dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

policies Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

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Wed 2010-10-13 09:01 EDT

Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System

...Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., commonly referred to as ``MERS,'' is the recorded owner of over half of the nation's residential mortgages. MERS operates a computer database designed to track servicing and ownership rights of mortgage loans anywhere in the United States. But, it also acts as a proxy for the real parties in interest in county land title records. Most importantly, MERS is also filing foreclosure lawsuits on behalf of financiers against hundreds of thousands of American families. This Article explores the legal and public policy foundations of this odd, but extremely powerful, company that is so attached to America's financial destiny...The article culminates in a discussion of MERS' culpability in fostering the mortgage foreclosure crisis and what the long term effects of privatized land title records will have on our public information infrastructure. The Article concludes by considers whether the mortgage banking industry, in creating and embracing MERS, has subverted the democratic governance of the nation's real property recording system.

foreclosures; mortgage Electronic Registration System; subprime mortgage lending.

Tue 2010-10-12 16:01 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> Iceland ... another neo-liberal casuality

...For a real world example of the benefits of adopting a floating, sovereign, currency we can look to Argentina....At the time of the 2001 crisis, the government realised it had to adopt a domestically-oriented growth strategy. One of the first policy initiatives taken by newly elected President Kirchner was a massive job creation program that guaranteed employment for poor heads of households. Within four months, the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar (Head of Households Plan) had created jobs for 2 million participants which was around 13 per cent of the labour force. This not only helped to quell social unrest by providing income to Argentina's poorest families, but it also put the economy on the road to recovery. Conservative estimates of the multiplier effect of the increased spending by Jefes workers are that it added a boost of more than 2.5 per cent of GDP. In addition, the program provided needed services and new public infrastructure that encouraged additional private sector spending. Without the flexibility provided by a sovereign, floating, currency, the government would not have been able to promise such a job guarantee. Argentina demonstrated something that the World's financial masters didn't want anyone to know about. That a country with huge foreign debt obligations can default successfully and enjoy renewed fortune based on domestic employment growth strategies and more inclusive welfare policies without an IMF austerity program being needed. And then as growth resumes, renewed FDI floods in...sovereign governments are not necessarily at the hostage of global financial markets. They can steer a strong recovery path based on domestically-orientated policies -- such as the introduction of a Job Guarantee -- which directly benefit the population by insulating the most disadvantaged workers from the devastation that recession brings...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Iceland; neo-liberal casuality.

Sun 2010-10-10 11:56 EDT

The Federal Reserve's Relevance Test - Project Syndicate

...as investors look outside the US for higher yield, the flood of money out of the dollar has bid up exchange rates in emerging markets around the world. Emerging markets know this, and are upset -- Brazil has vehemently expressed its concerns -- not only about the increased value of their currency, but that the influx of money risks fueling asset bubbles or triggering inflation. The normal response of emerging-market central banks to bubbles or inflation would be to raise interest rates -- thereby increasing their currencies' value still more. US policy is thus delivering a double whammy on competitive devaluation -- weakening the dollar and forcing competitors to strengthen their currencies...

Federal Reserve's Relevance Test; Project Syndicate.

Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Post Keynesian Perspective Thu 2010-09-30 08:12 EDT

Would Keynes have endorsed Modern Monetary Theory/Neochartalism?

...what would Keynes have thought of neochartalism/modern monetary theory (MMT)? MMT developed from Abba Lerner's theory of functional finance, as well as G. F. Knapp's theory of chartalism, as propounded in his book The State Theory of Money...MMT tells us that the government is the monopoly issuer of its own currency. Hence the government is not revenue-constrained. Taxes and bond issues do not finance government spending. No entity with the power to create and destroy money at will requires anyone to ``fund'' its spending. Having said this, one must immediately say that, even though deficits are not ``financially'' constrained in the normal sense, they do face real constraints in the inflation rate, exchange rate, available resources, capacity utilization, labour available (= unemployment level), and external balance...My discussion is based on the fundamental article by David Colander on this subject...``Lerner approached Keynes and asked: `Mr. Keynes, why don't we forget all this business of fiscal policy, public debt and all those things, and have some printing presses.' Keynes, after looking around the room to see that no newspaper reporters could hear, replied: `It's the art of statesmanship to tell lies but they must be plausible lies.' ''...

21st century; endorsed Modern Monetary Theory/Neochartalism; Keynes; Post Keynesian Perspective; social democracy.

billy blog Wed 2010-09-29 10:15 EDT

Budget deficits do not cause higher interest rates

...An often-cited paper outlining the ways in which budget deficits allegedly push up interest rates is -- Government Debt -- by Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998 -- subsequently published in a book in 1999). This paper was somewhat influential in perpetuating the mainstream myths about government debt and interest rates...Their depiction of...Ricardian equivalence...alleges that: ``the choice between debt and tax finance of government expenditure is irrelevant...[because]...a budget deficit today...[requires]...higher taxes in the future...'' ...I have dealt with this view extensively...Ignoring the fact that the description of a government raising taxes to pay back a deficit is nonsensical when applied to a fiat currency issuing government, the Ricardian Equivalence models rest [on] several key and extreme assumptions about behaviour and knowledge. Should any of these assumptions fail to hold (at any point in time), then the predictions of the models are meaningless. The other point is that the models have failed badly to predict or explain key policy changes in the past. That is no surprise given the assumptions they make about human behaviour. There are no Ricardian economies. It was always an intellectual ploy without any credibility to bolster the anti-government case that was being fought then (late 1970s, early 1980s) just as hard as it is being fought now...So where do the mainstream economists go wrong? At the heart of this conception is the [pre-Keynesian] theory of loanable funds...where perfectly flexible prices delivered self-adjusting, market-clearing aggregate markets at all times...Mankiw claims that this ``market works much like other markets in the economy''...[assuming] that savings are finite and the government spending is financially constrained which means it has to seek ``funding'' in order to progress their fiscal plans. The result competition for the ``finite'' saving pool drives interest rates up and damages private spending. This is what is taught under the heading ``financial crowding out''...Virtually none of the assumptions that underpin the key mainstream models relating to the conduct of government and the monetary system hold in the real world...When confronted with increasing empirical failures, the mainstream economists introduce these ad hoc amendments to the specifications to make them more realistic...The Australian Treasury Paper [used advanced econometric analysis to find that] domestic budget deficits do not drive up interest rates. The long-run effect...is virtually zero. The short-run effect is zero!...toss out your Mankiw textbooks...

Billy Blog; budgets deficit; caused higher Interest rate.

Jesse's Café Américain Wed 2010-09-29 09:13 EDT

Slouching Towards Bethlehem: Double Dip or Banana Split?

NBER: "If the 2010 contraction we are now monitoring in consumer demand for discretionary durable goods scales to the full economy as faithfully as the "Great Recession" did, the second dip will, at minimum, be 33% more painful than the first dip and will extend at least half again as long." This is the case for trouble dead ahead, a worse decline in consumer activity and therefore GDP than the first, and the likelihood of further quantitative easing from the US Federal Reserve to patch over the inability of the political process to reform the financial system and balance the real economy because of their myriad conflicts of interest. These policy errors favoring a small minority will most likely result in a stagflation of the most pernicious and corrosive kind, high unemployment and a rising price of essentials, that may ultimately test the fabric of society...

Banana Splits; Bethlehem; double dip; Jesse's Café Américain; Slouching.

Sat 2010-09-25 11:02 EDT

Where is the World Economy Headed?

...financial maneuvering and debt leverage play the role that military conquest did in times past. Its aim is still to control land, basic infrastructure and the economic surplus -- and also to gain control of national savings, commercial banking and central bank policy...Indebted ``host economies'' are in a similar position to that of defeated countries. Their economic surplus is transferred abroad financially, while locally, debtors lose sovereignty over their own financial, economic and tax policy. Public infrastructure is sold off to foreign buyers, on credit and therefore paying interest and fees that are expensed as tax-deductible and paid to foreigners. The Washington Consensus applauds this pro-rentier policy. Its neoliberal ideology holds that the most efficient path to wealth is to shift economic planning out of the hands of government into those of bankers and money managers in charge of privatizing and financializing the economy. Almost without anyone noticing, this view is replacing the classical law of nations based on the idea of sovereignty over debt and financial policy, tariff and tax policy...Bankers in the North look upon any economic surplus -- real estate rent, corporate cash flow or even the government's taxing power or ability to sell off public enterprises -- as a source of revenue to pay interest on debts...The original liberals -- from Adam Smith and the Physiocrats through John Stuart Mill and even Winston Churchill -- urged that the tax system be based on the economic rent of land so as to keep down the price of housing (and hence labor's cost of living). The Progressive Era followed this principle by aiming to keep natural monopolies such as transportation, communication and even banks (or at least, free credit creation) in the public domain. But the post-1980 world has encouraged private owners to buy them on credit and extract economic rent, thereby shifting the tax burden onto labor, industry and agriculture -- while concentrating wealth, first on credit and then via the enormous recent public bailouts of this failed financial debt pyramiding and deregulation...At issue is the concept of free markets. Are they to be free from monopoly and special privilege, or free for the occupying financial invaders and speculators?...

World Economy Headed.

Jesse's Café Américain Sat 2010-09-25 09:55 EDT

FOMC: Sound the Bell. School's In, Suckas

...What the Fed cannot do is breathe vitality into a zombie economy, and provoke a sustained recovery not tied to some sort of credit bubble. That is why stagflation remains the most likely outcome until the nation obtains the will and the determination to reform the financial system and restore a balance to trade and the real economy through a commitment to sound and practical public policy not driven by self-serving economic quackery. The dollar and bonds are made stronger through a vibrant underlying economy with the ability to generate taxable income and real returns to their holders. But in the meanwhile the special interests will be served. A profound deflation and hyperinflation remain as possibilities for the future, but they will most likely be seen on the horizon in advance of their arrival as the result of some exogenous event or catastrophic failure. So far, not a glimpse...

bell; FOMC; Jesse's Café Américain; school's; sounds; SUCKAS.

Mon 2010-09-20 10:12 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Fiat World Mathematical Model

...Conditions today are essentially the same as during the great depression...It is the destruction of credit, coupled with the fact that what the Fed is printing is not even being lent that matters...we are in deflation based on the following definitions: Inflation is a net expansion of money and credit. Deflation is a net contraction of money and credit. In both definitions, credit needs to be marked to market...the mark to market value of credit is contracting faster than base money is rising...The Fed tries to hide the contraction in the market value of bank credit by its Don't Ask, Don't Sell policy...The credit bubble that just popped exceeded that preceding the great depression, not just in the US but worldwide. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect the deflationary bust to be anything other than the biggest bust in history. Those looking for hyperinflation or even strong inflation in light of the above, are simply looking at the wrong model...

Fiat World Mathematical Model; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM Mon 2010-09-20 09:57 EDT

WHITHER CHINA?

In all likelihood, China has entered the most critical and taxing period since the country was reopened to the outside world in the 1970s. Domestically, there are a slew of issues, any one of which could create instability...Few can know the full story of what goes on within the State Council, but there appears to be a battle royal being fought over the real estate sector. There are those within the leadership who are concerned that average home prices have gotten too high for most first-time buyers (see our previous visit report). They want to see average prices fall by 10-20% across the country. Against this group are not just real estate developers but local governments and many others within Beijing...In effect, what is being seen is a battle between central and local governments. In our view, this is a fight that central government cannot afford to lose...against a background of cheap money and plenty of credit, house prices across the country have become unaffordable to most first-time buyers...if these price developments continued unchecked the leadership would risk encountering social instability...we doubt there will be any easing of policy until average house prices fall into the 10-20% range. China is transiting into a very difficult period as focus shifts towards sustainable domestic growth and away from short-term measures to defend the 8% GDP mantra. This transition is occurring when the existing leadership is preparing to give way to the new set in 2012, when social stability could be threatened if there are policy mistakes...

China; PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM.

Fri 2010-09-17 19:26 EDT

Memo to Obama: time to break the refinance strike by the big banks

...The Obama Administration and the Fed have taken the position that the crisis affecting the U.S. economy and the financial sector is slowly ending. In fact, the largest banks remain profoundly troubled by bad assets on their books as well as claims against these same banks for assets sold to investors. By allowing banks to ``muddle along'' and heal these wounds using low interest rates provided by the Fed, the Obama Administration is embracing a policy of deflation that has horrible consequences for U.S. workers and households...the Obama Administration has been providing political cover for the Fed to conduct a massive, reverse Robin Hood scheme, moving trillions of dollars in resources from savers and consumers to the big banks and their share and bond holders...the Obama Administration should use the power provided in the Dodd-Frank legislation to force an accelerated cleanup of bad assets and to mandate refinancing and principal reductions for performing loans with viable borrowers...President Obama also needs to focus on the growing competitive problem in the U.S. mortgage sector...now dominated by a cozy oligopoly of Too Big To Fail banks (TBTF)...Why is there no antitrust investigation of the top banks by the Department of Justice?...

big banks; break; memo; Obama; refinance strike; Time.

Wed 2010-09-15 13:55 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> Export-led growth strategies will fail

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) released their annual Trade and Development Report, 2010 yesterday (September 14, 2010). The 204 page report which I have been wading through today is full of interesting analysis and will take several blogs over the coming weeks to fully cover. The message is very clear. Export-led growth strategies are deeply flawed and austerity programs will worsen growth and increase poverty. UNCTAD consider a fundamental rethink has to occur where policy is reoriented towards domestic demand and employment creation. They consider an expansion of fiscal policy to be essential in the current economic climate as the threat of a wide-spread double dip recession increases. The Report is essential reading...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Export-led growth strategies; fail.

billy blog Wed 2010-09-08 19:04 EDT

Michal Kalecki -- The Political Aspects of Full Employment

...several readers have asked me whether I am familiar with the 1943 article by Polish economist Michal Kalecki -- The Political Aspects of Full Employment. The answer is that I am very familiar with the article and have written about it in my academic work in years past. So I thought I might write a blog about what I think of Kalecki's argument given that it is often raised by progressives as a case against effective fiscal intervention...[Job Guarantee concepts briefly summarized]...While orthodox economists typically attack the Job Guarantee policy for fiscal reasons, economists on the left also challenge its validity and effectiveness. In 1943, Michal Kalecki published the Political Aspects of Full Employment, in the Political Quarterly, which laid out the blueprint for socialist opposition to Keynesian-style employment policy. The criticisms would be equally applicable to a Job Guarantee policy...Kalecki's principle objection then seemed to be that ``the maintenance of full employment would cause social and political changes which would give a new impetus to the opposition of the business leaders.''...the major political blockages are no longer those that Kalecki foresaw. The opponents of fiscal activism are a different elite and work against the ``captains of industry'' just as much as they work against the broader working class. The growth of the financial sector and global derivatives trading and the substantial deregulation of labour markets and retrenchment of welfare states has altered things considerably since Kalecki wrote his brilliant article in 1943...

Billy Blog; full employment; Michal Kalecki; political aspects.

The Baseline Scenario Wed 2010-09-08 10:36 EDT

Irish Worries For The Global Economy

...Ireland's difficulties arose because of a massive property boom financed by cheap credit from Irish banks. Ireland's three main banks built up loans and investments by 2008 that were three times the size of the national economy; these big banks (relative to the economy) pushed the frontier in terms of reckless lending. The banks got the upside, and then came the global crash...Today roughly one-third of the loans on the balance sheets of major banks are nonperforming...The government responded to this with what are currently regarded as ``standard'' policies in Europe and America. It guaranteed all the liabilities of banks and began injecting government funds to keep these financial institutions afloat. It bought the most worthless assets from banks, paying them government bonds in return. Ministers have promised to recapitalize banks that need more capital. Despite or perhaps because of this therapy, financial markets are beginning to see Ireland as Europe's next Greece...Until very recently, Ireland was seen as Europe's poster child of prudent reforms...The ultimate result of Ireland's bank bailout exercise is obvious: one way or another, the government will have converted the liabilities of private banks into debts of the sovereign (that is, Irish taxpayers), yet the nation probably cannot afford these debts...The idea that Ireland, Greece or Portugal can cut spending and grow out of overvalued exchange rates with still large budget deficits, while servicing all their debts and building more debt, is proving -- not surprisingly -- wrong...

Baseline Scenario; global economy; Irish worries.

Clusterstock Sat 2010-09-04 11:16 EDT

Your Textbooks Lied To You: The Money Multiplier Is A Myth

The following comes from an excellent new paper from the Fed. The paper describes the myth of the money multiplier and is an absolute must read for anyone who is trying to fully understand the current environment. It turns much of textbook economics on its head and describes in large part why the bank rescue plan and the idea of banks being reserve constrained is entirely wrong: ``Simple textbook treatments of the money multiplier give the quantity of bank reserves a causal role in determining the quantity of money and bank lending and thus the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This role results from the assumptions that reserve requirements generate a direct and tight linkage between money and reserves and that the central bank controls the money supply by adjusting the quantity of reserves through open market operations. Using data from recent decades, we have demonstrated that this simple textbook link is implausible in the United States for a number of reasons...bank loan supply does not respond to changes in monetary policy through a bank lending channel, no matter how we group the banks...''

ClusterStock; Money Multiplier; myth; textbook lying.

New Deal 2.0 Fri 2010-09-03 18:57 EDT

The Real Lesson from the Great Depression: Fiscal Policy Works!

...At the outset of the Great Depression, economic output collapsed, and unemployment rose to 25 per cent. Influenced by his ``liquidationist'' Treasury Secretary, Andrew Mellon, then President Hoover made comparatively minimal attempts to deploy government fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand...This all changed under FDR...The government hired about 60 per cent of the unemployed in public works and conservation projects that planted a billion trees, saved the whooping crane, modernized rural America, and built such diverse projects as the Cathedral of Learning in Pittsburgh, the Montana state capitol, much of the Chicago lakefront, New York's Lincoln Tunnel and Triborough Bridge complex, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the aircraft carriers Enterprise and Yorktown...once the Great Depression hit bottom in early 1933, the US economy embarked on four years of expansion that constituted the biggest cyclical boom in U.S. economic history. For four years, real GDP grew at a 12% rate and nominal GDP grew at a 14% rate. There was another shorter and shallower depression in 1937 largely caused by renewed fiscal tightening (and higher Federal Reserve margin requirements)...

0; Fiscal policy worked; Great Depression; new dealing 2; Real Lesson.

Money Game Wed 2010-09-01 10:53 EDT

Why Ben Bernanke's Next Round Of Quantitative Easing Will Be Another Huge Flop

There is perhaps, no greater misunderstanding in the investment world today than the topic of quantitative easing [QE]. After all, it sounds so fancy, strange and complex. But in reality, it is quite a simple operation...The Fed simply electronically swaps an asset with the private sector. In most cases it swaps deposits with an interest bearing asset...The theory behind QE is that the Fed can reduce interest rates via asset purchases (which supposedly creates demand for debt) while also strengthening the bank balance sheet (which entices them to lend). Unfortunately, we've lived thru this scenario before and history shows us that neither is actually true. Banks are never reserve constrained and a private sector that is deeply indebted will not likely be enticed to borrow regardless of the rate of interest...The most glaring example of failed QE is in Japan in 2001. Richard Koo refers to this event as the ``greatest monetary non-event''...Since Ben Bernanke initiated his great monetarist gaffe in 2008 there has been almost no sign of a sustainable private sector recovery. Mr. Bernanke's new form of trickle down economics has surely fixed the banking sector (or at least bought some time), but the recovery ended there. ..The hyperventilating hyperinflationists and those investors calling for inevitable US default are now clinging to this QE story as their inflation or default thesis crumbles before their very eyes...With the government merely swapping assets they are not actually ``printing'' any new money. In fact, the government is now essentially stealing interest bearing assets from the private sector and replacing them with deposits...now that the banks are flush with excess reserves this policy response would in fact be deflationary - not inflationary...

Ben Bernanke's; Huge Flop; Money game; Quantitative Easing.

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