review processes, cutting back on due diligence sampling, accepting more and more copies, faxes, and phone calls instead of original ink-signed documents--threw off so much money that no one wanted to believe that the eventual cost of the fraud would eat it all up, and possibly more...

bubble; fraud; naked capitalism; summer reruns; unwinds.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-07-19 17:07 EDT

Is the SEC Settlement Really a Win for Goldman?

Tom Adams and Yves Smith

...Conventional wisdom in the financial media is that the settlement announced by the SEC over its lawsuit on a Goldman 2007 Abacus CDO is a home run for Goldman. But a closer reading suggests that Goldman's victory is qualified, and the enthusiastic press response is in large measure due to the firm's skillful manipulation of perceptions...it is hard to see how anything in the settlement, if affirmed, would be negative for private parties considering lawsuits against sellers of CDOs...we imagine potential CDO investors will be mightily encouraged that Goldman ended up returning the full amount of investment to the one true third party investor in the deal -- IKB...An investor considering bringing an action against a bank that sold them a CDO that failed (meaning virtually all 2006 and 2007 ``mezzanine'' CDOs) would probably be encouraged that a bank was required to pay such a large amount for making inaccurate statements about the true nature of the CDO...Plaintiffs who sue CDO sellers have good reason to be optimistic...The settlement thus tarnishes the popular myth that the subprime shorts were insightful outsiders who executed ``the greatest trade ever''...the SEC has demonstrated that investors in such a CDO can win a recovery as a result of such inaccurate statements.

Goldman; naked capitalism; SEC Settlement Really; Wins.

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-06-03 17:56 EDT

Guest Post: The 2004 Fed Transcripts: A Methodical, Diabolical Destruction of America's "Wealth"

Frederick Sheehan

The Federal Reserve releases transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings with a five-year lag (as required by law, the Fed would like to burn them). Transcripts for 2004 meetings were released on April 30, 2010...FOMC transcripts in 2004 confirm the Fed was afraid of markets...The FOMC seemed most concerned that higher rates might interfere with the carry trade. In the sad tale of The Financialization of the United States, the carry trade deserves a chapter...By 2004, the carry trade was a mammoth enterprise of hedge funds and banks. The too-big-to-fail banks were, by now, leveraging their own internally managed hedge funds, managing their own proprietary trading desks, and also lending to highly leveraged hedge funds. Leverage, and, the belief that access to rising levels of credit would never end, pushed up asset values on bank balance sheets -- whether real estate, bonds, stocks, or private-equity. This increased the banks' lending capacity which encouraged banks to lend more...Markets believed asset prices would only go up for many silly reasons. Belief in the Greenspan Put may have been the silliest but also the most influential...Federal Reserve Governor Donald Kohn...told his confreres that Federal Reserve policy was to distort asset prices. He also said this was deliberate and desirable. In other words, distorted asset prices were not an unfortunate consequence of such-and-such Fed policy. The Fed's goal was to distort asset prices...Consumer spending exceeded consumer income...This strategy of fixing asset prices at an artificially high rate to fool the American people into spending money they did not have was diabolical...The manipulation of markets and of the American people has grown worse under Bernanke's chairmanship...

2004 Fed Transcripts; America's; credit writedowns; Diabolical Destruction; Guest Post; Method; wealth.

Mon 2010-05-24 10:11 EDT

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: Don't Mess with Aunt Minnie - May 24, 2010

John P. Hussman

...Last week, we observed an Aunt Minnie featuring a collapse in market internals that has historically been associated with sharply negative market implications....Treasury Secretary Eddie Haskell/Timothy Geithner has scheduled a trip to Europe this week to urge European leaders "to pay better attention to potential market reactions to policy moves, and to accelerate the European rescue program." This promises to be a fiasco. What could European leaders possibly find more arrogant than to be lectured on bailout policy - not simply by the U.S., but specifically by a one-trick pony bureaucrat whose chief trick is the ability to smoothly talk the language of prudence while simultaneously pillaging the fiscal stability of an entire nation for the benefit of bondholders who made bad loans?...Providing Greece (and possibly some of its neighbors) a graceful exit from the Euro requires greater courage but lower ultimate cost - particularly to the citizens of Greece itself - than a policy of forcing heavy austerity, dislocations, and internal deflation within Greece. The effect of austerity policies will be to damage the revenue side of the Grecian economy enough to leave the deficits little changed in any event. One would like to go back a decade in time and choose different policies that would have allowed Greece to maintain the Maastricht deficit limitations, but it is far too late to push a full-grown genie back into an itty-bitty bottle...

2010; 24; Aunt Minnie; Hussman Funds; Mess; weekly market comments.

The Wall Street Examiner Sat 2010-05-22 19:56 EDT

Imagine There's No Credit Market: Another Look At German Controls

...Thus, when people speak of "rescuing the credit markets" they really mean to say rescuing the liquidity providers who failed to assess lending risks so profoundly they can't make required payments. When people talk of German restrictions killing the credit markets, they really mean killing the middle-men (which may or may not have a deleterious effect on government borrowing). German restrictions on certain types of equity and credit transactions are not aimed at reduced government borrowing. They are aimed at reducing the amount (and means of capture) of profit "earned" by middle-men in the transaction- profits, mind you, as per our model, in the case of government borrowing, come either as a result of the money's original owner getting less interest than a direct deal would generate, the government paying more interest (which only comes from higher tax revenues) than a direct deal would generate, or some combination thereof. ...liquidity providing actions of "credit market" middle-men has run amok. As per J.S. Mill, that credit markets are exerting a distinct and independent influence of their own means they are out of order. With increasing frequency, credit is mispriced or unwisely extended and liquidity, the raison d'être of these people, dries up when it is needed most. Yet the middle-men who fail in their tasks expect to be rescued from their failures, and given even more ways to profit from lending other people's money, while the pool of available savings shrinks. ...In one sense I'm quite happy about all of the financial sector bail-outs governments have provided these credit-market middle-men. Before the bail-outs, one had to argue that finance was like a tax on monetary exchange, now this point is clear, finance is, in fact, a tax- and a growing one at that.

credit markets; German-Controlled; imagine; looking; s; Wall Street Examiner.

Sat 2010-05-22 09:19 EDT

Bridgewater Associates: Be The Hyena. Attack The Wildebeest. <<; Dealbreaker: A Wall Street Tabloid -- Business News Headlines and Financial Gossip

Bess Levin

So, you're going to work for Bridgewater, are you? ...if you didn't know anything about the Bridgewater's Tao of Dalio, which requires all employees to ``probe'' their colleagues (boss's included), you might find yourself asking ``WTF is this shit?'' What this shit-- the Culture of the Probe-- is, is the secret to B-water's success, the tenets of which comprise ``Principles,'' the hedge fund's unofficial handbook, written by founder Ray Dalio...

attacked; Bridgewater Associates; business news headlines; Dealbreaker; Financial Gossip; hyena; Wall Street tabloid; wildebeest.

Wed 2010-05-19 11:53 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> When you've got friends like this ... Part 2

Part 2 in a series I am running about the propensity of self-proclaimed progressive commentators and writers to advance arguments about the monetary system (and government balances) which could easily have been written by any neo-liberal commentator. The former always use guarded rhetoric to establish their ``progressive'' credentials but they rehearse the same conservative message -- the US has dangerously high deficits and unsustainable debt levels and an exit plan is urgently required to take the fiscal position of the government bank into balance. In doing so, they not only damage the progressive cause but also perpetuate myths and lies about how the monetary system operates and the options available to a currency-issuing national government...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; friends; Part 2.

Wed 2010-05-19 11:52 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> When you've got friends like this ... Part 1

...I am forming the view that many so-called progressive economic think tanks and media outlets in the US are in fact nothing of the sort...Today I read two position pieces from self-proclaimed progressive writers which could have easily been written by any neo-liberal commentator. True, the rhetoric was guarded and there was talk about needing to worry about getting growth started again -- but the message was clear -- the US has dangerously high deficits and unsustainable debt levels and an exit plan is urgently required to take the fiscal position of the government bank into balance. Very sad...since when has the progressive agenda consisted of worrying about deficit reduction as a policy aim? Placing a focus on some specific targetted deficit outcome will almost always lead a policy maker astray in a modern monetary economy. It is not a progressive position...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; friends; Part 1.

The Wall Street Examiner Sun 2010-05-09 10:02 EDT

The Minsky Cruise (part 3, Business)

...While non-financial domestic corporate profits have shrunk from a Korean War inspired 11% of GDP to average around 5% of GDP since 1970, the financial sector's profits have been growing...The love affair with finance and disdain for what, during the tech boom, we called the "bricks and mortar" industry- and admittedly a failure, by some in those industries, to accept the transition to maturity- has inspired, for want of a better word, envy in the non-financial sector. While financial sector stocks seem to levitate on their own, non-financial sector stocks, if intent can be inferred from behavior, are believed to require a boost. I suspect the use of options as payment has something to do with this as well...Additionally, the non-financial sector, since the mid-80s has- a true sign of envy- opted to copy finance, by breaking into that field. GE Capital and GMAC Financial are two prominent examples...To paraphrase Nixon, "we're all Ponzis, now."

business; Minsky Cruise; Part 3; Wall Street Examiner.

zero hedge Sun 2010-05-09 09:15 EDT

Where Was Goldman's Supplementary Liquidity Provider Team Yesterday? A Recap Of Goldman's Program Trading Monopoly

In addition to having said many things about HFT in general in the last year, over the past 12 months Zero Hedge has focused a lot of attention specifically on Goldman's dominance of the NYSE's Program Trading platform, where in addition to recent entrant GETCO, it has been to date an explicit monopolist of the so-called Supplementary Liquidity Provider program, a role which affords the company greater liquidity rebates for, well providing liquidity (more on this below), and generating who knows what other possible front market-looking, flow-prop integration (presumably legal) benefits. Yesterday, Goldman's SLP function was non-existent. One wonders - was the Goldman SLP team in fact liquidity taking, or to put it bluntly, among the main reasons for the market collapse...Readers are welcome to go back through our archives and acquaint themselves with the NYSE's SLP program, with Goldman's domination of program trading, with Goldman's domination of dark trading venues via the Sigma X suite, with Goldman's domination of flow trading via Redi X, and with Goldman's domination of virtually every vertical of the capital markets, which would be terrific if monopolies were encouraged in the US...We have long claimed that Goldman is the de facto monopolist of the NYSE's program trading platform. As such, it is certainly the case that Goldman was instrumental in either a) precipitating yesterday's crash or b) not providing the critical liquidity which it is required to do, when the time came...

Goldman's Program Trading Monopoly; Goldman's Supplementary Liquidity Provider Team; Recap; Zero Hedge.