Christopher Whalen Fri 2010-09-17 19:31 EDT

The key to the future of finance is now emerging

Christopher Whalen

Basel III is entirely irrelevant to the economic situation and even to the banks. Through things like minimum capital levels, the Basel II rules provided the illusion of intelligent design in the regulation of banking and finance. In fact, Basel II made the subprime crisis possible and the subsequent bailout inevitable [by enabling off-balance sheet finance and OTC derivatives]...Part of the reason for my undisguised contempt for the Basel III process comes from caution regarding the benefits of regulating markets...But a large portion of my criticism for Basel III and the entire Basel framework is even more basic, namely the notion that any form of a priori regulation, public or private, can prevent people from doing stupid things...The key premise of Basel III is that the use of minimum capital guidelines and other strictures will somehow enable regulators to prevent a crises before it occurs. The only trouble is that regulators have no objective measures for compliance with Basel II/III, much less predicting market breaks...As in past decades and crises right through to 2008, the regulators will be the last to know about a problem...

Christopher Whalen; Emergency; finance; future; Key.

Dr. Housing Bubble Blog Thu 2010-09-16 16:36 EDT

Collapse in Southern California home sales a sign that prices will fall in 2011? The 2005 and 2006 collapse in sales led to prices tanking in 2007. Home prices still inflated after years of bank and government intervention.

drhousingbubble

Southern California home sales have collapsed for July and August. These are typically strong sales months. The summer is usually a solid time for sales but the introduction of government intervention, banks stalling, and toxic mortgages lingering on bank balance sheets have thrown a wrench into the typical home sales patterns. This August was the weakest month on record since August 2007, right when the California housing market was first entering the major price correction phase of the bursting bubble...

2005; 2006 collapse; 2007; 2011; bank; Collapse; Dr. Housing Bubble Blog; Fall; Government intervention; home prices; Inflation; Price; prices tank; sales led; signed; Southern California home sales; years.

The Baseline Scenario Wed 2010-09-08 10:36 EDT

Irish Worries For The Global Economy

Peter Boone and Simon Johnson

...Ireland's difficulties arose because of a massive property boom financed by cheap credit from Irish banks. Ireland's three main banks built up loans and investments by 2008 that were three times the size of the national economy; these big banks (relative to the economy) pushed the frontier in terms of reckless lending. The banks got the upside, and then came the global crash...Today roughly one-third of the loans on the balance sheets of major banks are nonperforming...The government responded to this with what are currently regarded as ``standard'' policies in Europe and America. It guaranteed all the liabilities of banks and began injecting government funds to keep these financial institutions afloat. It bought the most worthless assets from banks, paying them government bonds in return. Ministers have promised to recapitalize banks that need more capital. Despite or perhaps because of this therapy, financial markets are beginning to see Ireland as Europe's next Greece...Until very recently, Ireland was seen as Europe's poster child of prudent reforms...The ultimate result of Ireland's bank bailout exercise is obvious: one way or another, the government will have converted the liabilities of private banks into debts of the sovereign (that is, Irish taxpayers), yet the nation probably cannot afford these debts...The idea that Ireland, Greece or Portugal can cut spending and grow out of overvalued exchange rates with still large budget deficits, while servicing all their debts and building more debt, is proving -- not surprisingly -- wrong...

Baseline Scenario; global economy; Irish worries.

Money Game Wed 2010-09-01 10:53 EDT

Why Ben Bernanke's Next Round Of Quantitative Easing Will Be Another Huge Flop

There is perhaps, no greater misunderstanding in the investment world today than the topic of quantitative easing [QE]. After all, it sounds so fancy, strange and complex. But in reality, it is quite a simple operation...The Fed simply electronically swaps an asset with the private sector. In most cases it swaps deposits with an interest bearing asset...The theory behind QE is that the Fed can reduce interest rates via asset purchases (which supposedly creates demand for debt) while also strengthening the bank balance sheet (which entices them to lend). Unfortunately, we've lived thru this scenario before and history shows us that neither is actually true. Banks are never reserve constrained and a private sector that is deeply indebted will not likely be enticed to borrow regardless of the rate of interest...The most glaring example of failed QE is in Japan in 2001. Richard Koo refers to this event as the ``greatest monetary non-event''...Since Ben Bernanke initiated his great monetarist gaffe in 2008 there has been almost no sign of a sustainable private sector recovery. Mr. Bernanke's new form of trickle down economics has surely fixed the banking sector (or at least bought some time), but the recovery ended there. ..The hyperventilating hyperinflationists and those investors calling for inevitable US default are now clinging to this QE story as their inflation or default thesis crumbles before their very eyes...With the government merely swapping assets they are not actually ``printing'' any new money. In fact, the government is now essentially stealing interest bearing assets from the private sector and replacing them with deposits...now that the banks are flush with excess reserves this policy response would in fact be deflationary - not inflationary...

Ben Bernanke's; Huge Flop; Money game; Quantitative Easing.

Mon 2010-08-16 13:54 EDT

Could The US Become Another Ireland? >> The Baseline Scenario

Peter Boone and Simon Johnson

As Greece acts in an intransigent manner, refusing to act decisively despite deep fiscal difficulties, the financial markets look on Ireland all the more favorably. Ireland is seen as the poster child for prudent fiscal adjustment among the weaker eurozone countries...Ireland's perceived ``success'' is partly due to its draconian fiscal cuts...Ireland's difficulties arose because of a massive property boom financed by cheap credit from Irish banks...Today roughly 1/3 of the loans on the balance sheets of banks are non-performing or ``under surveillance''...The government...guaranteed all the liabilities of banks and then began injecting government funds...it is planning to buy the most worthless assets from banks and pay them government bonds in return. Ministers have also promised to recapitalize banks than need more capital. The ultimate result of this exercise is obvious: one way or another, the government will have converted the liabilities of private banks into debts of the sovereign (i.e., Irish taxpayers)...The government is gambling that GDP growth will recover to over 4% per year starting 2012 -- and they still plan further major expenditure cutting and revenue increasing measures each year until 2013...The latest round of bank bailouts (swapping bad debts for government bonds) dramatically exacerbates the fiscal problem...

Baseline Scenario; Becomes; Ireland.

Sat 2010-08-07 19:40 EDT

The biggest lie about U.S. companies

Brett Arends' ROI - MarketWatch

You may have heard recently that U.S. companies have emerged from the financial crisis in robust health, that they've paid down their debts, rebuilt their balance sheets and are sitting on growing piles of cash they are ready to invest in the economy...It's a crock...their debts have been rising, not falling. By some measures, they are now more leveraged than at any time since the Great Depression...gross domestic debts of nonfinancial corporations now amount to 50% of GDP. That's a postwar record...net leverage is nearly 50% of corporate net worth, a modern record...

biggest lie; U.S. companies.

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-08-05 20:20 EDT

Do Deficits Matter? Foreign Lending to the Treasury

L. Randall Wray

...a US current account deficit will be reflected in foreign accumulation of US Treasuries, held mostly by foreign central banks...While this is usually presented as foreign ``lending'' to ``finance'' the US budget deficit, one could just as well see the US current account deficit as the source of foreign current account surpluses that can be accumulated as treasuries...most public discussion ignores the fact that the Chinese desire to run a trade surplus with the US is linked to its desire to accumulate dollar assets...all of the following are linked...the willingness of Chinese to produce for export, the willingness of China to accumulate dollar-denominated assets, the shortfall of Chinese domestic demand that allows China to run a trade surplus, the willingness of Americans to buy foreign products, the (relatively) high level of US aggregate demand that results in a trade deficit, and the factors that result in a US government budget deficit...I am not arguing that the current situation will go on forever, although I do believe it will persist much longer than most commentators presume...there are strong incentives against the sort of simple, abrupt, and dramatic shifts often posited as likely scenarios...I expect that the complexity as well as the linkages among balance sheets ensure that transitions will be moderate and slow...

credit writedowns; deficits matter; foreign lending; Treasury.

PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM Thu 2010-08-05 19:52 EDT

REGARDING THOSE ``STRONG'' CORPORATE BALANCE SHEETS

TPC

Brett Arends had an excellent piece on MarketWatch yesterday regarding the true state of US corporations...the total debts of these companies has...skyrocketed...corporations are even worse off today (in terms of debt levels) than they were when the crisis began...It's not just the consumer and banking sectors that remain overly indebted and poorly positioned in the long-run. The period of de-leveraging (balance sheet recession) is likely far from over and the continuation of the private sector weakness likely to continue until the problem of debt is accepted and dealt with...Private sector demand for debt is likely to remain very tepid and this will exacerbate the risk of deflation and economic weakness.

corporate balance sheets; PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM; strong.

Credit Writedowns Fri 2010-07-30 15:30 EDT

Subversive Economists

The economic research staff at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has been busy. Last week we wrote about the New York Fed's Staff Report No. 458 , which discussed the shadow banking system in the United States. Today we refer to two other new reports: Staff Report No. 457 , entitled ``Resolving Troubled Systemically Important Cross-Border Financial Institutions: Is a New Corporate Organizational Form Required?'', and Staff Report No. 463 , ``The Central-Bank Balance Sheet as an Instrument of Monetary Policy.'' After reviewing them, we are left to conclude that these three papers demonstrate that the research staff at the New York Fed is perhaps the most subversive group of working economists currently on the government payroll....The combination of these three papers seems to suggest that the Federal Reserve is conducting a serious re-evaluation of its traditional role in the new financial landscape. No. 458 acknowledges that the shadow banking system is huge, but largely beyond the regulatory reach--and backstopping help--of the Fed. No. 457 suggests that the complexity of a large, modern financial institution is not only a challenge for managers, but is also a challenge for regulators. It is a cri de coeur for simplicity. And No. 463 breaks new ground by explicitly including central bank balance sheet management as a part of the monetary policy model...

credit writedowns; Subversive Economists.

Dr. Housing Bubble Blog Fri 2010-07-30 15:22 EDT

Banks cherry picking individual foreclosures that show up on the MLS in Culver City and Pasadena with proof: Southern California lenders pushing out properties in Culver City with an average price tag of $300,000. Median sale price for city is $600,000. Shadow inventory average price is $443,000 with loans at an average of $552,000. 141,000 homes in Southern California are distressed yet MLS only reflects 83,000 total properties.

...Prices even today are disconnected from market fundamentals. Inventory is still growing and the shadow inventory figures remain elevated...The bulk of properties are sitting hidden in bank balance sheets and are part of the shadow inventory...For Pasadena, for every one listed foreclosure or short sale, you can be assured that there are 5 other properties sitting in the depths of a bank balance sheet. Keep in mind this is for a highly desirable area...the numbers look nearly the same in Culver City. For every one distressed property on the MLS, you have 5 others hidden in some bank balance sheet. Now when I look at this data what I see is a façade in Southern California real estate...Banks are basically trying to avoid facing the music and realizing the reality that these properties are overpriced (people can't even keep up with their payments). Does any of this data look like a healthy market?

000; 000 home; 000 total properties; 141; 300; 443; 552; 600; Average; average price tag; Banks cherry picking individual foreclosures; Citi; Culver city; distressed; Dr. Housing Bubble Blog; Loans; median sales price; MLS; Pasadena; proof; property; reflects 83; Shadow inventory average price; showed; Southern California; Southern California lenders pushing.

Wed 2010-07-28 10:55 EDT

Economics: No, America lacks the necessary commitment to stimulus | The Economist

Richard Koo

...the US today is suffering from a balance sheet recession, a very rare ailment which happens only after the bursting of a nationwide debt-financed asset price bubble. In this type of recession, the private sector is minimising debt instead of maximising profits because the collapse in asset prices left its balance sheets in a serious state of excess liability and in urgent need of repair...fiscal stimulus becomes indispensible in a balance sheet recession. Moreover, the stimulus must be maintained until private sector deleveraging is over...When the deficit hawks manage to remove the fiscal stimulus while the private sector is still deleveraging, the economy collapses and re-enters the deflationary spiral. That weakness, in turn, prompts another fiscal stimulus, only to see it removed again by the deficit hawks once the economy stabilises. This unfortunate cycle can go on for years if the experience of post-1990 Japan is any guide. The net result is that the economy remains in the doldrums for years, and many unemployed workers will never find jobs in what appears to be structural unemployment even though there is nothing structural about their predicament...

America lacked; economic; Economist; necessary commitments; stimulus.

Minyanville Fri 2010-07-16 14:43 EDT

Intel Shows the 'Financialization' of Corporate America

Peter Atwater

To quote the company's own earnings headline: "Intel Reports Best Quarter Ever."While not taking anything away from the company's ability to deliver I'd strongly encourage readers to look at Intel's (INTC) balance sheet. To these eyes it's filled with financial assets...few have paid attention to what I term the "financialization" of corporate balance sheets, in which productive manufacturing assets have been increasingly replaced by various financial instruments, derivatives, and goodwill...because so much of corporate balance-sheet space is now a function of credit and market risk, financialization has created much tighter correlations to financial institutions than many currently think...And with corporate balance sheets more and more laden with financial instruments, it isn't just going to be product innovation that drives what earnings are ahead for companies like Intel.

Corporate America; Financial; Intel shows; Minyanville.

Fri 2010-06-18 10:37 EDT

Monetary Economics Review

Pablo Gabriel Bortz

Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth, W. Godley and M. Lavoie, Palgrave/Macmillan, London, 2007...Acknowledging the existence of a complex institutional structure that includes households, firms, banks and governments (sometimes separated from the Central Bank), "our aspiration is to introduce a new way in which an understanding can be gained as to how these very complicated systems work as a whole"...the "new way" referred above is currently known as Stock-Flow Consistent modelling (SFC)...The main bid of Godley and Lavoie (G&L, from now on) is to show (successfully, one could note) that the SFC models make it necessary to fully articulate an accounting structure, avoiding "black holes", gaining in consistency, accuracy, and providing a common framework for the comparison of different models...one gets really convinced that it is the type of approach that makes it possible to analyse a great number of elements and complexities of the real world, as much as one wishes!...G&L adopt an institutional classification (households, firms, banks, government and the central bank). All the models presented in the book start with a "balance sheet" matrix, where all the assets and liabilities of each sector are described...

Monetary Economics Review.

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-06-03 17:56 EDT

Guest Post: The 2004 Fed Transcripts: A Methodical, Diabolical Destruction of America's "Wealth"

Frederick Sheehan

The Federal Reserve releases transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings with a five-year lag (as required by law, the Fed would like to burn them). Transcripts for 2004 meetings were released on April 30, 2010...FOMC transcripts in 2004 confirm the Fed was afraid of markets...The FOMC seemed most concerned that higher rates might interfere with the carry trade. In the sad tale of The Financialization of the United States, the carry trade deserves a chapter...By 2004, the carry trade was a mammoth enterprise of hedge funds and banks. The too-big-to-fail banks were, by now, leveraging their own internally managed hedge funds, managing their own proprietary trading desks, and also lending to highly leveraged hedge funds. Leverage, and, the belief that access to rising levels of credit would never end, pushed up asset values on bank balance sheets -- whether real estate, bonds, stocks, or private-equity. This increased the banks' lending capacity which encouraged banks to lend more...Markets believed asset prices would only go up for many silly reasons. Belief in the Greenspan Put may have been the silliest but also the most influential...Federal Reserve Governor Donald Kohn...told his confreres that Federal Reserve policy was to distort asset prices. He also said this was deliberate and desirable. In other words, distorted asset prices were not an unfortunate consequence of such-and-such Fed policy. The Fed's goal was to distort asset prices...Consumer spending exceeded consumer income...This strategy of fixing asset prices at an artificially high rate to fool the American people into spending money they did not have was diabolical...The manipulation of markets and of the American people has grown worse under Bernanke's chairmanship...

2004 Fed Transcripts; America's; credit writedowns; Diabolical Destruction; Guest Post; Method; wealth.

Tue 2010-06-01 18:24 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirit of debate ... my reply Part 2

Bill Mitchell

Today, I offer Part 2 of my responses to the comments raised in the debate so far...Modern monetary theory does not use the term ``money'' in the same way as the mainstream because it creates instant confusion. As Scott said ``Money is always someone's liability, so better to be precise about whose liabilities we are talking about than saying money.'' That is why we emphasis fully understanding the asset-liability matches that occur in monetary systems. And that leads you to realise that transactions between government and non-government create or destroy net financial assets denominated in the currency of issue whereas transactions within the non-government sector cannot create net financial positions...So modern monetary theorists prefer to concentrate on what is going on with balance sheets after certain flows have occured rather than narrowly defining some financial assets as money and others not...There is no doubt that the non-government institutions can increase credit. Some slack analysts call this an increase in money. But the accurate statement is that, as a matter of accounting it increases the (in Scott's words) ``the quantity of financial assets and financial liabilities 1 for 1 in the non-govt sector. So, with private credit, there is BY DEFINITION no NET increase in private sector financial assets created.'' Once we understand that and note that typically the non-government sector seeks to net save in the currency of issue then modern monetary theory tells you that the public sector must run a deficit to underwrite this desired net saving or else see an output gap widen...Who is in control is an interesting question. Clearly, the government cannot directly control the money supply which renders much of the analysis in mainstream macroeconomics textbooks as being irrelevant. The Monetarists via Milton Friedman persuaded central banks to adopt monetary targetting in the 1980s and it failed a few years later -- miserably...Then you might like to consider it from the other angle -- a government which accepts responsibility for full employment can ``finance'' the saving desires of the non-government sector by increasing its deficit up to the level warranted by the spending gap (left by the full employment non-government savings)...Orthodox macroeconomic theory struggles with the idea of involuntary unemployment and typically tries to fudge the explanation by appealing to market rigidities (typically nominal wage inflexibility). However, in general, the orthodox framework cannot convincingly explain systemic constraints that comprehensively negate individual volition. The modern monetary framework clearly explicates how involuntary unemployment arises. The private sector, in aggregate, may desire to spend less of the monetary unit of account than it earns. In this case, if this gap in spending is not met by government, then unemployment will occur. Nominal (or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless they somehow eliminate the private sector desire to net save and increase spending...to maintain high levels of employment and given that the public generally desire to hold some reserves of fiat money, the government balance will normally have to be in deficit...modern monetary theory demonstrates that if you want the non-government sector to net save...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply Part 2; Spirit.

Sat 2010-05-22 20:28 EDT

New Economic Perspectives: What If the Government Just Prints Money?

Scott Fullwiler

As Congress gets set in the near future to consider raising the debt ceiling yet again, my fellow blogger L. Randall Wray creatively suggests not raising the debt ceiling but instead having the Treasury continue spending as it always does: by simply crediting bank accounts...Wray's proposal is based upon modern monetary theory (MMT) that is the focus this blog and those by Bill Mitchell, Warren Mosler, and Winterspeak. Of course, given the lack of understanding of basic reserve accounting at the heart of MMT and Wray's proposal on the part of the public, the financial press, and the vast majority of economists, one can already anticipate the outpouring of criticism suggesting that such a proposal amounts to ``printing money'' and thereby destroying the value of the currency...The approach here recognizes the importance of understanding the balance sheet implications of both of these options that are central to MMT. While most economists typically assume a supply and demand relationship, as in the hypothesized loanable funds market, and then build models accordingly, such an approach can miss important relationships in the real world...Both the Treasury's bond sales and the Fed's operations affect only the relative quantities of securities, reserve balances, and currency held by the non-government sector; the total sum of these is set by the outstanding government debt. With or without bond sales, it is the non-government sector's decision to spend or save that matters in regard to the potential inflationary impact of a given government deficit. Indeed, to be more precise, a deficit accompanied by bond sales is actually the MORE potentially inflationary option, as the net financial assets created by the deficit will be increased still further when additional debt service is paid.

Government Just Prints Money; New Economic Perspectives.

Sat 2010-05-22 14:06 EDT

A Japanese Rx for the West: Keep Spending - Interview with Richard Koo - Barrons.com

LESLIE P. NORTON

America seems to be suffering from the same affliction that has hobbled Japan for so long -- a balance-sheet recession. And no matter how hard the Federal Reserve tries, it won't end until businesses shake their heavy loads....the private-sector companies are no longer maximizing profits; they are minimizing debt. They are minimizing debt because all the assets they bought with borrowed money collapsed in value, but the debt is still on their books, so their balance sheets are all under water. If your balance sheet is under water, you have to repair it. So everybody is in balance-sheet-repair mode...It took us [in Japan] a decade to figure out. People said, "Ah, just run the printing presses, ah, structural reform, ah, just privatize the post office, this and that, and everything will be fine." Nothing worked. This is pneumonia, not the common cold. When people are minimizing debt because of their balance-sheet problems, monetary policy is largely useless. If your balance sheet is under water, in negative equity, you are not going to borrow money at any interest rate, and no one will lend you money, either...

Barrons; com; interview; Japanese Rx; keep spending; Richard Koo; West.