Thu 2010-09-23 09:33 EDT

Bob Rubin Just Wants to Be Cuddled

Iris Mack

[2010-04-29]...It's October 2007. I've just finished my morning jog on beautiful, sun-drenched Miami Beach and I'm getting a smoothie and a pastry at my usual place, Epicure Market. The subprime mortgage crisis is heading into full-swing mode; Jim Cramer had just done his crazy thing on TV, and you can feel the sky starting to fall all around you -- and that's a literal thing in Miami, where the cranes stopped on a lot of half-finished skyscrapers, the type where a few years back you'd hear about people flipping condos three times before the project even broke ground. (If there's ever a time that I don't regret leaving finance, it's now.) Anyway, I'm in line for the checkout, and a very familiar looking guy gets in line behind me. It's one of those situations where I'm not sure if I eyed him or he eyed me first, but I noticed him shortly when I turned to the left to swipe my debit card. He was standing right behind me in the checkout line - only a few feet away. He looked very familiar and famous, and while that's no rarity in Miami, it is when you realize it's because the guy looks like the former Treasury Secretary -- but maybe no, he's maybe not tall enough? -- and then somehow you finally just blurt out, "Hey, you look just like Bob Rubin!"...

Bob Rubin Just Wants; cuddling.

Dr. Housing Bubble Blog Thu 2010-09-16 16:36 EDT

Collapse in Southern California home sales a sign that prices will fall in 2011? The 2005 and 2006 collapse in sales led to prices tanking in 2007. Home prices still inflated after years of bank and government intervention.

drhousingbubble

Southern California home sales have collapsed for July and August. These are typically strong sales months. The summer is usually a solid time for sales but the introduction of government intervention, banks stalling, and toxic mortgages lingering on bank balance sheets have thrown a wrench into the typical home sales patterns. This August was the weakest month on record since August 2007, right when the California housing market was first entering the major price correction phase of the bursting bubble...

2005; 2006 collapse; 2007; 2011; bank; Collapse; Dr. Housing Bubble Blog; Fall; Government intervention; home prices; Inflation; Price; prices tank; sales led; signed; Southern California home sales; years.

naked capitalism Sat 2010-07-24 16:34 EDT

Summer Rerun: ``Unwinding the Fraud for Bubbles''

Tanta at Calculated Risk

This post first appeared on March 27, 2007. ...Telling the difference between the victims and the victimizers, the predators and the prey, and the fraudulent and the defrauded, is getting a lot harder when you have borrowers not required to make down payments able to lie about their incomes in order to buy a home the seller is overpricing in order to take an illegal kickback. The lender is getting defrauded, but the lender is the one who offered the zero-down stated-income program, delegated the drawing up of the legal documents and the final disbursement of funds to a fee-for-service settlement agent, and didn't do enough due diligence on the appraisal to see the inflation of the value. Legally, of course, there's a difference between lender as co-conspirator and lender as mark, utterly failing to exercise reasonable caution, but it's small comfort when the losses rack up. With tongue only partially in cheek, I'm about to suggest a third category of fraud: Fraud for Bubbles...My theory of the Fraud for Bubbles is, in a nutshell, that it isn't that lenders forgot that there are risks. It is that the miserable dynamic of unsound lending puffing up unsustainable real estate prices, which in turn kept supporting even more unsound lending, simply masked fraud problems sufficiently, and delayed the eventual ``feedback'' mechanisms sufficiently, that rampant fraud came to seem ``affordable.'' So many of the business practices that help fraud succeed--thinning backoffice staff, hiring untrained temps to replace retiring (and pricey) veterans, speeding up review processes, cutting back on due diligence sampling, accepting more and more copies, faxes, and phone calls instead of original ink-signed documents--threw off so much money that no one wanted to believe that the eventual cost of the fraud would eat it all up, and possibly more...

bubble; fraud; naked capitalism; summer reruns; unwinds.

Sat 2010-07-24 16:13 EDT

Disequilibria: A Constant State Of Instability >> The Shadow Banking System

RueTheDay

What we saw from mid-2007 through early-2009 was a run on the shadow banking system. There were two primary channels by which the shadow banking system operated: the Money Market/Commercial Paper Channel and the Repo Channel...we have largely unregulated [money market funds (MMMFs)] taking deposits (largely withdrawable on demand and usually checkable) and making the equivalent of loans, in other words, acting as banks. Except that the MMMFs were not subject to much in the way of prudential regulation beyond some broad parameters that dictated what investments they could buy, did not have access to FDIC deposit insurance, and did not have lender of last resort access to the Fed's discount window. They were a disaster waiting to happen...Repos also became a very popular mechanism for raising funds in the pre-crisis days, with MMMFs becoming large buyers of repos (lenders) and the broker dealers becoming both buyers and sellers (borrowers and lenders)...during the crisis...the classic maturity mismatch situation...concerns about the quality of commercial paper...triggered by the collapse of Lehman...Without the traditional protection of deposit insurance and lender of last resort financing by the Fed, it turned into a full blown panic...Any meaningful financial reform must bring the shadow banking system out of the shadows. It must be treated as banking, and its institutions regulated as banks...

constant state; Disequilibria; instability; Shadow banks Systems.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-07-19 17:07 EDT

Is the SEC Settlement Really a Win for Goldman?

Tom Adams and Yves Smith

...Conventional wisdom in the financial media is that the settlement announced by the SEC over its lawsuit on a Goldman 2007 Abacus CDO is a home run for Goldman. But a closer reading suggests that Goldman's victory is qualified, and the enthusiastic press response is in large measure due to the firm's skillful manipulation of perceptions...it is hard to see how anything in the settlement, if affirmed, would be negative for private parties considering lawsuits against sellers of CDOs...we imagine potential CDO investors will be mightily encouraged that Goldman ended up returning the full amount of investment to the one true third party investor in the deal -- IKB...An investor considering bringing an action against a bank that sold them a CDO that failed (meaning virtually all 2006 and 2007 ``mezzanine'' CDOs) would probably be encouraged that a bank was required to pay such a large amount for making inaccurate statements about the true nature of the CDO...Plaintiffs who sue CDO sellers have good reason to be optimistic...The settlement thus tarnishes the popular myth that the subprime shorts were insightful outsiders who executed ``the greatest trade ever''...the SEC has demonstrated that investors in such a CDO can win a recovery as a result of such inaccurate statements.

Goldman; naked capitalism; SEC Settlement Really; Wins.

New Deal 2.0 Fri 2010-07-16 18:50 EDT

Despite Foreign Debts, U.S. Has the Upper Hand

Henry Liu

U.S. public debt as of July 8, 2010 was $ 13.192 trillion against a projected 2010 GDP of $14.743 trillion. As of April 2010, China held $900.2 billion of US Treasuries, surpassing Japan's holding of $795.5 billion. As of 2007, outstanding GSE (Government Sponsored Enterprises like Fanny Mae; Freddy Mac) debt securities (non-mortgage and those backed by mortgages) summed up to $7.37 trillion. Does this mean disaster for the US? ...the U.S., while vulnerable, is not critically over a barrel by massive foreign holdings of U.S. sovereign debt. The reason is because U.S. sovereign debts are all denominated in dollars, a fiat currency that the Federal Reserve can issue at will. The U.S. has no foreign debt in the strict sense of the term. It has domestic debt denominated in its own fiat currency held in large quantities by foreign governments. The U.S. is never in danger of defaulting on its sovereign debt because it can print all the dollars necessary to pay off foreign holders of its debt. There is also no incentive for the foreign holders of U.S. sovereign debt to push for repayment, as that will only cause the U.S. to print more dollars to cause the dollar to fall further in exchange rates... ...trade globalization through cross-border wage arbitrage also pushes down wages in the US and other advanced economies, causing insufficient consumer income to absorb rising global production. This is the main cause of the current financial crises which have made more severe by financial deregulation. But the root cause is global overcapacity due to low wages of workers who cannot afford to buy what they produce. The world economy is plagued with overcapacity as a result. It is not enough to merely focus on job creation. Jobs must pay wages high enough to eliminate overcapacity. Instead of a G20 coordination on fiscal austerity, there needs to be a G20 commitment to raise wages globally. [Henry C.K. Liu]

0; Foreign debt; new dealing 2; U.S.; upper hand.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Fri 2010-07-16 14:41 EDT

Guest Post: Why Goldman Could Pull It Off

David Fiderer

The weaknesses in the S.E.C.'s case against Goldman were always obvious. At the end of the day, an investor who bought Abacus 2007 AC-1 was buying a static portfolio of risks....If you were a sophisticated investor who had done his due diligence, you didn't need to be told that the deal was designed to fail...If you actually reviewed the performance of mortgage backed securities held by the CDO, and understood how cash flow waterfalls and delinquency triggers worked, then you could see that subordinate tranches being insured for the benefit of Goldman were already worthless when the CDO closed. You could also figure out that the rating agencies had deliberately delayed announcing downgrades of the RMBS within the CDO, in order to keep the markets and the deal flow moving...The risk to Goldman was that more of its dirty laundry would be exposed...[but] the S.E.C. shows little appetite for digging deeper, especially since its new COO of the Enforcement Division is a 30-year-old kid from Goldman.

dropped; Goldman; Guest Post; long; pull; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

New Deal 2.0 Mon 2010-07-12 16:51 EDT

The Unlearned Lesson of the 1987 Crash

Henry Liu revisits the stock market crash of 1987 to dispel free market fundamentalism and the neo-conservative lust for deregulation...The Federal Reserve's actions under Greenspan in 1987 led market participants to conclude that the Fed would emphasize domestic market objectives with accommodative monetary stance, if necessary at the cost of a further decline in the dollar. By year-end, the dollar's value had fallen 21% against the yen and 14% against the mark from its levels at the time of the Louvre Accord while Greenspan, the wizard of bubble-land, was on his way to being hailed as the greatest central banker in history. Two decades later, by 2007, the Greenspan put was called by the market and trillions of dollars were lost.

0; 1987 crash; new dealing 2; unlearned lessons.

Fri 2010-06-18 10:37 EDT

Monetary Economics Review

Pablo Gabriel Bortz

Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth, W. Godley and M. Lavoie, Palgrave/Macmillan, London, 2007...Acknowledging the existence of a complex institutional structure that includes households, firms, banks and governments (sometimes separated from the Central Bank), "our aspiration is to introduce a new way in which an understanding can be gained as to how these very complicated systems work as a whole"...the "new way" referred above is currently known as Stock-Flow Consistent modelling (SFC)...The main bid of Godley and Lavoie (G&L, from now on) is to show (successfully, one could note) that the SFC models make it necessary to fully articulate an accounting structure, avoiding "black holes", gaining in consistency, accuracy, and providing a common framework for the comparison of different models...one gets really convinced that it is the type of approach that makes it possible to analyse a great number of elements and complexities of the real world, as much as one wishes!...G&L adopt an institutional classification (households, firms, banks, government and the central bank). All the models presented in the book start with a "balance sheet" matrix, where all the assets and liabilities of each sector are described...

Monetary Economics Review.

Fri 2010-06-18 10:24 EDT

The Progressive Economics Forum >> Remembering Wynne Godley

Jim Stanford

Progressive economists everywhere should say a thank you this week to Wynne Godley, who passed away May 13...His final major volume (published by Palgrave in 2007) was a tour de force of heterodox macro theory, co-written with Canada's (and the PEF's) own Marc Lavoie: Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth. Like Minsky, he can say ``I told you so'' to the whole neoclassical profession - although unlike Minsky, Godley could do this while he was still alive...His work exploring the implications of basic macro identities (such as the basic but oft-ignored fact that all sector deficits in the economy have to sum to zero in equilibrium, and hence not all sectors can be paying down debt simultaneously - someone must be increasing their debt to keep the money flowing) has influenced heterodox writers of all stripes...

Progressive Economics Forum; Remembering Wynne Godley.

billy blog Mon 2010-06-14 18:13 EDT

The OECDs perverted view of fiscal policy

...the big neo-liberal economic organisations like the IMF and the OECD are trying to re-assert their intellectual authority on the policy debate again after being unable to provide any meaningful insights into the cause of the global crisis or its immediate remedies. They were relatively quiet in the early days of the crisis and the IMF even issued an apology, albeit a conditional one. It is clear that the policies the OECD and the IMF have promoted over the last decades have not helped those in poorer nations solve poverty and have also maintained persistently high levels of labour underutilisation across most advanced economies. It is also clear that the economic policies these agencies have been promoting for years were instrumental in creating the conditions that ultimately led to the collapse in 2007. Now they are emerging, unashamed, and touting even more destructive policy frameworks...

Billy Blog; fiscal policies; OECDs perverted view.

naked capitalism Tue 2010-06-01 20:06 EDT

When Will Europe Have Its Wile E. Coyote Moment?

...The current program instead is ultimately about protecting Eurobanks from losses, and is destined to fail. John Mauldin, in his newsletters, has been featuring the work of Rob Parenteau, as featured first here on Naked Capitalism (and a source of much reader ire): that deleveraging the public sector and the private sector at the same time is impossible absent a big rise in exports. Pretty much every major economy is on a ``reduce government debt'' campaign. Many are also on a ``deleverage the private sector'' program too (which is warranted, given the amount of profligate lending that occurred). The problem, however, is that these states can't all increase exports, particularly to the degree sought...Rob Parenteau drew out the implications in an earlier post: ``...if households and businesses in the peripheral nations stubbornly defend their current net saving positions [continue to reduce debt levels], the attempt at fiscal retrenchment will be thwarted by a deflationary drop in nominal GDP. ''...This feels like 2007 all over again, with the authorities insistent that Things Will Be Fine, when a realistic assessment suggests the reverse.

Europe; naked capitalism; Wile E. Coyote Moment.

Mon 2010-05-24 10:55 EDT

The Root Cause Of Recurring Global Financial Crises

Henry Liu

Severe global financial crises have been recurring every decade: the 1987 crash, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2007 Credit Crisis. This recurring pattern had been generated by wholesale financial deregulation around the world. But the root causes have been dollar hegemony and the Washington Consensus...The Washington Consensus has since been characterized as a ``bashing of the state'' (Annual Report of the United Nations, 1998) and a ``new imperialism'' (M Shahid Alam, ``Does Sovereignty Matter for Economic Growth?'', 1999). But the real harm of the Washington Consensus has yet to be properly recognized: that it is a prescription for generating failed states around the world among developing economies that participate in globalized financial markets. Even in the developed economies, neo-liberalism generates a dangerous but generally unacknowledged failed-state syndrome.

Recurring Global Financial Crises; root cause.

The Money Game Sat 2010-05-22 21:47 EDT

The Root Cause Of Recurring Global Financial Crises

Henry Liu

Severe global financial crises have been recurring every decade: the 1987 crash, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2007 Credit Crisis. This recurring pattern had been generated by wholesale financial deregulation around the world. But the root causes have been dollar hegemony and the Washington Consensus. -- The Case of Greece --Following misguided neo-liberal market fundamentalist advice, Greece abandoned its national currency, the drachma, in favor of the euro in 2002. This critically consequential move enabled the Greek government to benefit from the strength of the euro, albeit not derived exclusively from the strength of the Greek economy, but from the strength of the economies of the stronger Eurozone member states, to borrow at lower interest rates collateralized by Greek assets denominated in euros. With newly available credit, Greece then went on a debt-funded spending spree, including high-profile projects such as the 2004 Athens Olympics that left the Greek nation with high sovereign debts not denominated in its national currency...

Money game; Recurring Global Financial Crises; root cause.

Wed 2010-05-19 13:23 EDT

Conspiracy of Banks Rigging States Came With Crash (Update1)

...a nationwide conspiracy in which financial advisers to municipalities colluded with Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Wachovia Corp. and 11 other banks... rigged bids on auctions for so-called guaranteed investment contracts, known as GICs, according to a Justice Department list that was filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan on March 24 and then put under seal. Those contracts hold tens of billions of taxpayer money...The workings of the conspiracy -- which stretched from California to Pennsylvania and included more than 200 deals involving about 160 state agencies, local governments and non- profits -- can be pieced together from the Justice Department's indictment of CDR, civil lawsuits by governments around the country, e-mails obtained by Bloomberg News and interviews with current and former bankers and public officials. "The whole investment process was rigged across the board," said Charlie Anderson, who retired in 2007 as head of field operations for the Internal Revenue Service's tax-exempt bond division. "It was so commonplace that people talked about it on the phones of their employers and ignored the fact that they were being recorded." Anderson said he referred scores of cases to the Justice Department when he was with the IRS. He estimates that bid rigging cost taxpayers billions of dollars...

Banks Rigging States Came; conspiracy; Crash; Update1.

zero hedge Wed 2010-05-19 11:37 EDT

Guest Post: Goldman's CDOs Had Nothing to Do With the Real Estate Bubble

David Fiderer

If Goldman Sachs wanted to reduce its exposure to subprime mortgage investments, why didn't it simply sell the assets it owned? Two reasons: First, those large sales would have sent a signal that something was terribly, terribly wrong, and thereby pushed prices down further. That's how supply and demand normally works. Second, Goldman professed to be market maker, which uses its trading book to instill confidence. It ostensibly bought, sold and inventoried mortgage securities to provide stability and liquidity to the marketplace. Of course, we now know that such market confidence was entirely misplaced. To sidestep these issues, Goldman and other major banks found a solution that subverted the laws of supply and demand, and escaped the price discovery of a transparent marketplace. They fabricated synthetic CDOs, such as Abacus 2007 AC-1. These toxic assets, invented out of thin air, made the meltdown worse than it otherwise would have been...

Goldman's CDOs; Guest Post; real estate bubble; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Tue 2010-05-11 09:04 EDT

Richard Smith: Another Nail in the ``Hoocoodanode'' Defense, Circa April 2007

Richard Smith

Here's someone with his head screwed on, back in April 2007, who proves singlehandedly that ``hoocoodanode'' was no defense for failing to anticipate the implosion of the shadow banking system (more on this prescient analyst in due course)...So who is this fellow who got it, back in that mythical time when nobody knew what was going on? According to an email correspondent of mine, he is ``a no-name equity guy'' in London. Actually his name is Henry Maxey, and he is chief investment officer and chief executive elect of Ruffer LLP, a small London fund manager. So there's no chance of making him US Treasury Secretary or head of the NYFRB, I'm afraid...

Circa April 2007; defense; Hoocoodanode; nail; naked capitalism; Richard Smith.

Tue 2010-05-11 09:02 EDT

Barofsky Says Criminal Charges Possible in Alleged AIG Coverup - Bloomberg.com

Richard Teitelbaum

...The TARP watchdog [Neil Barofsy] has also criticized Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner in reports and in congressional testimony for his handling of the process by which insurance giant American International Group Inc. was saved from insolvency in 2008, when Geithner was head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The secrecy that enveloped the deal was unwarranted, Barofsky says, adding that his probe of an alleged New York Fed coverup in the AIG case could result in criminal or civil charges. In Senate Finance Committee testimony on April 20, Barofsky said SIGTARP would investigate seven AIG-linked mortgage-related securities similar to Abacus 2007-AC1, the instrument underwritten by Goldman Sachs Group Inc. that is at the center of a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission lawsuit filed against the investment bank on April 16...

Alleged AIG Coverup; Barofsky Says Criminal Charges Possible; Bloomberg; com.

Mon 2010-04-05 15:16 EDT

Eleven lessons from Iceland

Thorvaldur Gylfason

Iceland's economic crisis has destroyed wealth equivalent to about seven times its GDP. The damage inflicted on foreign creditors, investors, and depositors amounts to about five times its GDP, while the asset losses thrust upon Icelandic residents account for the rest. These figures do not include the cost of Iceland's increased indebtedness. Iceland's gross public debt, domestic and foreign, is estimated to increase by more than 100% of GDP as a result of the collapse of the banks, or from 29% of GDP at the end of 2007 to 136% by the end of 2010. In 2009, the government spent almost as much on interest payments as on healthcare and social insurance, the single largest public expenditure item. The damage due to Iceland's tarnished reputation is harder to assess...the absence of checks and balances that had led to an unbalanced division of power between the strong executive branch and the much weaker legislative and judicial branches came to haunt the country when unscrupulous politicians put the new banks in the hands of reckless owners who then found themselves in a position to expand their balance sheets as if there were no tomorrow -- and no supervision. Politicians who privatise banks by delivering them on a silver plate to their friends are not very likely to subject the banks to stringent supervision or other such inconveniences...What can be done to reduce the likelihood of a repeat performance -- in Iceland and elsewhere?

Iceland; Lessons.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-03-29 13:48 EDT

Thinking the Unthinkable: What if China Devalues the Renminbi?

Marshall Auerback

Conventional wisdom holds that the Chinese are due (as in overdue) for a revaluation of their currency, the renminbi...We question whether a revaluation is the right answer for them, and more important, whether the Chinese themselves see a revaluation as a plus. The government has engineered an enormous increase in money and credit in the past year. In fact, it seems to be as great as 5 years' growth in credit in the previous Chinese bubble. The increase in money and credit is so great and so abrupt that you tend to get a high inflation quite quickly even if there are under utilised resources. Add to this the fact that China simultaneously is providing massive fiscal stimulus...Inflation can take off and thereby begin to ERODE the competitiveness of Chinese exports. Nouriel Roubini pointed out this issue in 2007: if China didn't revalue, inflation would do the trick regardless. A continued high rate of inflation relative to its trade partners would push up the price of goods in home currency terms, which in turn translates into higher export prices. This might be the real reason why China is so reticent to revalue its currency. The Americans might go crazy if the Chinese devalued, but if the inflation is high enough, they might have to do it, as it will severely erode their terms of trade and cause their tradeables sector to collapse.

China Devalue; naked capitalism; renminbi; Think; unthinkable.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 16:42 EDT

Indefensible Men

From the December 2009 issue of The Baffler (no online version of this article available). For those not familiar with The Baffler, this is the revival of a magazine of business and culture edited by Thomas Frank that had previously been published from 1988 to 2007. This issue was called ``Margin Call'' and included articles by Matt Taibbi, Naomi Klein, Michael Lind. I believe readers will find this piece to be relevant. Enjoy! Since inequalities of privilege are greater than could possibly be defended rationally, the intelligence of privileged groups is usually applied to the task of inventing specious proofs for the theory that universal values spring from, and that general interests are served by, the special privileges which they hold. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society

Indefensible Men; naked capitalism.

naked capitalism Sun 2010-02-28 13:13 EST

Das: Mark to Make Believe -- Still Toxic After All These Years!

Satyajit Das

n 2007, as the credit crisis commenced, paradoxically, nobody actually defaulted. Outside of sub-prime delinquencies, corporate defaults were at a record low. Instead, investors in high quality (AAA or AA) rated securities, that are unlikely to suffer real losses if held to maturity, faced paper -- mark-to-market (``MtM'') -- losses. In modern financial markets, market values drive asset values, profits and losses, risk calculations and the value of collateral supporting loans. Accounting standards, both in the U.S.A. and internationally, are now based on theoretically sound market values that are problematic in practice. The standards emerged from the past financial crisis where the use of ``historic cost'' accounting meant that losses on loans remained undisclosed because they continued to be carried at face value. The standards also reflect the fact that many modern financial instruments (such as derivatives) can only be accounted for in MtM framework. MtM accounting itself is flawed. There are difficulties in establishing real values of many instruments. It creates volatility in earnings attributable to inefficiencies in markets rather than real changes in financial position...

Das; Make-Believe; marked; naked capitalism; toxic; years.

New Deal 2.0 Sat 2010-02-27 22:55 EST

GSE Losses As Shadow Bailout

Roosevelt Institute Fellow Mike Konczal

...As the private sector started to dump housing and housing bonds quickly in 2007 and 2008, government officials made sure that the GSEs would be capable of absorbing these bad loans...This constitutes one part of many ``shadow bailouts'' according to Roosevelt Institute senior fellows Rob Johnson and Tom Ferguson; this argument, and the graph above, is from their Too Big to Bail: The `Paulson Put,' Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown Part II paper. (In Part I, they argue that the Federal Home Loan Bank System was also used in a similar manner.) Astute readers will notice that the action of government officials using public funding sources to provide makeshift backstops for losses of the banking sector to clear the balance sheets of toxic assets to ``unlock the frozen credit market'', without having to go to Congress for funding, was also a central feature of Geithner's PPIP plan, with FDIC stepping up to the plate once the GSEs went bust...

0; GSE losses; new dealing 2; Shadow Bailout.