dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

damage inflicted Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

repair damage inflicted (1).

naked capitalism Sun 2010-07-25 16:28 EDT

The Irish mess

The Irish banks got in a big mess with duff RE loans. The government swapped discounted bad loans for government-issued bonds...the whole thing is the usual dump onto taxpayers...loans to no more than ten or a dozen of these developers account for EUR 20Bn of the EUR70Bn face value of the debts exchanged...The extra national debt incurred (so far) equates to EUR25,000 per taxpayer. And EUR6,500 of that goes to repair damage inflicted by just a dozen well-placed spivs. Then go for some fairly brutal austerity to sort out the new debt/GDP ratio (Irish unemployment was 13.5% the last time I looked). You will have some pretty discontented citizens, and the debt/GDP ratio will stay the same, or get worse, so you cut again...

Irish mess; naked capitalism.

Mon 2010-04-05 15:16 EDT

Eleven lessons from Iceland

Iceland's economic crisis has destroyed wealth equivalent to about seven times its GDP. The damage inflicted on foreign creditors, investors, and depositors amounts to about five times its GDP, while the asset losses thrust upon Icelandic residents account for the rest. These figures do not include the cost of Iceland's increased indebtedness. Iceland's gross public debt, domestic and foreign, is estimated to increase by more than 100% of GDP as a result of the collapse of the banks, or from 29% of GDP at the end of 2007 to 136% by the end of 2010. In 2009, the government spent almost as much on interest payments as on healthcare and social insurance, the single largest public expenditure item. The damage due to Iceland's tarnished reputation is harder to assess...the absence of checks and balances that had led to an unbalanced division of power between the strong executive branch and the much weaker legislative and judicial branches came to haunt the country when unscrupulous politicians put the new banks in the hands of reckless owners who then found themselves in a position to expand their balance sheets as if there were no tomorrow -- and no supervision. Politicians who privatise banks by delivering them on a silver plate to their friends are not very likely to subject the banks to stringent supervision or other such inconveniences...What can be done to reduce the likelihood of a repeat performance -- in Iceland and elsewhere?

Iceland; Lessons.