dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

CDS Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

10 CDS (2); 45 trillion notional CDS outstanding (1); adequate margin make CDS uneconomic (1); AIG CDs (4); AIG CDS Fiasco (2); AIG CDS Payouts (1); AIG CDS Unwind Goes (1); AMBAC CDS (1); CDS book (1); CDS contract (2); CDS counterparty post adequate margin (1); CDS dealers banks orchestrated (1); CDS debacle looming (4); CDS Explosion (1); CDS market (6); CDS market creates (1); CDS notional amounts increased (1); CDS payouts (2); CDS price (3); CDS seller syndicate (1); CDS serve (1); CDS Settlements (1); CDS speculators win (1); CDS Start (4); CDS trade (3); higher CDS spreads (1); impending CDS blowup (2); Lehman CDS (1); Naked CDS (2); shady banks using CDS insurance deals (1); Uses CDS (3); Uses CDS Fears (1); whether naked CDS trading (1); whether using CDS (1).

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naked capitalism Wed 2010-09-08 17:27 EDT

Economic consequences of speculative side bets -- The case of naked CDS

...We argue that the existence of naked credit default swaps has significant effects on the terms of financing, the likelihood of default, and the size and composition of investment expenditures. And we identify three mechanisms through which these broader consequences of speculative side bets arise: collateral effects, rollover risk, and project choice...the existence of zero-sum side bets on default has major economic repercussions. These contracts induce investors who are optimistic about the future revenues of borrowers, and would therefore be natural purchasers of debt, to sell credit protection instead. This diverts their capital away from potential borrowers and channels it into collateral to support speculative positions. As a consequence, the marginal bond buyer is less optimistic about the borrower's prospects, and demands a higher interest rate in order to lend. This can result in an increased likelihood of default, and the emergence of self-fulfilling paths in which firms are unable to rollover their debt, even when such trajectories would not arise in the absence of credit derivatives. And it can influence the project choices of firms, leading not only to lower levels of investment overall but also in some cases to the selection of riskier ventures with lower expected returns...

Case; economic consequences; naked capitalism; Naked CDS; speculative side bets.

naked capitalism Tue 2010-08-17 12:40 EDT

Guest Post: Why Clearninghouses Are a Maginot Line Against Systemic Risk

As discussed in ECONNED and on this blog, clearinghouses are not a solution to the systemic risk posed by credit default swaps, since there is no way to have a CDS counterparty post adequate margin and have the product be viable (to put it more simply, adequate margin make CDS uneconomic). ..I am one of the few people around who knows something about the clearing business and theory and is not employed by an investment bank or clearinghouse. At the end of my career on Wall Street, I was hired to perform a financial autopsy of the special purpose derivatives clearinghouse set up by California as part of an innovative power market structure. It had failed in the state's power crisis of 2001-02. Observing the tremendous systemic risk generated by using conventional clearing techniques for all but straightforward derivatives, I embarked on a seven year quest. I formed a company that designed a mathematical, IT and legal structure to provide a transparent and orderly system to manage the risks of those derivatives which shouldn't be cleared conventionally. Imagine my surprise when the banks decided against using the system...

Clearninghouses; Guest Post; Maginot Line; naked capitalism; systemic risk.

Rajiv Sethi Tue 2010-06-15 14:25 EDT

Defenders and Demonizers of Credit Default Swaps

The recent difficulties faced by Greece (and some other eurozone states) in rolling over their national debt has let some to blame hedge fund involvement in the market for credit default swaps...Leaving aside the question of whether naked CDS trading has been good or bad for Greece, it is worth asking whether there exist mechanisms through which such contracts can ever have destabilizing effects. I believe that they can, for reasons that Salmon and Jones would do well to consider...such contracts allow pessimists to leverage (much more so than they could if they were to short bonds instead). The resulting increase in the cost of borrowing, which will rise in tandem with higher CDS spreads, can make the difference between solvency and insolvency. And recognition of this process can tempt those who are not otherwise pessimistic to bet on default, as long as they are confident that enough of their peers will also do so. This clearly creates an incentive for coordinated manipulation...

Credit Default Swap; defending; demonic; Rajiv Sethi.

Wed 2010-06-09 18:45 EDT

London business figures embroiled in Kaupthing fraud investigation: Serious Fraud Office team thought to be to be scrutinising Deutsche Bank's role in alleged suspect trades| Business | The Guardian

A Serious Fraud Office investigation into Kaupthing, the failed Icelandic bank, is understood to be pursuing a number of allegations of market manipulation involving investment vehicles controlled by some of the bank's largest clients, including several high profile UK business leaders. It is alleged that in the weeks and months before Iceland's financial system went into meltdown, certain trades improperly used at least €500m (£413m) of Kaupthing funds in an effort to manipulate credit derivatives. Bank bosses hoped this would restore crumbling confidence in Kaupthing's solvency in the months before the bank collapsed in October 2008...The effect was for investment vehicles -- financed by Kaupthing loans, and at least nominally controlled by some of the bank's largest clients -- to take on risk associated with the bank going bust. Kaupthing loans were being use to write insurance against Kaupthing bonds defaulting...Iceland's Truth Commission obtained details of emails sent by Deutsche Bank staff to Kaupthing which, according to its report, demonstrated that the German bank had been offering advice on how to influence the CDS price on Kaupthing bonds from early 2008...

alleged suspect trades; business; Guardian; Kaupthing fraud investigation; London business figures embroiled; scrutinising Deutsche Bank's role; Serious Fraud Office team thought.

THE PRAGMATIC CAPITALIST Wed 2010-04-07 18:22 EDT

THE ENRON BANKING SYSTEM

``Panics do not destroy capital -- they merely reveal the extent to which it has previously been destroyed by its betrayal in hopelessly unproductive works'' -- John Mills ...We should draw a distinct line in the sand between banks and diverse risk taking firms. There are always going to be Enron's in the economy, but why should we allow our entire banking sector to mirror Enron? Taking a 30,000 foot risk management view I say something must be done to ensure these banks can never do this again. Turn banks into true banks. Hedging and exotic business models are fine. Just don't commingle them under the same umbrella as a deposit taking ``bank''. With that, a few ideas come to mind: * Our banking system should be aligned with the goals of the nation to help ``grease'' the wheels of the economic growth engine of the United States. Banks should be more like utilities and less like hedge funds. Otherwise, banking becomes counter-productive and potentially destructive. * Banks should not be allowed to exact onerous fees on the public or enact a business model which is inherently dependent on driving their customers deeper and deeper into debt. This undermines the entire goal of productive economic growth. * ``Banks'' should be true lending institutions. Non-traditional banking operations and products such as CDS, ``off balance sheet'' finance, derivatives as collateral and such would be deemed illegal unless performed only by non banking/lending institutions (such as hedge funds) so as to insulate the public and true lending institutions from the risk taking, ``hedging'', and ``financial innovation'' of firms such as Lehman Brothers.

ENRON BANKING SYSTEM; pragmatic capitalists.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2010-04-01 11:50 EDT

Brown's Bottom Is an Enormous Issue In the UK: Was This a Bailout of the Multinational Bullion Banks Involving the NY Fed?

The bottom referred to, of course, is the bottom of the gold price, and the sale of approximately 400 tonnes of the UK's gold at the bottom of the market...There is also a credible speculation that the sale was designed to benefit a few of the London based bullion banks which were heavily short the precious metals, and were looking for a push down in price and a boost in supply to cover their positions and avoid a default. The unlikely names mentioned were AIG, which was trading heavily in precious metals, and the House of Rothschild. The terms of the bailout was that once their positions were covered, they were to leave the LBMA, the largest physical bullion market in the world...long before AIG crafted its enormous positions in CDS with the likes of Goldman Sachs, requiring a bailout by young Tim and the NY Fed, it was engaging in massive short positions in the metals markets, especially silver, and may have required a bailout by England to preserve the integrity of the LBMA....the gold sale provided a front-running opportunity for that most rapaciously well-connected of Wall Street Banks, Goldman Sachs.

Bailout; Brown s bottom; Enormous Issue; Jesse's Café Américain; Multinational Bullion Banks Involving; NY Fed; UK.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2010-03-09 17:42 EST

Are Traders Demanding US Credit Default Swaps Payable in Gold?

...I have a great deal of respect and admiration for Janet Tavakoli and her knowledge in this area. If she is seeing a new demand for Credit Default Swaps on the US payable in gold I would credit it since this is her area of expertise and industry connections...if the existence of CDS on the default or downgrade of US sovereign debt payable in gold bullion be true, who would be in a position to stand behind these Credit Default Swaps with any reliability, and what buyer would be in a position to make such a demand of a credible source?

Credit Default Swaps Payable; gold; Jesse's Café Américain; Traders Demand.

The Money Game Tue 2010-03-09 17:38 EST

Speculators Bid Up AMBAC CDS, As Fears Of A Municipal Default Wave Proliferate

Here's the latest from DebtWire: The CDS market is signaling increased fears that Ambac operating company Ambac Assurance will enter receivership within the year as fear of a municipal bond crisis spreads...

AMBAC CDS; fears; Money game; Municipal Default Wave Proliferate; Speculative bid.

naked capitalism Wed 2010-01-13 11:54 EST

William Black'' ``Anti-Regulators: The Federal Reserve's War Against Effective Regulation''

...This essay focuses on Chairman Bernanke recent appointment of Dr. Parkinson to lead the Fed's examination and supervision. My central point is that Dr. Bernanke appointed Dr. Parkinson because he shared Dr. Bernanke's anti-regulatory ideology and has never changed those views, even in the face of the Great Recession. The anti-regulator policies that Bernanke and Parkinson championed were the principal drivers of the fraud epidemic that have produced recurrent, intensifying crises...First, Dr. Parkinson was a leading proponent of the obscene (and successful) effort to prevent Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chair Brooksley Born from taking regulatory action to prevent destructive credit default swaps (CDS). Second, Dr. Parkinson, like Greenspan and Bernanke, subscribed to the naïve view that fraud was impossible in sophisticated financial markets and that credit rating agencies were reliable. Third, Dr. Parkinson endorsed the international ``competition in regulatory laxity'' that Dr. Bernanke (belatedly) warned has degraded regulation on a global basis...

anti regulators; effectively regulated; Federal Reserve's War; naked capitalism; William Black.

Culture of Life News Mon 2010-01-04 16:52 EST

The Horrors Of The Carbon Trade Derivatives Beast

There are many ways of fixing things. Using the right tools is important. The international bankers have chosen a very nasty tool for fixing both global warming and dealing with the Hubbert Oil Peak: wild derivative futures markets modeled on the goofy OTC --CDS market! The thing that just destroyed international banking. We mustn't forget that the reason we had a banking meltdown was due to the sudden climb in energy prices beginning with the invasion of Iraq.

Carbon Trade Derivatives Beast; Culture; horror; Life News.

zero hedge Thu 2009-12-17 10:37 EST

Is Selling US CDS A Risk-Free Way To Short The Dollar?

There has been much conjecture on whether using CDS is an effective way to hedge against US default risk. Many theoreticians, especially those of the post-March lows variety, have sprung up and are speculating that buying Credit Default Swaps on the US is ultimately a futile and pointless endeavor. The main argument: a US default would likely mean that interconnected dealers won't recognize contracts on a US default event, as they themselves will be out of business. Even if they continued to exist, like cockroaches in a postapocalyptic world, the collateral which backs derivatives is mostly US Treasurys: the same obligations that would end up being massively impaired...the US CDS seller syndicate could easily be one of the key sources of dollar short funding: with sellers pocketing euros and immediately going to market and selling dollars...a dollar-short unwind would probably have repercussions in the US CDS market. Not only would the dollar spike, but paradoxically US credit risk would probably widen dramatically...any unwind at the heart of the prevalent risk trade now: the massive dollar carry, would impact virtually every investment product, quite possibly in self-referential feedback loops. If correct, it merely shows how much more the Fed has at stake in keeping the dollar depressed than merely getting mom and pop to buy Amazon at $130/share. Losing control of the carry trade will be the systemic equivalent of allowing Lehman's book to be marked-to-market: a potentially complete collapse in systemic confidence, which would have such far ranging implications as the $300 trillion interest rate derivative market. And when sudden volatility reaches this product universe which is 6 times bigger than world GDP, the events from last year will seem like a dress rehearsal.

CDS; Dollar; Risk-Free Way; sell; short; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-12-08 18:26 EST

Guest Post: Woman Who Invented Credit Default Swaps [Blythe Masters] is One of the Key Architects of Carbon Derivatives, Which Would Be at the Very CENTER of Cap and Trade

...If the government allows massive carbon derivatives trading with as little oversight as over the CDS market, taxpayers will end up spending many trillions bailing out the giant banks and propping up the economy when the carbon market bubble bursts...(1) the giant banks will make a killing on carbon trading, (2) while the leading scientist crusading against global warming says it won't work, and (3) there is a very high probability of massive fraud and insider trading in the carbon trading markets.

Blythe Masters; capped; carbon derivatives; center; Guest Post; invented credit default swaps; key architect; naked capitalism; trading; Woman.

naked capitalism Fri 2009-11-20 09:42 EST

Einhorn: First, Let's Kill All the Credit Default Swaps

David Einhorn, who enjoys his considerable reputation for hard-fought battles against firms with shaky finances and dubious accounting (Alliance Capital and Lehman), has taken aim at a new and equally deserving target: credit default swaps...CDS are a means of extortion...CDS speculators win if companies die...a credit default swaps clearinghouse is not a viable solution...CDS serve the interests of the financial sector at the expense of the real economy...

Credit Default Swap; Einhorn; Let's Kill; naked capitalism.

naked capitalism Thu 2009-11-19 19:32 EST

Very Abbreviated Takedown on SIGTARP Report on AIG CDS Payouts

Dear sports fans, your humble blogger, along with a ton of others, got the not-very-embargoed copy of the SIGTARP report on the New York Fed's conduct with respect to its full payout on AIG's credit default swaps to its counterparties. The press is treating the report as if it was tough. I was sputtering with anger when reading it on how soft it was on the Fed. The positioning and framing of the issues was almost without exception far too forgiving. It read as if the findings had been negotiated with the Fed (and SIGTARP lost the negotiations as the ``shape of the table'' stage), but I am assured not, not by SIGTARP, but by those, as they like to say, in a position to know. That says SIGTARP is almost as badly cognitively captured as the Fed is...

Abbreviated Takedown; AIG CDS Payouts; naked capitalism; SIGTARP report.

naked capitalism Thu 2009-11-19 10:41 EST

Fed Authorized 100% Payout by AIG on CDS

It had generally been assumed that the AIG payouts of 100% on credit swaps (when the insurer was under water and bankrupt companies do not satisfy their obligations in full) was the result of some gap in oversight plus traders at AIG exercising discretion (they were unhappy about bonus rows and had reason to curry favor with dealers, who were potential employers). The article makes clear that AIG had been negotiating to settle on the swaps prior to getting aid from the government, and was seeking a 40% discount. The Fed might not have gotten that much of a discount, but there was clearly no need to pay out at par. This massive backdoor subsidy to the likes of Goldman, DeutscheBank was authorized by Geithner while he was at the New York Fed.

AIG; CDS; Fed Authorized 100; naked capitalism; payout.

zero hedge Fri 2009-10-23 09:05 EDT

Fitch Expects CMBS Loss Severity To Rise Markedly Next Year

As anyone who has spent even a day looking at securitization tranching or CDS trading will tell you, there are two critical components to any investment that involves risky fixed income: cumulative loss probability and loss severity...artificial delays in bringing the CRE market to fair value in terms of delinquencies and REOs going to foreclosures will simply result in much lower eventual recoveries...the temporary reprieves granted to many leveraged securities will come back to bite investors when defaults eventually pick up again, however with the result being loss rates which will be much higher than default expectations.

Fitch Expects CMBS Loss Severity; Rise Markedly; years; Zero Hedge.

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