zero hedge Wed 2010-05-19 11:37 EDT

Guest Post: Goldman's CDOs Had Nothing to Do With the Real Estate Bubble

David Fiderer

If Goldman Sachs wanted to reduce its exposure to subprime mortgage investments, why didn't it simply sell the assets it owned? Two reasons: First, those large sales would have sent a signal that something was terribly, terribly wrong, and thereby pushed prices down further. That's how supply and demand normally works. Second, Goldman professed to be market maker, which uses its trading book to instill confidence. It ostensibly bought, sold and inventoried mortgage securities to provide stability and liquidity to the marketplace. Of course, we now know that such market confidence was entirely misplaced. To sidestep these issues, Goldman and other major banks found a solution that subverted the laws of supply and demand, and escaped the price discovery of a transparent marketplace. They fabricated synthetic CDOs, such as Abacus 2007 AC-1. These toxic assets, invented out of thin air, made the meltdown worse than it otherwise would have been...

Goldman's CDOs; Guest Post; real estate bubble; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Sun 2010-05-09 09:42 EDT

Themis' Take: May 6, 2010 -- The Day That Will Change Market Structure

...The story is not a key-punch error. The story is a failed market structure. The market failed today. The market melted down and ``liquidity providers'' quickly pulled all bids. According to today's Wall Street Journal, high frequency firm, Tradebot, closed down its computer systems completely, as did New Jersey's own Tradeworx,...To make matters worse, while some high frequency firms shut down yesterday and pulled their bids, as we warned they would do for over a year and a half, other high frequency firms turned from being liquidity providers to liquidity demanders, as they turned around and indiscriminately hit bids...The market action of May 6th has demonstrated that our equity market has major systemic risks built into it...The price discovery process ceased to exist. High frequency firms have always insisted that their mini-scalping activities stabilized markets and provided liquidity, and on May 6th they just shut down. They pulled the plug, as we always said they would, and they even admit it in the papers this morning...This is not an isolated incident, and it will happen again.

2010; 6; Change Market Structure; day; take; Themis; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Fri 2010-04-23 20:02 EDT

An Overview Of The Fed's Intervention In Equity Markets Via The Primary Dealer Credit Facility

Recently, Zero Hedge presented a snapshot analysis of the various securities that made up the triparty repo agreement involving JPM, Lehman and the Fed. We uncovered numerous bankrupt companies' equities that were being pledged as collateral for what ultimately was taxpayer exposure. To our surprise, this discovery is not an exception, and in fact in the days immediately preceding the collapse of Bear Stearns first, and subsequently, Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve established and refined a program that permitted banks to pledge virtually any security as collateral, including not just investment grade bonds and higher ranked securities, but also stocks of companies, the riskiest investment possible, and a guaranteed way for taxpayer capital to evaporate in the context of a disintegrating financial system, all with the purpose of bailing out Wall Street's major institutions. On two occasions last year: on March 16, 2008, and subsequently on September 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve first established what is known as the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), and subsequently amended it, so that the Fed, in becoming the lender of last resort, would allow any collateral, up to and including stocks, to be funded by the Federal Reserve's credit facility, in order to prevent the $4.5 trillion repo financing system from imploding. By doing so, the Federal Reserve effectively gave a Carte Blanche to primary dealers to purchase any and all equities they so desired, with such purchases immediately being funded by the US taxpayer, via the PDCF. In essence, this was equivalent to the Fed purchasing equities by itself through a Primary Dealer agent...

equity markets; Fed's interventions; overview; Primary Dealers Credit Facility; Zero Hedge.

Jesse's Café Américain Wed 2010-04-07 19:14 EDT

The Case for Position Limits: What is the 'Spot Price' of Gold and Silver And How Is It Set?

Jesse

...almost all retail transactions for physical bullion in the US key off a 'spot price' that is derived from a paper market which is not based in the reality of physical supply, since the futures exchanges explicitly allow for the settlement in cash if physical bullion is not available. In fact, the vast majority of transactions are settled in cash, and are little more than derivatives bets it seems, and often hedges related to other things like another commodity or interest rates...As someone who approaches it as an amateur economist, and has been looking at its dynamics for the past few years, I may be missing something, but this seems less like an efficient market mechanism for price discovery and capital allocation, and more like a carney game.

Case; gold; Jesse's Café Américain; position limit; set; Silver; Spot Prices.

Thu 2010-01-07 19:24 EST

Precious Metals Derivatives: Louder Music, Fewer Chairs

...The weight of gold and silver represented by derivatives on the precious metals has grown so large relative to all reasonable measures of physical supply that more and more questions and doubts are being raised about not only the integrity of the price discovery mechanisms for these metals, primarily among LBMA members and on the COMEX, but also the reliability of many paper claims to the physical delivery of them.

chair; Louder Music; Precious Metals Derivatives.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2009-12-17 10:11 EST

Is the Price of World Silver the Result of Legitimate Market Discovery?

Jesse

Ted Butler: ...the concentrated short position in COMEX silver futures is so extreme, that it is hard to imagine how it can be resolved in an orderly manner. The most recent data from the CFTC indicate that one US bank, JPMorgan, now holds 200 million ounces net short in COMEX silver futures, fully 40% of the entire net short position on the COMEX (minus spreads). As I have previously written, JPMorgan accounted for 100% of all new short selling in COMEX silver futures for September and October, some 50 million additional ounces...So extreme is JPMorgan's silver short position that it cannot be closed out in an orderly fashion...As extreme as JPMorgan's position is, there is a total true net short position of 500 million ounces (100,000 contracts) in COMEX silver futures. Try to put that 500 million ounce short position in perspective. It equals 75% of world annual mine production, much higher than seen in any other commodity.

Jesse's Café Américain; Legitimate Market Discovery; Price; resulting; World Silver.

Wed 2008-08-06 00:00 EDT

Business Spectator - Apocalypse NAB

National Australia Bank's small portfolio of US residential mortgage-backed securities marked down 90%; CDO price discovery

Apocalypse NAB; Business Spectator.

Tue 2007-08-28 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Extreme Measures II: Gillian Tett at the Financial Times

"parties who are in the best position to facilitate price discovery have every reason to impede that process"

Extreme Measures II; Financial Times; Gillian Tett; naked capitalism.