Sat 2010-10-09 10:56 EDT

And Then There Were None | afoe | A Fistful of Euros | European Opinion

Edward Hugh

...rather than being over, what the debt crisis now may be entering is a new stage, where one sovereign bond after another is being chisled out and sent off to join their Greek counterpart in the isolation ward...the Irish economy has never really left recession...Irish GDP has now contracted on a quarterly basis for 9 out of the past 10 quarters, and there is no evident end in sight....the riskiest lenders to nationalized Anglo Irish Bank may not get all their money back...In the Portuguese case it is the budget deficit issue which is unsettling the markets, with the spread widening sharply following the revelation that far from the deficit being reduced is was actually increasing...Neither the European sovereign debt crisis nor the banking sector crisis has been resolved and both continue to mutually reinforce each other...the EU's stress tests for banks had manifestly failed to restore the necessary confidence.

afo; euro; European opinion; fisted.

Fri 2010-10-08 21:53 EDT

MERS 101

MERS - Mortgage Electronic Registration Inc. - holds approximately 60 million American mortgages and is a Delaware corporation whose sole shareholder is Mers Corp. MersCorp and its specified members have agreed to include the MERS corporate name on any mortgage that was executed in conjunction with any mortgage loan made by any member of MersCorp...Thus in place of the original lender being named as the mortgagee on the mortgage that is supposed to secure their loan, MERS is named as the ``nominee'' for the lender who actually loaned the money to the borrower. In other words MERS is really nothing more than a name that is used on the mortgage instrument in place of the actual lender. MERS' primary function, therefore, is to act as a document custodian. MERS was created solely to simplify the process of transferring mortgages by avoiding the need to re-record liens -- and pay county recorder filing fees -- each time a loan is assigned. Instead, servicer's record loans only once and MERS' electronic system monitors transfers and facilitates the trading of notes...MersCorp was created in the early 1990's by the former C.E.O.'s of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Indy Mac, Countrywide, Stewart Title Insurance and the American Land Title Association... MERS, as has clearly been proven in many civil cases, does not hold any promissory notes of any kind. A party must have possession of a promissory note in order to have standing to enforce and/or otherwise collect a debt that is owed to another party. Given this clear-cut legal definition, MERS does not have legal standing to enforce or collect on the over 60 million mortgages it controls and no member of MERS has any standing in an American civil court. MERS has been taken to civil courts across the country and charged with a lack of standing in reposession issues. When the mortgage debacle initially, and inevitably, began, MERS always routinely brought actions against defaulting mortgage holders purporting to represent the owners of the defaulted mortgages but once the courts discovered that MERS was only a front organization that did not hold any deed nor was aware of who or what agencies might hold a deed, they have routinely been denied in their attempts to force foreclosure. In the past, persons alleging they were officials of MERS in foreclosure motions, purported to be the holders of the mortgage, when, in fact, they not only were not the holder of the mortgage but, under a court order, could not produce the identity of the actual holder. These so-called MERS officers have usually been just employees of entities who are servicing the loan for the actual lender. MERS, it is now widely acknowledged by the courts, has no legal right to foreclose or otherwise collect debt which are evidenced by promissory notes held by someone else...

MERS 101.

Fri 2010-10-08 21:11 EDT

4ClosureFraud Posts Lender Processing Services Mortgage Document Fabrication Price Sheet >> naked capitalism

Yves Smith

...document fabrication is widespread in foreclosures. The reason is that the note, which is the borrower IOU, is the critical instrument to establishing the right to foreclose in 45 states (in those states, the mortgage, which is the lien on the property, is a mere ``accessory'' to the note). The pooling and servicing agreement, which governs the creation of mortgage backed securities, called for the note to be endorsed (wet ink signatures) through the full chain of title...Evidence is mounting that for cost reasons, starting in the 2004-2005 time frame, originators like Countrywide simply quit conveying the note. We are told this practice was widespread, probably endemic. The notes are apparently are still in originator warehouses. That means the trust does not have them (the legalese is it is not the real party of interest), therefore it is not in a position to foreclose on behalf of the RMBS investors. So various ruses have been used to finesse this rather large problem...We finally have concrete proof of how widespread document fabrication was...This revelation touches every major servicer and RMBS trustee in the US...The story that banks have been trying to sell has been that document problems like improper affidavits are mere technicalities. We've said from the get go that they were the tip of the iceberg of widespread document forgeries and fraud...

4ClosureFraud Posts Lender Processing Services Mortgage Document Fabrication Price Sheet; naked capitalism.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Sat 2010-09-25 09:47 EDT

Chris Whalen On The Upcoming "Worst Economic Contraction Since WWI (Forget WWII)"

Chris Whalen at Institutional Risk Analytics

The erosion of the profitability of the U.S. banking industry over the past two years under the glorious Summers-Geithner-Bernanke rescue scheme is the proverbial fly in the ointment for both major political parties. Democrats and republicans alike are going to be fed into the meat grinder over the next several years as the banking sector deals with literally hundreds of billions of dollars in direct and indirect expenses from the deflation of the mortgage bubble. For the economy, this slow process of muddle along championed by Summers and Geithner will ensure that Barack Obama becomes the Herbert Hoover of the Democratic Party. The economic carnage that will causes these losses, as we described in a recent post in Reuters, "Double Dip or Global Deflation?," is going to represent the worst economic contraction since WWI. Forget WWII. Think "shrinkage" to use the Gilded Age description for economic deflation. And frankly nothing that either the Fed or Treasury does in the near-term can change this basic economic fact of restructuring...the economic situation at BAC and among all of the legacy zombie banks continues to worsen. No amount of bullshit from Washington changes the fundamental economic situation inside the largest U.S. lenders.

Chris Whalen; dropped; Forget WWII; long; survival rate; Timeline; upcoming; worst economic contraction; WWI; zero; Zero Hedge.

Thu 2010-08-26 09:23 EDT

Jingle mail in Jersey from Hyatt Hotels ... | footnoted.com

If you're in Princeton, New Jersey, anytime soon, swing by the Hyatt Regency Princeton. With the Hyatt Hotels (H) quarterly report filed yesterday, it has become a symbol of the financial crisis... Like households across the country, one of Hyatt's subsidiaries ``did not have sufficient cash flow to meet interest payment requirements under its mortgage loan'' on the property, in this case a 347-room hotel with a restaurant, bar and comedy club, just a mile from [Princeton University]....``When hotel cash flow became insufficient to service the loan,'' the company said in the filing, ``HHC notified the lender that it would not provide assistance.'' In other words, Hyatt decided to walk away -- the equivalent of ``jingle mail''...

com; Footnote; Hyatt hotel; Jersey; Jingle Mail.

Tue 2010-08-24 19:48 EDT

California Court Rules: MERS Can't Foreclose, Citibank Can't Collect - Mandelman Matters

...if a foreclosing party in California, that is not the original lender, claims that payment is due under the note, and that they have the right to foreclose on the basis of a MERS assignment, they're wrong... based on this opinion. The bottom line is that MERS has no authority to transfer the note because it never owned it, and that's a view that even seems to be supported by MERS' own contract, which says that ``MERS agrees not to assert any rights to mortgage loans or properties mortgaged thereby''...some lawyers believe that this ruling is relevant to borrowers across the country as well, because the court cited non-bankruptcy cases related to the lack of authority of MERS, and because this opinion is consistent with prior rulings in Idaho and Nevada Bankruptcy courts on the same issue...

California court ruled; Citibank; collections; foreclose; Mandelman Matters; MER.

Dr. Housing Bubble Blog Fri 2010-07-30 15:22 EDT

Banks cherry picking individual foreclosures that show up on the MLS in Culver City and Pasadena with proof: Southern California lenders pushing out properties in Culver City with an average price tag of $300,000. Median sale price for city is $600,000. Shadow inventory average price is $443,000 with loans at an average of $552,000. 141,000 homes in Southern California are distressed yet MLS only reflects 83,000 total properties.

...Prices even today are disconnected from market fundamentals. Inventory is still growing and the shadow inventory figures remain elevated...The bulk of properties are sitting hidden in bank balance sheets and are part of the shadow inventory...For Pasadena, for every one listed foreclosure or short sale, you can be assured that there are 5 other properties sitting in the depths of a bank balance sheet. Keep in mind this is for a highly desirable area...the numbers look nearly the same in Culver City. For every one distressed property on the MLS, you have 5 others hidden in some bank balance sheet. Now when I look at this data what I see is a façade in Southern California real estate...Banks are basically trying to avoid facing the music and realizing the reality that these properties are overpriced (people can't even keep up with their payments). Does any of this data look like a healthy market?

000; 000 home; 000 total properties; 141; 300; 443; 552; 600; Average; average price tag; Banks cherry picking individual foreclosures; Citi; Culver city; distressed; Dr. Housing Bubble Blog; Loans; median sales price; MLS; Pasadena; proof; property; reflects 83; Shadow inventory average price; showed; Southern California; Southern California lenders pushing.

naked capitalism Sat 2010-07-24 16:34 EDT

Summer Rerun: ``Unwinding the Fraud for Bubbles''

Tanta at Calculated Risk

This post first appeared on March 27, 2007. ...Telling the difference between the victims and the victimizers, the predators and the prey, and the fraudulent and the defrauded, is getting a lot harder when you have borrowers not required to make down payments able to lie about their incomes in order to buy a home the seller is overpricing in order to take an illegal kickback. The lender is getting defrauded, but the lender is the one who offered the zero-down stated-income program, delegated the drawing up of the legal documents and the final disbursement of funds to a fee-for-service settlement agent, and didn't do enough due diligence on the appraisal to see the inflation of the value. Legally, of course, there's a difference between lender as co-conspirator and lender as mark, utterly failing to exercise reasonable caution, but it's small comfort when the losses rack up. With tongue only partially in cheek, I'm about to suggest a third category of fraud: Fraud for Bubbles...My theory of the Fraud for Bubbles is, in a nutshell, that it isn't that lenders forgot that there are risks. It is that the miserable dynamic of unsound lending puffing up unsustainable real estate prices, which in turn kept supporting even more unsound lending, simply masked fraud problems sufficiently, and delayed the eventual ``feedback'' mechanisms sufficiently, that rampant fraud came to seem ``affordable.'' So many of the business practices that help fraud succeed--thinning backoffice staff, hiring untrained temps to replace retiring (and pricey) veterans, speeding up review processes, cutting back on due diligence sampling, accepting more and more copies, faxes, and phone calls instead of original ink-signed documents--threw off so much money that no one wanted to believe that the eventual cost of the fraud would eat it all up, and possibly more...

bubble; fraud; naked capitalism; summer reruns; unwinds.

Sat 2010-07-24 16:13 EDT

Disequilibria: A Constant State Of Instability >> The Shadow Banking System

RueTheDay

What we saw from mid-2007 through early-2009 was a run on the shadow banking system. There were two primary channels by which the shadow banking system operated: the Money Market/Commercial Paper Channel and the Repo Channel...we have largely unregulated [money market funds (MMMFs)] taking deposits (largely withdrawable on demand and usually checkable) and making the equivalent of loans, in other words, acting as banks. Except that the MMMFs were not subject to much in the way of prudential regulation beyond some broad parameters that dictated what investments they could buy, did not have access to FDIC deposit insurance, and did not have lender of last resort access to the Fed's discount window. They were a disaster waiting to happen...Repos also became a very popular mechanism for raising funds in the pre-crisis days, with MMMFs becoming large buyers of repos (lenders) and the broker dealers becoming both buyers and sellers (borrowers and lenders)...during the crisis...the classic maturity mismatch situation...concerns about the quality of commercial paper...triggered by the collapse of Lehman...Without the traditional protection of deposit insurance and lender of last resort financing by the Fed, it turned into a full blown panic...Any meaningful financial reform must bring the shadow banking system out of the shadows. It must be treated as banking, and its institutions regulated as banks...

constant state; Disequilibria; instability; Shadow banks Systems.

Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Post Keynesian Perspective Thu 2010-07-22 16:00 EDT

Fractional Reserve Banking: An Evil?

Lord Keynes

Hostility to fractional reserve banking is ubiquitous. The Austrians hate it and regard it as a type of fraud. There are even a good many people on the left who despise fractional reserve banking as an evil institution. However, a careful look at fractional reserve banking suggests that it is not necessarily a problem with modern fiat money, a well-regulated financial system, deposit insurance and a central bank ready as the lender of last resort. Fractional reserve banking without these safeguards can be extremely destabilizing and has often led to disastrous bank collapses and depressions...

21st century; evil; fractional reserve banking; Post Keynesian Perspective; social democracy.

Sat 2010-05-22 21:13 EDT

EconPapers: An Alternative View of Finance, Saving, Deficits, and Liquidity

L. Randall Wray

This paper contrasts the orthodox approach with an alternative view on finance, saving, deficits, and liquidity. The conventional view on the cause of the current global financial crisis points first to excessive United States trade deficits that are supposed to have "soaked up" global savings. Worse, this policy was ultimately unsustainable because it was inevitable that lenders would stop the flow of dollars. Problems were compounded by the Federal Reserve's pursuit of a low-interest-rate policy, which involved pumping liquidity into the markets and thereby fueling a real estate boom. Finally, with the world awash in dollars, a run on the dollar caused it to collapse. The Fed (and then the Treasury) had to come to the rescue of U.S. banks, firms, and households. When asset prices plummeted, the financial crisis spread to much of the rest of the world. According to the conventional view, China, as the residual supplier of dollars, now holds the fate of the United States, and possibly the entire world, in its hands. Thus, it's necessary for the United States to begin living within its means, by balancing its current account and (eventually) eliminating its budget deficit. I challenge every aspect of this interpretation. Our nation operates with a sovereign currency, one that is issued by a sovereign government that operates with a flexible exchange rate. As such, the government does not really borrow, nor can foreigners be the source of dollars. Rather, it is the U.S. current account deficit that supplies the net dollar saving to the rest of the world, and the federal government budget deficit that supplies the net dollar saving to the nongovernment sector. Further, saving is never a source of finance; rather, private lending creates bank deposits to finance spending that generates income. Some of this income can be saved, so the second part of the saving decision concerns the form in which savings might be held--as liquid or illiquid assets. U.S. current account deficits and federal budget deficits are sustainable, so the United States does not need to adopt austerity, nor does it need to look to the rest of the world for salvation. Rather, it needs to look to domestic fiscal stimulus strategies to resolve the crisis, and to a larger future role for government in helping to stabilize the economy. [MMT]

alternative view; Deficit; EconPapers; finance; liquidity; save.

Calculated Risk Thu 2010-05-06 13:59 EDT

96.5% of Mortgages Backed by Government entities in Q1

CalculatedRisk

...Government-related entities backed 96.5% of all home loans during the first quarter, up from 90% in 2009, according to Inside Mortgage Finance...The government-sponsored enterprises--Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae--now own or guarantee an overwhelming share of originations. At the same time, non-agency mortgage securitization and loans retained in lender portfolios have largely dried up...Without the government backed entities there would be almost no mortgage market.

5; 96; Calculated Risk; government entity; Mortgage Backed; Q1.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2010-05-06 13:44 EDT

Control Frauds HyperInflate and Extend Bubbles Maximizing Damage - A Control Fraud at Work in the Silver Market Short Positions?

Jesse

Here is a working paper by William K. Black about 'control frauds' and how they relate to the most recent credit crisis in the United States, a breakdown of stewardship that has placed the rest of the world's financial sector at risk as well...``Control frauds'' are seemingly legitimate entities controlled by persons that use them as a fraud ``weapon.'' A single control fraud can cause greater losses than all other forms of property crime combined. This article addresses the role of control fraud in financial crises. Financial control frauds' primary weapon is accounting. Fraudulent lenders produce exceptional short-term ``profits'' through a four-part strategy: extreme growth (Ponzi), lending to uncreditworthy borrowers, extreme leverage, and minimal loss reserves...

Control Frauds HyperInflate; controls Fraud; Extend Bubbles Maximizing Damage; Jesse's Café Américain; Silver Market Short Positions; working.

zero hedge Fri 2010-04-23 20:02 EDT

An Overview Of The Fed's Intervention In Equity Markets Via The Primary Dealer Credit Facility

Recently, Zero Hedge presented a snapshot analysis of the various securities that made up the triparty repo agreement involving JPM, Lehman and the Fed. We uncovered numerous bankrupt companies' equities that were being pledged as collateral for what ultimately was taxpayer exposure. To our surprise, this discovery is not an exception, and in fact in the days immediately preceding the collapse of Bear Stearns first, and subsequently, Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve established and refined a program that permitted banks to pledge virtually any security as collateral, including not just investment grade bonds and higher ranked securities, but also stocks of companies, the riskiest investment possible, and a guaranteed way for taxpayer capital to evaporate in the context of a disintegrating financial system, all with the purpose of bailing out Wall Street's major institutions. On two occasions last year: on March 16, 2008, and subsequently on September 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve first established what is known as the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), and subsequently amended it, so that the Fed, in becoming the lender of last resort, would allow any collateral, up to and including stocks, to be funded by the Federal Reserve's credit facility, in order to prevent the $4.5 trillion repo financing system from imploding. By doing so, the Federal Reserve effectively gave a Carte Blanche to primary dealers to purchase any and all equities they so desired, with such purchases immediately being funded by the US taxpayer, via the PDCF. In essence, this was equivalent to the Fed purchasing equities by itself through a Primary Dealer agent...

equity markets; Fed's interventions; overview; Primary Dealers Credit Facility; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Tue 2010-03-09 17:59 EST

Is The Federal Reserve Insolvent?

...For a refined analysis of what would happen in that moment of clarity when the world realizes the world's biggest bank is broke, we turn to a presentation by Chris Sims, given before Princeton University, titled "Fiscal/Monetary Coordination When The Anchor Cable Has Snapped."...discusses precisely the issues were are faced with today: namely a monetary policy that has run amok, seignorage, exploding excess reserves, the impact of these on "power money", and, in general, a Fed balance sheet that is increasingly reminiscent of a drunk, rapid and schizophrenic bull in a China store...the only way to deal with a mark-to-market of the Fed currently is to embrace monetization. It is no longer a question of semantics, of who promised what: it is the only mechanical way by which the Fed can dig itself out of a capital deficiency. With GSE delinquencies exploding, and with the Fed (and Congress) singlehandedly facilitating imprudent lender policy by allowing ever more borrowers to become deliquent without consequences, the MBS delinquency rate will likely hit 10% over the next 6-12 months. At that moment, someone will ask the Fed: "what is the true basis of your capital account?" And when the Fed is forced to justify a valid response, is when monetizaton will begin...

Federal Reserve Insolvent; Zero Hedge.

Bruce Krasting Tue 2010-03-09 17:10 EST

Some Thoughts on Fannie's Horrible Year

Bruce Krasting

Fannie Mae released it's annual and 4th Q numbers after the close on Friday and during one hell of a messy snowstorm. FNM posted a loss of $16.3b for the quarter and $74.4b for the year. An unmitigated disaster. The timing of the release suggests that they were hoping that no one would notice how bad the last twelve months were. There was nothing particularly new in the most recent quarter, just more bad news. What is happening at Fannie is also happening at Freddie Mac and to a different extent at FHA. There are some trends that I think are worth noting...they have moved to restrict lending to better borrowers...all three of the D.C. mortgage lenders are pulling on the credit reins...It will be harder to get a mortgage in one month from today and even harder to get one six moths from today. For me the implications of this are very obvious. Broad RE values will have to go lower, high-end homes will suffer the most in percentage drops...the biggest seller of RE over the past 24 months in America has been the federal government...The vast majority of defaults come because borrowers are underwater. Falling RE prices are the number one contributor to the default cycle...

Bruce Krasting; Fannie's Horrible Year; thought.

THE PRAGMATIC CAPITALIST Wed 2010-02-10 11:22 EST

AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE REAL ESTATE TRAIN WRECK

TPC

The first time I spoke with real estate entrepreneur Andy Miller was in late 2007, when I asked him to serve on the faculty of a Casey Research Summit...what most intrigued me about Andy was that he had been almost alone among his peer group in foreseeing the coming end of the real estate bubble, and in liquidating essentially all of his considerable portfolio of projects near the top...he remains deeply concerned about the outlook for real estate...the United States home mortgage market has been nationalized without anybody noticing...If government support goes away, and it will go away, where will that leave the home market? It leaves you with a catastrophe...eventually the bond market is going to gag on the government-sponsored paper...commercial properties are not performing and that values have gone down, although I've got to tell you, the denial is still widespread, particularly in the United States and on the part of lenders sitting on and servicing all these real estate portfolios...The current volume of defaults is already alarming. And the volume of commercial real estate defaults is growing every month...When you hit that breaking point, unless there's some alternative in place, it's going to be a very hideous picture for the bond market and the banking system...second quarter 2010 is a guess...the FDIC and the Treasury Department have decided that rather than see 1,000 or 2,000 banks go under and then create another RTC to sift through all the bad assets, they'll let the banking system warehouse the bad assets. Their plan is to leave the assets in place, and then, when the market changes, let the banks deal with them. Now, that's horribly destructive...it's exactly a Japanese-style solution...The entire U.S. residential mortgage market has in effect been nationalized, but there wasn't any act of Congress, no screaming and shouting, no headlines in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times...That's a template for what they could do with the commercial loan market.

insider's view; pragmatic capitalists; Real Estate Train Wreck.

Asia Times Online Fri 2010-02-05 10:49 EST

Stiglitz pinpoints 'moral' core of crisis

Nobel Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz rightly condemns the "ersatz capitalism" of the United States, yet the government there is fixated on resurrecting the morally depraved system that led to the present crisis. Reformists forget that predatory lenders in the US in theory forfeit any right of collection. Start to fix that, and a new economic order could emerge. - Henry CK Liu

Asia Times Online; core; Crisis; morale; Stiglitz pinpoints.

Wed 2010-01-13 12:10 EST

Lynne Huxtable and Jeffrey Agnew, v. Timothy F. Geithner, et al., >> Foreclosure Combatant

Lender's refusal to modify loan may have violated borrowers' Fifth Amendment rights to due process.

Foreclosure Combatant; Jeffrey Agnew; Lynne Huxtable; Timothy F. Geithner.

Calculated Risk Wed 2010-01-13 12:01 EST

HAMP Loan Modifications and the Fifth Amendment

CalculatedRisk

...The homedebtor enjoyed some initial success arguing a non-judicial foreclosure was a violation of due process...The homedebtors are named Huxtable and Agnew. Interestingly, Agnew is also listed as the "lead attorney" for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs defaulted in late 2007, and the bank began a non-judicial foreclosure process in late 2008. The plaintiffs filed suit in federal court to stop the foreclosure, naming as defendants Timothy Geithner, the FHFA the lender and the servicer. The plaintiffs were allegedly denied a HAMP modification, and they claim the government and the bank violated the plaintiffs' right to "due process under the Fifth Amendment for failing to create rules implementing HAMP that comport with due process."...The judge refused to dismiss the case because the plaintiffs might be able to prove the government has "insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with the bank.

amendment; Calculated Risk; HAMP Loan Modifications.

Calculated Risk Sun 2010-01-03 23:50 EST

Putting the MERS Controversies in Perspective

CalculatedRisk

A great deal has been written in the last year or so about cases in which a court has denied a lender the right to foreclose on a mortgaged house. Lately many of the decisions have involved MERS, an acronym for the nationwide Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. This post focuses on two August decisions in which the courts decided MERS should be able to foreclose, despite vigorous legal efforts by the homeowners.

Calculated Risk; MERS Controversies; perspective; putting.

Wed 2009-12-16 15:41 EST

Steve Keen's DebtWatch No 31 February 2009: ``The Roving Cavaliers of Credit'' | Steve Keen's Debtwatch

``Talk about centralisation! The credit system, which has its focus in the so-called national banks and the big money-lenders and usurers surrounding them, constitutes enormous centralisation, and gives this class of parasites the fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous manner-- and this gang knows nothing about production and has nothing to do with it.'' [Karl Marx] Marx's analysis of money and credit, and how the credit system can bring an otherwise well-functioning market economy to its knees, was spot on. His observations on the financial crisis of 1857 still ring true today...

31 February 2009; credit; Roving Cavaliers; Steve Keen's Debtwatch.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-12-01 22:16 EST

Draining the Swamp: The Fed's Tri Party Repo Machine

Jesse

A triparty repo transaction is a transaction among three parties: a cash lender acting on behalf of all holders of dollars (the Fed), a borrower that will provide collateral (dodgy debt holder in shaky financial condition), and a clearing bank, most likely a primary dealer like J.P. Morgan, which is only too happy to collect its fees as an agent of the Fed... This is the method of obtaining toxic assets from the books of non-primary dealers, and providing stability and liquidity from the aggregate value of all dollar holders to cover the misdeeds of diverse financial institutions and other favored parties. In other words, the Fed is draining the financial debt swamp and toxic waste dumps into your basement, if you hold Federal Reserve Notes.

drain; Fed's Tri Party Repo Machine; Jesse's Café Américain; swamping.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

John P. Hussman

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.