dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

Valukas Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

Anton Valukas (2); court-appointed examiner Anton R. Valukas (1); Valukas report shows (1).

Tue 2010-08-03 15:02 EDT

Economics of Contempt: Anatomy of Lehman's Failure, and the Importance of Liquidity Requirements

Remember the Lehman Examiner's Report? The 4000+ page report by the court-appointed examiner was lauded for a couple of weeks after it was released, and then largely forgotten. The media and blogosphere quickly moved on to the next outrage-du-jour...Well, I did not forget about it, and thanks to the uptick in flights -- and thus reading time -- in the last few months, I can now credibly claim to have read....well, not every single word in the Examiner's Report (some appendices are just pages of CUSIPs), but all of the substantive sections...Anton Valukas and the lawyers at Jenner & Block who wrote the Examiner's Report did a masterful job. I was, and continue to be, in awe of the quality and comprehensiveness of the report...think I have a pretty good handle on what went wrong at Lehman, and why it failed...they were misrepresenting their liquidity pool. In a huge way...the brazenness of their misrepresentation was shocking...Including the clearing-bank collateral in its liquidity pool was not only inappropriate, but also aggressively deceptive...Lehman was also including in its liquidity pool non-central bank eligible CLOs and CDOs. And they had the audacity to mark these CLOs and CDOs at 100 (par) for purposes of the liquidity pool, even though JPMorgan's third-party pricing vendor marked them at 50--60...

Anatomy; contempt; economic; important; Lehman's failure; liquidity requirements.

Fri 2010-04-23 19:59 EDT

New York Fed Warehousing Junk Loans On Its Books: Examiner's Report

As Lehman Brothers careened toward bankruptcy in 2008, the New York Federal Reserve Bank came to its rescue, sopping up junk loans that the investment bank couldn't sell in the market, according to a report from court-appointed examiner Anton R. Valukas. The New York Fed, under the direction of now-Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, knowingly allowed itself to be used as a "warehouse" for junk loans, the report says, even though Fed guidelines say it can only accept investment grade bonds...

books; examinations s reported; new York Fed Warehousing Junk Loans.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 19:57 EDT

NY Fed Under Geithner Implicated in Lehman Accounting Fraud Allegation

Quite a few observers, including this blogger, have been stunned and frustrated at the refusal to investigate what was almost certain accounting fraud at Lehman. Despite the bankruptcy administrator's effort to blame the gaping hole in Lehman's balance sheet on its disorderly collapse, the idea that the firm, which was by its own accounts solvent, would suddenly spring a roughly $130+ billion hole in its $660 balance sheet, is simply implausible on its face. Indeed, it was such common knowledge in the Lehman flailing about period that Lehman's accounts were sus that Hank Paulson's recent book mentions repeatedly that Lehman's valuations were phony as if it were no big deal. Well, it is folks, as a newly-released examiner's report by Anton Valukas in connection with the Lehman bankruptcy makes clear. The unraveling isn't merely implicating Fuld and his recent succession of CFOs, or its accounting firm, Ernst & Young, as might be expected. It also emerges that the NY Fed, and thus Timothy Geithner, were at a minimum massively derelict in the performance of their duties, and may well be culpable in aiding and abetting Lehman in accounting fraud and Sarbox violations...

Geithner Implicated; Lehman Accounting Fraud Allegation; naked capitalism; NY Fed.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 15:02 EDT

SEC, Fed Alerted By Merrill of Lehman Balance Sheet Games in March 2008

...The Valukas report shows both regulators were monitoring Lehman on a day-to-day basis shortly after Bear's failure. They recognized that it has a massive hole in its balance sheet, yet took an inertial course of action. They pressured a clearly in denial Fuld to raise capital (and Andrew Ross Sorkin's accounts of those efforts make it clear they were likely to fail) and did not take steps towards any other remedy until the firm was on the brink of collapse (the effort to force a private sector bailout as part of a good bank/bad bank resolution)...Merrill warned both the SEC and the Fed in March 2008 that Lehman was engaging in balance sheet window dressing of a serious enough nature for it to put pressure on Merrill (as in it was making Merrill look worse relative to the obviously impaired Lehman)...

Fed Alerted; Lehman Balance Sheet Games; March 2008; Merrill; naked capitalism; SEC.