Wed 2010-06-09 18:56 EDT

Rajiv Sethi: The New Market Makers

...the SEC's preliminary report on the flash crash...led me to believe that most of this activity was caused by algorithmic trading strategies placing directional bets based on rapid responses to incoming market data. Two strategies in particular -- momentum ignition and order anticipation -- were explicitly mentioned as potentially destabilizing forces in the SEC's January Concept Release on Equity Market Structure. The SEC invited comments on the release, and dozens of these have been posted to date. There is one in particular, submitted by R.T. Leuchtkafer about three weeks before the crash, that I think is especially informative and analytically compelling...Leuchtkafer traces the history of recent changes in market microstructure and examines the resulting implications for the timing of liquidity demand and supply...The standard argument against increased regulation of the new market makers is that it would interfere with their ability to supply liquidity. Leuchtkafer argues, instead, that the strategies used by these firms cause them to demand liquidity at precisely those moments when liquidity is shortest supply...

New Market Makers; Rajiv Sethi.

Tue 2010-06-01 17:29 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirt of debate ... my reply

Bill Mitchell

...Steve Keen and I agreed to foster a debate about where modern monetary theory sits with his work on debt-deflation. So yesterday his blog carried the following post, which included a 1000-odd word precis written by me describing what I see as the essential characteristics of modern monetary theory. The discussion is on-going on that site and I invite you to follow it if you are interested. Rather than comment on all the comments over on Steve's site, I decided to collate them here (in part) and help develop the understanding that way. That is what follows today... We distinguish the horizontal dimension (which entails all transactions between entities in the non-government sector) from the vertical dimension (which entails all transactions between the government and non-government sector)...A properly specified model will show you emphatically that the horizontal transactions between household, firms, banks and foreigners (which is the domain of circuit theory) have to net to zero even if asset portfolios are changing in composition. For every asset created there will be a corresponding liability created at the same time...you will make errors if there is not an explicit understanding that in an accounting (stock-flow) consistent sense all these transaction will net to zero. In adopting this understanding you might abstract from analysing the vertical transactions that introduced the high-powered money in the first place, but never deny its importance in setting the scene for the horizontal transactions to occur. I think the differences between Steve's models and modern monetary theory are two-fold. First, I do not think that Steve's model is stock-flow consistent across all sectors. By leaving out the government sector (even implicitly) essential insights are lost that would avoid conclusions that do not obey basic and accepted national accounting (and financial accounting) rules. This extends to how we define money. Second, I think Steve uses accounting in a different way to that which is broadly accepted. It might be that for mathematical nicety or otherwise this is the chosen strategy but you cannot then claim that your models are ground in the operational reality of the fiat monetary system we live in. I have no problem with abstract modelling. But modern monetary theory is firmly ground in the operational reality and is totally stock-flow consistent across all sectors. If we used the same definitions and rendered Steve's model stock-flow consistent in the same way as modern monetary theory then Steve's endogenous money circuits would come up with exactly the same results as the horizontal dimensions in modern monetary theory. His results might look a bit different in accounting terms but most of the message he wishes to portray about the dangers of Ponzi stages in the private debt accumulation process would still hold.

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply; spirt.

Fri 2009-11-20 10:30 EST

Curious Meeting at Treasury Department >> naked capitalism

Yves Smith

The Treasury invited a small group of bloggers for a ``discussion'' with senior officials on Monday...we bloggers and the government officials kept talking past each other, in that one of us would ask a question, the reply would leave the questioner or someone in the audience unsatisfied, there might be a follow up question (either same person or someone interested), get another responsive-sounding but not really answer, and then another person would get the floor...the people we met are very cognitively captured, assuming one can take their remarks at face value. Although they kept stressing all the things that had changed or they were planning to change, the polite pushback from pretty all the attendees was that what Treasury thought of as major progress was insufficient...It was also striking to see that the Treasury officials did not articulate vision for a banking system for the 21st century that was materially different that the one we have now...

Curious Meeting; naked capitalism; Treasury Department.

Harper's Magazine Thu 2009-11-19 10:20 EST

An Object Lesson in Governmental Failure: Derivatives reform

KEN SILVERSTEIN

If you want to understand why Congress seems completely incapable of checking the power of Wall Street, look back to a hearing on the Hill last October 7, and the subsequent events surrounding it...he House Financial Services Committee hosted a panel on reform of the market for derivatives,...the committee, headed by Congressman Barney Frank (D-Wall Street), invited a panel of eight guests who were distinguished by their uniformly pro-industry positions...In response to complaints from Americans for Financial Reform, which represents hundreds of consumer groups and labor unions, the committee issued an invitation--the night before the hearing was held -- to Rob Johnson of the Roosevelt Institute. For the committee, the last minute inclusion of Johnson -- a former managing director at Bankers Trust Company and former economist at the Senate Banking Committee and Senate Budget Committee -- apparently constituted sufficient balance...About five days later Johnson submitted his full testimony to the committee, to be included on its website along with the statements of the other eight panelists...the committee's general counsel would not allow posting of the testimony because Johnson had not submitted it during the hearing. (Of course, since Johnson had been invited at the last minute it was impossible for him to fulfill this pointless requirement.)

Derivatives reform; Governmental Failure; Harper's Magazine; object lessons.

Credit Writedowns Wed 2009-10-14 12:12 EDT

Currencies pegged to the dollar under pressure to drop peg

...as the dollar continues to weaken, those countries with pegs will be under pressure to drop their peg or to revalue their pegs higher. The Bloomberg video linked below explains. The dichotomy whereby the adjustment process is done only through free-floating currencies is inherently unstable -- and invites a nationalistic response. A busted peg in any major U.S. trading partner's currency is likely to have a very negative psychological impact on currency markets and severe knock-on effects... [dollar losing reserve status]

credit writedowns; currency pegs; Dollar; drop peg; pressures.

Sun 2008-03-30 00:00 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: SEC Openly Invites Corporations To Lie

abandoning mark-to-market; moving dodgy assets into level 3

lying; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; SEC Openly Invites Corporations.