Jesse's Café Américain Mon 2010-08-16 16:09 EDT

Chris Whalen: Nothing Has Changed Because It's The Fraud and Corruption, Stupid

Jesse

...The dirty little secret of the Dodd-Frank legislation is that by failing to curtail the worst abuses of the OTC market in structured assets and derivatives, a financial ghetto that even today remains virtually unregulated, the Congress and the Fed are effectively even encouraging securities firms to act as de facto exchanges and thereby commit financial fraud. Allowing securities firms to originate complex structured securities without requiring SEC registration is a vast loophole that Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) deliberately left open for their campaign contributors on Wall Street. But it must be noted these same firms have a captive, client relationship with the Fed and other regulators as well, thus a love triangle may be the most apt metaphor...a recent key supervisory officer appointment by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY)...choice of Sarah Dahlgren as Head of Supervision...Ms Dahlgren has been at the center of many of the Federal Reserve's most embarrassing failures in the area of bank supervision and in particular with respect to the failure of American International Group (AIG)...

change because; Chris Whalen; corruption; fraud; Jesse's Café Américain; Stupid.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-07-19 17:07 EDT

Is the SEC Settlement Really a Win for Goldman?

Tom Adams and Yves Smith

...Conventional wisdom in the financial media is that the settlement announced by the SEC over its lawsuit on a Goldman 2007 Abacus CDO is a home run for Goldman. But a closer reading suggests that Goldman's victory is qualified, and the enthusiastic press response is in large measure due to the firm's skillful manipulation of perceptions...it is hard to see how anything in the settlement, if affirmed, would be negative for private parties considering lawsuits against sellers of CDOs...we imagine potential CDO investors will be mightily encouraged that Goldman ended up returning the full amount of investment to the one true third party investor in the deal -- IKB...An investor considering bringing an action against a bank that sold them a CDO that failed (meaning virtually all 2006 and 2007 ``mezzanine'' CDOs) would probably be encouraged that a bank was required to pay such a large amount for making inaccurate statements about the true nature of the CDO...Plaintiffs who sue CDO sellers have good reason to be optimistic...The settlement thus tarnishes the popular myth that the subprime shorts were insightful outsiders who executed ``the greatest trade ever''...the SEC has demonstrated that investors in such a CDO can win a recovery as a result of such inaccurate statements.

Goldman; naked capitalism; SEC Settlement Really; Wins.

naked capitalism Wed 2010-07-07 14:29 EDT

Face to Face With Polished Wall Street Psychopathy (SEC Says that ICP Stole from My Old Company Edition)

Tom Adams, an attorney and former monoline executive

When the financial crisis hit, I was in the direct line of fire. My company blew up very early in the crisis, giving me the dubious opportunity to see how bad things were going to get long before most of the rest of the world, including other banks, insurers, investors, administration officials or Federal Reserve members, were able to perceive the trajectory of the crisis...much of what I thought I knew was based on things that weren't really true...While many of the failings of the structured credit market were due to unsound reliance on historical data, some were not mistakes in judgment but were the result of bad actors, misinformation and wrongdoing...

Faces; ICP Stole; naked capitalism; Old Company Edition; Polished Wall Street Psychopathy; SEC says.

Wed 2010-06-09 18:56 EDT

Rajiv Sethi: The New Market Makers

...the SEC's preliminary report on the flash crash...led me to believe that most of this activity was caused by algorithmic trading strategies placing directional bets based on rapid responses to incoming market data. Two strategies in particular -- momentum ignition and order anticipation -- were explicitly mentioned as potentially destabilizing forces in the SEC's January Concept Release on Equity Market Structure. The SEC invited comments on the release, and dozens of these have been posted to date. There is one in particular, submitted by R.T. Leuchtkafer about three weeks before the crash, that I think is especially informative and analytically compelling...Leuchtkafer traces the history of recent changes in market microstructure and examines the resulting implications for the timing of liquidity demand and supply...The standard argument against increased regulation of the new market makers is that it would interfere with their ability to supply liquidity. Leuchtkafer argues, instead, that the strategies used by these firms cause them to demand liquidity at precisely those moments when liquidity is shortest supply...

New Market Makers; Rajiv Sethi.

zero hedge Sun 2010-05-09 09:45 EDT

The Day The Market Almost Died (Courtesy Of High Frequency Trading)

A year ago, before anyone aside from a hundred or so people had ever heard the words High Frequency Trading, Flash orders, Predatory algorithms, Sigma X, Sonar, Market topology, Liquidity providers, Supplementary Liquidity Providers, and many variations on these, Zero Hedge embarked upon a path to warn and hopefully prevent a full-blown market meltdown. On April 10, 2009, in a piece titled "The Incredibly Shrinking Market Liquidity, Or The Black Swan Of Black Swans" we cautioned "what happens in a world where the very core of the capital markets system is gradually deleveraging to a point where maintaining a liquid and orderly market becomes impossible: large swings on low volume, massive bid-offer spreads, huge trading costs, inability to clear and numerous failed trades. When the quant deleveraging finally catches up with the market, the consequences will likely be unprecedented, with dramatic dislocations leading the market both higher and lower on record volatility." Today, after over a year of seemingly ceaseless heckling and jeering by numerous self-proclaimed experts and industry lobbyists, we are vindicated...absent the last minute intervention of still unknown powers, the market, for all intents and purposes, broke. Liquidity disappeared. What happened today was no fat finger, it was no panic selling by one major account: it was simply the impact of everyone in the HFT community going from port to starboard on the boat, at precisely the same time...It is time for the SEC to do its job and not only ban flash trading as it said it would almost a year ago, but get rid of all the predatory aspects of high frequency trading, which are pretty much all of them...HFT killed over 12 months of hard fought propaganda by the likes of CNBC which has valiantly tried to restore faith in our broken capital markets. They have now failed in that task too. After today investors will have little if any faith left in the US stocks, assuming they had any to begin with. We need to purge the equity market structure of all liquidity-taking parasitic players. We must start today with High Frequency Trading...

courtesy; day; dies; high frequency trade; Market; Zero Hedge.

Tue 2010-04-27 08:27 EDT

Web of Debt - COMPUTERIZED FRONT RUNNING: ANOTHER GOLDMAN-DOMINATED FRAUD

Ellen Brown

While the SEC is busy investigating Goldman Sachs, it might want to look into another Goldman-dominated fraud: computerized front running using high-frequency trading programs...Wall Street commentator Max Keiser...claims to have invented one of the most widely used programs for doing the rigging. Not that that's what he meant to invent. His patented program was designed to take the manipulation out of markets. It would do this by matching buyers with sellers automatically, eliminating ``front running'' -- brokers buying or selling ahead of large orders coming in from their clients. The computer program was intended to remove the conflict of interest that exists when brokers who match buyers with sellers are also selling from their own accounts. But the program fell into the wrong hands and became the prototype for automated trading programs that actually facilitate front running...Keiser and HSX co-founder Michael Burns applied for a patent for a ``computer-implemented securities trading system with a virtual specialist function'' in 1996, and U.S. patent no. 5960176 was awarded in 1999...The listing for Keiser's patent shows that it has been referenced by 132 others involving automated program trading or HFT...

Computerized Front Running; debt; Goldman-dominated fraud; Web.

naked capitalism Wed 2010-04-21 12:20 EDT

Guest Post: Dodd Financial Reform Bill Is All Holes and No Cheese

George Washington

In a letter to Senate majority leader Harry Reid and minority leader Mitch McConnell, luminaries including former SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner, former Labor Secretary Robert Reich, hedge fund owner Jim Chanos, former Lehman Brothers Vice Chair Peter Solomon, former S&L investigator Bill Black, former Senate Banking Committee Chief Economist Rob Johnson, economists Dean Baker, Barry Eichengreen and others pointed out that Dodd's proposed financial reform legislation wouldn't have prevented the current crisis ... and won't prevent the next crisis...

cheese; Dodd Financial reform Bill; Guest Post; holes; naked capitalism.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Wed 2010-04-21 12:11 EDT

Geithner and the NY Fed Accused of Willfully Ignoring Fraud and Covering Up Lehman's Bad Assets by Senior Regulator During the S&L Crisis

Michael Shedlock

Inquiring minds are digging into a 27 page statement made by William Black before the Financial Services committee. Black is an Associate Professor of Economics and Law, at the University of Missouri...[According to Black,] Lehman's underlying problem that doomed it was that it was insolvent because it made so many bad loans and investments. It hid its insolvency through the traditional means -- it refused to recognize its losses honestly...The FRBNY knew that Lehman was engaged in fraud designed to overstate its liquidity and, therefore, was unwilling to loan as much money to Lehman. The FRBNY did not, however, inform the SEC, the public, or the OTS (which regulated an S&L that Lehman owned) of the fraud...The relevant issue was never: can Lehman be saved? The relevant issue, one that the SEC and the Fed appear never to have even asked, was: how can we stop Lehman from serving as a vector spreading the epidemic of liar's loans? They should have asked themselves that question -- and acted -- no later than 2001.

Cover; Geithner; L Crisis; Lehman's Bad Assets; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; NY Fed Accused; s; senior regulators; Willfully Ignoring Fraud.

Jesse's Café Américain Mon 2010-04-19 18:34 EDT

Goldman Sachs: A Pattern of Organized Criminal Behaviour?

Jesse

Chris Whalen provides some excellent commentary on the Goldman Sachs fraud inquiry by the SEC at the beginning of his weekly newsletter, The Institutional Risk Analyst...``hedge funds often times are merely extensions of the dealers with which they interact. It is often difficult if not impossible to tell where the dealer's interests end and those of the hedge fund begin, especially when the dealer and the fund seem to be working in concert to create securities that are being sold to third parties. This episode is a terrible mess and, to us at least, illustrates why the OTC markets for securities and derivatives need to be regulated out of existence -- or at least into compliance with norms of disclosure and fair dealing that would render such strategies impossible.''

Goldman Sachs; Jesse's Café Américain; Organized Criminal Behaviour; pattern.

zero hedge Mon 2010-04-19 10:52 EDT

SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud On Subprime Mortgages, Paulson & Co. Implicated

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Goldman, Sachs & Co. and one of its vice presidents for defrauding investors by misstating and omitting key facts about a financial product tied to subprime mortgages as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter. The SEC alleges that Goldman Sachs structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that hinged on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Goldman Sachs failed to disclose to investors vital information about the CDO, in particular the role that a major hedge fund played in the portfolio selection process and the fact that the hedge fund had taken a short position against the CDO.

Co; fraud; implications; Paulson; SEC charged Goldman Sachs; subprime-mortgage; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 16:10 EDT

Lehman: Regulators Chose to Deny, Extend and Pretend

The Lehman Examiner's report gives an unintentionally damning portrayal, both of the the structure of financial regulation in the US and how regulators failed to use the powers they had effectively...the authorities recognized Lehman had a large negative net worth. Yet rather than move decisively towards an unwind, they proceeded inertially. They urged Lehman CEO Dick Fuld to find a rescuer (who would invest in that garbage barge, particularly when Andrew Ross Sorkin's account makes clear that Fuld's moves were so obviously desperate and clumsy as to be certain to fail) and also promoted the notion of an LTCM-style ``share the pain'' resolution. Yet with the rest of the industry weak, and the magnitude of hole in Lehman's balance sheet a mystery, these courses of action had low odds of success from the outset (indeed, the ``Lehman weekend'' in which the authorities almost bulldozed through a deal, seemed designed to avoid sober analysis of how bad things were at the failing investment bank)...As much as the SEC did not cover itself with glory in this exercise, its lapses are somewhat comprehensible. By contrast, the Fed's are much harder to explain or excuse. And guess who is about to be given more oversight authority?

denied; extends; Lehman; naked capitalism; Pretends; Regulators Chose.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 15:02 EDT

SEC, Fed Alerted By Merrill of Lehman Balance Sheet Games in March 2008

...The Valukas report shows both regulators were monitoring Lehman on a day-to-day basis shortly after Bear's failure. They recognized that it has a massive hole in its balance sheet, yet took an inertial course of action. They pressured a clearly in denial Fuld to raise capital (and Andrew Ross Sorkin's accounts of those efforts make it clear they were likely to fail) and did not take steps towards any other remedy until the firm was on the brink of collapse (the effort to force a private sector bailout as part of a good bank/bad bank resolution)...Merrill warned both the SEC and the Fed in March 2008 that Lehman was engaging in balance sheet window dressing of a serious enough nature for it to put pressure on Merrill (as in it was making Merrill look worse relative to the obviously impaired Lehman)...

Fed Alerted; Lehman Balance Sheet Games; March 2008; Merrill; naked capitalism; SEC.

The Money Game Fri 2010-03-19 12:23 EDT

Rick Bookstaber: Hedge Funds Are Pumping The Gold Bubble And Luring Investors Off A Cliff

The SEC's Rick Bookstaber can hardly watch as sheep-like investors chase the gold bubble straight off a cliff...

cliff; Gold bubble; Hedge funds; lure investor; Money game; pump; Rick Bookstaber.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-01-29 16:22 EST

Fed Secrecy Claims Bogus, Redacted AIG Bailout Details Already Public

...The SEC agreed to let AIG keep Maiden Lane III information secret until 2018, since it ``qualifies as confidential commercial or financial information.'' ...this argument is worthless. Nearly all of the deleted information can be reassembled from sources that are publicly available...An examination of our data raises troubling questions about how the Fed is valuing the Maiden Lane III assets.

Fed Secrecy Claims Bogus; naked capitalism; public; Redacted AIG Bailout Details.

Taibblog Mon 2010-01-04 18:02 EST

There's always room for Goldman Sachs (at the SEC)

Matt Taibbi

The Securities and Exchange Commission hired a 29-year-old former employee in Goldman Sachs Group Inc.'s business intelligence unit as the first chief operating officer in the agency's enforcement division, according to people familiar with the decision. via SEC unit hires ex-Goldman Sachs worker as chief operating officer -- latimes.com.

Goldman Sachs; room; s; SEC; Taibblog.

Mon 2010-01-04 17:56 EST

Salon.com | Another Goldman executive named to key government post as its profits skyrocket

Glenn Greenwald

A Goldman Sachs executive has been named the first chief operating officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission's enforcement division. The market watchdog says Adam Storch, vice president in Goldman Sachs' Business Intelligence Group, is assuming the new position of managing executive of the SEC division.

com; Goldman executive named; key government post; profits skyrocket; Salon.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

Fri 2009-07-24 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Guest Post: Supercop or Superflop?

SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro; DownSouth quotes Niebuhr, Kevin Phillips

Guest Post; naked capitalism; supercop; Superflop.

Tue 2009-06-16 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Guest Post: Open Letter To The SEC Regarding Wall Street's REIT Bait-And-Switch

Guest Post; naked capitalism; Open Letter; SEC; switch; Wall Street's REIT Bait.

Thu 2009-05-07 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Now It's Official: Securities Industry Regulator Takes Care of Self, Not Investors

non-governmental regulator Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) pre-sold auction rate securities shortly before bottom fell out; current SEC head Mary Schapiro formerly FINRA head

Investors; naked capitalism; officials; Securities Industry Regulator Takes Care; Self.

Wed 2009-04-01 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: New York Subpoenas Bank of America CEO on Merrill Bonuses (and Where is the SEC?)

NY attorney general Andrew Cuomo

America CEO; Merrill bonuses; naked capitalism; New York Subpoenas Bank; SEC.

Thu 2009-02-26 00:00 EST

Calculated Risk: Ponzi: SEC Charges Stanford with $8 billion securities fraud

8; Calculated Risk; Ponzi; SEC Charges Stanford; securities fraud.

Tue 2009-02-24 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: SEC Stonewalls at Senate Hearings on Madoff (and Congressional Fireworks!)

Congressional Fireworks; Madoff; naked capitalism; SEC Stonewalls; Senate hearing.

Thu 2009-01-15 00:00 EST

Email Illuminates ``Deep Capture'' of the SEC | Deep Capture

Email Illuminates "Deep Capture" of the SEC | Deep Capture

deep Capture; Email Illuminates; SEC.

Sun 2008-07-20 00:00 EDT

Angry Bear: Soc Sec XXXIII: Medicare Finance

Angry Bear; Medicare Finance; Soc Sec XXXIII.

Mon 2008-06-30 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Senate Banking Committee Finally Sends Warning Shot Across Treasury's, Fed's, and SEC's Bows

Fed S; naked capitalism; SEC's Bows; Senate Banking Committee Finally Sends Warning Shot; Treasury's.

Mon 2008-06-30 00:00 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Turf Wars: Fed, SEC vs. Congress, Treasury

Congress; Fed; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; SEC; Treasury; turf wars.

Tue 2008-06-24 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: SEC Takes Chapter From Pontius Pilate on Rating Agency Regulation

SEC avoids question of rating agencies' culpability in the credit crisis

naked capitalism; Pontius Pilate; Ratings Agency Regulations; SEC Takes Chapter.

Mon 2008-03-31 00:00 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: The Fed And The Henhouse

recap of the credit implosion, blame laid on Congress, GSEs, SEC, and especially the Fed

Fed; Henhouse; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

Sun 2008-03-30 00:00 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: SEC Openly Invites Corporations To Lie

abandoning mark-to-market; moving dodgy assets into level 3

lying; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; SEC Openly Invites Corporations.

Sun 2008-03-30 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: SEC Gives Permission to Fudge Mark-to-Market

fudge marks; Market; naked capitalism; SEC Gives Permission.