dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

deceptively Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

accounting deception (1); adopt deception (1); aggressively deceptive (1); deceptions underlying (1); Deceptive Synthetic CDO Practices (1); pure deceptions played (3).

Minyanville Wed 2010-09-29 09:08 EDT

Excerpt From "Traders, Guns & Money" (Part 3)

Minyanville Professor Satyajit Das' book "Traders Guns & Money" is a wickedly comic exposé of the culture games and pure deceptions played out every day in trading rooms around the world. And played out with other people's money. Das is an international expert on financial derivatives and has more than 30 years of experience in the financial markets. Having worked on both the sell side and buy side for such banks as the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Citicorp Investment Bank Merrill Lynch and the TNT Group he now acts as a consultant advising banks and corporations and presenting

excerpts; gun; Minyanville; money; Part 3; Traders.

Mon 2010-09-20 19:04 EDT

Excerpt From "Traders, Guns & Money" (Part 2)

Minyanville Professor Satyajit Das' "Traders, Guns & Money" is a wickedly comic exposé of the culture, games, and pure deceptions played out every day in trading rooms around the world. And played out with other people's money...

excerpts; gun; money; Part 2; Traders.

Sat 2010-09-11 23:31 EDT

Excerpt From "Traders, Guns & Money" (Part 1)

Minyanville Professor Satyajit Das' "Traders, Guns & Money" is a wickedly comic exposé of the culture, games, and pure deceptions played out every day in trading rooms around the world. And played out with other people's money. Das is an international expert on financial derivatives and has more than 30 years of experience in the financial markets. Having worked on both the sell side and buy side for such banks as the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Citicorp Investment Bank, Merrill Lynch, and the TNT Group, he now acts as a consultant advising banks and corporations and presenting seminars on derivatives throughout the world...

excerpts; gun; money; Part 1; Traders.

Thu 2010-08-19 16:04 EDT

The AIG Bailout Scandal

The government's $182 billion bailout of insurance giant AIG should be seen as the Rosetta Stone for understanding the financial crisis and its costly aftermath. The story of American International Group explains the larger catastrophe not because this was the biggest corporate bailout in history but because AIG's collapse and subsequent rescue involved nearly all the critical elements, including delusion and deception. These financial dealings are monstrously complicated, but this account focuses on something mere mortals can understand--moral confusion in high places, and the failure of governing institutions to fulfill their obligations to the public. Three governmental investigative bodies have now pored through the AIG wreckage and turned up disturbing facts--the House Committee on Oversight and Reform; the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which will make its report at year's end; and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), which issued its report on AIG in June. The five-member COP, chaired by Harvard professor Elizabeth Warren, has produced the most devastating and comprehensive account so far. Unanimously adopted by its bipartisan members, it provides alarming insights that should be fodder for the larger debate many citizens long to hear--why Washington rushed to forgive the very interests that produced this mess, while innocent others were made to suffer the consequences. The Congressional panel's critique helps explain why bankers and their Washington allies do not want Elizabeth Warren to chair the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau...

AIG bailout scandal.

Tue 2010-08-03 15:02 EDT

Economics of Contempt: Anatomy of Lehman's Failure, and the Importance of Liquidity Requirements

Remember the Lehman Examiner's Report? The 4000+ page report by the court-appointed examiner was lauded for a couple of weeks after it was released, and then largely forgotten. The media and blogosphere quickly moved on to the next outrage-du-jour...Well, I did not forget about it, and thanks to the uptick in flights -- and thus reading time -- in the last few months, I can now credibly claim to have read....well, not every single word in the Examiner's Report (some appendices are just pages of CUSIPs), but all of the substantive sections...Anton Valukas and the lawyers at Jenner & Block who wrote the Examiner's Report did a masterful job. I was, and continue to be, in awe of the quality and comprehensiveness of the report...think I have a pretty good handle on what went wrong at Lehman, and why it failed...they were misrepresenting their liquidity pool. In a huge way...the brazenness of their misrepresentation was shocking...Including the clearing-bank collateral in its liquidity pool was not only inappropriate, but also aggressively deceptive...Lehman was also including in its liquidity pool non-central bank eligible CLOs and CDOs. And they had the audacity to mark these CLOs and CDOs at 100 (par) for purposes of the liquidity pool, even though JPMorgan's third-party pricing vendor marked them at 50--60...

Anatomy; contempt; economic; important; Lehman's failure; liquidity requirements.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2010-05-18 15:10 EDT

The US Intelligentsia and Middle Class Are In the Firm Grip of Fear, Fraud and Denial

The lie is comfortable, an illusion easy to live with, familiar, and safe. Writing from the 'disgraced profession' of economics, James K. Galbraith speaks of the unspoken, the many frauds and deceptions underlying the recent financial crisis centered in the US...``the country faces an existential threat. Either the legal system must do its work. Or the market system cannot be restored. There must be a thorough, transparent, effective, radical cleaning of the financial sector and also of those public officials who failed the public trust. The financiers must be made to feel, in their bones, the power of the law. And the public, which lives by the law, must see very clearly and unambiguously that this is the case...''

denial; fears; firm grip; fraud; intelligentsia; Jesse's Café Américain; middle class.

Jesse's Café Américain Wed 2010-04-07 19:06 EDT

Banks Come Back For Another Bailout in Ireland While the US 'Manages Perceptions'

The whole notion of bank bailouts is a tremendous injustice when not accompanied by personal bankruptcy and civil and criminal prosecution for those banks managers who created them and are found guilty of fraud. In addition, the owners of the banks, whether through debt or shares, should be wiped out and the bank placed in a proper receivership while its books are sorted out. The US is an accounting mirage. The notion that it will make money from its stake in Citi is a sleight of hand. The enormous subsidies to the banks both in terms of direct payments, indirect payments through entities like AIG, and subsidies such as the erosion of the currency and the deterioration of the real economy, will never be repaid. ...the facts seem to indicate that the US is still pursuing a policy of managed perceptions, accounting deceptions, and old fashioned insider dealing and other forms of corruption that always accompany government, but reach a feverish pitch in times of crisis. It is the establishment's form of looting.

Bailout; banking comes; Ireland; Jesse's Café Américain; managing perception.

naked capitalism Sun 2010-01-03 10:58 EST

On Goldman's (and Now Morgan Stanley's) Deceptive Synthetic CDO Practices (aka Screwing Their Customers)

Goldman is trying to diffuse the increasingly harsh light being turned on its dubious practices in the collateralized debt obligation market, with the wattage turned up considerably last week by a story in the New York Times that described how a synthetic CDO program called Abacus was the means by which Goldman famously went ``net short'' subprime....Goldman wanted its Abacus trades to fail. That was the most profitable course of action for them (note the Times clearly states that that was the role of the Abacus trades and Goldman has not disputed that claim). They were net short, this was no mere hedge of a long position but a trading bet. And those CDOs did turn out to be big turkeys...

aka Screwing; customer; Deceptive Synthetic CDO Practices; Goldman's; Morgan Stanley's; naked capitalism.

The IRA Analyst Sun 2009-09-13 12:14 EDT

House Testimony: The Trouble With Models Starts With Subjectivity

...we have now many examples where a model or the pretense of a model was used as a vehicle for creating risk and hiding it. More important, however, is the role of financial models for creating opportunities for deliberate acts of securities fraud..the widespread use of [VaR] statistical models for risk management suggest that financial institutions are subject to occasional "Black Swans" in the form of risk events that cannot be anticipated...We don't actually believe there is such a thing as a "Black Swan."...leaders in finance and politics simply made the mistake of, again, believing in what were in fact flawed models...Or worse, our leaders in Washington and on Wall Street decided to be short sighted and not care about the inevitable debacle...We need to simply ensure that all of the financial instruments in our marketplace have an objective basis, including a visible, cash basis market that is visible to all market participants. If investors cannot price a security without reference to subjective models, then the security should be banned from the US markets as a matter of law and regulation. To do otherwise is to adopt deception as the public policy goal of the US when it comes to financial markets regulation.

House testimony; IRA Analyst; models starting; subject; Troubles.