Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Post Keynesian Perspective Thu 2010-09-30 08:12 EDT

Would Keynes have endorsed Modern Monetary Theory/Neochartalism?

Lord Keynes

...what would Keynes have thought of neochartalism/modern monetary theory (MMT)? MMT developed from Abba Lerner's theory of functional finance, as well as G. F. Knapp's theory of chartalism, as propounded in his book The State Theory of Money...MMT tells us that the government is the monopoly issuer of its own currency. Hence the government is not revenue-constrained. Taxes and bond issues do not finance government spending. No entity with the power to create and destroy money at will requires anyone to ``fund'' its spending. Having said this, one must immediately say that, even though deficits are not ``financially'' constrained in the normal sense, they do face real constraints in the inflation rate, exchange rate, available resources, capacity utilization, labour available (= unemployment level), and external balance...My discussion is based on the fundamental article by David Colander on this subject...``Lerner approached Keynes and asked: `Mr. Keynes, why don't we forget all this business of fiscal policy, public debt and all those things, and have some printing presses.' Keynes, after looking around the room to see that no newspaper reporters could hear, replied: `It's the art of statesmanship to tell lies but they must be plausible lies.' ''...

21st century; endorsed Modern Monetary Theory/Neochartalism; Keynes; Post Keynesian Perspective; social democracy.

billy blog Thu 2010-08-19 16:25 EDT

There is no credit risk for a sovereign government

Bill Mitchell

...UC Berkeley economist Brad DeLong...likes to think of himself alongside Krugman as part of the ``Keynesian'' army against all the neo-liberals. Both are in fact New Keynesians. In that sense, they are not very dissimilar to Mankiw and his gang. Interestingly, they appear to be continually trying to one-up Mankiw as part of some internecine struggle within the American economics academy. But from a Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) perspective, it is hard to tell their various narratives apart...a sovereign government is never revenue constrained because it is the monopoly issuer of the currency. That is a basic starting point in exploring the differences between spending and taxation decisions of a sovereign government and the spending and income-earning decisions/possibilities of the private sector entities (households and firms). The two domains -- government and non-government -- are very different in this respect and any attempt to conflate them as if both are subject to budget constraints is wrong and starts the slippery slide down into the total mispresentation of how the macroeconomics system operates...When a government runs a surplus it is not ``saving'' anything. The surpluses go nowhere! They are just flows that are accounted for and the aggregate demand which is drained by the surpluses is lost in that period forever...DeLong is actually teaching some bastardised course in Political Science here and only allowing the conservative side of the debate to be aired...HSBC economist Steven Major ...[writes in the Financial Times (FT)]...so contrary to what is being peddled each day in the financial press that a medal for bravery should be awarded...

Billy Blog; credit Risk; sovereign Government.

Sat 2010-08-07 20:18 EDT

Wall Street's Big Win | Rolling Stone Politics

Matt Taibbi

...Obama and the Democrats boasted that the bill is the "toughest financial reform since the ones we created in the aftermath of the Great Depression" -- a claim that would maybe be more impressive if Congress had passed any financial reforms since the Great Depression, or at least any that didn't specifically involve radically undoing the Depression-era laws...What it was, ultimately, was a cop-out, a Band-Aid on a severed artery. If it marks the end of anything at all, it represents the end of the best opportunity we had to do something real about the criminal hijacking of America's financial-services industry. During the yearlong legislative battle that forged this bill, Congress took a long, hard look at the shape of the modern American economy -- and then decided that it didn't have the stones to wipe out our country's one --dependably thriving profit center: theft...Dodd-Frank was never going to be a meaningful reform unless these two fateful Clinton-era laws -- commercial banks gambling with taxpayer money, and unregulated derivatives being traded in the dark -- were reversed...Republican and Democratic leaders were working together with industry insiders and deep-pocketed lobbyists to prevent rogue members like Merkley and Levin from effecting real change...Geithner acted almost like a liaison to the financial industry, pushing for Wall Street-friendly changes on everything...Without the Volcker rule and the --Lincoln rule, the final version of finance reform is like treating the opportunistic symptoms of AIDS without taking on the virus itself. In a sense, the failure of Congress to treat the disease is a tacit admission that it has no strategy for our economy going forward that doesn't involve continually inflating and reinflating speculative bubbles...

Rolling Stone political; Wall Street's Big Win.

New Deal 2.0 Fri 2010-07-16 18:50 EDT

Despite Foreign Debts, U.S. Has the Upper Hand

Henry Liu

U.S. public debt as of July 8, 2010 was $ 13.192 trillion against a projected 2010 GDP of $14.743 trillion. As of April 2010, China held $900.2 billion of US Treasuries, surpassing Japan's holding of $795.5 billion. As of 2007, outstanding GSE (Government Sponsored Enterprises like Fanny Mae; Freddy Mac) debt securities (non-mortgage and those backed by mortgages) summed up to $7.37 trillion. Does this mean disaster for the US? ...the U.S., while vulnerable, is not critically over a barrel by massive foreign holdings of U.S. sovereign debt. The reason is because U.S. sovereign debts are all denominated in dollars, a fiat currency that the Federal Reserve can issue at will. The U.S. has no foreign debt in the strict sense of the term. It has domestic debt denominated in its own fiat currency held in large quantities by foreign governments. The U.S. is never in danger of defaulting on its sovereign debt because it can print all the dollars necessary to pay off foreign holders of its debt. There is also no incentive for the foreign holders of U.S. sovereign debt to push for repayment, as that will only cause the U.S. to print more dollars to cause the dollar to fall further in exchange rates... ...trade globalization through cross-border wage arbitrage also pushes down wages in the US and other advanced economies, causing insufficient consumer income to absorb rising global production. This is the main cause of the current financial crises which have made more severe by financial deregulation. But the root cause is global overcapacity due to low wages of workers who cannot afford to buy what they produce. The world economy is plagued with overcapacity as a result. It is not enough to merely focus on job creation. Jobs must pay wages high enough to eliminate overcapacity. Instead of a G20 coordination on fiscal austerity, there needs to be a G20 commitment to raise wages globally. [Henry C.K. Liu]

0; Foreign debt; new dealing 2; U.S.; upper hand.

Fri 2010-07-16 18:09 EDT

A Blistering Ride Through Hell: Key Property Charts to Make Sense of This Week's Housing Numbers and This Year's Financial Crisis - Michael David White -- Seeking Alpha

Michael David White

Housing inventory rising, housing price versus housing inventory may imply dramatic price falls; deleveraging is a myth; mortgage bubble; negative equity; forecasts total fall in property prices about half over, another 20% to go.

Blistering Ride; hell; Key property charts; make sense; Michael David White; Seeking Alpha; Week's Housing Numbers; year's financial crisis.

PressThink Thu 2010-06-24 10:18 EDT

Clowns to the Left of Me, Jokers to the Right: On the Actual Ideology of the American Press

Jay Rosen

That it's easy to describe the ideology of the press is a point on which the left, the right and the profession of journalism converge. I disagree. I think it's tricky. So tricky, I've had to invent my own language for discussing it...political journalists...are skeptical about changing society in any fundamental way...professional journalist...generate authority and respect...flee opprobrium...[by demonstrating] that they are not on anyone's ``team,'' or cheerleading for a known position. This puts a premium on stories that embarrass, disrupt, annoy or counter the preferred narrative...``True believer,'' a term of contempt...narcissistic reactions of both sides prove how mature and professional and detached he is...people with political sense in press treatment will usually be the moderates, mavericks and ``pragmatists,'' a word that in political journalism has almost no content beyond, ``opposite of true believer... ideologically flexible... not a purist.''...journalists try to win the argument not by having better arguments but by standing closer to a reality they get to define as more real than your reality...The Church of the Savvy...The Quest for Innocence...Regression to a Phony Mean...The View from Nowhere...He said, she said journalism...The sphere of deviance...

actual ideological; American press; clowns; jokers; left; PressThink; Right.

Tue 2010-06-01 17:29 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirt of debate ... my reply

Bill Mitchell

...Steve Keen and I agreed to foster a debate about where modern monetary theory sits with his work on debt-deflation. So yesterday his blog carried the following post, which included a 1000-odd word precis written by me describing what I see as the essential characteristics of modern monetary theory. The discussion is on-going on that site and I invite you to follow it if you are interested. Rather than comment on all the comments over on Steve's site, I decided to collate them here (in part) and help develop the understanding that way. That is what follows today... We distinguish the horizontal dimension (which entails all transactions between entities in the non-government sector) from the vertical dimension (which entails all transactions between the government and non-government sector)...A properly specified model will show you emphatically that the horizontal transactions between household, firms, banks and foreigners (which is the domain of circuit theory) have to net to zero even if asset portfolios are changing in composition. For every asset created there will be a corresponding liability created at the same time...you will make errors if there is not an explicit understanding that in an accounting (stock-flow) consistent sense all these transaction will net to zero. In adopting this understanding you might abstract from analysing the vertical transactions that introduced the high-powered money in the first place, but never deny its importance in setting the scene for the horizontal transactions to occur. I think the differences between Steve's models and modern monetary theory are two-fold. First, I do not think that Steve's model is stock-flow consistent across all sectors. By leaving out the government sector (even implicitly) essential insights are lost that would avoid conclusions that do not obey basic and accepted national accounting (and financial accounting) rules. This extends to how we define money. Second, I think Steve uses accounting in a different way to that which is broadly accepted. It might be that for mathematical nicety or otherwise this is the chosen strategy but you cannot then claim that your models are ground in the operational reality of the fiat monetary system we live in. I have no problem with abstract modelling. But modern monetary theory is firmly ground in the operational reality and is totally stock-flow consistent across all sectors. If we used the same definitions and rendered Steve's model stock-flow consistent in the same way as modern monetary theory then Steve's endogenous money circuits would come up with exactly the same results as the horizontal dimensions in modern monetary theory. His results might look a bit different in accounting terms but most of the message he wishes to portray about the dangers of Ponzi stages in the private debt accumulation process would still hold.

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply; spirt.

Sat 2010-05-22 21:31 EDT

It's Hard Being a Bear (Part Six)?Good Alternative Theory? | Steve Keen's Debtwatch

...Chartalism rejects neoclassical economics, as I do. However it takes a very different approach to analyzing the monetary system, putting the emphasis upon government money creation whereas I focus upon private credit creation. It is therefore in one sense a rival approach to the ``Circuitist'' School which I see myself as part of. But it could also be that both groups are right, as in the parable of the blind men and the elephant: we've got hold of the same animal, but since one of us has a leg and the other a trunk, we think we're holding on to vastly different creatures...a leading Chartalist, Professor Bill Mitchell from the University of Newcastle, [writes] a précis of the Chartalist argument...The fundamental principles of modern monetary economics, By Bill Mitchell...The following discussion outlines the macroeconomic principles underpinning modern monetary theory (sometimes referred to as Chartalism)... [MMT principles]

Bear; Good Alternative Theory; hard; part; Steve Keen's Debtwatch.

The Wall Street Examiner Sat 2010-05-22 19:56 EDT

Imagine There's No Credit Market: Another Look At German Controls

...Thus, when people speak of "rescuing the credit markets" they really mean to say rescuing the liquidity providers who failed to assess lending risks so profoundly they can't make required payments. When people talk of German restrictions killing the credit markets, they really mean killing the middle-men (which may or may not have a deleterious effect on government borrowing). German restrictions on certain types of equity and credit transactions are not aimed at reduced government borrowing. They are aimed at reducing the amount (and means of capture) of profit "earned" by middle-men in the transaction- profits, mind you, as per our model, in the case of government borrowing, come either as a result of the money's original owner getting less interest than a direct deal would generate, the government paying more interest (which only comes from higher tax revenues) than a direct deal would generate, or some combination thereof. ...liquidity providing actions of "credit market" middle-men has run amok. As per J.S. Mill, that credit markets are exerting a distinct and independent influence of their own means they are out of order. With increasing frequency, credit is mispriced or unwisely extended and liquidity, the raison d'être of these people, dries up when it is needed most. Yet the middle-men who fail in their tasks expect to be rescued from their failures, and given even more ways to profit from lending other people's money, while the pool of available savings shrinks. ...In one sense I'm quite happy about all of the financial sector bail-outs governments have provided these credit-market middle-men. Before the bail-outs, one had to argue that finance was like a tax on monetary exchange, now this point is clear, finance is, in fact, a tax- and a growing one at that.

credit markets; German-Controlled; imagine; looking; s; Wall Street Examiner.

Sun 2010-05-09 09:18 EDT

Why Do Senators Corker And Dodd Really Think We Need Big Banks? >> The Baseline Scenario

Simon Johnson

On Friday, Senator Bob Corker (R, TN) took to the Senate floor to rebut critics of big banks. His language was not entirely senatorial: ``I hope we'll all come to our senses'', while listing the reasons we need big banks. And Senator Chris Dodd (D, CT) rose to agree that (in Corker's words) reducing the size of our largest banks would be ``cutting our nose off to spite our face'' and that by taking on Wall Street, ``we may be taking on the heartland.'' Unfortunately, all of their arguments in favor of our largest banks remaining at or near (or above) their current scale are completely at odds with the facts (e.g., as documented in our book, 13 Bankers). ...As for why exactly Senators Corker and Dodd really support big banks, it seems increasingly likely that this is all about campaign contributions.

Baseline Scenario; Dodd Really Think; Needs Big Banks; Senator Corker.

Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST

What the PBoC cannot do with its reserves

Michael Pettis

...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.

PBoC cannot; reserves.

zero hedge Tue 2010-01-05 20:24 EST

Guest Post: Apocalypse Not: The Dollar

The apocalyptic flavor of the month is dollar crisis. One should take the possibility seriously. The data does offer reasonable assurance that it won't happen anytime soon. Yes, even in spite of massive (but not unprecedented) fiscal and monetary craziness, a socialist president, a populist legislature, and seething people just itching for the whole outhouse to go up in flames. Why doesn't it make sense that the dollar should be out on its rear while gold or oil and their devotees dance in the street?

Apocalypse; Dollar; Guest Post; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Wed 2009-12-16 12:13 EST

``Values and Rules''

Satyajit Das

Wall Street Revalued: Imperfect Markets and Inept Central Bankers by Andrew Smithers (2009) The Road to Financial Reformation: Warnings, Consequences, Reforms by Henry Kaufman (2009) In a sense, this crisis is about values (the prices paid for many assets) and the rules (regulations governing financial markets). It is also about rules (rigid model based formulations of price) and values (ethics or the lack thereof). These two books provide different perspectives on the issues...

naked capitalism; rules; valued.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Fri 2009-10-23 09:07 EDT

Death of the 'Soul of Capitalism'

Michael Shedlock

Paul Farrell on MarketWatch is writing about the Death of the 'Soul of Capitalism', referring to Jack Bogle, Marc Faber, and Michael Moore. Has capitalism lost its soul? Guys like Bogle and Faber sense it...Virtually everything that failed can be traced back to government intervention into the free markets, especially the creation of the Fed itself.

capitalism; death; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; souls.

zero hedge Mon 2009-10-12 10:10 EDT

Albert Edwards Warns Of Western Authorities' Positioning For Dismal Failure, As US Becomes Japan Redux

Albert Edwards continues doling out common sense; everyone, and the market in particular, continues ignoring it...The post-bubble whiplash in the economic and profits cycle is exactly a replay of Japan?'s experience. They too had seen an extended period of strong and steady growth going into the peak of the bubble. It took many years, repeated painful lapses back into recession, and sharp declines in equity markets before investors fully de-rated valuations low enough to reflect a new new paradigm...To gauge whether the world economy can surprise and escape this balance sheet recession, keep a very close eye on the bank lending numbers.

Albert Edwards Warns; Becomes Japan Redux; dismal failure; positive; Western authorities; Zero Hedge.

The Baseline Scenario Mon 2009-10-12 09:41 EDT

Escape from Punchbowlism

StatsGuy

When the Fed pumps money into the system to prevent deflation, the disincentive to holding cash/reserves is supposed to get money moving and thus restore the savings/investment equilibrium. In a sense, the goal is to decrease the incentive to use money as a store of value and therefore increase its use as a medium of exchange. Unfortunately, many conventional macroeconomists (unlike their brethren in the real-world finance schools) haven't admitted that this monetary stimulus ``leaks'' out of their models (which focus on closed domestic economies without moral hazard). Where does it go?

Baseline Scenario; escape; Punchbowl.

Thu 2009-10-08 17:04 EDT

After subverting bank insolvency, our leaders are now about to make a mess of liquidity

FT.com | Willem Buiter's Maverecon

Unless there is a major change of direction among global economic and financial officialdom, we are at risk of ending up with a world in which liquidity provision is privatised and insolvency risk for banks is socialised. This would be the exact opposite of what makes sense: solvency is (or should be) a private good and liquidity is (or should be) a public good...The authorities should not waste their limited organisational capital to force banks to provide inefficiently the public good of liquidity when confidence and trust are low. They should instead focus on ways of enforcing hard budget constraints on banks - to confront them with the realities of insolvency in a way that separates shareholders, unsecured creditors, boards and managers from their investments while leaving the bank as a functioning organisation capable of continued intermediation.

leaders; liquidity; makes; Mess; subverting bank insolvency.

Bogarty Files Sun 2009-09-20 14:22 EDT

Bogarty Files: The Postmodern Explanation

...Every time there is a gap between what appears to be reality, and what mainstream seems to believe, I get this uneasy feeling. Is it me, I wonder, am I missing something?...I ordered a few books on postmodernism...So now everything is starting to make sense. This is the Obama strategy -- the ``Geithner plan''. While I'm busy studying the balance sheets of the banks, unemployment data etc. they acted, creating a new reality, one without another great depression. Are the banks insolvent? What is insolvency? My definition or Ken Lewis's? There is no universal meaning for insolvent, there is no transcendental signified, just some archaic meaning handed down to us. We don't have to accept it, we can define it anyway we want, especially if another great depression hinges on its meaning...

Bogarty Files; Postmodern Explanation.

Taibblog Sun 2009-09-20 09:51 EDT

Will Obama listen to ex-Fed chief Paul Volcker's warnings?

Matt Taibbi

So former Fed chief Paul Volcker yesterday was spouting off about how nuts it is that certain ``too big to fail'' commercial banks that receive mountains of public money are allowed to run around acting like high-risk hedge funds...This would be meaningful if the Economic Recovery Board that Volcker runs for Obama were actually a chief policymaking center for the president. But the reality is that the Volcker group is a kind of show-pony the Obama administration kept on as a way to give consolation jobs to the more progressive economic advisers who led them through the campaign season, people like University of Chicago professor Austan Goolsbee...Obama did a bit of a bait-and-switch, hiring progressives to run his campaign and jettisoning them once he got into office. I hear about this phenomenon from different corners of the policymaking universe, from health care to defense and intelligence spending. But my sense is that the switch was most violent in the realm of economic policy...

ex-Fed chief Paul Volcker's warnings; Obama listen; Taibblog.

zero hedge Thu 2009-09-03 09:59 EDT

Deep Thoughts From Leucadia

With Leucadia coming boldly from behind the shadows, where Ian Cumming and Joe Steinberg have always enjoyed operating, and joining Buffett in a deal over Capmark's loan-servicing and mortgage business, it makes sense to introduce readers with some of the very original thinking of the Leucadia founders (and very close friends of the mellifluously named Dick Handler). We present their most recent annual investor letter, which frequently is cited as among the best hedge fund (even though they don't like to be seen as one) strategy reading material. downloaded pdf.

Deep Thought; Leucadia; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Thu 2009-09-03 09:59 EDT

Deep Thoughts From Leucadia

With Leucadia coming boldly from behind the shadows, where Ian Cumming and Joe Steinberg have always enjoyed operating, and joining Buffett in a deal over Capmark's loan-servicing and mortgage business, it makes sense to introduce readers with some of the very original thinking of the Leucadia founders (and very close friends of the mellifluously named Dick Handler). We present their most recent annual investor letter, which frequently is cited as among the best hedge fund (even though they don't like to be seen as one) strategy reading material. downloaded pdf.

Deep Thought; Leucadia; Zero Hedge.

Tue 2009-04-21 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: On Traders Behaving Badly and Cognitive Bias

``traders will cheat to maximize their bottom line, which makes sense, since they are screened and incentivized to be the sort that will seek aggressively to extract as much as they can''

cognitive biases; naked capitalism; Traders Behaving Badly.