Fri 2010-10-08 21:53 EDT

MERS 101

MERS - Mortgage Electronic Registration Inc. - holds approximately 60 million American mortgages and is a Delaware corporation whose sole shareholder is Mers Corp. MersCorp and its specified members have agreed to include the MERS corporate name on any mortgage that was executed in conjunction with any mortgage loan made by any member of MersCorp...Thus in place of the original lender being named as the mortgagee on the mortgage that is supposed to secure their loan, MERS is named as the ``nominee'' for the lender who actually loaned the money to the borrower. In other words MERS is really nothing more than a name that is used on the mortgage instrument in place of the actual lender. MERS' primary function, therefore, is to act as a document custodian. MERS was created solely to simplify the process of transferring mortgages by avoiding the need to re-record liens -- and pay county recorder filing fees -- each time a loan is assigned. Instead, servicer's record loans only once and MERS' electronic system monitors transfers and facilitates the trading of notes...MersCorp was created in the early 1990's by the former C.E.O.'s of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Indy Mac, Countrywide, Stewart Title Insurance and the American Land Title Association... MERS, as has clearly been proven in many civil cases, does not hold any promissory notes of any kind. A party must have possession of a promissory note in order to have standing to enforce and/or otherwise collect a debt that is owed to another party. Given this clear-cut legal definition, MERS does not have legal standing to enforce or collect on the over 60 million mortgages it controls and no member of MERS has any standing in an American civil court. MERS has been taken to civil courts across the country and charged with a lack of standing in reposession issues. When the mortgage debacle initially, and inevitably, began, MERS always routinely brought actions against defaulting mortgage holders purporting to represent the owners of the defaulted mortgages but once the courts discovered that MERS was only a front organization that did not hold any deed nor was aware of who or what agencies might hold a deed, they have routinely been denied in their attempts to force foreclosure. In the past, persons alleging they were officials of MERS in foreclosure motions, purported to be the holders of the mortgage, when, in fact, they not only were not the holder of the mortgage but, under a court order, could not produce the identity of the actual holder. These so-called MERS officers have usually been just employees of entities who are servicing the loan for the actual lender. MERS, it is now widely acknowledged by the courts, has no legal right to foreclose or otherwise collect debt which are evidenced by promissory notes held by someone else...

MERS 101.

Thu 2010-08-26 09:23 EDT

Jingle mail in Jersey from Hyatt Hotels ... | footnoted.com

If you're in Princeton, New Jersey, anytime soon, swing by the Hyatt Regency Princeton. With the Hyatt Hotels (H) quarterly report filed yesterday, it has become a symbol of the financial crisis... Like households across the country, one of Hyatt's subsidiaries ``did not have sufficient cash flow to meet interest payment requirements under its mortgage loan'' on the property, in this case a 347-room hotel with a restaurant, bar and comedy club, just a mile from [Princeton University]....``When hotel cash flow became insufficient to service the loan,'' the company said in the filing, ``HHC notified the lender that it would not provide assistance.'' In other words, Hyatt decided to walk away -- the equivalent of ``jingle mail''...

com; Footnote; Hyatt hotel; Jersey; Jingle Mail.

naked capitalism Sun 2010-08-22 09:32 EDT

Auerback: News Flash-- China Reduces US Treasury Holdings, World Does Not Come To an End

Marshall Auerback

In a post titled ``China Cuts US Treasury Holdings By Record Amount,'' Mike Norman makes the excellent observation that while China is moving its money out of Treasuries, interest rates are hitting record lows. In other words, the sky still isn't falling. So, Mike wonders, ``Where is the Debt/Doomsday crowd?'' He rightly concludes: ``They're nowhere to be found because they can't explain this. This is a `gut punch' to them. Their whole theory is out the window. They just don't understand or don't want to understand, that interest rates are set by the Fed...PERIOD!!!''...Also of note today: Tokyo's Nikkei QUICK News reports that the #309 10-year Japanese benchmark government bond, the current benchmark, traded to a yield of 0.920% Tuesday morning, down 2.5 basis points from yesterday's close. This is the lowest yield since August 13, 2003. This, from a country with a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 210%!...These are facts. Inconvenient for those who like to perpetuate the lie that the US or Japan faces imminent national insolvency as a means of justifying their almost daily attacks on proactive fiscal policy...

Auerback; China reducing; comes; ending; naked capitalism; News Flash; Treasury holds; world.

Tue 2010-08-03 15:02 EDT

Economics of Contempt: Anatomy of Lehman's Failure, and the Importance of Liquidity Requirements

Remember the Lehman Examiner's Report? The 4000+ page report by the court-appointed examiner was lauded for a couple of weeks after it was released, and then largely forgotten. The media and blogosphere quickly moved on to the next outrage-du-jour...Well, I did not forget about it, and thanks to the uptick in flights -- and thus reading time -- in the last few months, I can now credibly claim to have read....well, not every single word in the Examiner's Report (some appendices are just pages of CUSIPs), but all of the substantive sections...Anton Valukas and the lawyers at Jenner & Block who wrote the Examiner's Report did a masterful job. I was, and continue to be, in awe of the quality and comprehensiveness of the report...think I have a pretty good handle on what went wrong at Lehman, and why it failed...they were misrepresenting their liquidity pool. In a huge way...the brazenness of their misrepresentation was shocking...Including the clearing-bank collateral in its liquidity pool was not only inappropriate, but also aggressively deceptive...Lehman was also including in its liquidity pool non-central bank eligible CLOs and CDOs. And they had the audacity to mark these CLOs and CDOs at 100 (par) for purposes of the liquidity pool, even though JPMorgan's third-party pricing vendor marked them at 50--60...

Anatomy; contempt; economic; important; Lehman's failure; liquidity requirements.

Sat 2010-07-24 16:13 EDT

Disequilibria: A Constant State Of Instability >> The Shadow Banking System

RueTheDay

What we saw from mid-2007 through early-2009 was a run on the shadow banking system. There were two primary channels by which the shadow banking system operated: the Money Market/Commercial Paper Channel and the Repo Channel...we have largely unregulated [money market funds (MMMFs)] taking deposits (largely withdrawable on demand and usually checkable) and making the equivalent of loans, in other words, acting as banks. Except that the MMMFs were not subject to much in the way of prudential regulation beyond some broad parameters that dictated what investments they could buy, did not have access to FDIC deposit insurance, and did not have lender of last resort access to the Fed's discount window. They were a disaster waiting to happen...Repos also became a very popular mechanism for raising funds in the pre-crisis days, with MMMFs becoming large buyers of repos (lenders) and the broker dealers becoming both buyers and sellers (borrowers and lenders)...during the crisis...the classic maturity mismatch situation...concerns about the quality of commercial paper...triggered by the collapse of Lehman...Without the traditional protection of deposit insurance and lender of last resort financing by the Fed, it turned into a full blown panic...Any meaningful financial reform must bring the shadow banking system out of the shadows. It must be treated as banking, and its institutions regulated as banks...

constant state; Disequilibria; instability; Shadow banks Systems.

New Deal 2.0 Thu 2010-07-22 15:54 EDT

The Summer(s) of Our Discontent

Marshall Auerback

Virtually every profile on Larry Summers tells us that he is one of the most brilliant economists of his generation...Only Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan played a more important role than Summers in promoting the deregulation and lax oversight that laid the foundations for the current crisis...the latest FT defense reflects Summers's fundamental lack of understanding of modern money. Contrary to his view, the late 90s surpluses was not the reason for that period's prosperity. The surpluses are what ended the prosperity. And until the public understands this, we should expect no fundamental improvement in economic policymaking from the Obama Administration...he violates one of Abba Lerner's key laws of functional finance: a government's spending and borrowing should be conducted ``with an eye only to the results of these actions on the economy, and not to any established traditional doctrine about what is sound and what is unsound.'' In other words, Lerner believed that the very idea of what good fiscal policy means boils down to what results you can get -- not some arbitrary notion of ``fiscal sustainability''...The government budget surplus meant by identity that the private sector was running a deficit. Households and firms were going ever farther into debt, and they were losing their net wealth of government bonds. Growth was a product of a private debt bubble, which in turn fuelled a stock market and real estate bubble, the collapse of which has created the foundations for today's troubles...

0; discontent; new dealing 2; s; summer.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-07-19 16:57 EDT

58% of Real Income Growth Since 1976 Went to Top 1% (and Why That Matters)

...the new program was to reduce workers' bargaining power, both by combating unions, and by tolerating un and underemployment. Rising worker wages had been seen as crucial to greater prosperity; it was quietly abandoned as a policy goal. But this has profound implications. As rising income inequality demonstrates, the benefits of growth accrued substantially to those at the very top...much of America seems blithely unaware of our diminished role in the world. Likewise, financiers, having wrested massive concessions from national governments (bailouts with almost no concessions demanded of them) if anything view themselves as even more influential than before the crisis. In other words, both the distorted self image of key players and a reluctance to admit the deep seated nature of the problems make a happy resolution unlikely.

1976 Went; 58; matter; naked capitalism; real income growth; Top 1.

PressThink Thu 2010-06-24 10:18 EDT

Clowns to the Left of Me, Jokers to the Right: On the Actual Ideology of the American Press

Jay Rosen

That it's easy to describe the ideology of the press is a point on which the left, the right and the profession of journalism converge. I disagree. I think it's tricky. So tricky, I've had to invent my own language for discussing it...political journalists...are skeptical about changing society in any fundamental way...professional journalist...generate authority and respect...flee opprobrium...[by demonstrating] that they are not on anyone's ``team,'' or cheerleading for a known position. This puts a premium on stories that embarrass, disrupt, annoy or counter the preferred narrative...``True believer,'' a term of contempt...narcissistic reactions of both sides prove how mature and professional and detached he is...people with political sense in press treatment will usually be the moderates, mavericks and ``pragmatists,'' a word that in political journalism has almost no content beyond, ``opposite of true believer... ideologically flexible... not a purist.''...journalists try to win the argument not by having better arguments but by standing closer to a reality they get to define as more real than your reality...The Church of the Savvy...The Quest for Innocence...Regression to a Phony Mean...The View from Nowhere...He said, she said journalism...The sphere of deviance...

actual ideological; American press; clowns; jokers; left; PressThink; Right.

Wed 2010-06-09 18:39 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> The comeback of conservative ideology

Bill Mitchell

Today I have been writing about the resurgence of the conservative ideology...Ever hear the term Ruthanasia? You should have because she is still at it berating us about the wrongs of fiscal policy and the need for radical reform. Ruth Richardson was New Zealand's minister of finance from 1990-93...As an historical episode ``Ruthanasia'' followed ``Rogernomics'' as increasingly radical reform programs that were inflicted on the New Zealand population from 1984 onwards -- for the next few decades...Unemployment became a policy tool (for disciplining inflation) rather than a primary policy target. The inflation-first monetary stance (and undemocratic reforms of the central bank) combined with a harsh fiscal policy contraction to drive up unemployment and significantly reduce per capita income...Successive right-wing governments (which not only included the conservatives but also the Lange Labour Party government which started it all) used the concept of a "strategic deficit". David Stockman, the budget director under President Reagan, was the person to coin this term which is taken to mean using a budget deficit as a "political weapon". The strategy was to hand out huge tax cuts to allegedly "incentivise" (the word that was used at the time) private entrepreneurs even though there has never been any convincing research evidence to suggest that there are major losses of activity arising from taxation. The resulting deficits were then paraded as evidence of the need for dramatic public spending cut backs...The experience of New Zealand during those years of being ruthanased by the free market zealots should serve as a warning to all of us...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; comeback; Conservative ideology.

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-06-03 17:56 EDT

Guest Post: The 2004 Fed Transcripts: A Methodical, Diabolical Destruction of America's "Wealth"

Frederick Sheehan

The Federal Reserve releases transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings with a five-year lag (as required by law, the Fed would like to burn them). Transcripts for 2004 meetings were released on April 30, 2010...FOMC transcripts in 2004 confirm the Fed was afraid of markets...The FOMC seemed most concerned that higher rates might interfere with the carry trade. In the sad tale of The Financialization of the United States, the carry trade deserves a chapter...By 2004, the carry trade was a mammoth enterprise of hedge funds and banks. The too-big-to-fail banks were, by now, leveraging their own internally managed hedge funds, managing their own proprietary trading desks, and also lending to highly leveraged hedge funds. Leverage, and, the belief that access to rising levels of credit would never end, pushed up asset values on bank balance sheets -- whether real estate, bonds, stocks, or private-equity. This increased the banks' lending capacity which encouraged banks to lend more...Markets believed asset prices would only go up for many silly reasons. Belief in the Greenspan Put may have been the silliest but also the most influential...Federal Reserve Governor Donald Kohn...told his confreres that Federal Reserve policy was to distort asset prices. He also said this was deliberate and desirable. In other words, distorted asset prices were not an unfortunate consequence of such-and-such Fed policy. The Fed's goal was to distort asset prices...Consumer spending exceeded consumer income...This strategy of fixing asset prices at an artificially high rate to fool the American people into spending money they did not have was diabolical...The manipulation of markets and of the American people has grown worse under Bernanke's chairmanship...

2004 Fed Transcripts; America's; credit writedowns; Diabolical Destruction; Guest Post; Method; wealth.

Tue 2010-06-01 18:24 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirit of debate ... my reply Part 2

Bill Mitchell

Today, I offer Part 2 of my responses to the comments raised in the debate so far...Modern monetary theory does not use the term ``money'' in the same way as the mainstream because it creates instant confusion. As Scott said ``Money is always someone's liability, so better to be precise about whose liabilities we are talking about than saying money.'' That is why we emphasis fully understanding the asset-liability matches that occur in monetary systems. And that leads you to realise that transactions between government and non-government create or destroy net financial assets denominated in the currency of issue whereas transactions within the non-government sector cannot create net financial positions...So modern monetary theorists prefer to concentrate on what is going on with balance sheets after certain flows have occured rather than narrowly defining some financial assets as money and others not...There is no doubt that the non-government institutions can increase credit. Some slack analysts call this an increase in money. But the accurate statement is that, as a matter of accounting it increases the (in Scott's words) ``the quantity of financial assets and financial liabilities 1 for 1 in the non-govt sector. So, with private credit, there is BY DEFINITION no NET increase in private sector financial assets created.'' Once we understand that and note that typically the non-government sector seeks to net save in the currency of issue then modern monetary theory tells you that the public sector must run a deficit to underwrite this desired net saving or else see an output gap widen...Who is in control is an interesting question. Clearly, the government cannot directly control the money supply which renders much of the analysis in mainstream macroeconomics textbooks as being irrelevant. The Monetarists via Milton Friedman persuaded central banks to adopt monetary targetting in the 1980s and it failed a few years later -- miserably...Then you might like to consider it from the other angle -- a government which accepts responsibility for full employment can ``finance'' the saving desires of the non-government sector by increasing its deficit up to the level warranted by the spending gap (left by the full employment non-government savings)...Orthodox macroeconomic theory struggles with the idea of involuntary unemployment and typically tries to fudge the explanation by appealing to market rigidities (typically nominal wage inflexibility). However, in general, the orthodox framework cannot convincingly explain systemic constraints that comprehensively negate individual volition. The modern monetary framework clearly explicates how involuntary unemployment arises. The private sector, in aggregate, may desire to spend less of the monetary unit of account than it earns. In this case, if this gap in spending is not met by government, then unemployment will occur. Nominal (or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless they somehow eliminate the private sector desire to net save and increase spending...to maintain high levels of employment and given that the public generally desire to hold some reserves of fiat money, the government balance will normally have to be in deficit...modern monetary theory demonstrates that if you want the non-government sector to net save...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply Part 2; Spirit.

Tue 2010-06-01 17:29 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirt of debate ... my reply

Bill Mitchell

...Steve Keen and I agreed to foster a debate about where modern monetary theory sits with his work on debt-deflation. So yesterday his blog carried the following post, which included a 1000-odd word precis written by me describing what I see as the essential characteristics of modern monetary theory. The discussion is on-going on that site and I invite you to follow it if you are interested. Rather than comment on all the comments over on Steve's site, I decided to collate them here (in part) and help develop the understanding that way. That is what follows today... We distinguish the horizontal dimension (which entails all transactions between entities in the non-government sector) from the vertical dimension (which entails all transactions between the government and non-government sector)...A properly specified model will show you emphatically that the horizontal transactions between household, firms, banks and foreigners (which is the domain of circuit theory) have to net to zero even if asset portfolios are changing in composition. For every asset created there will be a corresponding liability created at the same time...you will make errors if there is not an explicit understanding that in an accounting (stock-flow) consistent sense all these transaction will net to zero. In adopting this understanding you might abstract from analysing the vertical transactions that introduced the high-powered money in the first place, but never deny its importance in setting the scene for the horizontal transactions to occur. I think the differences between Steve's models and modern monetary theory are two-fold. First, I do not think that Steve's model is stock-flow consistent across all sectors. By leaving out the government sector (even implicitly) essential insights are lost that would avoid conclusions that do not obey basic and accepted national accounting (and financial accounting) rules. This extends to how we define money. Second, I think Steve uses accounting in a different way to that which is broadly accepted. It might be that for mathematical nicety or otherwise this is the chosen strategy but you cannot then claim that your models are ground in the operational reality of the fiat monetary system we live in. I have no problem with abstract modelling. But modern monetary theory is firmly ground in the operational reality and is totally stock-flow consistent across all sectors. If we used the same definitions and rendered Steve's model stock-flow consistent in the same way as modern monetary theory then Steve's endogenous money circuits would come up with exactly the same results as the horizontal dimensions in modern monetary theory. His results might look a bit different in accounting terms but most of the message he wishes to portray about the dangers of Ponzi stages in the private debt accumulation process would still hold.

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply; spirt.

Dr. Housing Bubble Blog Sun 2010-05-16 15:17 EDT

Housing never really improved -- 10 charts showing the United States housing market is entering the second wave of problems. 1 out of 4 people with no mortgage payment in the last year are still not in the foreclosure process.

To put it bluntly, the U.S. housing market today is in deep water. Nothing exemplifies the transfer of risk to the public from the private investment banks more than the deep losses at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie Mae announced a stunning first quarter loss of $13.1 billion while Freddie Mac lost $8 billion. At the same time, toxic mortgage superstar JP Morgan Chase announced a $3.3 billion profit for Q1. This reversal of fortunes has been orchestrated perfectly by Wall Street. Since the toxic assets were never marked to market, the big losses have been funneled to the big GSEs (and as we will show in this article, now makes up 96.5 percent of the entire mortgage market). In other words, banks are making profits gambling on Wall Street while pushing out mortgages that are completely backed by the government...

1; 10 Charts Showing; 4 people; Dr. Housing Bubble Blog; enters; Foreclosures process; Housing; mortgage payments; problem; really improving; United States housing market; wave; years.

The Wall Street Examiner Sun 2010-05-09 10:02 EDT

The Minsky Cruise (part 3, Business)

...While non-financial domestic corporate profits have shrunk from a Korean War inspired 11% of GDP to average around 5% of GDP since 1970, the financial sector's profits have been growing...The love affair with finance and disdain for what, during the tech boom, we called the "bricks and mortar" industry- and admittedly a failure, by some in those industries, to accept the transition to maturity- has inspired, for want of a better word, envy in the non-financial sector. While financial sector stocks seem to levitate on their own, non-financial sector stocks, if intent can be inferred from behavior, are believed to require a boost. I suspect the use of options as payment has something to do with this as well...Additionally, the non-financial sector, since the mid-80s has- a true sign of envy- opted to copy finance, by breaking into that field. GE Capital and GMAC Financial are two prominent examples...To paraphrase Nixon, "we're all Ponzis, now."

business; Minsky Cruise; Part 3; Wall Street Examiner.

zero hedge Sun 2010-05-09 09:45 EDT

The Day The Market Almost Died (Courtesy Of High Frequency Trading)

A year ago, before anyone aside from a hundred or so people had ever heard the words High Frequency Trading, Flash orders, Predatory algorithms, Sigma X, Sonar, Market topology, Liquidity providers, Supplementary Liquidity Providers, and many variations on these, Zero Hedge embarked upon a path to warn and hopefully prevent a full-blown market meltdown. On April 10, 2009, in a piece titled "The Incredibly Shrinking Market Liquidity, Or The Black Swan Of Black Swans" we cautioned "what happens in a world where the very core of the capital markets system is gradually deleveraging to a point where maintaining a liquid and orderly market becomes impossible: large swings on low volume, massive bid-offer spreads, huge trading costs, inability to clear and numerous failed trades. When the quant deleveraging finally catches up with the market, the consequences will likely be unprecedented, with dramatic dislocations leading the market both higher and lower on record volatility." Today, after over a year of seemingly ceaseless heckling and jeering by numerous self-proclaimed experts and industry lobbyists, we are vindicated...absent the last minute intervention of still unknown powers, the market, for all intents and purposes, broke. Liquidity disappeared. What happened today was no fat finger, it was no panic selling by one major account: it was simply the impact of everyone in the HFT community going from port to starboard on the boat, at precisely the same time...It is time for the SEC to do its job and not only ban flash trading as it said it would almost a year ago, but get rid of all the predatory aspects of high frequency trading, which are pretty much all of them...HFT killed over 12 months of hard fought propaganda by the likes of CNBC which has valiantly tried to restore faith in our broken capital markets. They have now failed in that task too. After today investors will have little if any faith left in the US stocks, assuming they had any to begin with. We need to purge the equity market structure of all liquidity-taking parasitic players. We must start today with High Frequency Trading...

courtesy; day; dies; high frequency trade; Market; Zero Hedge.

Sun 2010-05-09 09:18 EDT

Why Do Senators Corker And Dodd Really Think We Need Big Banks? >> The Baseline Scenario

Simon Johnson

On Friday, Senator Bob Corker (R, TN) took to the Senate floor to rebut critics of big banks. His language was not entirely senatorial: ``I hope we'll all come to our senses'', while listing the reasons we need big banks. And Senator Chris Dodd (D, CT) rose to agree that (in Corker's words) reducing the size of our largest banks would be ``cutting our nose off to spite our face'' and that by taking on Wall Street, ``we may be taking on the heartland.'' Unfortunately, all of their arguments in favor of our largest banks remaining at or near (or above) their current scale are completely at odds with the facts (e.g., as documented in our book, 13 Bankers). ...As for why exactly Senators Corker and Dodd really support big banks, it seems increasingly likely that this is all about campaign contributions.

Baseline Scenario; Dodd Really Think; Needs Big Banks; Senator Corker.

Credit Writedowns Sun 2010-05-09 09:06 EDT

Guest Post: Possible Misunderstandings about Municipalities and their Bonds

Frederick Sheehan

Problems of state and municipal finance worsen. Governors announce new spending cuts at press conferences but inspire little confidence. The fury of emergency announcements leaves the listener (as well as the governors) in a daze. Research reports offer broad explanations but have left bondholders, as well as employees and local residents, unprepared for discontinuities. In other words, there will be instances when these constituencies will find themselves marched to the slaughterhouse without warning...

bonds; credit writedowns; Guest Post; municipalities; Possible Misunderstandings.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-04-22 18:57 EDT

More Evidence of Lack of Competitiveness of Many Chinese Exporters

...From Bloomberg: The profits of China's makers of household appliances, automobiles and cell phones may plunge by between 30 percent and 50 percent if the Chinese currency were to strengthen by 3 percent, according to a state media report. Small and medium-size exporters with low price-negotiating powers will face losses and may even go out of business, according to the Xinhua News Agency's Economic Information Daily newspaper, citing the results of a ``stress test.'' ... Richard Kline: ...Not that it matters at all for US manufacturing whether the renminbi notches up or not. Because wealth enterprises in the US don't really give a damn about their host country. Low-value added assembly will simply flow to Vietnam, Bangaladesh, back to Mexico, or the like. An industrial policy presupposes a political policy. And the malefactors of great wealth have complete control of US governmental policy, as we see, and not the least interest in investing in their host country. Great wealth here is parasitical, in a word. Fuddling about with currency rates won't change the political equation at all.

Chinese exports; competitions; evidence; lack; naked capitalism.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-04-19 18:46 EDT

Soros, Galbraith and Stiglitz on resisting inevitability in Greece

However, for now, it is Greece which is on everyone's mind...Kevin de Bruxelles says: ...I have to give credit to Angela Merkel. She is holding a pretty strong hand and it is now clear we are down to two choices for the endgame. The bailout solution will be international, in other words not limited to the Eurozone, and the amounts donated will be proportional to the risk each country holds. Or Greece simply defaults, probably first on their Anglo-Saxon debt (in return for low interest loans from Germany and France!), and each country then just bails out their respective banking system.

Galbraith; Greece; naked capitalism; resisting inevitability; Soros; Stiglitz.

Fri 2010-02-26 10:45 EST

Saudi Central Banker Confirms that US Dollar is on its Deathbed | The Underground Investor

In Hong Kong, Mohammed al-Jasser, the head of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority affirmed that the US dollar's role as the world's reserve currency is coming to an end when he stated, ``The dollar is still preeminent in its role as a reserve currency.'' We should recall former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Blinder's statement, ``The last duty of a central banker is to tell the public the truth'' (PBS's Nightly Business Report, 1994) and thus be astute enough to realize that the often hollow words of Central Bankers serve as a contrary indicator of the truth...

deathbed; Dollar; Saudi Central Banker Confirms; Underground Investor.

Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST

What the PBoC cannot do with its reserves

Michael Pettis

...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.

PBoC cannot; reserves.

Thu 2010-01-07 19:31 EST

Capital City | Mother Jones

Kevin Drum

A year after the biggest bailout in US history, Wall Street lobbyists don't just have influence in Washington. They own it lock, stock, and barrel...This is a story about politics. It's about how Congress and the president and the Federal Reserve were persuaded to let all this happen in the first place. In other words, it's about the finance lobby--the people who, as Sen. Dick Durbin [5] (D-Ill.) put it [6] last April, even after nearly destroying the world are "still the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill. And they frankly own the place."...It's about the way that lobby--with the eager support of a resurgent conservative movement and a handful of powerful backers--was able to fundamentally change the way we think about the world. Call it a virus. Call it a meme. Call it the power of a big idea. Whatever you call it, for three decades they had us convinced that the success of the financial sector should be measured not by how well it provides financial services to actual consumers and corporations, but by how effectively financial firms make money for themselves. It sounds crazy when you put it that way, but stripped to its bones, that's what they pulled off.

capital city; Mother Jones.