argue away (1); Ellen Brown argue (1); fed economist Richard Alford argues Fed misread inflation (1); Greg Mankiw Argues (1); initial success arguing (1); Italian historian Gaetano Salvemini argued (1); James Grant argues (1); Jon Danielsson argues management primary (1); Leuchtkafer argues (1); Lynn argues (1); Michael Pettis argues (1); Minsky argued (2); monetary reformers argue (3); Sam Bowles argues people ofen act (1); wherein Michael F. Cannon argues (1); Willem Buiter argues (1).
Mon 2010-09-20 18:49 EDT
Many commentators have argued that interbank lending froze following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This column presents evidence from the fed funds market that, while rates spiked and loan terms became more sensitive to borrower risk, mean borrowing amounts remained stable on aggregate. It seems likely that the market did not expand to meet additional demand for funds.
naked capitalism Fri 2010-09-17 19:42 EDT
...the only way to call TARP a winner is by defining government sanctioned financial fraud as the main metric of results. The finance leaders who are guilty of wrecking much of the global economy remain in power -- while growing extraordinarily wealthy in the process. They know that their primary means of destruction was accounting ``control fraud'', a term coined by Professor Bill Black, who argued that ``Control frauds occur when those that control a seemingly legitimate entity use it as a `weapon' to defraud.'' TARP did nothing to address this abuse; indeed, it perpetuates it. Are we now using lying and fraud as the measure of success for financial reform?...Money was ``repaid'', not because the banks were accumulating massive profits as a consequence of their revival, but largely as an outgrowth of the accounting tricks sanctioned by Congress and the White House in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis...When we lie about accounting and leave zombie banks in the hands of those that looted them and caused trillions of dollars of losses we eviscerate our integrity and our efforts at economic recovery...
Auerback; naked capitalism; Simply Institutionalized Fraud; Success; TARP.
naked capitalism Wed 2010-09-08 17:27 EDT
...We argue that the existence of naked credit default swaps has significant effects on the terms of financing, the likelihood of default, and the size and composition of investment expenditures. And we identify three mechanisms through which these broader consequences of speculative side bets arise: collateral effects, rollover risk, and project choice...the existence of zero-sum side bets on default has major economic repercussions. These contracts induce investors who are optimistic about the future revenues of borrowers, and would therefore be natural purchasers of debt, to sell credit protection instead. This diverts their capital away from potential borrowers and channels it into collateral to support speculative positions. As a consequence, the marginal bond buyer is less optimistic about the borrower's prospects, and demands a higher interest rate in order to lend. This can result in an increased likelihood of default, and the emergence of self-fulfilling paths in which firms are unable to rollover their debt, even when such trajectories would not arise in the absence of credit derivatives. And it can influence the project choices of firms, leading not only to lower levels of investment overall but also in some cases to the selection of riskier ventures with lower expected returns...
Case; economic consequences; naked capitalism; Naked CDS; speculative side bets.
Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-08-05 20:20 EDT
...a US current account deficit will be reflected in foreign accumulation of US Treasuries, held mostly by foreign central banks...While this is usually presented as foreign ``lending'' to ``finance'' the US budget deficit, one could just as well see the US current account deficit as the source of foreign current account surpluses that can be accumulated as treasuries...most public discussion ignores the fact that the Chinese desire to run a trade surplus with the US is linked to its desire to accumulate dollar assets...all of the following are linked...the willingness of Chinese to produce for export, the willingness of China to accumulate dollar-denominated assets, the shortfall of Chinese domestic demand that allows China to run a trade surplus, the willingness of Americans to buy foreign products, the (relatively) high level of US aggregate demand that results in a trade deficit, and the factors that result in a US government budget deficit...I am not arguing that the current situation will go on forever, although I do believe it will persist much longer than most commentators presume...there are strong incentives against the sort of simple, abrupt, and dramatic shifts often posited as likely scenarios...I expect that the complexity as well as the linkages among balance sheets ensure that transitions will be moderate and slow...
credit writedowns; deficits matter; foreign lending; Treasury.
Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Tue 2010-08-03 12:11 EDT
Every time there is a little blip by China in its purchasing or holding of US treasuries, hyperinflationists come out of the woodwork ranting about the "Nuclear Option" of China dumping treasuries en masse. Such fears are extremely overblown for several reasons...[Michael Pettis argues] the real problem is exactly the opposite of what most are ranting about: ``The problem facing the US and the world is not that China may stop purchasing US Treasury obligations. The problem is exactly the opposite. The major capital exporting countries -- China, Germany, and Japan -- are desperate to maintain or even increase their net capital exports, which are simply the flip side of their trade surpluses.'' ...If consumers decide to stop buying goods from China there is almost nothing China can do about it...Chinese exporters are already under severe price pressures...pray tell what is stopping a collapse in global trade? Nothing as far as I can see. It all depends on consumer attitudes. Certainly Bernanke and Congress will do their best efforts to get banks to lend and consumers to spend, it is by no means a certainty the Fed will succeed...consumer attitudes towards spending and debt will determine the global trade imbalance math...The result may be a collapse in global trade, not an inflationary event to say the least.
China Dumps dollar; Commodities; dumped Treasury; global trade collapsed; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; nuclear option.
New Economic Perspectives Sat 2010-07-24 16:30 EDT
...We support the central objective of the letter -- a full employment policy now, based on sharply expanded public effort..apart from the effects of unemployment itself the United States does not in fact face a serious deficit problem over the next generation, and for this reason there is no "necessity [for] a program to cut the mid-and long-term deficit." On the contrary: If unemployment can be cured, the deficits we presently face will necessarily shrink. This is the universal experience of rapid economic growth: tax revenues rise, public welfare spending falls...The long-term deficit scare story plays into the hands of those who will argue, very soon, for cuts in Social Security as though these were necessary for economic reasons...We call on fellow economists to reconsider their casual willingness to concede to an unfounded hysteria over supposed long-term deficits, and to concentrate instead on solving the vast problems we presently face. It would be tragic if the Evans letter and similar efforts - whose basic purpose we strongly support - led to acquiescence in Social Security and Medicare cuts that impoverish America's elderly just a few years from now.
Deficit Doves Meet; Deficit Owls; New Economic Perspectives.
Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Post Keynesian Perspective Thu 2010-07-22 16:08 EDT
Neoclassical economics has the erroneous belief that money is neutral...Neoclassical analysis sees economic life in terms of a moneyless, ideal barter system. In this system, money exists but has been introduced merely to make trade easier...[however] John Maynard Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) argued that modern capitalist economies are pre-dominantly monetary systems. The starting point for any sensible economic theory must recognise that monetary factors are crucial to modern economic activity...
21st century; money; Neutral Veil; Post Keynesian Perspective; social democracy.
Wed 2010-07-21 11:01 EDT
...Sreedhari Desai, Arthur Brief, and Jennifer George...have been exploring the link between executive pay and ``meanness.''...they may have shifted executive pay scholarly research in a sobering new direction, with much less attention on ``performance'' and much more on raw naked power...``exaggerated power asymmetry'' can make people with power mean to people without. Contemporary corporate workplaces, the three researchers continue, regularly display this ``exaggerated power asymmetry.'' And that asymmetry, they argue, is intensifying as pay gaps between CEOs and their workers have widened...
New Economic Perspectives Mon 2010-07-19 13:51 EDT
...with nearly 10% of the US labor force unemployed and another 7% underemployed, the public debate is now focused on the false issue of deficits and debt. A case in point is a recent book by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, ``This Time is Different'' that has become a bestseller...The media as well as academia have fawned all over this book...The crux of the book is that each time people think that ``this time is different'', that crises cannot occur anymore or that they happen to other people in other places. True. This is exactly what Hyman Minsky was arguing more than 40 years ago. Reinhart and Rogoff don't really explain why this perception leads to crises...The book is mostly on crises driven by government debt...[however] Aggregating data over different monetary regimes and different countries cannot yield any meaningful conclusions about sovereign debt and crises. It is only useful if the goal is to merely validate one's preconceived myth about government debt being similar to private debt...As far as I can tell Rogoff and Reinhart haven't identified a single case of government default on domestic-currency denominated debt with a floating exchange rate system...Professional economists are a major impediment on the way to using our economic system for the benefit of us all. And Reinhart and Rogoff are no exception.
Carmen Reinhart; Deficit; government debt; Kenneth Rogoff; myth; New Economic Perspectives; told.
Wed 2010-06-09 18:56 EDT
...the SEC's preliminary report on the flash crash...led me to believe that most of this activity was caused by algorithmic trading strategies placing directional bets based on rapid responses to incoming market data. Two strategies in particular -- momentum ignition and order anticipation -- were explicitly mentioned as potentially destabilizing forces in the SEC's January Concept Release on Equity Market Structure. The SEC invited comments on the release, and dozens of these have been posted to date. There is one in particular, submitted by R.T. Leuchtkafer about three weeks before the crash, that I think is especially informative and analytically compelling...Leuchtkafer traces the history of recent changes in market microstructure and examines the resulting implications for the timing of liquidity demand and supply...The standard argument against increased regulation of the new market makers is that it would interfere with their ability to supply liquidity. Leuchtkafer argues, instead, that the strategies used by these firms cause them to demand liquidity at precisely those moments when liquidity is shortest supply...
The Wall Street Examiner Sat 2010-05-22 19:56 EDT
...Thus, when people speak of "rescuing the credit markets" they really mean to say rescuing the liquidity providers who failed to assess lending risks so profoundly they can't make required payments. When people talk of German restrictions killing the credit markets, they really mean killing the middle-men (which may or may not have a deleterious effect on government borrowing). German restrictions on certain types of equity and credit transactions are not aimed at reduced government borrowing. They are aimed at reducing the amount (and means of capture) of profit "earned" by middle-men in the transaction- profits, mind you, as per our model, in the case of government borrowing, come either as a result of the money's original owner getting less interest than a direct deal would generate, the government paying more interest (which only comes from higher tax revenues) than a direct deal would generate, or some combination thereof. ...liquidity providing actions of "credit market" middle-men has run amok. As per J.S. Mill, that credit markets are exerting a distinct and independent influence of their own means they are out of order. With increasing frequency, credit is mispriced or unwisely extended and liquidity, the raison d'être of these people, dries up when it is needed most. Yet the middle-men who fail in their tasks expect to be rescued from their failures, and given even more ways to profit from lending other people's money, while the pool of available savings shrinks. ...In one sense I'm quite happy about all of the financial sector bail-outs governments have provided these credit-market middle-men. Before the bail-outs, one had to argue that finance was like a tax on monetary exchange, now this point is clear, finance is, in fact, a tax- and a growing one at that.
credit markets; German-Controlled; imagine; looking; s; Wall Street Examiner.
The Wall Street Examiner Sun 2010-05-09 09:58 EDT
...Now for the Minsky part. The theory above, in layman's terms, argues that over time, when an economy expands without serious contractions, finances will become increasingly risky. Minsky wrote of a shift from hedge finance (when debt, both principal and interest, can be serviced from cash flows) through speculative finance (when debt must be rolled over as only interest payments can be serviced from cash flows) and into Ponzi finance (when cash flows cannot cover interest payments and thus new debt must be added or assets sold). The idea in the Ponzi finance stage is that asset appreciation will compensate for the extra risk...I don't mean to suggest we (collectively) are broke, just that, as Minsky argued (and the data bears out) our balance sheets are increasingly betting on real estate and equity price appreciation with borrowed money...
Electric Politics Mon 2010-03-22 14:06 EDT
...Barry Lynn of the New America Foundation has written an interesting refutation of...an almost universal popular assumption in the United States that this country is much more entrepreneurial and individualistic than the purportedly lazy, pension-sponging socialists of Old Europe. Yet U.S. small business development is at the bottom of the heap of the OECD countries. Once again, our flattering self image is so wildly at variance with reality it verges on schizophrenia...Lynn argues that a key inflection point in government policy towards small business came in 1981, when the Reagan administration essentially stopped enforcing anti-monopoly and small business-protection statutes....
New Deal 2.0 Sat 2010-02-27 22:55 EST
...As the private sector started to dump housing and housing bonds quickly in 2007 and 2008, government officials made sure that the GSEs would be capable of absorbing these bad loans...This constitutes one part of many ``shadow bailouts'' according to Roosevelt Institute senior fellows Rob Johnson and Tom Ferguson; this argument, and the graph above, is from their Too Big to Bail: The `Paulson Put,' Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown Part II paper. (In Part I, they argue that the Federal Home Loan Bank System was also used in a similar manner.) Astute readers will notice that the action of government officials using public funding sources to provide makeshift backstops for losses of the banking sector to clear the balance sheets of toxic assets to ``unlock the frozen credit market'', without having to go to Congress for funding, was also a central feature of Geithner's PPIP plan, with FDIC stepping up to the plate once the GSEs went bust...
Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST
...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.
The Money Game Tue 2010-02-16 16:49 EST
Investors are increasingly giving up on hyperinflation bets. For example, investors are willing to buy standard U.S. treasury bonds that pay just 3.69% yield. That doesn't leave room for much inflation...The niche market of Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS, bonds that adjust their yield to inflation) is giving up on its inflation concerns as well. As this market is too small for major central bank investment, it's far harder to argue away the lack of inflation it forecasts.
BlackRock's Hyperinflation Fears Flounder; Inflation Protected Bonds Murdered; Money game; PIMCO.
Calculated Risk Wed 2010-01-13 12:01 EST
...The homedebtor enjoyed some initial success arguing a non-judicial foreclosure was a violation of due process...The homedebtors are named Huxtable and Agnew. Interestingly, Agnew is also listed as the "lead attorney" for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs defaulted in late 2007, and the bank began a non-judicial foreclosure process in late 2008. The plaintiffs filed suit in federal court to stop the foreclosure, naming as defendants Timothy Geithner, the FHFA the lender and the servicer. The plaintiffs were allegedly denied a HAMP modification, and they claim the government and the bank violated the plaintiffs' right to "due process under the Fifth Amendment for failing to create rules implementing HAMP that comport with due process."...The judge refused to dismiss the case because the plaintiffs might be able to prove the government has "insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with the bank.
