dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

paradox Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

savings paradox (1).

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-07-29 17:00 EDT

James Montier does MMT

It seems that a lot of analysts have caught onto the MMT framework popularized by the late economist Wynne Godley and made topical in this downturn by Rob Parenteau of the Richebacher Letter...Now, it's James Montier's turn...He concluded: ``There is a danger the proposed fiscal tightening in the eurozone will lead to further deflation and economic collapse. The Spanish government faces what Mr Parenteau calls ``the paradox of public thrift'': the less it borrows, the more it will end up owing. It is unfortunate that it has taken a severe global recession to vindicate Prof Godley's macroeconomic analysis. If economic policymakers start to pay more attention to financial balances, they might forestall the next crisis. European politicians might also understand the potentially dreadful consequences of their new-found frugality.'' ...A downward shift in the government's net fiscal deficit means a downward shift in the private sector's net fiscal surplus -- totally doable except for this little thing called debt in places like Spain, the US, Ireland or the UK. Moreover, the savings rate is already incredibly low in countries like the U.S. and the U.K. If the government tries to pare its fiscal deficit, the result will not be less private sector savings to meet the lower public sector deficit, but rather lower aggregate demand and a larger deficit -- that's the paradox of thrift...

credit writedowns; James Montier; MMT.

zero hedge Sat 2010-05-22 13:41 EDT

Albert Edwards: Europe Is On The Edge Of A Deflationary Precipice That Will, Paradoxically, Usher In 20-30% Inflation

A few days ago we pointed out that the latest Japanese GDP deflator came at multi-decade lows, this despite years of printing, pumping and other -ings. Today, Albert Edwards takes the observation of rampant regional deflation and concludes precisely what we have long claimed, that once rampant deflation is finally acknowledged by central bankers everywhere, and they are now running out for time, their only natural response to preserve the system will be to do what Japan has been doing for decades (successfully, they will claim) and respond with the most extreme round of monetization ever seen, "inevitably driving us towards out ultimate destination - 1970's style 20-30% inflation."...

20 30; Albert Edwards; deflationary precipice; edge; Europe; Inflation; paradox; usher; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Sun 2010-02-28 13:13 EST

Das: Mark to Make Believe -- Still Toxic After All These Years!

n 2007, as the credit crisis commenced, paradoxically, nobody actually defaulted. Outside of sub-prime delinquencies, corporate defaults were at a record low. Instead, investors in high quality (AAA or AA) rated securities, that are unlikely to suffer real losses if held to maturity, faced paper -- mark-to-market (``MtM'') -- losses. In modern financial markets, market values drive asset values, profits and losses, risk calculations and the value of collateral supporting loans. Accounting standards, both in the U.S.A. and internationally, are now based on theoretically sound market values that are problematic in practice. The standards emerged from the past financial crisis where the use of ``historic cost'' accounting meant that losses on loans remained undisclosed because they continued to be carried at face value. The standards also reflect the fact that many modern financial instruments (such as derivatives) can only be accounted for in MtM framework. MtM accounting itself is flawed. There are difficulties in establishing real values of many instruments. It creates volatility in earnings attributable to inefficiencies in markets rather than real changes in financial position...

Das; Make-Believe; marked; naked capitalism; toxic; years.

zero hedge Thu 2009-12-17 10:37 EST

Is Selling US CDS A Risk-Free Way To Short The Dollar?

There has been much conjecture on whether using CDS is an effective way to hedge against US default risk. Many theoreticians, especially those of the post-March lows variety, have sprung up and are speculating that buying Credit Default Swaps on the US is ultimately a futile and pointless endeavor. The main argument: a US default would likely mean that interconnected dealers won't recognize contracts on a US default event, as they themselves will be out of business. Even if they continued to exist, like cockroaches in a postapocalyptic world, the collateral which backs derivatives is mostly US Treasurys: the same obligations that would end up being massively impaired...the US CDS seller syndicate could easily be one of the key sources of dollar short funding: with sellers pocketing euros and immediately going to market and selling dollars...a dollar-short unwind would probably have repercussions in the US CDS market. Not only would the dollar spike, but paradoxically US credit risk would probably widen dramatically...any unwind at the heart of the prevalent risk trade now: the massive dollar carry, would impact virtually every investment product, quite possibly in self-referential feedback loops. If correct, it merely shows how much more the Fed has at stake in keeping the dollar depressed than merely getting mom and pop to buy Amazon at $130/share. Losing control of the carry trade will be the systemic equivalent of allowing Lehman's book to be marked-to-market: a potentially complete collapse in systemic confidence, which would have such far ranging implications as the $300 trillion interest rate derivative market. And when sudden volatility reaches this product universe which is 6 times bigger than world GDP, the events from last year will seem like a dress rehearsal.

CDS; Dollar; Risk-Free Way; sell; short; Zero Hedge.

Fri 2009-04-10 00:00 EDT

article

Keynes' savings paradox, Fisher's debt deflation and the banking crisis, by Paul de Grauwe

article.