Blog entry Sun 2010-10-10 09:51 EDT

Crony Capitalism: Wall Street's Favorite Politicians

Zach Carter

A full 90 members of Congress who voted to bailout Wall Street in 2008 failed to support financial reform reining in the banks who drove our economy off a cliff. But when you examine campaign contribution data, it's really no surprise that these particular lawmakers voted to mortgage our economic future to Big Finance: This election cycle, they've raked in over $48.8 million from the financial establishment. Over the course of their Congressional careers, the figure swells to a massive $176.9 million. The full list of these Crony Capitalists is below, along with the money they pulled in from Big Finance, according to data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics (opensecrets.org)...

blog entry; Crony Capitalism; Wall Street's Favorite Politicians.

Fri 2010-10-08 20:54 EDT

BofA Halts All Foreclosure Sales - WSJ.com

Bank of America is placing a moratorium on all foreclosure proceedings and sales in the U.S., amid political pressure on U.S. banks to examine foreclosure-documentation problems.

BofA Halts; com; Foreclosures Sale; WSJ.

Tue 2010-08-03 15:02 EDT

Economics of Contempt: Anatomy of Lehman's Failure, and the Importance of Liquidity Requirements

Remember the Lehman Examiner's Report? The 4000+ page report by the court-appointed examiner was lauded for a couple of weeks after it was released, and then largely forgotten. The media and blogosphere quickly moved on to the next outrage-du-jour...Well, I did not forget about it, and thanks to the uptick in flights -- and thus reading time -- in the last few months, I can now credibly claim to have read....well, not every single word in the Examiner's Report (some appendices are just pages of CUSIPs), but all of the substantive sections...Anton Valukas and the lawyers at Jenner & Block who wrote the Examiner's Report did a masterful job. I was, and continue to be, in awe of the quality and comprehensiveness of the report...think I have a pretty good handle on what went wrong at Lehman, and why it failed...they were misrepresenting their liquidity pool. In a huge way...the brazenness of their misrepresentation was shocking...Including the clearing-bank collateral in its liquidity pool was not only inappropriate, but also aggressively deceptive...Lehman was also including in its liquidity pool non-central bank eligible CLOs and CDOs. And they had the audacity to mark these CLOs and CDOs at 100 (par) for purposes of the liquidity pool, even though JPMorgan's third-party pricing vendor marked them at 50--60...

Anatomy; contempt; economic; important; Lehman's failure; liquidity requirements.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-07-19 17:00 EDT

Satyajit Das Examines Eurozone Stability Fund Three Card Monte

...Central banks and governments have developed an alarming fondness for the very sort of fancy financial structures that investment banks used to camouflage and transfer risk and engage in regulatory arbitrage prior to the crisis...The Eurozone has taken this affinity for financial structuring legerdemain even further, drawing on the most abused structure of the crisis, collateralized debt obligations, to create (as before) super duper AAA credits from less promising material...Das has exposed one major source of vulnerability, that of the impact of ratings downgrades. Auerback points out another: a revolt by workers in the Austerian nations, who will recognized, intuitively, perhaps explicitly, that the sacrifices demanded of them are a transfer to bankers in other countries...

card monte; naked capitalism; Satyajit Das Examines Eurozone Stability Fund.

Wed 2010-06-09 18:56 EDT

Rajiv Sethi: The New Market Makers

...the SEC's preliminary report on the flash crash...led me to believe that most of this activity was caused by algorithmic trading strategies placing directional bets based on rapid responses to incoming market data. Two strategies in particular -- momentum ignition and order anticipation -- were explicitly mentioned as potentially destabilizing forces in the SEC's January Concept Release on Equity Market Structure. The SEC invited comments on the release, and dozens of these have been posted to date. There is one in particular, submitted by R.T. Leuchtkafer about three weeks before the crash, that I think is especially informative and analytically compelling...Leuchtkafer traces the history of recent changes in market microstructure and examines the resulting implications for the timing of liquidity demand and supply...The standard argument against increased regulation of the new market makers is that it would interfere with their ability to supply liquidity. Leuchtkafer argues, instead, that the strategies used by these firms cause them to demand liquidity at precisely those moments when liquidity is shortest supply...

New Market Makers; Rajiv Sethi.

The Wall Street Examiner Sat 2010-05-22 19:56 EDT

Imagine There's No Credit Market: Another Look At German Controls

...Thus, when people speak of "rescuing the credit markets" they really mean to say rescuing the liquidity providers who failed to assess lending risks so profoundly they can't make required payments. When people talk of German restrictions killing the credit markets, they really mean killing the middle-men (which may or may not have a deleterious effect on government borrowing). German restrictions on certain types of equity and credit transactions are not aimed at reduced government borrowing. They are aimed at reducing the amount (and means of capture) of profit "earned" by middle-men in the transaction- profits, mind you, as per our model, in the case of government borrowing, come either as a result of the money's original owner getting less interest than a direct deal would generate, the government paying more interest (which only comes from higher tax revenues) than a direct deal would generate, or some combination thereof. ...liquidity providing actions of "credit market" middle-men has run amok. As per J.S. Mill, that credit markets are exerting a distinct and independent influence of their own means they are out of order. With increasing frequency, credit is mispriced or unwisely extended and liquidity, the raison d'être of these people, dries up when it is needed most. Yet the middle-men who fail in their tasks expect to be rescued from their failures, and given even more ways to profit from lending other people's money, while the pool of available savings shrinks. ...In one sense I'm quite happy about all of the financial sector bail-outs governments have provided these credit-market middle-men. Before the bail-outs, one had to argue that finance was like a tax on monetary exchange, now this point is clear, finance is, in fact, a tax- and a growing one at that.

credit markets; German-Controlled; imagine; looking; s; Wall Street Examiner.

The Wall Street Examiner Sat 2010-05-22 19:50 EDT

Merkel Does Mahathir and Martin Luther: Tilting the Market Table

...I'm very interested in Germany's policy shift because it's the first time in decades a mature industrialized nation has protested the allocation of profits decreed by financial orthodoxy. At core, German bans of "naked" (held by those who don't own the securities) shorts, paraphrasing Ms. Merkel- perhaps unsurprisingly the daughter of a Lutheran Minister- stops people profiting from the destruction of their neighbor's house at cost of less liquidity in the restricted markets...500 years ago, the Germans defied orthodoxy and ushered in a revolution which moved the center of Europe from South to North. They are defying orthodoxy again, and I can't wait to see what happens next.

Mahathir; Market Table; Martin Luther; Merkel; tilting; Wall Street Examiner.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-05-20 15:44 EDT

Germany's Short Selling Bans: Prudence, Populism or Bank Protection?

...Now why do the Germans in particular feel a tad nervous? Well, Germany, like the UK and Switzerland, has a banking system so large relative to its economy that it cannot credibly backstop it if it goes seriously off the rails. The problem is more acute in Germany because it does not control its own currency (as it cannot simply throw whatever it takes at the banks and if need be, ``print'' later; by contrast, the risk to the UK and Swiss banking system comes from its banks' foreign currency exposures)...The bailout plan shifted risk from the periphery to the core of Europe, and the core, upon examination, does not look too solid. Prepare yourself for a rough ride.

Banks Protected; Germany's short-selling ban; naked capitalism; population; prudence.

Wed 2010-05-19 13:01 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> The origins of the economic crisis

A good way to understand the origins of the current economic crisis in Australia is to examine the historical behaviour of key macroeconomic aggregates. The previous Federal Government claimed they were responsibly managing the fiscal and monetary parameters and creating a resilient competitive economy. This was a spurious claim they were in fact setting Australia up for crisis. The reality is that the previous government created an economy which was always going to crash badly. The global nature of the crisis has arisen because over the last 2-3 decades most Western governments including the Australian government succumbed to the neo-liberal myth of budget austerity and introduced policies which allowed the destructive dynamics of the capitalist system to create an economic structure that was ultimately unsustainable. Once this instability began to manifest it was only a matter of time before the system imploded -- as we are now seeing...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Economic Crisis; originally.

The Wall Street Examiner Sun 2010-05-09 10:02 EDT

The Minsky Cruise (part 3, Business)

...While non-financial domestic corporate profits have shrunk from a Korean War inspired 11% of GDP to average around 5% of GDP since 1970, the financial sector's profits have been growing...The love affair with finance and disdain for what, during the tech boom, we called the "bricks and mortar" industry- and admittedly a failure, by some in those industries, to accept the transition to maturity- has inspired, for want of a better word, envy in the non-financial sector. While financial sector stocks seem to levitate on their own, non-financial sector stocks, if intent can be inferred from behavior, are believed to require a boost. I suspect the use of options as payment has something to do with this as well...Additionally, the non-financial sector, since the mid-80s has- a true sign of envy- opted to copy finance, by breaking into that field. GE Capital and GMAC Financial are two prominent examples...To paraphrase Nixon, "we're all Ponzis, now."

business; Minsky Cruise; Part 3; Wall Street Examiner.

The Wall Street Examiner Sun 2010-05-09 09:58 EDT

The Minsky Cruise (part 2, Households)

...Now for the Minsky part. The theory above, in layman's terms, argues that over time, when an economy expands without serious contractions, finances will become increasingly risky. Minsky wrote of a shift from hedge finance (when debt, both principal and interest, can be serviced from cash flows) through speculative finance (when debt must be rolled over as only interest payments can be serviced from cash flows) and into Ponzi finance (when cash flows cannot cover interest payments and thus new debt must be added or assets sold). The idea in the Ponzi finance stage is that asset appreciation will compensate for the extra risk...I don't mean to suggest we (collectively) are broke, just that, as Minsky argued (and the data bears out) our balance sheets are increasingly betting on real estate and equity price appreciation with borrowed money...

Household; Minsky Cruise; Part 2; Wall Street Examiner.

The Wall Street Examiner Sun 2010-05-09 09:55 EDT

Taking a Minsky Cruise on the Flow of Funds Datastream (part 1)

...Banks (who are, of course, owned by people, equity liabilities are not included in that data set) have always had a big lien on the country, but that lien has doubled (relative to GDP) since 1980. Households used to be a major source of finance in the country but as their distaste for debt faded along with memories of the depression they started to borrow more than they leant. Then, as restrictions to foreign capital inflows fell (how else to maintain a trade deficit without settling in specie) the Rest of the World became a significant source of funds. In 2001, The RoW overtook US Households as a source of funding and this trend has accelerated. Warren Buffett was wrong, we weren't going to become a sharecropper society, we already were one...

flowing; Funds Datastream; Minsky Cruise; Part 1; take; Wall Street Examiner.

Fri 2010-04-23 19:59 EDT

New York Fed Warehousing Junk Loans On Its Books: Examiner's Report

Ryan Grim

As Lehman Brothers careened toward bankruptcy in 2008, the New York Federal Reserve Bank came to its rescue, sopping up junk loans that the investment bank couldn't sell in the market, according to a report from court-appointed examiner Anton R. Valukas. The New York Fed, under the direction of now-Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, knowingly allowed itself to be used as a "warehouse" for junk loans, the report says, even though Fed guidelines say it can only accept investment grade bonds...

books; examinations s reported; new York Fed Warehousing Junk Loans.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 19:57 EDT

NY Fed Under Geithner Implicated in Lehman Accounting Fraud Allegation

Quite a few observers, including this blogger, have been stunned and frustrated at the refusal to investigate what was almost certain accounting fraud at Lehman. Despite the bankruptcy administrator's effort to blame the gaping hole in Lehman's balance sheet on its disorderly collapse, the idea that the firm, which was by its own accounts solvent, would suddenly spring a roughly $130+ billion hole in its $660 balance sheet, is simply implausible on its face. Indeed, it was such common knowledge in the Lehman flailing about period that Lehman's accounts were sus that Hank Paulson's recent book mentions repeatedly that Lehman's valuations were phony as if it were no big deal. Well, it is folks, as a newly-released examiner's report by Anton Valukas in connection with the Lehman bankruptcy makes clear. The unraveling isn't merely implicating Fuld and his recent succession of CFOs, or its accounting firm, Ernst & Young, as might be expected. It also emerges that the NY Fed, and thus Timothy Geithner, were at a minimum massively derelict in the performance of their duties, and may well be culpable in aiding and abetting Lehman in accounting fraud and Sarbox violations...

Geithner Implicated; Lehman Accounting Fraud Allegation; naked capitalism; NY Fed.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 16:10 EDT

Lehman: Regulators Chose to Deny, Extend and Pretend

The Lehman Examiner's report gives an unintentionally damning portrayal, both of the the structure of financial regulation in the US and how regulators failed to use the powers they had effectively...the authorities recognized Lehman had a large negative net worth. Yet rather than move decisively towards an unwind, they proceeded inertially. They urged Lehman CEO Dick Fuld to find a rescuer (who would invest in that garbage barge, particularly when Andrew Ross Sorkin's account makes clear that Fuld's moves were so obviously desperate and clumsy as to be certain to fail) and also promoted the notion of an LTCM-style ``share the pain'' resolution. Yet with the rest of the industry weak, and the magnitude of hole in Lehman's balance sheet a mystery, these courses of action had low odds of success from the outset (indeed, the ``Lehman weekend'' in which the authorities almost bulldozed through a deal, seemed designed to avoid sober analysis of how bad things were at the failing investment bank)...As much as the SEC did not cover itself with glory in this exercise, its lapses are somewhat comprehensible. By contrast, the Fed's are much harder to explain or excuse. And guess who is about to be given more oversight authority?

denied; extends; Lehman; naked capitalism; Pretends; Regulators Chose.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-01-29 16:22 EST

Fed Secrecy Claims Bogus, Redacted AIG Bailout Details Already Public

...The SEC agreed to let AIG keep Maiden Lane III information secret until 2018, since it ``qualifies as confidential commercial or financial information.'' ...this argument is worthless. Nearly all of the deleted information can be reassembled from sources that are publicly available...An examination of our data raises troubling questions about how the Fed is valuing the Maiden Lane III assets.

Fed Secrecy Claims Bogus; naked capitalism; public; Redacted AIG Bailout Details.

naked capitalism Wed 2010-01-13 11:54 EST

William Black'' ``Anti-Regulators: The Federal Reserve's War Against Effective Regulation''

...This essay focuses on Chairman Bernanke recent appointment of Dr. Parkinson to lead the Fed's examination and supervision. My central point is that Dr. Bernanke appointed Dr. Parkinson because he shared Dr. Bernanke's anti-regulatory ideology and has never changed those views, even in the face of the Great Recession. The anti-regulator policies that Bernanke and Parkinson championed were the principal drivers of the fraud epidemic that have produced recurrent, intensifying crises...First, Dr. Parkinson was a leading proponent of the obscene (and successful) effort to prevent Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chair Brooksley Born from taking regulatory action to prevent destructive credit default swaps (CDS). Second, Dr. Parkinson, like Greenspan and Bernanke, subscribed to the naïve view that fraud was impossible in sophisticated financial markets and that credit rating agencies were reliable. Third, Dr. Parkinson endorsed the international ``competition in regulatory laxity'' that Dr. Bernanke (belatedly) warned has degraded regulation on a global basis...

anti regulators; effectively regulated; Federal Reserve's War; naked capitalism; William Black.

Yahoo! Finance: Tech Ticker Tue 2009-10-27 11:18 EDT

Policymakers in "Denial" About the Banks, Carmen Reinhart Says

In "This Time Is Different," economic professors Kenneth Rogoff (Harvard) and Carmen Reinhart (Maryland) examine eight centuries of financial crises, demonstrating how the credit crunch of 2008 wasn't so unique, after all. That's the good news...Reinhart gives policymakers "low marks" for failing to deal head on with toxic assets. There's "a lot of denial" in the approach to the banks, she says, seeing comparisons to Japan's post-bubble policies of delaying write-downs, which created zombie banks. "I'm not seeing a great deal of learning,"

bank; Carmen Reinhart Says; denial; finance; policymaking; Tech Ticker; Yahoo.

The Guardian World News Mon 2009-10-12 10:04 EDT

Kaupthing chief named as suspect

Iceland's most controversial banker, Sigurdur Einarsson, the former executive chairman of failed bank Kaupthing, has been made an official suspect by fraud prosecutors examining alleged market manipulation relating to an investment in the bank by Qatari royal Sheikh Mohammed Bin Khalifa al-Thani weeks before its collapse a year ago.

Guardian World News; Kaupthing chief named; Suspected.

The Wall Street Examiner Tue 2009-10-06 09:27 EDT

From Black Scholes to Black Holes (part 4- Finance)

...the problems associated with mortgage finance pale in comparison to those associated with derivatives. Warren Buffett famously called these securities financial weapons of mass destruction, but I think he understated the problem. These securities are far worse- a Ponzi scheme even Carlo wouldn't have dreamed of. We can choose to fire a WMD, but these securities have taken on a life of their own and they will, in my view, drag everything financially tied to them into oblivion- into a black hole...In the end the remaining banks will merge into one and money, instead of light, would never be able to escape as the fallacy of netting benefits- the assumption that they are all similarly valued- is exposed.

Black Holes; Black Scholes; finance; Part 4; Wall Street Examiner.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

Fri 2009-01-16 00:00 EST

Disabusing Popular Assumptions | The Wall Street Examiner

Disabusing Popular Assumptions, by Lee Adler | The Wall Street Examiner; ``Once the forces of deflation have been set in motion monetary and fiscal policy are powerless to stop them.''

Disabusing Popular Assumptions; Wall Street Examiner.