zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Fri 2010-10-08 19:33 EDT

Will We Have Hyperinflation In America?

I have been reading a lot lately about the coming hyperinflation in America. Among those I've read are Mr. Shadowstats John Williams, John Hussman, Jim Quinn, commentators on Zero Hedge, and Mr. Gloom Doom and Boom himself Marc Faber. My favorite philosopher, Nassim Taleb has also taken up the hyperinflation case. And I didn't forget Jim Rogers, Peter Schiff, and others...Will hyperinflation happen here? It is possible but unlikely and improbable...There are economic and political reasons why I don't think hyperinflation would occur...none of the economic or political factors required to set off hyperinflation are present. A careful analysis of theory, fact, and history leads me to conclude that inflation/stagflation is our future. It is quite a leap of fancy to say we are certain to have hyperinflation.

America; dropped; Hyperinflation; long; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM Mon 2010-09-20 09:57 EDT

WHITHER CHINA?

Simon Hunt

In all likelihood, China has entered the most critical and taxing period since the country was reopened to the outside world in the 1970s. Domestically, there are a slew of issues, any one of which could create instability...Few can know the full story of what goes on within the State Council, but there appears to be a battle royal being fought over the real estate sector. There are those within the leadership who are concerned that average home prices have gotten too high for most first-time buyers (see our previous visit report). They want to see average prices fall by 10-20% across the country. Against this group are not just real estate developers but local governments and many others within Beijing...In effect, what is being seen is a battle between central and local governments. In our view, this is a fight that central government cannot afford to lose...against a background of cheap money and plenty of credit, house prices across the country have become unaffordable to most first-time buyers...if these price developments continued unchecked the leadership would risk encountering social instability...we doubt there will be any easing of policy until average house prices fall into the 10-20% range. China is transiting into a very difficult period as focus shifts towards sustainable domestic growth and away from short-term measures to defend the 8% GDP mantra. This transition is occurring when the existing leadership is preparing to give way to the new set in 2012, when social stability could be threatened if there are policy mistakes...

China; PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-09-17 19:42 EDT

Auerback: TARP Was Not a Success -- It Simply Institutionalized Fraud

Marshall Auerback

...the only way to call TARP a winner is by defining government sanctioned financial fraud as the main metric of results. The finance leaders who are guilty of wrecking much of the global economy remain in power -- while growing extraordinarily wealthy in the process. They know that their primary means of destruction was accounting ``control fraud'', a term coined by Professor Bill Black, who argued that ``Control frauds occur when those that control a seemingly legitimate entity use it as a `weapon' to defraud.'' TARP did nothing to address this abuse; indeed, it perpetuates it. Are we now using lying and fraud as the measure of success for financial reform?...Money was ``repaid'', not because the banks were accumulating massive profits as a consequence of their revival, but largely as an outgrowth of the accounting tricks sanctioned by Congress and the White House in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis...When we lie about accounting and leave zombie banks in the hands of those that looted them and caused trillions of dollars of losses we eviscerate our integrity and our efforts at economic recovery...

Auerback; naked capitalism; Simply Institutionalized Fraud; Success; TARP.

Christopher Whalen Fri 2010-09-17 19:31 EDT

The key to the future of finance is now emerging

Christopher Whalen

Basel III is entirely irrelevant to the economic situation and even to the banks. Through things like minimum capital levels, the Basel II rules provided the illusion of intelligent design in the regulation of banking and finance. In fact, Basel II made the subprime crisis possible and the subsequent bailout inevitable [by enabling off-balance sheet finance and OTC derivatives]...Part of the reason for my undisguised contempt for the Basel III process comes from caution regarding the benefits of regulating markets...But a large portion of my criticism for Basel III and the entire Basel framework is even more basic, namely the notion that any form of a priori regulation, public or private, can prevent people from doing stupid things...The key premise of Basel III is that the use of minimum capital guidelines and other strictures will somehow enable regulators to prevent a crises before it occurs. The only trouble is that regulators have no objective measures for compliance with Basel II/III, much less predicting market breaks...As in past decades and crises right through to 2008, the regulators will be the last to know about a problem...

Christopher Whalen; Emergency; finance; future; Key.

Wed 2010-09-15 13:55 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> Export-led growth strategies will fail

Bill Mitchell

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) released their annual Trade and Development Report, 2010 yesterday (September 14, 2010). The 204 page report which I have been wading through today is full of interesting analysis and will take several blogs over the coming weeks to fully cover. The message is very clear. Export-led growth strategies are deeply flawed and austerity programs will worsen growth and increase poverty. UNCTAD consider a fundamental rethink has to occur where policy is reoriented towards domestic demand and employment creation. They consider an expansion of fiscal policy to be essential in the current economic climate as the threat of a wide-spread double dip recession increases. The Report is essential reading...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Export-led growth strategies; fail.

Wed 2010-08-25 08:41 EDT

2008 Bailout Counter-Factual | The Big Picture

Barry Ritholtz

...My disagreement with the Zandi-Blinder report is not its theoretical underpinnings -- it is by definition a hypothetical counter-factual. Rather, it is the counter-factual Blinder/Zandi chose to use: ``What would the economy look like now if we had done nothing?'' Instead, I propose a better counter-factual: ``What if we had done the right thing, instead of nothing -- or the wrong thing?''...In my counter factual, the bailouts did not occur. Instead of the Japanese model, the US government went the Swedish route of banking crises: They stepped in with temporary nationalizations, prepackaged bankruptcies, and financial reorganizations; banks write down all of their bad debt, they sell off the paper. In the end, the goal is to spin out clean, well financed, toxic-asset-free banks into the public markets...One by one, we should have put each insolvent bank into receivership, cleaned up the balance sheer, sold off the bad debts for 15-50 cents on the dollar, fired the management, wiped out the shareholders, and spun out the proceeds, with the bondholders taking the haircut, and the taxpayers on the hook for precisely zero dollars. Citi, Bank of America, Wamu, Wachovia, Countrywide, Lehman, Merrill, Morgan, etc. all of them should have been handled this way...

2008 Bailout Counter-Factual; Big Picture.

Tue 2010-08-24 20:21 EDT

Gonzalo Lira: How Hyperinflation Will Happen

Right now, we are in the middle of deflation. The Global Depression we are experiencing has squeezed both aggregate demand levels and aggregate asset prices as never before. Since the credit crunch of September 2008, the U.S. and world economies have been slowly circling the deflationary drain...For its part, the Federal Reserve has been busy propping up all assets--including Treasuries--by way of ``quantitative easing''...But this Fed policy--call it ``money-printing'', call it ``liquidity injections'', call it ``asset price stabilization''--has been overwhelmed by the credit contraction...the next step down in this world-historical Global Depression which we are experiencing will be hyperinflation...Hyperinflation is the loss of faith in the currency. Prices rise in a hyperinflationary environment just like in an inflationary environment, but they rise not because people want more money for their labor or for commodities, but because people are trying to get out of the currency. It's not that they want more money--they want less of the currency: So they will pay anything for a good which is not the currency...Treasuries are now the New and Improved Toxic Asset...there will be a commodities burp: A slight but sudden rise in the price of a necessary commodity, such as oil...asset managers will sell Treasuries...right before a largish Treasury auction. So Bernanke and the Fed will buy Treasuries, in an effort to counteract the sell-off and maintain low yields...The Fed's buying of Treasuries will occur in such a way that it will encourage asset managers to dump even more Treasuries...It will be a flash panic...By the end of that terrible day, commodites of all stripes--precious and industrial metals, oil, foodstuffs--will shoot the moon...if it doesn't happen this fall, it'll happen next fall, without question before the end of 2011...

Gonzalo Lira; happened; Hyperinflation.

Tue 2010-08-03 14:34 EDT

Rajiv Sethi: The Economics of Hyman Minsky [2009-12-03]

There has been a resurgence of interest in the economic writings of Hyman Minsky over the past few years, and for good reason...Minsky's theoretical framework combines a cash-flow approach to investment with a theory of financial instability...expectations of financial tranquility are self-falsifying. Stability, as Minsky liked to put it, is itself destabilizing...An essential feature of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is that a long period of sustained stability gives rise to changes in financial practices which are not conducive to the persistence of stable growth...A sustained period of stability gives rise to optimistic expectations and a rise in speculative financing...if a large number of investments which are prompted by the availability of speculative finance are found to be inept, so that immediate cash flows are significantly lower than expected, then the need for short-term refinancing becomes acute while at the same time banks are less willing to roll over existing debt. A sharp rise in short-term interest rates occurs which can lead to present value reversals, a rush towards liquidity, a plunge in the prices of illiquid assets, both real and financial, and a corresponding drop in new investments...described as a credit crunch, a state of financial distress, or a financial crisis...

2009-12-03; economic; Hyman Minsky; Rajiv Sethi.

New Deal 2.0 Sun 2010-07-25 16:08 EDT

Marriner S. Eccles: Keynesian Evangelist Before Keynes

Henry C. K. Liu

...From direct experience, [1930s Federal Reserve chairman Marriner S. Eccles] realized that bankers like himself, by doing what seemed sound on an individual basis, by calling in loans and refusing new lending in hard times, only contributed to the financial crisis. He saw from direct experience the evidence of market failure. He concluded that to get out of the depression, government intervention, something he had been taught was evil, was necessary to place purchasing power in the hands of the public. In the industrial age, the mal-distribution of income (which was hugely unequal) and the excessive savings for capital investment always lead to the masses exhausting their purchasing power, unable to sustain the benefits of mass production that such savings brought...By denying the masses necessary purchasing power, capital denies itself of the very demand that would justify its investment in new production. Credit can extend purchasing power but only until the credit runs out, which would soon occur without the support of adequate income...Eccles, who never attended university or studied economics formally, articulated his pragmatic conclusions in speeches a good three years before Keynes wrote his epoch-making The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936)....Eccles' transformation from a businessman, brought up to believe in survival of the fittest, to his belief in government spending on the neediest can teach us many lessons today...The solution is to start the money flowing again by directing it not toward those who already have a surplus, but to those who have not enough. Giving more money to those who already have too much would take more money out of circulation into idle savings and prolong the depression...Eccles promoted a limited war on poverty and unemployment, not on moral but on utilitarian grounds.

0; Keynes; Keynesian Evangelist; Marriner S. Eccles; new dealing 2.

New Economic Perspectives Mon 2010-07-19 13:51 EDT

The Myths About Government Debt and Deficit as Told By Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff

Yeva Nersisyan

...with nearly 10% of the US labor force unemployed and another 7% underemployed, the public debate is now focused on the false issue of deficits and debt. A case in point is a recent book by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, ``This Time is Different'' that has become a bestseller...The media as well as academia have fawned all over this book...The crux of the book is that each time people think that ``this time is different'', that crises cannot occur anymore or that they happen to other people in other places. True. This is exactly what Hyman Minsky was arguing more than 40 years ago. Reinhart and Rogoff don't really explain why this perception leads to crises...The book is mostly on crises driven by government debt...[however] Aggregating data over different monetary regimes and different countries cannot yield any meaningful conclusions about sovereign debt and crises. It is only useful if the goal is to merely validate one's preconceived myth about government debt being similar to private debt...As far as I can tell Rogoff and Reinhart haven't identified a single case of government default on domestic-currency denominated debt with a floating exchange rate system...Professional economists are a major impediment on the way to using our economic system for the benefit of us all. And Reinhart and Rogoff are no exception.

Carmen Reinhart; Deficit; government debt; Kenneth Rogoff; myth; New Economic Perspectives; told.

naked capitalism Tue 2010-06-01 20:06 EDT

When Will Europe Have Its Wile E. Coyote Moment?

...The current program instead is ultimately about protecting Eurobanks from losses, and is destined to fail. John Mauldin, in his newsletters, has been featuring the work of Rob Parenteau, as featured first here on Naked Capitalism (and a source of much reader ire): that deleveraging the public sector and the private sector at the same time is impossible absent a big rise in exports. Pretty much every major economy is on a ``reduce government debt'' campaign. Many are also on a ``deleverage the private sector'' program too (which is warranted, given the amount of profligate lending that occurred). The problem, however, is that these states can't all increase exports, particularly to the degree sought...Rob Parenteau drew out the implications in an earlier post: ``...if households and businesses in the peripheral nations stubbornly defend their current net saving positions [continue to reduce debt levels], the attempt at fiscal retrenchment will be thwarted by a deflationary drop in nominal GDP. ''...This feels like 2007 all over again, with the authorities insistent that Things Will Be Fine, when a realistic assessment suggests the reverse.

Europe; naked capitalism; Wile E. Coyote Moment.

Tue 2010-06-01 18:24 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirit of debate ... my reply Part 2

Bill Mitchell

Today, I offer Part 2 of my responses to the comments raised in the debate so far...Modern monetary theory does not use the term ``money'' in the same way as the mainstream because it creates instant confusion. As Scott said ``Money is always someone's liability, so better to be precise about whose liabilities we are talking about than saying money.'' That is why we emphasis fully understanding the asset-liability matches that occur in monetary systems. And that leads you to realise that transactions between government and non-government create or destroy net financial assets denominated in the currency of issue whereas transactions within the non-government sector cannot create net financial positions...So modern monetary theorists prefer to concentrate on what is going on with balance sheets after certain flows have occured rather than narrowly defining some financial assets as money and others not...There is no doubt that the non-government institutions can increase credit. Some slack analysts call this an increase in money. But the accurate statement is that, as a matter of accounting it increases the (in Scott's words) ``the quantity of financial assets and financial liabilities 1 for 1 in the non-govt sector. So, with private credit, there is BY DEFINITION no NET increase in private sector financial assets created.'' Once we understand that and note that typically the non-government sector seeks to net save in the currency of issue then modern monetary theory tells you that the public sector must run a deficit to underwrite this desired net saving or else see an output gap widen...Who is in control is an interesting question. Clearly, the government cannot directly control the money supply which renders much of the analysis in mainstream macroeconomics textbooks as being irrelevant. The Monetarists via Milton Friedman persuaded central banks to adopt monetary targetting in the 1980s and it failed a few years later -- miserably...Then you might like to consider it from the other angle -- a government which accepts responsibility for full employment can ``finance'' the saving desires of the non-government sector by increasing its deficit up to the level warranted by the spending gap (left by the full employment non-government savings)...Orthodox macroeconomic theory struggles with the idea of involuntary unemployment and typically tries to fudge the explanation by appealing to market rigidities (typically nominal wage inflexibility). However, in general, the orthodox framework cannot convincingly explain systemic constraints that comprehensively negate individual volition. The modern monetary framework clearly explicates how involuntary unemployment arises. The private sector, in aggregate, may desire to spend less of the monetary unit of account than it earns. In this case, if this gap in spending is not met by government, then unemployment will occur. Nominal (or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless they somehow eliminate the private sector desire to net save and increase spending...to maintain high levels of employment and given that the public generally desire to hold some reserves of fiat money, the government balance will normally have to be in deficit...modern monetary theory demonstrates that if you want the non-government sector to net save...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply Part 2; Spirit.

Tue 2010-06-01 17:29 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirt of debate ... my reply

Bill Mitchell

...Steve Keen and I agreed to foster a debate about where modern monetary theory sits with his work on debt-deflation. So yesterday his blog carried the following post, which included a 1000-odd word precis written by me describing what I see as the essential characteristics of modern monetary theory. The discussion is on-going on that site and I invite you to follow it if you are interested. Rather than comment on all the comments over on Steve's site, I decided to collate them here (in part) and help develop the understanding that way. That is what follows today... We distinguish the horizontal dimension (which entails all transactions between entities in the non-government sector) from the vertical dimension (which entails all transactions between the government and non-government sector)...A properly specified model will show you emphatically that the horizontal transactions between household, firms, banks and foreigners (which is the domain of circuit theory) have to net to zero even if asset portfolios are changing in composition. For every asset created there will be a corresponding liability created at the same time...you will make errors if there is not an explicit understanding that in an accounting (stock-flow) consistent sense all these transaction will net to zero. In adopting this understanding you might abstract from analysing the vertical transactions that introduced the high-powered money in the first place, but never deny its importance in setting the scene for the horizontal transactions to occur. I think the differences between Steve's models and modern monetary theory are two-fold. First, I do not think that Steve's model is stock-flow consistent across all sectors. By leaving out the government sector (even implicitly) essential insights are lost that would avoid conclusions that do not obey basic and accepted national accounting (and financial accounting) rules. This extends to how we define money. Second, I think Steve uses accounting in a different way to that which is broadly accepted. It might be that for mathematical nicety or otherwise this is the chosen strategy but you cannot then claim that your models are ground in the operational reality of the fiat monetary system we live in. I have no problem with abstract modelling. But modern monetary theory is firmly ground in the operational reality and is totally stock-flow consistent across all sectors. If we used the same definitions and rendered Steve's model stock-flow consistent in the same way as modern monetary theory then Steve's endogenous money circuits would come up with exactly the same results as the horizontal dimensions in modern monetary theory. His results might look a bit different in accounting terms but most of the message he wishes to portray about the dangers of Ponzi stages in the private debt accumulation process would still hold.

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply; spirt.

Tue 2010-06-01 16:23 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirit of debate ...

Bill Mitchell

Readers of my blog often ask me about how modern monetary theory sits with the views of the debt-deflationists (and specifically my academic colleague Steve Keen). Steve and I have collaborated in the last few days to foster some debate between us on a constructive level with the aim of demonstrating that the common enemy is mainstream macroeconomics and that progressive thinkers should target that school of thought rather than looking within...hopefully, this initiative will broaden the debate and bring more people up to speed on where the real enemy of full employment lies...The modern monetary system is characterised by a floating exchange rate (so monetary policy is freed from the need to defend foreign exchange reserves) and the monopoly provision of fiat currency. The monopolist is the national government. Most countries now operate monetary systems that have these characteristics...the monetary unit defined by the government has no intrinsic worth...The viability of the fiat currency is ensured by the fact that it is the only unit which is acceptable for payment of taxes and other financial demands of the government.The analogy that mainstream macroeconomics draws between private household budgets and the national government budget is thus false. Households, the users of the currency, must finance their spending prior to the fact. However, government, as the issuer of the currency, must spend first (credit private bank accounts) before it can subsequently tax (debit private accounts)... Taxation acts to withdraw spending power from the private sector but does not provide any extra financial capacity for public spending...As a matter of national accounting, the federal government deficit (surplus) equals the non-government surplus (deficit). In aggregate, there can be no net savings of financial assets of the non-government sector without cumulative government deficit spending...contrary to mainstream economic rhetoric, the systematic pursuit of government budget surpluses is necessarily manifested as systematic declines in private sector savings...Unemployment occurs when net government spending is too low. As a matter of accounting, for aggregate output to be sold, total spending must equal total income (whether actual income generated in production is fully spent or not each period). Involuntary unemployment is idle labour unable to find a buyer at the current money wage. In the absence of government spending, unemployment arises when the private sector, in aggregate, desires to spend less of the monetary unit of account than it earns. Nominal (or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless they somehow eliminate the private sector desire to net save and increase spending. Thus, unemployment occurs when net government spending is too low to accommodate the need to pay taxes and the desire to net save...Unlike the mainstream rhetoric, insolvency is never an issue with deficits. The only danger with fiscal policy is inflation which would arise if the government pushed nominal spending growth above the real capacity of the economy to absorb it...government debt functions as interest rate support via the maintenance of desired reserve levels in the commercial banking system and not as a source of funds to finance government spending...there is no intrinsic reason for...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; Spirit.

Wed 2010-05-19 11:40 EDT

Community Development Job Guarantee

CofFEE - Centre of Full Employment and Equity

The Centre of Full Employment and Equity has developed a sustainable path to full employment, which it calls the Job Guarantee program. A major focus of our work is on articulating this program - explaining how it works, the urgency of it, and the reasons why it is the only way to achieve full employment with price stability, a combination that has evaded most economies in the last 25 years. Under the Job Guarantee policy, the government continuously absorbs workers displaced from private sector employment. The Job Guarantee employees would be paid the minimum wage, which defines a wage floor for the economy. Government employment and spending automatically increases (decreases) as jobs are lost (gained) in the private sector. The approach generates full employment and price stability. The Job Guarantee wage provides a floor that prevents serious deflation from occurring and defines the private sector wage structure. CofFEE's latest work in this area has been developed into a proposal for a Community Development Job Guarantee (CD-JG) focussing on the long-term unemployed (people who have been unemployed longer than 12 months) and youth unemployed. These two groups have been targeted because of the severe economic and social costs that result as the period of unemployment lengthens, or when unemployment occurs at the beginning of a person's working life...

Community Development Job Guarantee.

zero hedge Wed 2010-04-07 18:26 EDT

The Latest Gold Fraud Bombshell: Canada's Only Bullion Bank Gold Vault Is Practically Empty

Continuing on the trail of exposing what is rapidly becoming one of the largest frauds in commodity markets history is the most recent interview by Eric King with GATA's Adrian Douglas, Harvey Orgen (who recently testified before the CFTC hearing) and his son, Lenny, in which the two discuss their visit to the only bullion bank vault in Canada, that of ScotiaMocatta, located at 40 King Street West in Toronto, and find the vault is practically empty..."The game ends when the people who own all these paper obligations say enough and take physical delivery, and that's when the mess will occur."...It is funny that central bankers thought they could take the ponzi mentality of infinite dilution of all assets coupled with infinite debt issuance, as they have done to fiat money, and apply it to gold, in essence piling leverage upon leverage. They underestimated gold holders' willingness to be diluted into perpetuity - when the realization that gold owned is just 1% of what is physically deliverable, you will see the biggest bank run in history.

Bullion Bank Gold Vault; Canada's; Latest Gold Fraud Bombshell; practically empty; Zero Hedge.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-03-04 08:47 EST

Stuck in neutral -- what Japan's rebalancing can teach us

Michael Pettis

...A few days ago I read a good article (``Stuck on Neutral'') about Japan [from] the Economist...about Japan's post-1989 rebalancing, ...discusses why, in spite of every attempt, Japan has not been able supposedly to rebalance the economy and achieve any real growth during the two lost decades after 1990. Private consumption never took off to drive economic growth...After many years of excess investment driving growth, Japan's rebalancing process, which occurred after corporate, bank and government debt levels prevented the investment party from continuing, locked the country into many years of slow growth because it had to grind through years of debt-fueled overinvestment...it doesn't matter what individual policies we take to boost consumption if these polices don't in the aggregate represent a real transfer of income to the household sector, as they did not in Japan...Japan's experience suggests one of the risks China faces...Chinese household consumption will undoubtedly rise as a share of Chinese GDP over the next decade or two, but the process nonetheless can be disappointing for growth. It depends on lots of other moving parts, most importantly perhaps the change in investment and the speed with which income is transferred to households. And the change in investment might depend on debt capacity constraints and the extent of earlier overinvestment.

China Financial Markets; Japan's rebalancing; neutral; stuck; teach.

Sun 2010-01-31 23:06 EST

The Formula for This Market Rally In Simple Terms

The first, most obvious trend is the Manic Mondays trend...for the 43 weeks ended Friday January 8, 2010, stocks have rallied on 30 out of the 43 Mondays...these Monday ramp jobs have contributed the bulk of the market rally's gains since March 2009...The second trend that has dominated this market since the March 2009 bottom is the Bernanke Options Expiration juicing. In simple terms Ben Bernanke has shown a REAL preference for pumping money into the financial system on the exact week when options are expiring...The final trend that has dominated this market is cousin to the Manic Monday Ramp Job. It is the Night Session Ramp Job...from September 13, 2009 until year-end, ALL of the stock market's gains occurred in the over-night futures session from 4:00 ET to 9:30 AM ET...So there you have it, the three most dominant trends of this market rally. None of them are pretty. None of them involve fundamentals. And ALL of them are directly related to the Fed's liquidity pump.

Formula; markets Rally; simple terms.

Jesse's Café Américain Fri 2010-01-29 16:15 EST

Why Are 86% of the NY Fed's MBS Purchases Occurring During Option Expiration Weeks?

Jesse

My friends at ContraryInvestor have published some remarkable data...This data suggests that the Fed's purchases of Market Backed Securities serves not only to artificially depress mortgage rates and the longer end of the yield curves. The purchases occur, with a remarkably high correlation of 86%, during monthly stock market options expiration weeks in the US...Talk about timing of liquidity injections to get maximum effect in the equities market...option expiration in the US stock indices occurs on the third Friday of every month. We have pointed out in the past that this monthly event is often the occasion of some not so subtle racketeering by the funds and prop trading desks.

86; Jesse's Café Américain; NY Fed's MBS Purchases Occurring; options expirations week.

Unqualified Reservations Fri 2009-12-18 10:03 EST

Expiring liquidity facilities: bad plan, Stan

Mencius Moldbug

I predict: serious financial disturbances will occur on or before February 1, 2010. Or soon thereafter...I also have a serious - ie, verifiable - prediction. I predict that before the end of 2010, probably well before the end of 2010, possibly even before the beginning of 2010, the Fed will be forced to renew these facilities or others like them. In other words, I predict that its attempt to kick the liquidity junk will not succeed. In the end, I believe all these "temporary" facilities will become substantively permanent - just like the original LF, deposit insurance.

Bad plans; Expiring liquidity facilities; Stan; Unqualified Reservations.