dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

short Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

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naked capitalism Thu 2010-09-30 08:22 EDT

Why Backstopping Repo is a Bad Idea

The normally sound Gillian Tett of the Financial Times endorses an idea that is both dangerous and unnecessary, namely, government backstopping of the system of short-term collateralized lending called repo, for ``sale with agreement to repurchase.''...But the real problem is that the only securities that were once considered to be suitable were those of the very highest quality, namely Treasuries. The real problem is in widening the market beyond that. If you have absolutely impeccable collateral, you don't care if your counterparty goes belly up if you aren't at risk of losses on the assets you hold...the real problem is the use of low quality collateral...why would we possibly WANT a system that might down the road encourage the pledging of less than stellar instruments as repo?...we need to go back and look hard at why the need for repo has risen since 2001, and how much is related to legitimate activity. The fact that it grew much more rapidly than the economy overall suggests not...official efforts should proceed...to shrink the repo market (as we've recommended for a market that has contributed to the growth of repo, credit default swaps)...our efforts NOT to restrain banks leads to a tremendous tax on all of us...a banking industry that creates global crises is negative value added from a societal standpoint. It is purely extractive...

Backstopping Repo; Bad Ideas; naked capitalism.

billy blog Wed 2010-09-29 10:15 EDT

Budget deficits do not cause higher interest rates

...An often-cited paper outlining the ways in which budget deficits allegedly push up interest rates is -- Government Debt -- by Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998 -- subsequently published in a book in 1999). This paper was somewhat influential in perpetuating the mainstream myths about government debt and interest rates...Their depiction of...Ricardian equivalence...alleges that: ``the choice between debt and tax finance of government expenditure is irrelevant...[because]...a budget deficit today...[requires]...higher taxes in the future...'' ...I have dealt with this view extensively...Ignoring the fact that the description of a government raising taxes to pay back a deficit is nonsensical when applied to a fiat currency issuing government, the Ricardian Equivalence models rest [on] several key and extreme assumptions about behaviour and knowledge. Should any of these assumptions fail to hold (at any point in time), then the predictions of the models are meaningless. The other point is that the models have failed badly to predict or explain key policy changes in the past. That is no surprise given the assumptions they make about human behaviour. There are no Ricardian economies. It was always an intellectual ploy without any credibility to bolster the anti-government case that was being fought then (late 1970s, early 1980s) just as hard as it is being fought now...So where do the mainstream economists go wrong? At the heart of this conception is the [pre-Keynesian] theory of loanable funds...where perfectly flexible prices delivered self-adjusting, market-clearing aggregate markets at all times...Mankiw claims that this ``market works much like other markets in the economy''...[assuming] that savings are finite and the government spending is financially constrained which means it has to seek ``funding'' in order to progress their fiscal plans. The result competition for the ``finite'' saving pool drives interest rates up and damages private spending. This is what is taught under the heading ``financial crowding out''...Virtually none of the assumptions that underpin the key mainstream models relating to the conduct of government and the monetary system hold in the real world...When confronted with increasing empirical failures, the mainstream economists introduce these ad hoc amendments to the specifications to make them more realistic...The Australian Treasury Paper [used advanced econometric analysis to find that] domestic budget deficits do not drive up interest rates. The long-run effect...is virtually zero. The short-run effect is zero!...toss out your Mankiw textbooks...

Billy Blog; budgets deficit; caused higher Interest rate.

Thu 2010-09-23 09:33 EDT

Bob Rubin Just Wants to Be Cuddled

[2010-04-29]...It's October 2007. I've just finished my morning jog on beautiful, sun-drenched Miami Beach and I'm getting a smoothie and a pastry at my usual place, Epicure Market. The subprime mortgage crisis is heading into full-swing mode; Jim Cramer had just done his crazy thing on TV, and you can feel the sky starting to fall all around you -- and that's a literal thing in Miami, where the cranes stopped on a lot of half-finished skyscrapers, the type where a few years back you'd hear about people flipping condos three times before the project even broke ground. (If there's ever a time that I don't regret leaving finance, it's now.) Anyway, I'm in line for the checkout, and a very familiar looking guy gets in line behind me. It's one of those situations where I'm not sure if I eyed him or he eyed me first, but I noticed him shortly when I turned to the left to swipe my debit card. He was standing right behind me in the checkout line - only a few feet away. He looked very familiar and famous, and while that's no rarity in Miami, it is when you realize it's because the guy looks like the former Treasury Secretary -- but maybe no, he's maybe not tall enough? -- and then somehow you finally just blurt out, "Hey, you look just like Bob Rubin!"...

Bob Rubin Just Wants; cuddling.

PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM Mon 2010-09-20 09:57 EDT

WHITHER CHINA?

In all likelihood, China has entered the most critical and taxing period since the country was reopened to the outside world in the 1970s. Domestically, there are a slew of issues, any one of which could create instability...Few can know the full story of what goes on within the State Council, but there appears to be a battle royal being fought over the real estate sector. There are those within the leadership who are concerned that average home prices have gotten too high for most first-time buyers (see our previous visit report). They want to see average prices fall by 10-20% across the country. Against this group are not just real estate developers but local governments and many others within Beijing...In effect, what is being seen is a battle between central and local governments. In our view, this is a fight that central government cannot afford to lose...against a background of cheap money and plenty of credit, house prices across the country have become unaffordable to most first-time buyers...if these price developments continued unchecked the leadership would risk encountering social instability...we doubt there will be any easing of policy until average house prices fall into the 10-20% range. China is transiting into a very difficult period as focus shifts towards sustainable domestic growth and away from short-term measures to defend the 8% GDP mantra. This transition is occurring when the existing leadership is preparing to give way to the new set in 2012, when social stability could be threatened if there are policy mistakes...

China; PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM.

PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM Thu 2010-09-16 16:15 EDT

CREDIT SUISSE: 6 BULLISH FACTS ABOUT HOUSING

Here's a contrarian view for you. Credit Suisse says the fears about housing are well overdone. In their analysis they cite 6 different bullish factors that should help to bolster house prices in the USA...The government now owns or guarantees about 70% of US mortgage debt...Valuation is extremely cheap on all measures...Delinquency ratios, charge-off and foreclosure rates seem to have peaked...Housing starts are about 1m below trend demand of housing units -- based on household formation and replacement demand... * Distressed sales (short-sales, foreclosures and REO sales) are less than a third of the total, after peaking at almost half in 2009...Housing as a proportion of GDP is now just 2.2%, compared with a long-run average of 4.5%...

6 BULLISH FACTS; Credit Suisse; Housing; PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM.

Mon 2010-08-23 11:11 EDT

Hussman Funds - Valuing Foreign Currencies: Currency is both a means of payment and a store of value. [2000-09-22]

Any currency is both a means of payment and a store of value. So when you try to determine what it's worth, you have to consider both what it can buy in terms of goods, and what it can earn if you hold it as an asset. An exchange rate is just the price of a currency...If you look at a currency as a means of exchange...you can get a reasonable idea of the "long term" tendency of the currency by tracking the movements of price indices in two countries. This is what traders refer to as the "Purchasing Power Parity" (PPP) value of the exchange rate...But PPP is only a tendency that holds loosely over the long term. Over the short term, there's another important factor: interest rates...anytime long term interest rates, after inflation (i.e. real interest rates) are expected to be higher in the foreign country than in the U.S., the foreign currency will be above PPP...

2000-09-22; currency; Hussman Funds; meaning; payment; store; valued; Valuing Foreign Currencies.

Tue 2010-08-03 14:34 EDT

Rajiv Sethi: The Economics of Hyman Minsky [2009-12-03]

There has been a resurgence of interest in the economic writings of Hyman Minsky over the past few years, and for good reason...Minsky's theoretical framework combines a cash-flow approach to investment with a theory of financial instability...expectations of financial tranquility are self-falsifying. Stability, as Minsky liked to put it, is itself destabilizing...An essential feature of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is that a long period of sustained stability gives rise to changes in financial practices which are not conducive to the persistence of stable growth...A sustained period of stability gives rise to optimistic expectations and a rise in speculative financing...if a large number of investments which are prompted by the availability of speculative finance are found to be inept, so that immediate cash flows are significantly lower than expected, then the need for short-term refinancing becomes acute while at the same time banks are less willing to roll over existing debt. A sharp rise in short-term interest rates occurs which can lead to present value reversals, a rush towards liquidity, a plunge in the prices of illiquid assets, both real and financial, and a corresponding drop in new investments...described as a credit crunch, a state of financial distress, or a financial crisis...

2009-12-03; economic; Hyman Minsky; Rajiv Sethi.

Dr. Housing Bubble Blog Fri 2010-07-30 15:22 EDT

Banks cherry picking individual foreclosures that show up on the MLS in Culver City and Pasadena with proof: Southern California lenders pushing out properties in Culver City with an average price tag of $300,000. Median sale price for city is $600,000. Shadow inventory average price is $443,000 with loans at an average of $552,000. 141,000 homes in Southern California are distressed yet MLS only reflects 83,000 total properties.

...Prices even today are disconnected from market fundamentals. Inventory is still growing and the shadow inventory figures remain elevated...The bulk of properties are sitting hidden in bank balance sheets and are part of the shadow inventory...For Pasadena, for every one listed foreclosure or short sale, you can be assured that there are 5 other properties sitting in the depths of a bank balance sheet. Keep in mind this is for a highly desirable area...the numbers look nearly the same in Culver City. For every one distressed property on the MLS, you have 5 others hidden in some bank balance sheet. Now when I look at this data what I see is a façade in Southern California real estate...Banks are basically trying to avoid facing the music and realizing the reality that these properties are overpriced (people can't even keep up with their payments). Does any of this data look like a healthy market?

000; 000 home; 000 total properties; 141; 300; 443; 552; 600; Average; average price tag; Banks cherry picking individual foreclosures; Citi; Culver city; distressed; Dr. Housing Bubble Blog; Loans; median sales price; MLS; Pasadena; proof; property; reflects 83; Shadow inventory average price; showed; Southern California; Southern California lenders pushing.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-07-19 17:07 EDT

Is the SEC Settlement Really a Win for Goldman?

...Conventional wisdom in the financial media is that the settlement announced by the SEC over its lawsuit on a Goldman 2007 Abacus CDO is a home run for Goldman. But a closer reading suggests that Goldman's victory is qualified, and the enthusiastic press response is in large measure due to the firm's skillful manipulation of perceptions...it is hard to see how anything in the settlement, if affirmed, would be negative for private parties considering lawsuits against sellers of CDOs...we imagine potential CDO investors will be mightily encouraged that Goldman ended up returning the full amount of investment to the one true third party investor in the deal -- IKB...An investor considering bringing an action against a bank that sold them a CDO that failed (meaning virtually all 2006 and 2007 ``mezzanine'' CDOs) would probably be encouraged that a bank was required to pay such a large amount for making inaccurate statements about the true nature of the CDO...Plaintiffs who sue CDO sellers have good reason to be optimistic...The settlement thus tarnishes the popular myth that the subprime shorts were insightful outsiders who executed ``the greatest trade ever''...the SEC has demonstrated that investors in such a CDO can win a recovery as a result of such inaccurate statements.

Goldman; naked capitalism; SEC Settlement Really; Wins.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-07-16 16:31 EDT

Debunking Michael Lewis' Subprime Short Hagiography

Lewis' tale is neat, plausible to a mass market audience fed a steady diet of subprime markets stupidity and greed, and incomplete in critical ways that render his account fundamentally misleading...The Big Short focuses on four clusters of subprime short sellers, all early to figure out this ``greatest trade ever'' and thus supposedly deserving of star treatment...The anchor is Steve Eisman...Lewis completely ignores the most vital player, the one who was on the other side of the subprime short bets...Who really was on the other side of the shorts' trades is the important question... ...these are the international equivalent of widows and orphans...Eisman is no noble outsider. He is a willing, knowing co-conspirator. Even worse, he and the other shorts Lewis lionizes didn't simply set off the global debt conflagration, they made the severity of the crisis vastly worse. So it wasn't just that these speculators were harmful, and Lewis gave them a free pass. He failed to clue in his readers that the actions of his chosen heroes drove the demand for the worst sort of mortgages and turned what would otherwise have been a ``contained'' problem into a systemic crisis. The subprime market would have died a much earlier, much less costly death absent the actions of the men Lewis celebrates. They didn't simply keep the market going well past its sell-by date, they were the moving force behind otherwise inexplicable, superheated demand for the very worst sort of mortgages...

Debunking Michael Lewis; naked capitalism; Subprime Short Hagiography.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-07-16 16:15 EDT

What is Simon Johnson Smoking?

Simon Johnson...incorrectly celebrates a toothless provision in the Dodd-Frank bill as being tantamount to an anti-trust act for too big to fail banks...If we believed this bill was meaningful, action be taken against these banks immediately upon signing. Odds of that happening? Zero...The problem is it not merely the size of these firms, but the fact that they control infrastructure that is deemed critical to modern commerce. I'll get into specifics in short order, but in some cases the firm owns critical plumbing outright; in other cases, it is so tightly networked to other firms that mucking with it very much runs the risk of taking down the rest of the grid...Citi runs a big corporate cash management/reporting system called GTS...And no one is going to dare tamper with JP Morgan's clearing business...The problem is that it would take a radical restructuring of the very biggest banks, the critically placed dealer firms, and the most important payment and clearing operations to make a real dent in systemic risk. The officialdom the political lacked the will to do so at the peak of the crisis, and there is no basis for fantasizing that it will suddenly develop more nerve now.

naked capitalism; Simon Johnson Smoking.

Rajiv Sethi Tue 2010-06-15 14:25 EDT

Defenders and Demonizers of Credit Default Swaps

The recent difficulties faced by Greece (and some other eurozone states) in rolling over their national debt has let some to blame hedge fund involvement in the market for credit default swaps...Leaving aside the question of whether naked CDS trading has been good or bad for Greece, it is worth asking whether there exist mechanisms through which such contracts can ever have destabilizing effects. I believe that they can, for reasons that Salmon and Jones would do well to consider...such contracts allow pessimists to leverage (much more so than they could if they were to short bonds instead). The resulting increase in the cost of borrowing, which will rise in tandem with higher CDS spreads, can make the difference between solvency and insolvency. And recognition of this process can tempt those who are not otherwise pessimistic to bet on default, as long as they are confident that enough of their peers will also do so. This clearly creates an incentive for coordinated manipulation...

Credit Default Swap; defending; demonic; Rajiv Sethi.

The Wall Street Examiner Sat 2010-05-22 19:50 EDT

Merkel Does Mahathir and Martin Luther: Tilting the Market Table

...I'm very interested in Germany's policy shift because it's the first time in decades a mature industrialized nation has protested the allocation of profits decreed by financial orthodoxy. At core, German bans of "naked" (held by those who don't own the securities) shorts, paraphrasing Ms. Merkel- perhaps unsurprisingly the daughter of a Lutheran Minister- stops people profiting from the destruction of their neighbor's house at cost of less liquidity in the restricted markets...500 years ago, the Germans defied orthodoxy and ushered in a revolution which moved the center of Europe from South to North. They are defying orthodoxy again, and I can't wait to see what happens next.

Mahathir; Market Table; Martin Luther; Merkel; tilting; Wall Street Examiner.

Culture of Life News Thu 2010-05-20 16:57 EDT

Imbalances In World Trade Cause Tectonic Shifts In Power

...Very, very soon, China will be the world's #1 oil buyer and shortly after this, the yuan will suddenly displace the dollar as the currency which determines the value of oil deals. Then, the yuan/dollar peg will vanish. And we better prepare for this day: it is INEVITABLE. We will suddenly find out where all those many trillions of US dollars are hidden in various foreign FOREX accounts and then hyperinflation will rage...for the US dollar, not the Chinese yuan...

Culture; imbalances; Life News; Power; World Trade Cause Tectonic Shifts.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-05-20 15:44 EDT

Germany's Short Selling Bans: Prudence, Populism or Bank Protection?

...Now why do the Germans in particular feel a tad nervous? Well, Germany, like the UK and Switzerland, has a banking system so large relative to its economy that it cannot credibly backstop it if it goes seriously off the rails. The problem is more acute in Germany because it does not control its own currency (as it cannot simply throw whatever it takes at the banks and if need be, ``print'' later; by contrast, the risk to the UK and Swiss banking system comes from its banks' foreign currency exposures)...The bailout plan shifted risk from the periphery to the core of Europe, and the core, upon examination, does not look too solid. Prepare yourself for a rough ride.

Banks Protected; Germany's short-selling ban; naked capitalism; population; prudence.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2010-05-06 13:44 EDT

Control Frauds HyperInflate and Extend Bubbles Maximizing Damage - A Control Fraud at Work in the Silver Market Short Positions?

Here is a working paper by William K. Black about 'control frauds' and how they relate to the most recent credit crisis in the United States, a breakdown of stewardship that has placed the rest of the world's financial sector at risk as well...``Control frauds'' are seemingly legitimate entities controlled by persons that use them as a fraud ``weapon.'' A single control fraud can cause greater losses than all other forms of property crime combined. This article addresses the role of control fraud in financial crises. Financial control frauds' primary weapon is accounting. Fraudulent lenders produce exceptional short-term ``profits'' through a four-part strategy: extreme growth (Ponzi), lending to uncreditworthy borrowers, extreme leverage, and minimal loss reserves...

Control Frauds HyperInflate; controls Fraud; Extend Bubbles Maximizing Damage; Jesse's Café Américain; Silver Market Short Positions; working.

zero hedge Sun 2010-04-25 14:23 EDT

Exclusive: Second Whistleblower Emerges - A Deep Insider's Walkthru To Silver Market Manipulation

A second whistleblower speaks. As the topic of physical delivery has gained prominent attention recently, it is crucial to complete the circle and show how this weakest link in the PM market is (ab)used by the big boys: Phibro and Warren Buffet. Pay particular attention to the analogues between the methods employed in the 90's commodity market and how the PM (and equity) market is being gamed currently. And to think that each new generation of traders believes it has discovered something new...As a market maker in silver options from 1989 to 2000 I was present during both the 1994 and 1997 silver events. They were seminal in my education of gamesmanship in trading and how probabilities can come up short...

Deep Insider's Walkthru; exclusive; Silver Market Manipulation; whistleblower emerging; Zero Hedge.

Mon 2010-04-19 15:42 EDT

Why The World Is Headed For A Balance Sheet Recession - Credit Writedowns

...[Richard Koo] believes the US, Europe and China are headed for a period of incredibly weak consumer spending not unlike what Japan has been through...what US policymakers are trying to do is to both increase asset prices and consumption in order to short circuit the D-Process i.e. prevent the debt deflation that results from deleveraging and asset and price deflation. Almost all measures taken to date are attempts to prop up asset prices (artificially I believe)...we are in for a debt restructuring across Europe, and in America and China because of the accumulation of debt and malinvestment. Policy makers are reverting to the same old game of asset price inflation to stave this off...It leaves us with chronically weak consumption trends acutely exacerbated by the demographic trends of an aging populace...these dynamics are particularly problematic for Europe because of the strictures imposed by the Euro, the large public sector debt-to-GDP ratios and the advance age of the populace. The Greek problem is the tip of the iceberg and the Europeans are seriously deluded if they think their troubles are over...

Balance Sheet Recessions; credit writedowns; Head; world.

zero hedge Mon 2010-04-19 10:52 EDT

SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud On Subprime Mortgages, Paulson & Co. Implicated

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Goldman, Sachs & Co. and one of its vice presidents for defrauding investors by misstating and omitting key facts about a financial product tied to subprime mortgages as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter. The SEC alleges that Goldman Sachs structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that hinged on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Goldman Sachs failed to disclose to investors vital information about the CDO, in particular the role that a major hedge fund played in the portfolio selection process and the fact that the hedge fund had taken a short position against the CDO.

Co; fraud; implications; Paulson; SEC charged Goldman Sachs; subprime-mortgage; Zero Hedge.

Jesse's Café Américain Mon 2010-04-12 18:11 EDT

Most Wall Street Banks Using Lehman Style Accounting Trickery Enabled by the Fed to Hide Their Risk

This analysis from the Wall Street Journal indicates that most of the big US Banks are engaging in the same kind of repo accounting at the end of the quarter that Lehman Brothers was doing to hide their financial instability until deteriorating credit conditions and liquidity problems made them precipitously collapse, as all ponzi schemes and financial frauds do when the truth becomes known. The basic exercise is to hold big leverage and dodgy debt, but swap it off your books with the Fed at the end of each quarter for a short period of time when you have to report your holdings...

Fed; hide; Jesse's Café Américain; Risk; Wall Street Banks Using Lehman Style Accounting Trickery Enabled.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2010-04-01 11:50 EDT

Brown's Bottom Is an Enormous Issue In the UK: Was This a Bailout of the Multinational Bullion Banks Involving the NY Fed?

The bottom referred to, of course, is the bottom of the gold price, and the sale of approximately 400 tonnes of the UK's gold at the bottom of the market...There is also a credible speculation that the sale was designed to benefit a few of the London based bullion banks which were heavily short the precious metals, and were looking for a push down in price and a boost in supply to cover their positions and avoid a default. The unlikely names mentioned were AIG, which was trading heavily in precious metals, and the House of Rothschild. The terms of the bailout was that once their positions were covered, they were to leave the LBMA, the largest physical bullion market in the world...long before AIG crafted its enormous positions in CDS with the likes of Goldman Sachs, requiring a bailout by young Tim and the NY Fed, it was engaging in massive short positions in the metals markets, especially silver, and may have required a bailout by England to preserve the integrity of the LBMA....the gold sale provided a front-running opportunity for that most rapaciously well-connected of Wall Street Banks, Goldman Sachs.

Bailout; Brown s bottom; Enormous Issue; Jesse's Café Américain; Multinational Bullion Banks Involving; NY Fed; UK.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 15:02 EDT

SEC, Fed Alerted By Merrill of Lehman Balance Sheet Games in March 2008

...The Valukas report shows both regulators were monitoring Lehman on a day-to-day basis shortly after Bear's failure. They recognized that it has a massive hole in its balance sheet, yet took an inertial course of action. They pressured a clearly in denial Fuld to raise capital (and Andrew Ross Sorkin's accounts of those efforts make it clear they were likely to fail) and did not take steps towards any other remedy until the firm was on the brink of collapse (the effort to force a private sector bailout as part of a good bank/bad bank resolution)...Merrill warned both the SEC and the Fed in March 2008 that Lehman was engaging in balance sheet window dressing of a serious enough nature for it to put pressure on Merrill (as in it was making Merrill look worse relative to the obviously impaired Lehman)...

Fed Alerted; Lehman Balance Sheet Games; March 2008; Merrill; naked capitalism; SEC.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Tue 2010-03-09 17:27 EST

Short Selling Restrictions "A Great Indicator of Imminent Market Crashes"

...The Securities and Exchange Commission voted on Wednesday to limit short-selling of stocks that are falling rapidly in price...[quoting friend HB:] "Short selling restrictions are a great indicator of imminent market crashes. The biggest market declines in history all happened shortly after short selling restrictions were introduced."

great indicator; Imminent Market Crashes; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; short-selling restrictions.

Sun 2010-01-31 11:43 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: The Stock Market Has Never Been This (Intermediate-Term) Overbought - October 19, 2009

In reviewing the status of the market late last week, the condition of the data was something of an anomaly in that regard. On the valuation front, stocks are presently overvalued, but to levels that we've observed at least several times in history. The anomaly relates to market action, where we can no longer find a single historical instance where stocks were more overbought on the combination of short- and intermediate-term measures we respond to most strongly. Indeed, only one instance comes close, which is November 28, 1980...the peak of the furious advance in S&P 500 driven by enthusiasm over "less bad" economic news, though with little proven economic strength. It was the last day of the 1980 bull market. The economy later proved to have been in a short lull within a double-dip recession, taking stocks to their final lows in 1982...One of the notable features of extreme overbought conditions is that investors rarely have much opportunity to get out...

2009; Hussman Funds; intermediate term; October 19; Overbought; stock market; weekly market comments.

Taibblog Thu 2010-01-07 18:20 EST

Fannie, Freddie, and the New Red and Blue

...what we've learned in the last few years as one scandal after another spilled onto the front pages is that the bubble economies of the last two decades were not merely monstrous Ponzi schemes that destroyed trillions in wealth while making a small handful of people rich. They were also a profound expression of the fundamentally criminal nature of our political system, in which state power/largess and the private pursuit of (mostly short-term) profit were brilliantly fused in a kind of ongoing theft scheme that sought to instant-cannibalize all the wealth America had stored up during its postwar glory, in the process keeping politicians in office and bankers in beach homes while continually moving the increasingly inevitable disaster to the future.

blue; Fannie; Freddie; New red; Taibblog.

naked capitalism Sun 2010-01-03 10:58 EST

On Goldman's (and Now Morgan Stanley's) Deceptive Synthetic CDO Practices (aka Screwing Their Customers)

Goldman is trying to diffuse the increasingly harsh light being turned on its dubious practices in the collateralized debt obligation market, with the wattage turned up considerably last week by a story in the New York Times that described how a synthetic CDO program called Abacus was the means by which Goldman famously went ``net short'' subprime....Goldman wanted its Abacus trades to fail. That was the most profitable course of action for them (note the Times clearly states that that was the role of the Abacus trades and Goldman has not disputed that claim). They were net short, this was no mere hedge of a long position but a trading bet. And those CDOs did turn out to be big turkeys...

aka Screwing; customer; Deceptive Synthetic CDO Practices; Goldman's; Morgan Stanley's; naked capitalism.

naked capitalism Mon 2009-12-28 22:05 EST

``Body Count From Goldman Actions Crosses Into Criminal Territory''

Readers may have noticed Janet Tavakoli's recent article at Huffington Post on Goldman Sachs and AIG. While much of it covers territory that Yves and I already wrote about previously, Ms. Tavakoli stops short of telling the whole story...The Federal Reserve and the Treasury aided and abetted Goldman Sachs in committing financial and ethical crimes at an astounding level.

Body Count; Criminal Territory; Goldman Actions Crosses; naked capitalism.

zero hedge Mon 2009-12-28 15:12 EST

Quantitative Easing Has Been A Monetary Failure; Persistent Deflation Means More Fed Intervention Coming Soon

As more and more pundits discuss the spectre of inflation, with gold flying to all time highs which many explain as an inflation hedge, not to mention stock price performance which is extrapolating virtual hyperinflation, the market "truth" as determined by Fed Fund futures and options is, and continues to be, diametrically opposite...Bernanke is very likely about to unleash Quantitative Easing 2: If the $1.7 trillion already thrown at the problem has not fixed it, you can bet that the Chairman will not stop here. Furthermore, as the Fed has the best perspective on the economy, which is certainly far worse than is represented, the Fed has to act fast before things escalate even more out of control. Which is why Zero Hedge is willing to wager that not only will the agency/MBS program not expire in March as it is supposed to, but that a parallel QE process will likely begin very shortly. The end result of all these actions, of course, is that the value of the dollar is about to plummet: when Bernanke announces that not only will he not end QE but that he will launch another version of the program, expect the dollar to take off on its one way path to $2 = €1. And when that happens, look for global trade to cease completely. In its quest to continue bailing out the banking system and rolling the trillions of toxic loans it refuses to accept are worthless (for if it did, equity values in the banking system would go, to zero immediately), the Fed will promptly resume destroying not only the US middle class, but the entire system of global trade built through many years of globalization. Look for America to end up in an insulated liquidity bubble in a few short years, trading exclusively with its vassal master: the People's Republic of China.

Fed Intervention Coming; Monetary Failure; Persistent Deflation Means; Quantitative Easing; Zero Hedge.

Mon 2009-12-21 19:18 EST

America's Head Servant? The PRC's Dilemma in the Global Crisis

...Despite all the talk of China's capacity to destroy the dollar's reserve-currency status and construct a new global financial order, the prc and its neighbours have few choices in the short term other than to sustain American economic dominance by extending more credit...the historical and social origins of the deepening dependence of China and East Asia on the consumer markets of the global North as the source of their growth, and on us financial vehicles as the store of value for their savings. I then assess the longer-term possibilities for ending this dependence, arguing that, to create a more autonomous economic order in Asia, China would have to transform an export-oriented growth model--which has mostly benefited, and been perpetuated by, vested interests in the coastal export sectors--into one driven by domestic consumption, through a large-scale redistribution of income to the rural-agricultural sector. This will not be possible, however, without breaking the coastal urban elite's grip on power.

America's Head Servant; Global Crisis; PRC's Dilemma.

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