Thu 2010-08-26 09:23 EDT

Jingle mail in Jersey from Hyatt Hotels ... | footnoted.com

If you're in Princeton, New Jersey, anytime soon, swing by the Hyatt Regency Princeton. With the Hyatt Hotels (H) quarterly report filed yesterday, it has become a symbol of the financial crisis... Like households across the country, one of Hyatt's subsidiaries ``did not have sufficient cash flow to meet interest payment requirements under its mortgage loan'' on the property, in this case a 347-room hotel with a restaurant, bar and comedy club, just a mile from [Princeton University]....``When hotel cash flow became insufficient to service the loan,'' the company said in the filing, ``HHC notified the lender that it would not provide assistance.'' In other words, Hyatt decided to walk away -- the equivalent of ``jingle mail''...

com; Footnote; Hyatt hotel; Jersey; Jingle Mail.

The Wall Street Examiner Sun 2010-05-09 09:58 EDT

The Minsky Cruise (part 2, Households)

...Now for the Minsky part. The theory above, in layman's terms, argues that over time, when an economy expands without serious contractions, finances will become increasingly risky. Minsky wrote of a shift from hedge finance (when debt, both principal and interest, can be serviced from cash flows) through speculative finance (when debt must be rolled over as only interest payments can be serviced from cash flows) and into Ponzi finance (when cash flows cannot cover interest payments and thus new debt must be added or assets sold). The idea in the Ponzi finance stage is that asset appreciation will compensate for the extra risk...I don't mean to suggest we (collectively) are broke, just that, as Minsky argued (and the data bears out) our balance sheets are increasingly betting on real estate and equity price appreciation with borrowed money...

Household; Minsky Cruise; Part 2; Wall Street Examiner.

Mon 2010-04-05 15:16 EDT

Eleven lessons from Iceland

Thorvaldur Gylfason

Iceland's economic crisis has destroyed wealth equivalent to about seven times its GDP. The damage inflicted on foreign creditors, investors, and depositors amounts to about five times its GDP, while the asset losses thrust upon Icelandic residents account for the rest. These figures do not include the cost of Iceland's increased indebtedness. Iceland's gross public debt, domestic and foreign, is estimated to increase by more than 100% of GDP as a result of the collapse of the banks, or from 29% of GDP at the end of 2007 to 136% by the end of 2010. In 2009, the government spent almost as much on interest payments as on healthcare and social insurance, the single largest public expenditure item. The damage due to Iceland's tarnished reputation is harder to assess...the absence of checks and balances that had led to an unbalanced division of power between the strong executive branch and the much weaker legislative and judicial branches came to haunt the country when unscrupulous politicians put the new banks in the hands of reckless owners who then found themselves in a position to expand their balance sheets as if there were no tomorrow -- and no supervision. Politicians who privatise banks by delivering them on a silver plate to their friends are not very likely to subject the banks to stringent supervision or other such inconveniences...What can be done to reduce the likelihood of a repeat performance -- in Iceland and elsewhere?

Iceland; Lessons.

Tue 2009-12-01 22:52 EST

Harvard ignored warnings about investments - The Boston Globe

It happened at least once a year, every year. In a roomful of a dozen Harvard University financial officials, Jack Meyer, the hugely successful head of Harvard's endowment, and Lawrence Summers, then the school's president, would face off in a heated debate. The topic: cash and how the university was managing - or mismanaging - its basic operating funds. Through the first half of this decade, Meyer repeatedly warned Summers and other Harvard officials that the school was being too aggressive with billions of dollars in cash, according to people present for the discussions, investing almost all of it with the endowment's risky mix of stocks, bonds, hedge funds, and private equity. Meyer's successor, Mohamed El-Erian, would later sound the same warnings to Summers, and to Harvard financial staff and board members. ... But the warnings fell on deaf ears, under Summers's regime and beyond. And when the market crashed in the fall of 2008, Harvard would pay dearly, as $1.8 billion in cash simply vanished. Indeed, it is still paying, in the form of tighter budgets, deferred expansion plans, and big interest payments on bonds issued to cover the losses.

Boston Globe; Harvard ignored warnings; investment.