dimelab: Michael Pettis Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog at Feed-Adept

Michael Pettis Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

China Financial Markets Wed 2010-09-15 19:28 EDT

What do banking crises have to do with consumption?

For the next several years, as Keynes reminded us in the 1930s, savings is not going to be a virtue for the world economy. It is more likely to be a vice. In order to regain growth the world desperately needs less savings and more private consumption, but I think it is not going to get nearly enough to generate growth. Why? Because in all the major economies the banking systems are largely insolvent, or about to become so, and desperately need to rebuild capital...With all of the major economies facing banking crises, they must clean up the banks by forcing the household sector to pay the bill. This will put downward pressure on household disposable income and wealth for many years...For twenty years Japanese consumption growth has limped along [due to paying for] their banking crisis...Chinese consumption dropped from a very-low 45% of GDP ten years ago to an astonishing 36% last year just as -- no coincidence -- Chinese households were forced to clean up the last banking crisis...

bank crises; China Financial Markets; consumption.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Tue 2010-08-03 12:11 EDT

Should China Dump Dollars for Commodities? What about the "Nuclear Option" of Dumping Treasuries? Can Global Trade Collapse?

Michael Shedlock

Every time there is a little blip by China in its purchasing or holding of US treasuries, hyperinflationists come out of the woodwork ranting about the "Nuclear Option" of China dumping treasuries en masse. Such fears are extremely overblown for several reasons...[Michael Pettis argues] the real problem is exactly the opposite of what most are ranting about: ``The problem facing the US and the world is not that China may stop purchasing US Treasury obligations. The problem is exactly the opposite. The major capital exporting countries -- China, Germany, and Japan -- are desperate to maintain or even increase their net capital exports, which are simply the flip side of their trade surpluses.'' ...If consumers decide to stop buying goods from China there is almost nothing China can do about it...Chinese exporters are already under severe price pressures...pray tell what is stopping a collapse in global trade? Nothing as far as I can see. It all depends on consumer attitudes. Certainly Bernanke and Congress will do their best efforts to get banks to lend and consumers to spend, it is by no means a certainty the Fed will succeed...consumer attitudes towards spending and debt will determine the global trade imbalance math...The result may be a collapse in global trade, not an inflationary event to say the least.

China Dumps dollar; Commodities; dumped Treasury; global trade collapsed; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; nuclear option.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-07-22 10:17 EDT

Do sovereign debt ratios matter?

Michael Pettis

...No aspect of history seems to repeat itself quite as regularly as financial history. The written history of financial crises dates back at least as far back as the reign of Tiberius, when we have very good accounts of Rome's 33 AD real estate crisis...we have only begun the period of sovereign default. The major global adjustments haven't yet taken place and until they do, we won't have seen the full consequences of the global crisis...there is no threshold debt level that indicates a country is in trouble. Many things matter when evaluating a country's creditworthiness...there are at least five important factors in determining the likelihood that a country will be suspend or renegotiate certain types of debt...With inverted debt, the value of liabilities is positively correlated with the value of assets, so that the debt burden and servicing costs decline in good times (when asset prices and earnings rise) and rise in bad times...Inverted debt structures leave a country extremely vulnerable to debt crises...

China Financial Markets; sovereign debt ratios matter.

naked capitalism Tue 2010-04-20 09:18 EDT

Three ways to keep NPLs down, recapitalize banks, and socialize losses all at the same time

Edward Harrison

Michael Pettis is out with another great piece on the likelihood that non-performing loans (NPLs) will rise in China when the present spate of malinvestment comes a-cropper. What caught my eye were his statements about the hidden ways in which government pays for bank recapitalization...

keep NPLs; naked capitalism; Recapitalize Banks; socializing losses; Time; way.

China Financial Markets Tue 2010-04-20 09:17 EDT

Who will pay for China's bad loans?

Michael Pettis

...pessimists are starting to worry about excessive debt levels in China, about which they are very right to worry, and many are predicting a banking or financial collapse, which I think is much less likely. Optimists, on the other hand, are blithely discounting the problem of rising NPLs and insisting that they create little risk to Chinese growth. Their proof? A decade ago China had a huge surge in NPLs, the cleaning up of which was to cost China 40% of GDP and a possible banking collapse, and yet, they claim, nothing bad happened. The doomsayers were wrong, the last banking crisis was easily managed, and Chinese growth surged. But although I think the pessimists are wrong to expect a banking collapse, the optimists are nonetheless very mistaken, largely because they implicitly assumed away the cost of the bank recapitalization. In fact China paid a very high price for its banking crisis. The cost didn't come in the form of a banking collapse but rather in the form of a collapse in consumption growth as households were forced to pay for the enormous cleanup bill...

China Financial Markets; China's bad loans; pay.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-03-04 08:47 EST

Stuck in neutral -- what Japan's rebalancing can teach us

Michael Pettis

...A few days ago I read a good article (``Stuck on Neutral'') about Japan [from] the Economist...about Japan's post-1989 rebalancing, ...discusses why, in spite of every attempt, Japan has not been able supposedly to rebalance the economy and achieve any real growth during the two lost decades after 1990. Private consumption never took off to drive economic growth...After many years of excess investment driving growth, Japan's rebalancing process, which occurred after corporate, bank and government debt levels prevented the investment party from continuing, locked the country into many years of slow growth because it had to grind through years of debt-fueled overinvestment...it doesn't matter what individual policies we take to boost consumption if these polices don't in the aggregate represent a real transfer of income to the household sector, as they did not in Japan...Japan's experience suggests one of the risks China faces...Chinese household consumption will undoubtedly rise as a share of Chinese GDP over the next decade or two, but the process nonetheless can be disappointing for growth. It depends on lots of other moving parts, most importantly perhaps the change in investment and the speed with which income is transferred to households. And the change in investment might depend on debt capacity constraints and the extent of earlier overinvestment.

China Financial Markets; Japan's rebalancing; neutral; stuck; teach.

Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST

What the PBoC cannot do with its reserves

Michael Pettis

...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.

PBoC cannot; reserves.