naked capitalism Fri 2010-09-10 18:46 EDT

Auerback: China is Still a Renegade Nation

Marshall Auerback

...In response to Beijing's mind boggling increase in real credit in the first half of 2009,Chinese fixed investment in industrial tradables rose dramatically...By the second quarter of this year some -- but only some -- of this new capacity began to come on stream. Further production responses to this new round of Chinese overinvestment lie ahead...But because of the potential protectionist threat and the underlying fragility at the heart of China's capex boom (along with the corruption of its political class), the change in status might prove to be ephemeral, much as Japan's vaunted rise to number 2 ultimately gave way to a post-bubble morass...in July Chinese domestic demand may have gone negative in real terms. It was only a huge improvement in net trade that kept production growth significantly positive on a sequential basis...The fact that China has the greatest fixed investment excess ever suggests that, when it unwinds, there will be a nasty economic adjustment in China...

Auerback; China; naked capitalism; Renegade Nation.

naked capitalism Sat 2010-07-24 16:34 EDT

Summer Rerun: ``Unwinding the Fraud for Bubbles''

Tanta at Calculated Risk

This post first appeared on March 27, 2007. ...Telling the difference between the victims and the victimizers, the predators and the prey, and the fraudulent and the defrauded, is getting a lot harder when you have borrowers not required to make down payments able to lie about their incomes in order to buy a home the seller is overpricing in order to take an illegal kickback. The lender is getting defrauded, but the lender is the one who offered the zero-down stated-income program, delegated the drawing up of the legal documents and the final disbursement of funds to a fee-for-service settlement agent, and didn't do enough due diligence on the appraisal to see the inflation of the value. Legally, of course, there's a difference between lender as co-conspirator and lender as mark, utterly failing to exercise reasonable caution, but it's small comfort when the losses rack up. With tongue only partially in cheek, I'm about to suggest a third category of fraud: Fraud for Bubbles...My theory of the Fraud for Bubbles is, in a nutshell, that it isn't that lenders forgot that there are risks. It is that the miserable dynamic of unsound lending puffing up unsustainable real estate prices, which in turn kept supporting even more unsound lending, simply masked fraud problems sufficiently, and delayed the eventual ``feedback'' mechanisms sufficiently, that rampant fraud came to seem ``affordable.'' So many of the business practices that help fraud succeed--thinning backoffice staff, hiring untrained temps to replace retiring (and pricey) veterans, speeding up review processes, cutting back on due diligence sampling, accepting more and more copies, faxes, and phone calls instead of original ink-signed documents--threw off so much money that no one wanted to believe that the eventual cost of the fraud would eat it all up, and possibly more...

bubble; fraud; naked capitalism; summer reruns; unwinds.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 16:10 EDT

Lehman: Regulators Chose to Deny, Extend and Pretend

The Lehman Examiner's report gives an unintentionally damning portrayal, both of the the structure of financial regulation in the US and how regulators failed to use the powers they had effectively...the authorities recognized Lehman had a large negative net worth. Yet rather than move decisively towards an unwind, they proceeded inertially. They urged Lehman CEO Dick Fuld to find a rescuer (who would invest in that garbage barge, particularly when Andrew Ross Sorkin's account makes clear that Fuld's moves were so obviously desperate and clumsy as to be certain to fail) and also promoted the notion of an LTCM-style ``share the pain'' resolution. Yet with the rest of the industry weak, and the magnitude of hole in Lehman's balance sheet a mystery, these courses of action had low odds of success from the outset (indeed, the ``Lehman weekend'' in which the authorities almost bulldozed through a deal, seemed designed to avoid sober analysis of how bad things were at the failing investment bank)...As much as the SEC did not cover itself with glory in this exercise, its lapses are somewhat comprehensible. By contrast, the Fed's are much harder to explain or excuse. And guess who is about to be given more oversight authority?

denied; extends; Lehman; naked capitalism; Pretends; Regulators Chose.

zero hedge Thu 2009-12-17 10:37 EST

Is Selling US CDS A Risk-Free Way To Short The Dollar?

There has been much conjecture on whether using CDS is an effective way to hedge against US default risk. Many theoreticians, especially those of the post-March lows variety, have sprung up and are speculating that buying Credit Default Swaps on the US is ultimately a futile and pointless endeavor. The main argument: a US default would likely mean that interconnected dealers won't recognize contracts on a US default event, as they themselves will be out of business. Even if they continued to exist, like cockroaches in a postapocalyptic world, the collateral which backs derivatives is mostly US Treasurys: the same obligations that would end up being massively impaired...the US CDS seller syndicate could easily be one of the key sources of dollar short funding: with sellers pocketing euros and immediately going to market and selling dollars...a dollar-short unwind would probably have repercussions in the US CDS market. Not only would the dollar spike, but paradoxically US credit risk would probably widen dramatically...any unwind at the heart of the prevalent risk trade now: the massive dollar carry, would impact virtually every investment product, quite possibly in self-referential feedback loops. If correct, it merely shows how much more the Fed has at stake in keeping the dollar depressed than merely getting mom and pop to buy Amazon at $130/share. Losing control of the carry trade will be the systemic equivalent of allowing Lehman's book to be marked-to-market: a potentially complete collapse in systemic confidence, which would have such far ranging implications as the $300 trillion interest rate derivative market. And when sudden volatility reaches this product universe which is 6 times bigger than world GDP, the events from last year will seem like a dress rehearsal.

CDS; Dollar; Risk-Free Way; sell; short; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Wed 2009-11-25 11:52 EST

Albert Edwards Calls For The Next Black Swan: Expect Yuan Devaluation Following Deep 2010 Downturn

With everyone and their grandmother screeching that it is about time for China to inflate the renminbi, despite that such an action would be economic and social suicide for the world's most populous country, SocGen's Albert Edwards once again stalks out the Black Swan in left field and posits the contrarian view de jour: China will aggressively devalue the yuan following a deep 2010 downturn coupled with escalating trade wars. As Edwards says: "I think the next 18 months will see major ructions in the financial markets. The consequences of a double-dip back into recession next year require some lateral thinking. If the carry trade unwind results in a turbo-charged dollar, any collapse in the China economic bubble will be doubly destructive to commodity prices.

Albert Edwards Calls; Black Swan; Deep 2010 downturn; Expect Yuan Devaluation; Zero Hedge.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

John P. Hussman

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.

naked capitalism Thu 2009-11-19 10:43 EST

Roubini Predicts ``Mother of All Carry Trade Unwinds''

Nouriel Roubini has officially left the ``hedging your bets on the economy'' camp. He has declared the markets to be frothy because super low dollar borrowing rates have turned the greenback into the funding currency for the carry trade. Far more important than the peppy rally in the stock market is the resumption of early 2007 style risk taking in the credit markets.

carry trade unwind; mother; naked capitalism; Roubini predicted.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

Fri 2009-07-24 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Guest Post: AIG CDS Unwind Goes From Waterfall To A Trickle

*** banks' fixed income trading desks generated phenomenal profitability in January and February hadnothing to do with actual trading of fixed income and everything to do with AIG's hamheaded (and loss-generating) unwind of its CDS book''

AIG CDS Unwind Goes; Guest Post; naked capitalism; trickle; waterfall.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-06-11 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Credit Default Swaps and Too Big to Fail or Unwind: Interview With Ed Kane

Credit Default Swaps and Too Big to Fail or Unwind: Interview With Ed Kane; ``The whole basis of policy making in Washington today is that the taxpayer is a sucker who does not know how to defend him or her self against this kind of regulatory gambling.''

big; Credit Default Swap; Ed Kane; fail; Institutional Risk Analyst; interview; IRA Analyst; unwinds.

Thu 2009-02-26 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: Martin Wolf: Rethinking the Lessons of Japan's Debt Unwind

Japan's Debt Unwind; Lessons; Martin Wolf; naked capitalism; rethink.

Wed 2008-10-08 00:00 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Yen Rallies as Carry Trade Continues to Unwind

Carry Trade Continues; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; unwinds; Yen Rallies.

Wed 2008-05-28 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Monoline Death Watch: CDO Unwind Disputes

CDO Unwind Disputes; Monoline Death Watch; naked capitalism.

Tue 2008-04-01 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Bear Conspiracy Theories and Carry Trade Unwind

Bear Conspiracy Theories; carry trade unwind; naked capitalism.

Thu 2008-01-31 00:00 EST

Money Matters: The Great Credit Unwind of '08

by Mike Whitney

08; Great Credit Unwind; money matters.

Sun 2008-01-06 00:00 EST

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Asymmetrical Unwind of the Credit Bubble

investing for muddle-through

Asymmetrical Unwind; credit bubble; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

Sun 2007-11-25 00:00 EST

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Slamming on the brakes in China

global credit crunch; US slowdown threatens Chinese growth; dollar repatriation ahead? carry trade unwind building

brake; China; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; Slams.

Sun 2007-09-23 00:00 EDT

Bits of News - The Unwinding of the Asian Currency Crisis

by Garrett Johnson

Asian currency crisis; Bits; news; unwinds.