Tue 2010-06-01 17:29 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirt of debate ... my reply

Bill Mitchell

...Steve Keen and I agreed to foster a debate about where modern monetary theory sits with his work on debt-deflation. So yesterday his blog carried the following post, which included a 1000-odd word precis written by me describing what I see as the essential characteristics of modern monetary theory. The discussion is on-going on that site and I invite you to follow it if you are interested. Rather than comment on all the comments over on Steve's site, I decided to collate them here (in part) and help develop the understanding that way. That is what follows today... We distinguish the horizontal dimension (which entails all transactions between entities in the non-government sector) from the vertical dimension (which entails all transactions between the government and non-government sector)...A properly specified model will show you emphatically that the horizontal transactions between household, firms, banks and foreigners (which is the domain of circuit theory) have to net to zero even if asset portfolios are changing in composition. For every asset created there will be a corresponding liability created at the same time...you will make errors if there is not an explicit understanding that in an accounting (stock-flow) consistent sense all these transaction will net to zero. In adopting this understanding you might abstract from analysing the vertical transactions that introduced the high-powered money in the first place, but never deny its importance in setting the scene for the horizontal transactions to occur. I think the differences between Steve's models and modern monetary theory are two-fold. First, I do not think that Steve's model is stock-flow consistent across all sectors. By leaving out the government sector (even implicitly) essential insights are lost that would avoid conclusions that do not obey basic and accepted national accounting (and financial accounting) rules. This extends to how we define money. Second, I think Steve uses accounting in a different way to that which is broadly accepted. It might be that for mathematical nicety or otherwise this is the chosen strategy but you cannot then claim that your models are ground in the operational reality of the fiat monetary system we live in. I have no problem with abstract modelling. But modern monetary theory is firmly ground in the operational reality and is totally stock-flow consistent across all sectors. If we used the same definitions and rendered Steve's model stock-flow consistent in the same way as modern monetary theory then Steve's endogenous money circuits would come up with exactly the same results as the horizontal dimensions in modern monetary theory. His results might look a bit different in accounting terms but most of the message he wishes to portray about the dangers of Ponzi stages in the private debt accumulation process would still hold.

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply; spirt.

China Financial Markets Tue 2010-04-20 09:17 EDT

Who will pay for China's bad loans?

Michael Pettis

...pessimists are starting to worry about excessive debt levels in China, about which they are very right to worry, and many are predicting a banking or financial collapse, which I think is much less likely. Optimists, on the other hand, are blithely discounting the problem of rising NPLs and insisting that they create little risk to Chinese growth. Their proof? A decade ago China had a huge surge in NPLs, the cleaning up of which was to cost China 40% of GDP and a possible banking collapse, and yet, they claim, nothing bad happened. The doomsayers were wrong, the last banking crisis was easily managed, and Chinese growth surged. But although I think the pessimists are wrong to expect a banking collapse, the optimists are nonetheless very mistaken, largely because they implicitly assumed away the cost of the bank recapitalization. In fact China paid a very high price for its banking crisis. The cost didn't come in the form of a banking collapse but rather in the form of a collapse in consumption growth as households were forced to pay for the enormous cleanup bill...

China Financial Markets; China's bad loans; pay.

zero hedge Fri 2010-01-15 17:46 EST

Is The Mysterious "Direct Bidder" Simply China Executing 'Quantitative Easing' On Behalf Of The Federal Reserve?

...we make the claim that the Fed has now informally offloaded the Treasury portion of Quantitative Easing to China, which does so via the elusive Direct Bid. It also explains why the Fed has generically been much less worried about TSY purchases under Q.E. (a mere $300 billion out of a total $1.7 trillion in monetization). It does beg the question of just how much Chinese holdings of US Debt truly are, as this number is likely hundreds of billions higher than the disclosed $799 billion...if there is indeed an implicit understanding between Bernanke and his Chinese colleagues, it means that not only the housing market (via Agency and MBS security purchases), but the Treasury market as well, are both manipulated beyond recognition and implies that broad securities are massively overvalued due to the stealth purchasing of core "riskless" assets by the US and China, as investors look higher in the cap structure for yield. Lastly, implications for world trade are great, as Asian countries will have to deal not only with the Chinese behemoth, which will constantly seek to keep its currency as low as possible, thus exacerbating the rest of Asia's foreign trade balances, but that of the US itself. The immediate implication is that China (or the US for that matter) will likely not reflate their currencies out of their own volition any time in the foreseeable future. Look for a much weaker dollar in the coming months.

behalf; Direct bidders; Federal Reserve; mysteriously; Quantitative Easing; Simply China Executing; Zero Hedge.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

John P. Hussman

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

Thu 2007-12-27 00:00 EST

Winter (Economic & Market) Watch >> Did the Grinch Steal Christmas?

Winter (Economic & Market) Watch >> Did the Grinch Steal Christmas? FHLB not creating liquidity, until bailout; guarantee is merely implicit

economic; Grinch Steal Christmas; Market; watch; winter.