Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST

What the PBoC cannot do with its reserves

Michael Pettis

...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.

PBoC cannot; reserves.

zero hedge Mon 2009-12-21 19:54 EST

Cautionary Observations From A Chronological Analysis Of The S&P 500 Balance Sheet

...In essence the entire S&P is one big High Yield credit, and would likely be rated in the B2/B area by the rating agencies (assuming these had any credibility). As such, the cost of debt of the combined S&P if it were a standalone company would be around 7.5-8.5%. That it is currently much lower due to the Fed's intervention in the interest rate market is an aberration: look for cost of debt (and, by implication, overall capital) to spike broadly over the next several years, as normalcy (hopefully) returns. ...Both the return on assets (EBITDA/total assets) and return on equity (EBITDA/Shareholders' Equity) has plunged...companies are scrambling to beef up the asset side of their balance sheets even as debt continues to be a major threat. The problem, however, as this brief exercise has shown, is that incremental assets are of lesser and lesser quality (even assuming no major goodwill impairments in the future), and the actual cash they generate continues eroding.

Cautionary Observations; Chronological Analysis; P 500 Balance Sheet; s; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Thu 2009-10-08 16:47 EDT

Latvia in Crisis; Threatens to Stiff Swedish Banks With Mini-Jubilee

Latvia and to a lesser extent Estonia and Lithuania had a massive and unsustainable current account deficit...Foreign benefactors have just put the choke collar on Latvia. The government was unable to roll over its debt this week...Sweden on Tuesday put pressure on the tiny Baltic nation to fulfill required spending cuts, threatening to withhold payments [from a] euro rescue loan put together by Nordic countries...But Latvia does not appear to be ready to accede to Sweden's demands. The immediate cause for concern is that Latvia will simultaneously devalue its currency and provide a mechanism for its consumers to partially default on mortgages held by foreign banks.

Crisis; Latvia; Mini-Jubilee; naked capitalism; Stiff Swedish Banks; threatens.