zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Wed 2010-08-25 10:47 EDT

Illinois Teachers' Retirement System Enters The Death Spiral: AIG Wannabe's Go-For-Broke Strategy Fails As Pension Fund Begins Liquidations

Two few months ago we disclosed how the Illinois Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) was doing all it can to become the next AIG. In addition to, or maybe precisely due to, its deplorable fundamental condition, which can be summarized as being 61% underfunded on its $33.7 billion in assets, with a performance record of down $4.4 billion in 2009 and 5% in 2008, the fund, courtesy of a detailed analysis by Alexandra Harris of the Medill Journalism school at Northwestern, was found to be on its way to trying to become a veritable self-made TBTF: as was described then, "TRS is largely on the risky side of the contracts, selling and writing OTC derivatives, including credit default swaps,..."

AIG Wannabe's Go; Broke Strategy Fails; Death Spiral; dropped; Illinois teacher; long; Pension Fund Begins Liquidations; Retirement System Enters; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

Tue 2010-08-24 20:34 EDT

Is Bank of America Hiding an Insolvency Problem From The Public? | MFI-Miami

...My contact told me that Bank of America is selling off their servicing rights on loans they serviced for other investment houses and they are selling off their trustee rights they hold in their name, Countrywide's name and LaSalle Bank's name to Deutsche Bank. What they can't sell to other banks they are selling to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac...On the surface this looks like Bank of America is having a liquidity problem but then buried deep in the Asian edition of the Wall Street Journal last week was an article that the Blackstone Group was taking over Bank of America's Asian Real Estate Fund. This would indicate this much more than Bank of America having a liquidity problem. This would indicate that Bank of America has turned into the SS Titanic...My source was even bold enough to say that executives are planning on Bank of America being out of business by the end of the year. They are waiting for someone to buy their branch network before making the news of their pending demise public...while the mainstream media was distracted by the Gulf oil spill, Bank of America could go about liquidating their assets and no one would be the wiser.

America Hiding; bank; insolvency problem; MFI-Miami; public.

Tue 2010-08-24 20:21 EDT

Gonzalo Lira: How Hyperinflation Will Happen

Right now, we are in the middle of deflation. The Global Depression we are experiencing has squeezed both aggregate demand levels and aggregate asset prices as never before. Since the credit crunch of September 2008, the U.S. and world economies have been slowly circling the deflationary drain...For its part, the Federal Reserve has been busy propping up all assets--including Treasuries--by way of ``quantitative easing''...But this Fed policy--call it ``money-printing'', call it ``liquidity injections'', call it ``asset price stabilization''--has been overwhelmed by the credit contraction...the next step down in this world-historical Global Depression which we are experiencing will be hyperinflation...Hyperinflation is the loss of faith in the currency. Prices rise in a hyperinflationary environment just like in an inflationary environment, but they rise not because people want more money for their labor or for commodities, but because people are trying to get out of the currency. It's not that they want more money--they want less of the currency: So they will pay anything for a good which is not the currency...Treasuries are now the New and Improved Toxic Asset...there will be a commodities burp: A slight but sudden rise in the price of a necessary commodity, such as oil...asset managers will sell Treasuries...right before a largish Treasury auction. So Bernanke and the Fed will buy Treasuries, in an effort to counteract the sell-off and maintain low yields...The Fed's buying of Treasuries will occur in such a way that it will encourage asset managers to dump even more Treasuries...It will be a flash panic...By the end of that terrible day, commodites of all stripes--precious and industrial metals, oil, foodstuffs--will shoot the moon...if it doesn't happen this fall, it'll happen next fall, without question before the end of 2011...

Gonzalo Lira; happened; Hyperinflation.

Tue 2010-08-03 15:02 EDT

Economics of Contempt: Anatomy of Lehman's Failure, and the Importance of Liquidity Requirements

Remember the Lehman Examiner's Report? The 4000+ page report by the court-appointed examiner was lauded for a couple of weeks after it was released, and then largely forgotten. The media and blogosphere quickly moved on to the next outrage-du-jour...Well, I did not forget about it, and thanks to the uptick in flights -- and thus reading time -- in the last few months, I can now credibly claim to have read....well, not every single word in the Examiner's Report (some appendices are just pages of CUSIPs), but all of the substantive sections...Anton Valukas and the lawyers at Jenner & Block who wrote the Examiner's Report did a masterful job. I was, and continue to be, in awe of the quality and comprehensiveness of the report...think I have a pretty good handle on what went wrong at Lehman, and why it failed...they were misrepresenting their liquidity pool. In a huge way...the brazenness of their misrepresentation was shocking...Including the clearing-bank collateral in its liquidity pool was not only inappropriate, but also aggressively deceptive...Lehman was also including in its liquidity pool non-central bank eligible CLOs and CDOs. And they had the audacity to mark these CLOs and CDOs at 100 (par) for purposes of the liquidity pool, even though JPMorgan's third-party pricing vendor marked them at 50--60...

Anatomy; contempt; economic; important; Lehman's failure; liquidity requirements.

Tue 2010-08-03 14:34 EDT

Rajiv Sethi: The Economics of Hyman Minsky [2009-12-03]

There has been a resurgence of interest in the economic writings of Hyman Minsky over the past few years, and for good reason...Minsky's theoretical framework combines a cash-flow approach to investment with a theory of financial instability...expectations of financial tranquility are self-falsifying. Stability, as Minsky liked to put it, is itself destabilizing...An essential feature of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is that a long period of sustained stability gives rise to changes in financial practices which are not conducive to the persistence of stable growth...A sustained period of stability gives rise to optimistic expectations and a rise in speculative financing...if a large number of investments which are prompted by the availability of speculative finance are found to be inept, so that immediate cash flows are significantly lower than expected, then the need for short-term refinancing becomes acute while at the same time banks are less willing to roll over existing debt. A sharp rise in short-term interest rates occurs which can lead to present value reversals, a rush towards liquidity, a plunge in the prices of illiquid assets, both real and financial, and a corresponding drop in new investments...described as a credit crunch, a state of financial distress, or a financial crisis...

2009-12-03; economic; Hyman Minsky; Rajiv Sethi.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-07-22 16:19 EDT

Decoding the NY Fed on Shadow Banking

Richard Smith

NY Fed: We document that the shadow banking system became severely strained during the financial crisis because, like traditional banks, shadow banks conduct credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation, but unlike traditional financial intermediaries, they lack access to public sources of liquidity, such as the Federal Reserve's discount window, or public sources of insurance, such as federal deposit insurance.

decoding; naked capitalism; NY Fed; Shadow banks.

Wed 2010-06-09 18:56 EDT

Rajiv Sethi: The New Market Makers

...the SEC's preliminary report on the flash crash...led me to believe that most of this activity was caused by algorithmic trading strategies placing directional bets based on rapid responses to incoming market data. Two strategies in particular -- momentum ignition and order anticipation -- were explicitly mentioned as potentially destabilizing forces in the SEC's January Concept Release on Equity Market Structure. The SEC invited comments on the release, and dozens of these have been posted to date. There is one in particular, submitted by R.T. Leuchtkafer about three weeks before the crash, that I think is especially informative and analytically compelling...Leuchtkafer traces the history of recent changes in market microstructure and examines the resulting implications for the timing of liquidity demand and supply...The standard argument against increased regulation of the new market makers is that it would interfere with their ability to supply liquidity. Leuchtkafer argues, instead, that the strategies used by these firms cause them to demand liquidity at precisely those moments when liquidity is shortest supply...

New Market Makers; Rajiv Sethi.

zero hedge Mon 2010-05-24 16:38 EDT

Presenting What Could Be The Oddest Capital Flow Observation In History

It is no secret that the last few weeks saw massive liquidations along all asset classes. The result was a huge outflow across almost all products: Loans, HY Bonds, Municipals, Commodities... all a typical reaction to broad based liquidations. However, note we said "almost" - one class that actually posted a $6.2 billion inflow was equities. Yet not is all as it seems: peeking underneath the hood indicates that the bulk of this inflow, or $10.3 billion, had to do with inflow into ETFs... or rather, just one ETF - the SPY, accounting for $10.1 billion. Did someone prop up the entire equity market last week by massively pushing capital into the most liquid equity proxy available?...

History; Oddest Capital Flow Observation; presenter; Zero Hedge.

Sat 2010-05-22 21:13 EDT

EconPapers: An Alternative View of Finance, Saving, Deficits, and Liquidity

L. Randall Wray

This paper contrasts the orthodox approach with an alternative view on finance, saving, deficits, and liquidity. The conventional view on the cause of the current global financial crisis points first to excessive United States trade deficits that are supposed to have "soaked up" global savings. Worse, this policy was ultimately unsustainable because it was inevitable that lenders would stop the flow of dollars. Problems were compounded by the Federal Reserve's pursuit of a low-interest-rate policy, which involved pumping liquidity into the markets and thereby fueling a real estate boom. Finally, with the world awash in dollars, a run on the dollar caused it to collapse. The Fed (and then the Treasury) had to come to the rescue of U.S. banks, firms, and households. When asset prices plummeted, the financial crisis spread to much of the rest of the world. According to the conventional view, China, as the residual supplier of dollars, now holds the fate of the United States, and possibly the entire world, in its hands. Thus, it's necessary for the United States to begin living within its means, by balancing its current account and (eventually) eliminating its budget deficit. I challenge every aspect of this interpretation. Our nation operates with a sovereign currency, one that is issued by a sovereign government that operates with a flexible exchange rate. As such, the government does not really borrow, nor can foreigners be the source of dollars. Rather, it is the U.S. current account deficit that supplies the net dollar saving to the rest of the world, and the federal government budget deficit that supplies the net dollar saving to the nongovernment sector. Further, saving is never a source of finance; rather, private lending creates bank deposits to finance spending that generates income. Some of this income can be saved, so the second part of the saving decision concerns the form in which savings might be held--as liquid or illiquid assets. U.S. current account deficits and federal budget deficits are sustainable, so the United States does not need to adopt austerity, nor does it need to look to the rest of the world for salvation. Rather, it needs to look to domestic fiscal stimulus strategies to resolve the crisis, and to a larger future role for government in helping to stabilize the economy. [MMT]

alternative view; Deficit; EconPapers; finance; liquidity; save.

The Wall Street Examiner Sat 2010-05-22 19:56 EDT

Imagine There's No Credit Market: Another Look At German Controls

...Thus, when people speak of "rescuing the credit markets" they really mean to say rescuing the liquidity providers who failed to assess lending risks so profoundly they can't make required payments. When people talk of German restrictions killing the credit markets, they really mean killing the middle-men (which may or may not have a deleterious effect on government borrowing). German restrictions on certain types of equity and credit transactions are not aimed at reduced government borrowing. They are aimed at reducing the amount (and means of capture) of profit "earned" by middle-men in the transaction- profits, mind you, as per our model, in the case of government borrowing, come either as a result of the money's original owner getting less interest than a direct deal would generate, the government paying more interest (which only comes from higher tax revenues) than a direct deal would generate, or some combination thereof. ...liquidity providing actions of "credit market" middle-men has run amok. As per J.S. Mill, that credit markets are exerting a distinct and independent influence of their own means they are out of order. With increasing frequency, credit is mispriced or unwisely extended and liquidity, the raison d'être of these people, dries up when it is needed most. Yet the middle-men who fail in their tasks expect to be rescued from their failures, and given even more ways to profit from lending other people's money, while the pool of available savings shrinks. ...In one sense I'm quite happy about all of the financial sector bail-outs governments have provided these credit-market middle-men. Before the bail-outs, one had to argue that finance was like a tax on monetary exchange, now this point is clear, finance is, in fact, a tax- and a growing one at that.

credit markets; German-Controlled; imagine; looking; s; Wall Street Examiner.

The Wall Street Examiner Sat 2010-05-22 19:50 EDT

Merkel Does Mahathir and Martin Luther: Tilting the Market Table

...I'm very interested in Germany's policy shift because it's the first time in decades a mature industrialized nation has protested the allocation of profits decreed by financial orthodoxy. At core, German bans of "naked" (held by those who don't own the securities) shorts, paraphrasing Ms. Merkel- perhaps unsurprisingly the daughter of a Lutheran Minister- stops people profiting from the destruction of their neighbor's house at cost of less liquidity in the restricted markets...500 years ago, the Germans defied orthodoxy and ushered in a revolution which moved the center of Europe from South to North. They are defying orthodoxy again, and I can't wait to see what happens next.

Mahathir; Market Table; Martin Luther; Merkel; tilting; Wall Street Examiner.

zero hedge Wed 2010-05-19 11:37 EDT

Guest Post: Goldman's CDOs Had Nothing to Do With the Real Estate Bubble

David Fiderer

If Goldman Sachs wanted to reduce its exposure to subprime mortgage investments, why didn't it simply sell the assets it owned? Two reasons: First, those large sales would have sent a signal that something was terribly, terribly wrong, and thereby pushed prices down further. That's how supply and demand normally works. Second, Goldman professed to be market maker, which uses its trading book to instill confidence. It ostensibly bought, sold and inventoried mortgage securities to provide stability and liquidity to the marketplace. Of course, we now know that such market confidence was entirely misplaced. To sidestep these issues, Goldman and other major banks found a solution that subverted the laws of supply and demand, and escaped the price discovery of a transparent marketplace. They fabricated synthetic CDOs, such as Abacus 2007 AC-1. These toxic assets, invented out of thin air, made the meltdown worse than it otherwise would have been...

Goldman's CDOs; Guest Post; real estate bubble; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-05-13 18:21 EDT

An Analysis of the Thursday Meltdown

...Contrast the reports at the Times and the Wall Street Journal, that the officialdom is pouring through the records and is still puzzled after a full three days on the case, versus this analysis produced by a lone sell-side analyst (who sadly must remain anonymous) roughly 24 hours after the implosion...``...it was not a sudden, random surge of volume from a fat finger that overwhelmed the market. It was a steady onslaught of selling that pressured the market lower in order to catch up with the carnage taking place in the credit markets and the currency markets...this episode exposed structural flaws in how a trade is implemented (think orphaned algo orders) and it exposed the danger of leaving market making up to a network of entities with no mandate to ensure the smooth and orderly functioning of the market (think of the electronic market makers and high freqs who can pull bids instantaneously as opposed to a specialist on the floor who has a clearly defined mandate to provide liquidity).''

Analysis; naked capitalism; Thursday Meltdown.

zero hedge Sun 2010-05-09 09:45 EDT

The Day The Market Almost Died (Courtesy Of High Frequency Trading)

A year ago, before anyone aside from a hundred or so people had ever heard the words High Frequency Trading, Flash orders, Predatory algorithms, Sigma X, Sonar, Market topology, Liquidity providers, Supplementary Liquidity Providers, and many variations on these, Zero Hedge embarked upon a path to warn and hopefully prevent a full-blown market meltdown. On April 10, 2009, in a piece titled "The Incredibly Shrinking Market Liquidity, Or The Black Swan Of Black Swans" we cautioned "what happens in a world where the very core of the capital markets system is gradually deleveraging to a point where maintaining a liquid and orderly market becomes impossible: large swings on low volume, massive bid-offer spreads, huge trading costs, inability to clear and numerous failed trades. When the quant deleveraging finally catches up with the market, the consequences will likely be unprecedented, with dramatic dislocations leading the market both higher and lower on record volatility." Today, after over a year of seemingly ceaseless heckling and jeering by numerous self-proclaimed experts and industry lobbyists, we are vindicated...absent the last minute intervention of still unknown powers, the market, for all intents and purposes, broke. Liquidity disappeared. What happened today was no fat finger, it was no panic selling by one major account: it was simply the impact of everyone in the HFT community going from port to starboard on the boat, at precisely the same time...It is time for the SEC to do its job and not only ban flash trading as it said it would almost a year ago, but get rid of all the predatory aspects of high frequency trading, which are pretty much all of them...HFT killed over 12 months of hard fought propaganda by the likes of CNBC which has valiantly tried to restore faith in our broken capital markets. They have now failed in that task too. After today investors will have little if any faith left in the US stocks, assuming they had any to begin with. We need to purge the equity market structure of all liquidity-taking parasitic players. We must start today with High Frequency Trading...

courtesy; day; dies; high frequency trade; Market; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Sun 2010-05-09 09:42 EDT

Themis' Take: May 6, 2010 -- The Day That Will Change Market Structure

...The story is not a key-punch error. The story is a failed market structure. The market failed today. The market melted down and ``liquidity providers'' quickly pulled all bids. According to today's Wall Street Journal, high frequency firm, Tradebot, closed down its computer systems completely, as did New Jersey's own Tradeworx,...To make matters worse, while some high frequency firms shut down yesterday and pulled their bids, as we warned they would do for over a year and a half, other high frequency firms turned from being liquidity providers to liquidity demanders, as they turned around and indiscriminately hit bids...The market action of May 6th has demonstrated that our equity market has major systemic risks built into it...The price discovery process ceased to exist. High frequency firms have always insisted that their mini-scalping activities stabilized markets and provided liquidity, and on May 6th they just shut down. They pulled the plug, as we always said they would, and they even admit it in the papers this morning...This is not an isolated incident, and it will happen again.

2010; 6; Change Market Structure; day; take; Themis; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Sun 2010-05-09 09:25 EDT

Dissecting The Crash

Here are two accounts dissecting in detail the events from yesterday. One is from Dan Hinckley at Wild Analytics, the second from Dan O'Brien. ...The idea that it was a 'fat finger' error is ludicrous; unless the fat finger hit every market in the world virtually simultaneously. Liquidity simply left the world financial markets for about four minutes this afternoon. The bids just vanished...In one second more or less someone (and yes, under these circumstances, human beings take control of the machines) made the decision to pull the bids on every equity in the S&P, every financial futures contract, every FX contract in every market in the world. This kind of thing just doesn't happen in a pure auction environment; there just isn't a tight enough communication link between the parties to allow the decisions to propagate within the same second -- even with HFT algorithms. No. Some human made the decision to pull the bids; all of them, all at once. If that is not a condemnation of the concentration of financial power and the systematic risk it engenders I don't know what is...How does all of this happen? Well, you can thank the Federal Reserve... 1) The Fed prints fake money out of thin air... 2) Large banks and hedge funds borrow money from the Fed at near-ZERO interest rates... 3) These institutions buy Treasuries with a guaranteed 4% return, thus guaranteeing the banks massive and risk-free profits on the backs of the middle class (remember, you're not allowed to earn an interest rate on your savings accounts!)... 4) These institutions then swap Treasuries with the Fed for cash... 5) These same institutions (banks) then take the cash and gun the stock market higher with its FREE MONEY from the government...I meant free money from you. By the way, were you asked to vote on this? Frankly, it's better than free money - they're being PAID to do this... 6) Banks pay the very clown-posse that cause the 2008 crash (and today's) the largest bonuses...EVER...with your tax dollars.

Crash; dissecting; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Sun 2010-05-09 09:15 EDT

Where Was Goldman's Supplementary Liquidity Provider Team Yesterday? A Recap Of Goldman's Program Trading Monopoly

In addition to having said many things about HFT in general in the last year, over the past 12 months Zero Hedge has focused a lot of attention specifically on Goldman's dominance of the NYSE's Program Trading platform, where in addition to recent entrant GETCO, it has been to date an explicit monopolist of the so-called Supplementary Liquidity Provider program, a role which affords the company greater liquidity rebates for, well providing liquidity (more on this below), and generating who knows what other possible front market-looking, flow-prop integration (presumably legal) benefits. Yesterday, Goldman's SLP function was non-existent. One wonders - was the Goldman SLP team in fact liquidity taking, or to put it bluntly, among the main reasons for the market collapse...Readers are welcome to go back through our archives and acquaint themselves with the NYSE's SLP program, with Goldman's domination of program trading, with Goldman's domination of dark trading venues via the Sigma X suite, with Goldman's domination of flow trading via Redi X, and with Goldman's domination of virtually every vertical of the capital markets, which would be terrific if monopolies were encouraged in the US...We have long claimed that Goldman is the de facto monopolist of the NYSE's program trading platform. As such, it is certainly the case that Goldman was instrumental in either a) precipitating yesterday's crash or b) not providing the critical liquidity which it is required to do, when the time came...

Goldman's Program Trading Monopoly; Goldman's Supplementary Liquidity Provider Team; Recap; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-04-23 20:44 EDT

The Greek Crisis Has Me Thinking About 1931

The news about Greece's bailout has me thinking a lot about Creditanstalt, the Austrian bank which collapsed in 1931. This account bears remembering because we should see the 1929-1933 descent as a two-part episode, with the second part starting in the Spring of 1931 with Creditanstalt. It should be noted that there were a lot of positive economic signs before the Creditanstalt ruined this. The key difference to today is the monetary liquidity and fiscal stimulus, which has buoyed both asset markets and the real economy. But, the situation in Greece makes me think a lot about Creditanstalt...

1931; Greek crisis; naked capitalism; Think.

zero hedge Fri 2010-04-23 20:02 EDT

How Lehman, With The Fed's Complicity, Created Another Illegal Precedent In Abusing The Primary Dealer Credit Facility

Five months ago, Zero Hedge observed the nuances of the Federal Reserve's Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and concluded that this artificial liquidity boosting construct was nothing more than yet another scam to allow banks to extract ever more money from taxpayers, with the complicit blessing of the Federal Reserve Board Of New York (as the original piece also provided an in-depth discussion of the triparty repo market which is now a parallel to the buzzword of the day in the form of Lehman's "Repo 105" off balance sheet contraption, it should serve as a useful refresher course to anyone who wishes to understand why while Repo 105 with its $50 billion in liability contingency may have been an issue, the true Repo market, with over $3 trillion of likely just as toxic assets, is where the real pain in the future will come from). The PDCF would allow assets of declining and even inexistent value to be pledged as collateral, thus making sure that taxpayer cash was funneled into sham institutions holding predominantly toxic assets, and whose viability was and is limited, yet still is backed by the Fed, which to this day continues to pour our money into them. Today, with a tip from the NYT's Eric Dash, we demonstrate just how grossly negligent the Federal Reserve was when it came to Lehman's abuse of the PDCF, and how the trail of slime of Lehman's increasingly obvious manipulation of its books goes to the very top of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and its then governor - a very much complicit Tim Geithner...

abuse; created; Fed's Complicity; Illegal Precedent; Lehman; Primary Dealers Credit Facility; Zero Hedge.