Wed 2010-10-13 09:01 EDT

Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System

Christopher Peterson

...Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., commonly referred to as ``MERS,'' is the recorded owner of over half of the nation's residential mortgages. MERS operates a computer database designed to track servicing and ownership rights of mortgage loans anywhere in the United States. But, it also acts as a proxy for the real parties in interest in county land title records. Most importantly, MERS is also filing foreclosure lawsuits on behalf of financiers against hundreds of thousands of American families. This Article explores the legal and public policy foundations of this odd, but extremely powerful, company that is so attached to America's financial destiny...The article culminates in a discussion of MERS' culpability in fostering the mortgage foreclosure crisis and what the long term effects of privatized land title records will have on our public information infrastructure. The Article concludes by considers whether the mortgage banking industry, in creating and embracing MERS, has subverted the democratic governance of the nation's real property recording system.

foreclosures; mortgage Electronic Registration System; subprime mortgage lending.

Thu 2010-09-23 09:33 EDT

Bob Rubin Just Wants to Be Cuddled

Iris Mack

[2010-04-29]...It's October 2007. I've just finished my morning jog on beautiful, sun-drenched Miami Beach and I'm getting a smoothie and a pastry at my usual place, Epicure Market. The subprime mortgage crisis is heading into full-swing mode; Jim Cramer had just done his crazy thing on TV, and you can feel the sky starting to fall all around you -- and that's a literal thing in Miami, where the cranes stopped on a lot of half-finished skyscrapers, the type where a few years back you'd hear about people flipping condos three times before the project even broke ground. (If there's ever a time that I don't regret leaving finance, it's now.) Anyway, I'm in line for the checkout, and a very familiar looking guy gets in line behind me. It's one of those situations where I'm not sure if I eyed him or he eyed me first, but I noticed him shortly when I turned to the left to swipe my debit card. He was standing right behind me in the checkout line - only a few feet away. He looked very familiar and famous, and while that's no rarity in Miami, it is when you realize it's because the guy looks like the former Treasury Secretary -- but maybe no, he's maybe not tall enough? -- and then somehow you finally just blurt out, "Hey, you look just like Bob Rubin!"...

Bob Rubin Just Wants; cuddling.

Christopher Whalen Fri 2010-09-17 19:31 EDT

The key to the future of finance is now emerging

Christopher Whalen

Basel III is entirely irrelevant to the economic situation and even to the banks. Through things like minimum capital levels, the Basel II rules provided the illusion of intelligent design in the regulation of banking and finance. In fact, Basel II made the subprime crisis possible and the subsequent bailout inevitable [by enabling off-balance sheet finance and OTC derivatives]...Part of the reason for my undisguised contempt for the Basel III process comes from caution regarding the benefits of regulating markets...But a large portion of my criticism for Basel III and the entire Basel framework is even more basic, namely the notion that any form of a priori regulation, public or private, can prevent people from doing stupid things...The key premise of Basel III is that the use of minimum capital guidelines and other strictures will somehow enable regulators to prevent a crises before it occurs. The only trouble is that regulators have no objective measures for compliance with Basel II/III, much less predicting market breaks...As in past decades and crises right through to 2008, the regulators will be the last to know about a problem...

Christopher Whalen; Emergency; finance; future; Key.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-07-19 17:07 EDT

Is the SEC Settlement Really a Win for Goldman?

Tom Adams and Yves Smith

...Conventional wisdom in the financial media is that the settlement announced by the SEC over its lawsuit on a Goldman 2007 Abacus CDO is a home run for Goldman. But a closer reading suggests that Goldman's victory is qualified, and the enthusiastic press response is in large measure due to the firm's skillful manipulation of perceptions...it is hard to see how anything in the settlement, if affirmed, would be negative for private parties considering lawsuits against sellers of CDOs...we imagine potential CDO investors will be mightily encouraged that Goldman ended up returning the full amount of investment to the one true third party investor in the deal -- IKB...An investor considering bringing an action against a bank that sold them a CDO that failed (meaning virtually all 2006 and 2007 ``mezzanine'' CDOs) would probably be encouraged that a bank was required to pay such a large amount for making inaccurate statements about the true nature of the CDO...Plaintiffs who sue CDO sellers have good reason to be optimistic...The settlement thus tarnishes the popular myth that the subprime shorts were insightful outsiders who executed ``the greatest trade ever''...the SEC has demonstrated that investors in such a CDO can win a recovery as a result of such inaccurate statements.

Goldman; naked capitalism; SEC Settlement Really; Wins.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-07-16 16:31 EDT

Debunking Michael Lewis' Subprime Short Hagiography

Lewis' tale is neat, plausible to a mass market audience fed a steady diet of subprime markets stupidity and greed, and incomplete in critical ways that render his account fundamentally misleading...The Big Short focuses on four clusters of subprime short sellers, all early to figure out this ``greatest trade ever'' and thus supposedly deserving of star treatment...The anchor is Steve Eisman...Lewis completely ignores the most vital player, the one who was on the other side of the subprime short bets...Who really was on the other side of the shorts' trades is the important question... ...these are the international equivalent of widows and orphans...Eisman is no noble outsider. He is a willing, knowing co-conspirator. Even worse, he and the other shorts Lewis lionizes didn't simply set off the global debt conflagration, they made the severity of the crisis vastly worse. So it wasn't just that these speculators were harmful, and Lewis gave them a free pass. He failed to clue in his readers that the actions of his chosen heroes drove the demand for the worst sort of mortgages and turned what would otherwise have been a ``contained'' problem into a systemic crisis. The subprime market would have died a much earlier, much less costly death absent the actions of the men Lewis celebrates. They didn't simply keep the market going well past its sell-by date, they were the moving force behind otherwise inexplicable, superheated demand for the very worst sort of mortgages...

Debunking Michael Lewis; naked capitalism; Subprime Short Hagiography.

zero hedge Wed 2010-05-19 11:37 EDT

Guest Post: Goldman's CDOs Had Nothing to Do With the Real Estate Bubble

David Fiderer

If Goldman Sachs wanted to reduce its exposure to subprime mortgage investments, why didn't it simply sell the assets it owned? Two reasons: First, those large sales would have sent a signal that something was terribly, terribly wrong, and thereby pushed prices down further. That's how supply and demand normally works. Second, Goldman professed to be market maker, which uses its trading book to instill confidence. It ostensibly bought, sold and inventoried mortgage securities to provide stability and liquidity to the marketplace. Of course, we now know that such market confidence was entirely misplaced. To sidestep these issues, Goldman and other major banks found a solution that subverted the laws of supply and demand, and escaped the price discovery of a transparent marketplace. They fabricated synthetic CDOs, such as Abacus 2007 AC-1. These toxic assets, invented out of thin air, made the meltdown worse than it otherwise would have been...

Goldman's CDOs; Guest Post; real estate bubble; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Mon 2010-04-19 10:52 EDT

SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud On Subprime Mortgages, Paulson & Co. Implicated

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Goldman, Sachs & Co. and one of its vice presidents for defrauding investors by misstating and omitting key facts about a financial product tied to subprime mortgages as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter. The SEC alleges that Goldman Sachs structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that hinged on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Goldman Sachs failed to disclose to investors vital information about the CDO, in particular the role that a major hedge fund played in the portfolio selection process and the fact that the hedge fund had taken a short position against the CDO.

Co; fraud; implications; Paulson; SEC charged Goldman Sachs; subprime-mortgage; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Sun 2010-01-03 10:58 EST

On Goldman's (and Now Morgan Stanley's) Deceptive Synthetic CDO Practices (aka Screwing Their Customers)

Goldman is trying to diffuse the increasingly harsh light being turned on its dubious practices in the collateralized debt obligation market, with the wattage turned up considerably last week by a story in the New York Times that described how a synthetic CDO program called Abacus was the means by which Goldman famously went ``net short'' subprime....Goldman wanted its Abacus trades to fail. That was the most profitable course of action for them (note the Times clearly states that that was the role of the Abacus trades and Goldman has not disputed that claim). They were net short, this was no mere hedge of a long position but a trading bet. And those CDOs did turn out to be big turkeys...

aka Screwing; customer; Deceptive Synthetic CDO Practices; Goldman's; Morgan Stanley's; naked capitalism.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

Goldman left foreign investors holding the subprime bag | McClatchy

Greg Gordon

Goldman sold more than $57 billion in risky mortgage-backed securities during a 14-month period in 2006 and 2007, including nearly $39 billion issued from mortgages it purchased. Meanwhile, the firm peddled billions of dollars in complex deals, many of them tied to subprime mortgages, in the Caymans and other offshore locations...Goldman's traders also made huge bets that those securities would lose value by buying insurance-like contracts, called credit-default swaps, with private parties. Beginning early in 2007, they bought swaps on a London-based exchange.

Goldman left foreign investors holding; McClatchy; subprime bag.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:12 EST

Business & Technology | Part one | Reckless strategies doomed WaMu | Seattle Times Newspaper

Drew DeSilver

In its headlong pursuit of growth, WaMu systematically dismantled or weakened the internal controls meant to prevent the bank from taking on too much risk -- the very standards and practices that had helped it grow in the first place. WaMu's riskiest loans raked in money from high fees, but because the bank skimped on making sure borrowers could repay them, they eventually failed at disastrously high rates. As loans went bad, they sucked massive amounts of cash that WaMu needed to stay in business. WaMu's subprime home loans failed at the highest rates in nation. Foreclosure rates for subprime loans made from 2005 to 2007 -- the peak of the boom -- were calamitous. In the 10 hardest-hit cities, more than a third of WaMu subprime loans went into foreclosure.

business; part; Reckless Strategies Doomed WaMu; Seattle Times Newspaper; Technology.

zero hedge Tue 2009-10-27 11:50 EDT

Freddie Mac Annualized Defaults Hit Record High At 7.3%, Even As Lending Increases Once Again

With the US government now having taken over the functions of such pristine subprime lenders as New Century, with the provision that it not only is not checking borrowers' credit scores, income potential, or other "facts" that the mortgage lenders at least pretended to care about, but also giving away massive incentives to promote housing bubble V2, it was only a matter of time before the taxpayer's balance sheet would start looking like an Angelo Mozilo wet dream. Today, Freddie Mac released its September Monthly Volume Summary and, as expected, it is beginning to look just like the subprime debacle is among us, only this time all of America is on the hook thanks to a brilliant Fed and the even more brilliant geniuses in D.C.

3; 7; Freddie Mac Annualized Defaults Hit Record High; lending increasingly; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Mon 2009-10-12 10:22 EDT

FHA: Next Bailout?

...The FHA has ALWAYS been in the low down payment business! It has long offered loans requiring only 3% down, long before ``subprime'' was part of the lexicon. Historically, FHA loans did not show default rates materially worse than prime loans. That experience has been replicated by not for profit lenders in low income neighborhoods...the big difference from how the FHA once did business versus its subprime competitors was.....the FHA screened loans on an individual basis. The process was time consuming and somewhat intrusive. Private lenders were faster, easier, and (lo and behold) less stringent.

Bailout; FHA; naked capitalism.

Calculated Risk Tue 2009-09-22 09:30 EDT

Inspector General: FDIC saw risks at IndyMac in 2002

CalculatedRisk

From the Inspector General Report: Between 2001 and 2003, [Division of Insurance and Research] DIR risk assessments and quarterly banking profiles identified concerns about a number of issues, including:*** consumers' ever-increasing debt load, the expansion of adjustable rate mortgages, and a potential housing bubble; *** subprime and high loan-to-value (HLTV) lending as a risk in the event that the United States economy suffered a significant recession; and *** pricing and modeling charge-off risk with respect to the originate-to-sell model of the mortgage business.

2002; Calculated Risk; FDIC saw risks; IndyMac; Inspector generally.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Mon 2009-09-21 14:57 EDT

Strategic Default Data Suggests Foreclosure Prevention Tactics Useless

Michael Shedlock

An interesting report in the Los Angeles Times shows that a person with super-prime credit scores is more likely to walk away from an underwater mortgage than a person with a subprime credit rating.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; Strategic Default Data Suggests Foreclosure Prevention Tactics Useless.

Taibblog Wed 2009-09-02 09:06 EDT

Bailout Propaganda Begins

Matt Taibbi

``the Fed's decision to brag publicly about a few loans that are actually performing is sort of scary -- it speaks to a level of intellectual desperation and magical-thinking unusual even for a banker in the subprime/MBS era''

Bailout Propaganda Begins; Taibblog.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2009-08-27 10:45 EDT

'New Deal for Wall Street' Programs Subsidizing Subprime Lenders

Jesse

Welfare for Wall Street is just another phase of the 'trickle down' approach that seems to be so popular with the financerati. If "Cash for Clunkers" had involved subsidized loans for cars administered by the banks it would have been touted as the greatest thing since sliced bread by the coporate media and mainstream infomercials, instead of being slammed on a daily basis as a troubled, pointless giveaway program.

Jesse's Café Américain; new deal; Programs Subsidizing Subprime Lenders; Wall Street.

The Baseline Scenario Wed 2009-08-26 16:09 EDT

Vermont, Texas, and Subprime Loans

The Wall Street Journal has a story about Vermont and subprime loans: ...For the past five years, as home loans went to even Americans with poor credit and no proof of steady work, Ms. Todd couldn't get a mortgage in spite of her good credit and low debt. Vermont banks told the self-employed landscaper that her [...]

Baseline Scenario; subprime loans; Texas; Vermont.

Fri 2009-07-24 00:00 EDT

Economic Meltdown - Articles: The Roots of the Financial Crisis: Who Is to Blame?

-- John Dunbar, David Donald; top 25 subprime lenders; wall street backers; banks that financed subprime industry collecting bailout billions

article; blames; economic meltdown; Financial Crisis; rooted.

Fri 2009-02-13 00:00 EST

Calculated Risk: COF: "Strikingly high FICO customers" Defaulting

we are all subprime now!

Calculated Risk; COF; default; Strikingly high FICO customers.

Wed 2009-02-11 00:00 EST

Calculated Risk: We're All Subprime Now! *

Calculated Risk: We're All Subprime Now! growing foreclosure crisis transcends subprime

Calculated Risk; subprime.

Fri 2009-01-16 00:00 EST

ClubOrlov: The Canadian Solution to the Subprime Credit Crisis

Canadian Solution; ClubOrlov; subprime credit crisis.

Sun 2008-08-24 00:00 EDT

Winter (Economic & Market) Watch >> Here They Go Again

Winter (Economic & Market) Watch >> Here They Go Again; many early subprime modifications failing; banks which ``moved early and aggressively to deal with this in terms of raising new capital, foreclosing instead of restructuring, and tightening down early on lax credit, may be the last people standing''; loss severity increasing; ``third quarter is going to be an unmitigated disaster for the financial sector'', ``foreign money will move in a big way to gobble up American assets''

economic; Go; Market; watch; winter.

Sun 2008-08-24 00:00 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: GM, Ford Seek Taxpayer Bailout

``GM is not really a manufacturing company at all, but rather a subprime lender that sells cars.''

Ford Seek Taxpayer Bailout; GM; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

Wed 2008-06-25 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Illinois Sues Countrywide

mortgage counsellor suggests "70% to 80% of subprime mortgages involved fraud by the mortgage broker"

Illinois Sues Countrywide; naked capitalism.

Fri 2008-05-30 00:00 EDT

Foreclosure Phil

by David Corn; McCain economic advisor, anti-regulatory crusader, former Senator Phil Gramm helped enable subprime debacle

Foreclosure Phil.