dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

Risk Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

000 foot risk management view (1); 1 risk rated bank (1); actually mask long-term risks (1); aggressive risk-seekers looking (1); assess lending risks (1); bad risk (1); bailout plan shifted risk (1); Banks Ignoring Risk Warnings (1); Biggest Systemic Risk (1); borrowing risks (1); Britain risking bankruptcy (1); buyer's risk premium (1); Calculated Risk (138); concealed risks (1); continuing risks (1); Counterparty Risk (2); Counterparty Risk Problems (1); creating risk (1); credit Risk (8); debt risk (2); decrease risk (1); Defaulting Risk (4); defines systemic risk (1); Deleveraging Risk High (1); Derivatives credit risk (2); DIR risk assessments (1); Discusses Collateral Risks (1); diverse risk taking firms (1); Dr. Risk's Bookshelf (1); early 2007 style risk taking (1); excess liquidity inhibits risk pricing (1); excessive risk-taking (2); extra risk (1); extra-fat risk-free spread (1); FDIC saw risks (1); Fed Hires Bear Stearns Risk (2); Fed Hires Bear Stearns Risk Boss (1); Fed Hires Bear Stearns Risk Chief (1); Fed Risks (3); Fed Risks Moral Hazard (1); Freddie Mac's risk management culturethe Foster (1); funded high risk (1); greater risk (2); greatest risk (2); hidden risk (1); High Risk Credit Card Solution (1); high risk hedge funds (1); high-risk (6); high-risk financial engineering (1); immediate risk (1); increased risk (1); increasing credit risk spreads (1); Increasing Treasury Default Risk (1); Inflation Risks (2); insolvency risk (1); Institutional Risk (69); Institutional Risk Analyst (43); Institutional Risk Analytics (26); interest rate risk (1); irresponsible risks taking (1); leveraged risk-taking (1); liquidity risk (2); liquidity risk posed (1); Lousy Risk Controls (1); main default risk model (1); major deflation risk (1); major systemic risks built (1); manage risk promoting investment (1); manufacturing risk (1); market risk (1); mega-catastrophic risk (1); money chasing risk (1); money risks fueling asset bubbles (1); Mortgage Duration Risk (1); officially-subsidized risk-taking (1); ones taking risk (1); ormer Bear Stearns chief risk officer Michael Alix (1); prevalent risk trade (1); pricing mortgage default risk (1); readily disguised using derivatives exacerbating risks (1); Return-free risk (1); rising risks (1); Risk 1 category went (1); risk 2 (1); risk 3 (1); risk addiction (1); risk appetite (1); risk associated (1); risk aversion (4); Risk Aversion Leads (2); Risk calculation (1); risk encountering social instability (1); risk events (1); Risk free spreads (2); risk losing retail space (1); risk management (8); risk management failures (2); risk management failures report (1); risk management suggest (1); risk profile (1); risk take (12); risk taking equally (1); RISK'S BOOKSHELF (2); risk-bearing (1); risk-free (6); risk-free returns (1); risk-free Treasury bills (1); Risk-Free Way (1); risk-taking based (1); risking downgrade (1); RISKS 5 (1); risks China faces (1); risks free profit (1); risks posed (2); risks s (3); rollover risk (1); s risk (2); See Calculated Risk's post showing (1); Serious Inflation Risks (1); single greatest risk (1); small risk (1); solvency risks (1); successfully transformed credit risk (1); Systematic Risk (1); systemic risk (15); Systemic Risk Exception (1); systemic risks posed (1); take risk (2); took reckless risks (1); took risks (1); topic brings risk (1); toxic debts risk overwhelming EU governments (1); Trading risk becomes liquidity risk (1); transfer risks (1); tremendous systemic risk generated (1); unfavourable risk/reward (1).

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Sun 2010-10-10 11:56 EDT

The Federal Reserve's Relevance Test - Project Syndicate

...as investors look outside the US for higher yield, the flood of money out of the dollar has bid up exchange rates in emerging markets around the world. Emerging markets know this, and are upset -- Brazil has vehemently expressed its concerns -- not only about the increased value of their currency, but that the influx of money risks fueling asset bubbles or triggering inflation. The normal response of emerging-market central banks to bubbles or inflation would be to raise interest rates -- thereby increasing their currencies' value still more. US policy is thus delivering a double whammy on competitive devaluation -- weakening the dollar and forcing competitors to strengthen their currencies...

Federal Reserve's Relevance Test; Project Syndicate.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-09-30 08:22 EDT

Why Backstopping Repo is a Bad Idea

The normally sound Gillian Tett of the Financial Times endorses an idea that is both dangerous and unnecessary, namely, government backstopping of the system of short-term collateralized lending called repo, for ``sale with agreement to repurchase.''...But the real problem is that the only securities that were once considered to be suitable were those of the very highest quality, namely Treasuries. The real problem is in widening the market beyond that. If you have absolutely impeccable collateral, you don't care if your counterparty goes belly up if you aren't at risk of losses on the assets you hold...the real problem is the use of low quality collateral...why would we possibly WANT a system that might down the road encourage the pledging of less than stellar instruments as repo?...we need to go back and look hard at why the need for repo has risen since 2001, and how much is related to legitimate activity. The fact that it grew much more rapidly than the economy overall suggests not...official efforts should proceed...to shrink the repo market (as we've recommended for a market that has contributed to the growth of repo, credit default swaps)...our efforts NOT to restrain banks leads to a tremendous tax on all of us...a banking industry that creates global crises is negative value added from a societal standpoint. It is purely extractive...

Backstopping Repo; Bad Ideas; naked capitalism.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Sat 2010-09-25 09:47 EDT

Chris Whalen On The Upcoming "Worst Economic Contraction Since WWI (Forget WWII)"

The erosion of the profitability of the U.S. banking industry over the past two years under the glorious Summers-Geithner-Bernanke rescue scheme is the proverbial fly in the ointment for both major political parties. Democrats and republicans alike are going to be fed into the meat grinder over the next several years as the banking sector deals with literally hundreds of billions of dollars in direct and indirect expenses from the deflation of the mortgage bubble. For the economy, this slow process of muddle along championed by Summers and Geithner will ensure that Barack Obama becomes the Herbert Hoover of the Democratic Party. The economic carnage that will causes these losses, as we described in a recent post in Reuters, "Double Dip or Global Deflation?," is going to represent the worst economic contraction since WWI. Forget WWII. Think "shrinkage" to use the Gilded Age description for economic deflation. And frankly nothing that either the Fed or Treasury does in the near-term can change this basic economic fact of restructuring...the economic situation at BAC and among all of the legacy zombie banks continues to worsen. No amount of bullshit from Washington changes the fundamental economic situation inside the largest U.S. lenders.

Chris Whalen; dropped; Forget WWII; long; survival rate; Timeline; upcoming; worst economic contraction; WWI; zero; Zero Hedge.

Mon 2010-09-20 18:49 EDT

What happened to US interbank lending in the financial crisis?

Many commentators have argued that interbank lending froze following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This column presents evidence from the fed funds market that, while rates spiked and loan terms became more sensitive to borrower risk, mean borrowing amounts remained stable on aggregate. It seems likely that the market did not expand to meet additional demand for funds.

Financial Crisis; happened; Interbank Lending.

Mon 2010-09-20 10:14 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Fictional Reserve Lending And The Myth Of Excess Reserves

...1) Lending comes first and what little reserves there are (if any) come later. 2) There really are no excess reserves. 3) Not only are there no excess reserves, there are essentially no reserves to speak of at all. Indeed, bank reserves are completely "fictional". 4) Banks are capital constrained not reserve constrained. 5) Banks aren't lending because there are few credit worthy borrowers worth the risk. ...concern that excess reserves will lead to lending and inflation is totally unfounded in theory and practice. Fractional Reserve Lending is really Fictional Reserve Lending. In practice, the major constraints to lending are insufficient capital and willingness of credit worthy borrowers to seek loans.

excess reserves; Fictional Reserve Lending; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; myth.

PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM Mon 2010-09-20 09:57 EDT

WHITHER CHINA?

In all likelihood, China has entered the most critical and taxing period since the country was reopened to the outside world in the 1970s. Domestically, there are a slew of issues, any one of which could create instability...Few can know the full story of what goes on within the State Council, but there appears to be a battle royal being fought over the real estate sector. There are those within the leadership who are concerned that average home prices have gotten too high for most first-time buyers (see our previous visit report). They want to see average prices fall by 10-20% across the country. Against this group are not just real estate developers but local governments and many others within Beijing...In effect, what is being seen is a battle between central and local governments. In our view, this is a fight that central government cannot afford to lose...against a background of cheap money and plenty of credit, house prices across the country have become unaffordable to most first-time buyers...if these price developments continued unchecked the leadership would risk encountering social instability...we doubt there will be any easing of policy until average house prices fall into the 10-20% range. China is transiting into a very difficult period as focus shifts towards sustainable domestic growth and away from short-term measures to defend the 8% GDP mantra. This transition is occurring when the existing leadership is preparing to give way to the new set in 2012, when social stability could be threatened if there are policy mistakes...

China; PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-09-17 18:52 EDT

Why Do We Keep Indulging the Fiction That Banks Are Private Enterprises?

... Big finance has an unlimited credit line with governments around the globe. ``Most subsidized industry in the world'' is inadequate to describe this relationship. Banks are now in the permanent role of looters, as described in the classic Akerlof/Romer paper. They run highly leveraged operations, extract compensation based on questionable accounting and officially-subsidized risk-taking, and dump their losses on the public at large...The usual narrative, ``privatized gains and socialized losses'' is insufficient to describe the dynamic at work. The banking industry falsely depicts markets, and by extension, its incumbents as a bastion of capitalism. The blatant manipulations of the equity markets shows that financial activity, which used to be recognized as valuable because it supported commercial activity, is whenever possible being subverted to industry rent-seeking. And worse, these activities are state supported...banks can no longer meaningfully be called private enterprises, yet no one in the media will challenge this fiction...

bank; fiction; Keep Indulging; naked capitalism; private enterprise.

Calculated Risk Wed 2010-09-08 17:55 EDT

Freddie Mac: $4.7 billion Loss, REO Inventory increases 79% YoY

Freddie Mac reported: "a net loss of $4.7 billion for the quarter ended June 30, 2010, compared to a net loss of $6.7 billion for the quarter ended March 31, 2010." and the FHFA requested another $1.8 billion from Treasury...Freddie Mac reported that their REO inventory increased 79% year over year, from 34,699 in Q2 2009 to 62,178 in Q2 2010...

4; 7; Calculated Risk; Freddie Mac; losses; REO Inventory increases 79; YoY.

naked capitalism Wed 2010-09-08 17:27 EDT

Economic consequences of speculative side bets -- The case of naked CDS

...We argue that the existence of naked credit default swaps has significant effects on the terms of financing, the likelihood of default, and the size and composition of investment expenditures. And we identify three mechanisms through which these broader consequences of speculative side bets arise: collateral effects, rollover risk, and project choice...the existence of zero-sum side bets on default has major economic repercussions. These contracts induce investors who are optimistic about the future revenues of borrowers, and would therefore be natural purchasers of debt, to sell credit protection instead. This diverts their capital away from potential borrowers and channels it into collateral to support speculative positions. As a consequence, the marginal bond buyer is less optimistic about the borrower's prospects, and demands a higher interest rate in order to lend. This can result in an increased likelihood of default, and the emergence of self-fulfilling paths in which firms are unable to rollover their debt, even when such trajectories would not arise in the absence of credit derivatives. And it can influence the project choices of firms, leading not only to lower levels of investment overall but also in some cases to the selection of riskier ventures with lower expected returns...

Case; economic consequences; naked capitalism; Naked CDS; speculative side bets.

Minyanville Sat 2010-08-21 10:33 EDT

How Pimco Is Holding American Homeowners Hostage

...According to Bill Gross ...the American economy can be saved only through ``full nationalization'' of the mortgage finance system and a massive ``jubilee'' of debt forgiveness for millions of underwater homeowners...As overlord of the fixed-income finance market [Pacific Investment Management Co. (Pimco)] generates billions annually in effort-free profits from its trove of essentially riskless US Treasury securities and federally guaranteed housing paper. Now Pimco wants to swell Uncle Sam's supply of this no-brainer paper even further -- adding upward of $2 trillion per year of what would be ``government-issue'' mortgages...This final transformation of American taxpayers into indentured servants of HIDC (the Housing Investment & Debt Complex) has been underway for a long time, and is now unstoppable because all principled political opposition to Pimco-style crony capitalism has been extinguished...At the heart of the matter is the statist Big Lie trumpeting the alleged public welfare benefits of the home-ownership society and subsidized real estate finance...the congregates of the HIDC lobby -- homebuilders, mortgage bankers, real estate brokers, Wall Street securitizers, property appraisers and lawyers, landscapers and land speculators, home improvement retailers and the rest -- have gotten their fill at the Federal trough. But the most senseless gift -- the extra-fat risk-free spread on Freddie and Fannie paper -- went to the great enablers of the mortgage debt boom, that is, the mega-funds like Pimco...there isn't a shred of evidence that all of this largese serves any legitimate public purpose whatsoever, and plenty of evidence that the HIDC boom has been deeply destructive...there are upward of 15-20 million American households that can't afford their current mortgages or will be strongly disinclined to service them once housing prices take their next -- and unpreventable -- leg down. But Pimco's gold-coast socialism is exactly the wrong answer. Rather than having their mortgages modified or forgiven, these households should be foreclosed upon, and the sooner the better...

Holding American Homeowners Hostage; Minyanville; PIMCO.

billy blog Thu 2010-08-19 16:25 EDT

There is no credit risk for a sovereign government

...UC Berkeley economist Brad DeLong...likes to think of himself alongside Krugman as part of the ``Keynesian'' army against all the neo-liberals. Both are in fact New Keynesians. In that sense, they are not very dissimilar to Mankiw and his gang. Interestingly, they appear to be continually trying to one-up Mankiw as part of some internecine struggle within the American economics academy. But from a Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) perspective, it is hard to tell their various narratives apart...a sovereign government is never revenue constrained because it is the monopoly issuer of the currency. That is a basic starting point in exploring the differences between spending and taxation decisions of a sovereign government and the spending and income-earning decisions/possibilities of the private sector entities (households and firms). The two domains -- government and non-government -- are very different in this respect and any attempt to conflate them as if both are subject to budget constraints is wrong and starts the slippery slide down into the total mispresentation of how the macroeconomics system operates...When a government runs a surplus it is not ``saving'' anything. The surpluses go nowhere! They are just flows that are accounted for and the aggregate demand which is drained by the surpluses is lost in that period forever...DeLong is actually teaching some bastardised course in Political Science here and only allowing the conservative side of the debate to be aired...HSBC economist Steven Major ...[writes in the Financial Times (FT)]...so contrary to what is being peddled each day in the financial press that a medal for bravery should be awarded...

Billy Blog; credit Risk; sovereign Government.

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products Thu 2010-08-19 16:16 EDT

Grecian Derivative

...In the 1990s, Japanese companies and investors pioneered the use of derivatives to hide losses...Since then, the use of derivatives to disguise debt and arbitrage regulations and accounting rules has increased...Italy used a currency swap against an existing Yen 200 billion bond ($1.6 billion) to lock in profits from the depreciation of the Yen. The swap was done at off-market rates...the swap was really a loan where Italy had accepted an off-market unfavourable exchange rate and received cash in return...A key element of the recent Greek debt problems has been the use of derivative transactions to disguise the true level of its borrowing...More recently, similar structures have emerged in Latvia...This follows a series of revelation regrading the use of derivatives by municipal authorities in the U.S., Italy, German, Austria and France where complex bets on interest rates were used to provide funding or cosmetically lower borrowing costs. Many of these transactions resulted in substantial losses and are now in dispute...Normal commercial transactions can be readily disguised using derivatives exacerbating risks and reducing market transparency. Current proposals to regulate derivatives do not focus on this issue...

fears; financial products; Grecian Derivative; loath; Satyajit Das's Blog.

naked capitalism Tue 2010-08-17 12:40 EDT

Guest Post: Why Clearninghouses Are a Maginot Line Against Systemic Risk

As discussed in ECONNED and on this blog, clearinghouses are not a solution to the systemic risk posed by credit default swaps, since there is no way to have a CDS counterparty post adequate margin and have the product be viable (to put it more simply, adequate margin make CDS uneconomic). ..I am one of the few people around who knows something about the clearing business and theory and is not employed by an investment bank or clearinghouse. At the end of my career on Wall Street, I was hired to perform a financial autopsy of the special purpose derivatives clearinghouse set up by California as part of an innovative power market structure. It had failed in the state's power crisis of 2001-02. Observing the tremendous systemic risk generated by using conventional clearing techniques for all but straightforward derivatives, I embarked on a seven year quest. I formed a company that designed a mathematical, IT and legal structure to provide a transparent and orderly system to manage the risks of those derivatives which shouldn't be cleared conventionally. Imagine my surprise when the banks decided against using the system...

Clearninghouses; Guest Post; Maginot Line; naked capitalism; systemic risk.

PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM Thu 2010-08-05 19:52 EDT

REGARDING THOSE ``STRONG'' CORPORATE BALANCE SHEETS

Brett Arends had an excellent piece on MarketWatch yesterday regarding the true state of US corporations...the total debts of these companies has...skyrocketed...corporations are even worse off today (in terms of debt levels) than they were when the crisis began...It's not just the consumer and banking sectors that remain overly indebted and poorly positioned in the long-run. The period of de-leveraging (balance sheet recession) is likely far from over and the continuation of the private sector weakness likely to continue until the problem of debt is accepted and dealt with...Private sector demand for debt is likely to remain very tepid and this will exacerbate the risk of deflation and economic weakness.

corporate balance sheets; PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM; strong.

New Economic Perspectives Tue 2010-08-03 14:12 EDT

The CBO's Misplaced Fear of a Looming Fiscal Crisis

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has just released an 8-page brief titled "Federal Debt and the Risk of a Fiscal Crisis." In it you will find all the traditional arguments regarding government deficits and debt: "unsustainability," "crowding out", bond rates rising to "unaffordable" levels because of fears that the Treasury would default or "monetize the debt," the need to raise taxes to pay for interest servicing and government spending, the need "to restore investor's confidence" by cutting government spending and raising taxes. This gives us an opportunity to go over those issues one more time...

CBO's Misplaced Fear; looming fiscal crisis; New Economic Perspectives.

naked capitalism Sat 2010-07-24 16:34 EDT

Summer Rerun: ``Unwinding the Fraud for Bubbles''

This post first appeared on March 27, 2007. ...Telling the difference between the victims and the victimizers, the predators and the prey, and the fraudulent and the defrauded, is getting a lot harder when you have borrowers not required to make down payments able to lie about their incomes in order to buy a home the seller is overpricing in order to take an illegal kickback. The lender is getting defrauded, but the lender is the one who offered the zero-down stated-income program, delegated the drawing up of the legal documents and the final disbursement of funds to a fee-for-service settlement agent, and didn't do enough due diligence on the appraisal to see the inflation of the value. Legally, of course, there's a difference between lender as co-conspirator and lender as mark, utterly failing to exercise reasonable caution, but it's small comfort when the losses rack up. With tongue only partially in cheek, I'm about to suggest a third category of fraud: Fraud for Bubbles...My theory of the Fraud for Bubbles is, in a nutshell, that it isn't that lenders forgot that there are risks. It is that the miserable dynamic of unsound lending puffing up unsustainable real estate prices, which in turn kept supporting even more unsound lending, simply masked fraud problems sufficiently, and delayed the eventual ``feedback'' mechanisms sufficiently, that rampant fraud came to seem ``affordable.'' So many of the business practices that help fraud succeed--thinning backoffice staff, hiring untrained temps to replace retiring (and pricey) veterans, speeding up review processes, cutting back on due diligence sampling, accepting more and more copies, faxes, and phone calls instead of original ink-signed documents--threw off so much money that no one wanted to believe that the eventual cost of the fraud would eat it all up, and possibly more...

bubble; fraud; naked capitalism; summer reruns; unwinds.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Fri 2010-07-23 11:01 EDT

Charting The Second Half Economic Slowdown

Goldman's Jan Hatzius...summarizes all the adverse trends that continue to not be priced into stocks. He notes that while the inventory cycle has boosted growth, this artificial rise is now losing steam. Key headwinds facing the economy are that fiscal policy, which has been expansionary, has now become to restrictive; that there has been no overshoot in layoffs for a mean reversion expectation; that the labor market multiplier is very much limited; that while capital spending is just modestly above replacement levels, the large output gap suggests spending should be subdued; the housing overhang is still huge and house prices have further to fall; that there are risks to US from European crisis; that inflation is dropping (and non-existent) even as utilization is low everywhere, which creates a major deflation risk; that the scary budget deficit will destroy any hope for future fiscal stimulus as public debt is surging out of control; lastly, with Taylor-implied Fed rates expected to be negative, the Fed's monetary policy arsenal is non-existent...

chart; dropped; economic slowdown; long; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-07-19 17:00 EDT

Satyajit Das Examines Eurozone Stability Fund Three Card Monte

...Central banks and governments have developed an alarming fondness for the very sort of fancy financial structures that investment banks used to camouflage and transfer risk and engage in regulatory arbitrage prior to the crisis...The Eurozone has taken this affinity for financial structuring legerdemain even further, drawing on the most abused structure of the crisis, collateralized debt obligations, to create (as before) super duper AAA credits from less promising material...Das has exposed one major source of vulnerability, that of the impact of ratings downgrades. Auerback points out another: a revolt by workers in the Austerian nations, who will recognized, intuitively, perhaps explicitly, that the sacrifices demanded of them are a transfer to bankers in other countries...

card monte; naked capitalism; Satyajit Das Examines Eurozone Stability Fund.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-07-16 16:15 EDT

What is Simon Johnson Smoking?

Simon Johnson...incorrectly celebrates a toothless provision in the Dodd-Frank bill as being tantamount to an anti-trust act for too big to fail banks...If we believed this bill was meaningful, action be taken against these banks immediately upon signing. Odds of that happening? Zero...The problem is it not merely the size of these firms, but the fact that they control infrastructure that is deemed critical to modern commerce. I'll get into specifics in short order, but in some cases the firm owns critical plumbing outright; in other cases, it is so tightly networked to other firms that mucking with it very much runs the risk of taking down the rest of the grid...Citi runs a big corporate cash management/reporting system called GTS...And no one is going to dare tamper with JP Morgan's clearing business...The problem is that it would take a radical restructuring of the very biggest banks, the critically placed dealer firms, and the most important payment and clearing operations to make a real dent in systemic risk. The officialdom the political lacked the will to do so at the peak of the crisis, and there is no basis for fantasizing that it will suddenly develop more nerve now.

naked capitalism; Simon Johnson Smoking.

Minyanville Fri 2010-07-16 14:43 EDT

Intel Shows the 'Financialization' of Corporate America

To quote the company's own earnings headline: "Intel Reports Best Quarter Ever."While not taking anything away from the company's ability to deliver I'd strongly encourage readers to look at Intel's (INTC) balance sheet. To these eyes it's filled with financial assets...few have paid attention to what I term the "financialization" of corporate balance sheets, in which productive manufacturing assets have been increasingly replaced by various financial instruments, derivatives, and goodwill...because so much of corporate balance-sheet space is now a function of credit and market risk, financialization has created much tighter correlations to financial institutions than many currently think...And with corporate balance sheets more and more laden with financial instruments, it isn't just going to be product innovation that drives what earnings are ahead for companies like Intel.

Corporate America; Financial; Intel shows; Minyanville.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Fri 2010-07-16 14:41 EDT

Guest Post: Why Goldman Could Pull It Off

The weaknesses in the S.E.C.'s case against Goldman were always obvious. At the end of the day, an investor who bought Abacus 2007 AC-1 was buying a static portfolio of risks....If you were a sophisticated investor who had done his due diligence, you didn't need to be told that the deal was designed to fail...If you actually reviewed the performance of mortgage backed securities held by the CDO, and understood how cash flow waterfalls and delinquency triggers worked, then you could see that subordinate tranches being insured for the benefit of Goldman were already worthless when the CDO closed. You could also figure out that the rating agencies had deliberately delayed announcing downgrades of the RMBS within the CDO, in order to keep the markets and the deal flow moving...The risk to Goldman was that more of its dirty laundry would be exposed...[but] the S.E.C. shows little appetite for digging deeper, especially since its new COO of the Enforcement Division is a 30-year-old kid from Goldman.

dropped; Goldman; Guest Post; long; pull; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

Wed 2010-06-09 18:45 EDT

London business figures embroiled in Kaupthing fraud investigation: Serious Fraud Office team thought to be to be scrutinising Deutsche Bank's role in alleged suspect trades| Business | The Guardian

A Serious Fraud Office investigation into Kaupthing, the failed Icelandic bank, is understood to be pursuing a number of allegations of market manipulation involving investment vehicles controlled by some of the bank's largest clients, including several high profile UK business leaders. It is alleged that in the weeks and months before Iceland's financial system went into meltdown, certain trades improperly used at least €500m (£413m) of Kaupthing funds in an effort to manipulate credit derivatives. Bank bosses hoped this would restore crumbling confidence in Kaupthing's solvency in the months before the bank collapsed in October 2008...The effect was for investment vehicles -- financed by Kaupthing loans, and at least nominally controlled by some of the bank's largest clients -- to take on risk associated with the bank going bust. Kaupthing loans were being use to write insurance against Kaupthing bonds defaulting...Iceland's Truth Commission obtained details of emails sent by Deutsche Bank staff to Kaupthing which, according to its report, demonstrated that the German bank had been offering advice on how to influence the CDS price on Kaupthing bonds from early 2008...

alleged suspect trades; business; Guardian; Kaupthing fraud investigation; London business figures embroiled; scrutinising Deutsche Bank's role; Serious Fraud Office team thought.

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