dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

RMBS Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

RMBS investors (1); RMBS trustee (1).

Fri 2010-10-08 21:11 EDT

4ClosureFraud Posts Lender Processing Services Mortgage Document Fabrication Price Sheet >> naked capitalism

...document fabrication is widespread in foreclosures. The reason is that the note, which is the borrower IOU, is the critical instrument to establishing the right to foreclose in 45 states (in those states, the mortgage, which is the lien on the property, is a mere ``accessory'' to the note). The pooling and servicing agreement, which governs the creation of mortgage backed securities, called for the note to be endorsed (wet ink signatures) through the full chain of title...Evidence is mounting that for cost reasons, starting in the 2004-2005 time frame, originators like Countrywide simply quit conveying the note. We are told this practice was widespread, probably endemic. The notes are apparently are still in originator warehouses. That means the trust does not have them (the legalese is it is not the real party of interest), therefore it is not in a position to foreclose on behalf of the RMBS investors. So various ruses have been used to finesse this rather large problem...We finally have concrete proof of how widespread document fabrication was...This revelation touches every major servicer and RMBS trustee in the US...The story that banks have been trying to sell has been that document problems like improper affidavits are mere technicalities. We've said from the get go that they were the tip of the iceberg of widespread document forgeries and fraud...

4ClosureFraud Posts Lender Processing Services Mortgage Document Fabrication Price Sheet; naked capitalism.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Fri 2010-07-16 14:41 EDT

Guest Post: Why Goldman Could Pull It Off

The weaknesses in the S.E.C.'s case against Goldman were always obvious. At the end of the day, an investor who bought Abacus 2007 AC-1 was buying a static portfolio of risks....If you were a sophisticated investor who had done his due diligence, you didn't need to be told that the deal was designed to fail...If you actually reviewed the performance of mortgage backed securities held by the CDO, and understood how cash flow waterfalls and delinquency triggers worked, then you could see that subordinate tranches being insured for the benefit of Goldman were already worthless when the CDO closed. You could also figure out that the rating agencies had deliberately delayed announcing downgrades of the RMBS within the CDO, in order to keep the markets and the deal flow moving...The risk to Goldman was that more of its dirty laundry would be exposed...[but] the S.E.C. shows little appetite for digging deeper, especially since its new COO of the Enforcement Division is a 30-year-old kid from Goldman.

dropped; Goldman; Guest Post; long; pull; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Mon 2010-04-19 10:52 EDT

SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud On Subprime Mortgages, Paulson & Co. Implicated

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Goldman, Sachs & Co. and one of its vice presidents for defrauding investors by misstating and omitting key facts about a financial product tied to subprime mortgages as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter. The SEC alleges that Goldman Sachs structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that hinged on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Goldman Sachs failed to disclose to investors vital information about the CDO, in particular the role that a major hedge fund played in the portfolio selection process and the fact that the hedge fund had taken a short position against the CDO.

Co; fraud; implications; Paulson; SEC charged Goldman Sachs; subprime-mortgage; Zero Hedge.