Fri 2010-10-08 21:57 EDT

A Mammoth One in Five Borrowers Will Default <<; Real Estate Prices & Mortgages on HousingStory.net

Michael David White

A leading mortgage analyst predicts over 11 million homeowners will default and lose their home if the government fails to take more radical intervention. Amherst Securities Group LP, one of the most respected names in mortgage research, has trumpeted an ambitious call-to-government arms in its October mortgage report. ``The death spiral of lower home prices, more borrowers underwater, higher transition rates (to default), more distressed sales and lower home prices must be arrested.''...

borrowing; default; HousingStory; mammoth; mortgage; net; real estate prices.

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-07-29 17:00 EDT

James Montier does MMT

It seems that a lot of analysts have caught onto the MMT framework popularized by the late economist Wynne Godley and made topical in this downturn by Rob Parenteau of the Richebacher Letter...Now, it's James Montier's turn...He concluded: ``There is a danger the proposed fiscal tightening in the eurozone will lead to further deflation and economic collapse. The Spanish government faces what Mr Parenteau calls ``the paradox of public thrift'': the less it borrows, the more it will end up owing. It is unfortunate that it has taken a severe global recession to vindicate Prof Godley's macroeconomic analysis. If economic policymakers start to pay more attention to financial balances, they might forestall the next crisis. European politicians might also understand the potentially dreadful consequences of their new-found frugality.'' ...A downward shift in the government's net fiscal deficit means a downward shift in the private sector's net fiscal surplus -- totally doable except for this little thing called debt in places like Spain, the US, Ireland or the UK. Moreover, the savings rate is already incredibly low in countries like the U.S. and the U.K. If the government tries to pare its fiscal deficit, the result will not be less private sector savings to meet the lower public sector deficit, but rather lower aggregate demand and a larger deficit -- that's the paradox of thrift...

credit writedowns; James Montier; MMT.

Tue 2010-06-01 18:24 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirit of debate ... my reply Part 2

Bill Mitchell

Today, I offer Part 2 of my responses to the comments raised in the debate so far...Modern monetary theory does not use the term ``money'' in the same way as the mainstream because it creates instant confusion. As Scott said ``Money is always someone's liability, so better to be precise about whose liabilities we are talking about than saying money.'' That is why we emphasis fully understanding the asset-liability matches that occur in monetary systems. And that leads you to realise that transactions between government and non-government create or destroy net financial assets denominated in the currency of issue whereas transactions within the non-government sector cannot create net financial positions...So modern monetary theorists prefer to concentrate on what is going on with balance sheets after certain flows have occured rather than narrowly defining some financial assets as money and others not...There is no doubt that the non-government institutions can increase credit. Some slack analysts call this an increase in money. But the accurate statement is that, as a matter of accounting it increases the (in Scott's words) ``the quantity of financial assets and financial liabilities 1 for 1 in the non-govt sector. So, with private credit, there is BY DEFINITION no NET increase in private sector financial assets created.'' Once we understand that and note that typically the non-government sector seeks to net save in the currency of issue then modern monetary theory tells you that the public sector must run a deficit to underwrite this desired net saving or else see an output gap widen...Who is in control is an interesting question. Clearly, the government cannot directly control the money supply which renders much of the analysis in mainstream macroeconomics textbooks as being irrelevant. The Monetarists via Milton Friedman persuaded central banks to adopt monetary targetting in the 1980s and it failed a few years later -- miserably...Then you might like to consider it from the other angle -- a government which accepts responsibility for full employment can ``finance'' the saving desires of the non-government sector by increasing its deficit up to the level warranted by the spending gap (left by the full employment non-government savings)...Orthodox macroeconomic theory struggles with the idea of involuntary unemployment and typically tries to fudge the explanation by appealing to market rigidities (typically nominal wage inflexibility). However, in general, the orthodox framework cannot convincingly explain systemic constraints that comprehensively negate individual volition. The modern monetary framework clearly explicates how involuntary unemployment arises. The private sector, in aggregate, may desire to spend less of the monetary unit of account than it earns. In this case, if this gap in spending is not met by government, then unemployment will occur. Nominal (or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless they somehow eliminate the private sector desire to net save and increase spending...to maintain high levels of employment and given that the public generally desire to hold some reserves of fiat money, the government balance will normally have to be in deficit...modern monetary theory demonstrates that if you want the non-government sector to net save...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply Part 2; Spirit.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-05-13 18:21 EDT

An Analysis of the Thursday Meltdown

...Contrast the reports at the Times and the Wall Street Journal, that the officialdom is pouring through the records and is still puzzled after a full three days on the case, versus this analysis produced by a lone sell-side analyst (who sadly must remain anonymous) roughly 24 hours after the implosion...``...it was not a sudden, random surge of volume from a fat finger that overwhelmed the market. It was a steady onslaught of selling that pressured the market lower in order to catch up with the carnage taking place in the credit markets and the currency markets...this episode exposed structural flaws in how a trade is implemented (think orphaned algo orders) and it exposed the danger of leaving market making up to a network of entities with no mandate to ensure the smooth and orderly functioning of the market (think of the electronic market makers and high freqs who can pull bids instantaneously as opposed to a specialist on the floor who has a clearly defined mandate to provide liquidity).''

Analysis; naked capitalism; Thursday Meltdown.

naked capitalism Tue 2010-05-11 09:04 EDT

Richard Smith: Another Nail in the ``Hoocoodanode'' Defense, Circa April 2007

Richard Smith

Here's someone with his head screwed on, back in April 2007, who proves singlehandedly that ``hoocoodanode'' was no defense for failing to anticipate the implosion of the shadow banking system (more on this prescient analyst in due course)...So who is this fellow who got it, back in that mythical time when nobody knew what was going on? According to an email correspondent of mine, he is ``a no-name equity guy'' in London. Actually his name is Henry Maxey, and he is chief investment officer and chief executive elect of Ruffer LLP, a small London fund manager. So there's no chance of making him US Treasury Secretary or head of the NYFRB, I'm afraid...

Circa April 2007; defense; Hoocoodanode; nail; naked capitalism; Richard Smith.

Jesse's Café Américain Mon 2010-04-19 18:34 EDT

Goldman Sachs: A Pattern of Organized Criminal Behaviour?

Jesse

Chris Whalen provides some excellent commentary on the Goldman Sachs fraud inquiry by the SEC at the beginning of his weekly newsletter, The Institutional Risk Analyst...``hedge funds often times are merely extensions of the dealers with which they interact. It is often difficult if not impossible to tell where the dealer's interests end and those of the hedge fund begin, especially when the dealer and the fund seem to be working in concert to create securities that are being sold to third parties. This episode is a terrible mess and, to us at least, illustrates why the OTC markets for securities and derivatives need to be regulated out of existence -- or at least into compliance with norms of disclosure and fair dealing that would render such strategies impossible.''

Goldman Sachs; Jesse's Café Américain; Organized Criminal Behaviour; pattern.

zero hedge Mon 2010-04-05 15:14 EDT

Former Goldman Commodities Research Analyst Confirms LMBA OTC Gold Market Is "Paper Gold" Ponzi

When we put up a link to last week's CFTC hearing webcast little did we know that it would end up being the veritable (physical) gold mine (no pun intended) of information about what really transpires in the commodities market. First, we obtained direct evidence from Andrew Maguire (who may or may not have been the target of an attempt at "bodily harm" as reported yesterday) of extensive manipulation in the silver market. Today, Adrian Douglas, director of GATA, adds to the mountain of evidence that the commodities market, and the CFTC, stand behind what is potentially the biggest market manipulation scheme in the history of capital markets (we are assuming for the time being that all allegations of the Fed manipulating the broader equity and credit markets are completely baseless). Using the testimony of a clueless Jeffrey Christian, formerly a staffer at the Commodities Research Group in the Goldman Sachs Investment Research Department and now head and founder of the CPM Group, Douglas confirms that the "LBMA trades over 100 times the amount of gold it actually has to back the trades."

Goldman Commodities Research Analyst Confirms LMBA OTC Gold Market; paper gold; Ponzi; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Sat 2010-04-03 09:55 EDT

Guest Post: Top Analyst Says ``Developed Market Governments Are Insolvent By Any Reasonable Definition''

Washington&apos;s Blog

Dylan Grice, a top analyst for European financial giant Société Générale, writes: Developed market governments are insolvent by any reasonable definition. Who could have known? Everyone, actually...Grice also says: Eventually, there will be a crisis of such magnitude that the political winds change direction, and become blustering gales forcing us onto the course of fiscal sustainability. Until it does, the temptation to inflate will remain, as will economists with spurious mathematical rationalisations as to why such inflation will make everything OK . Until it does, the outlook will remain favorable for gold. But eventually, majority opinion will accept the painful contractionary medicine because it will have to. That will be the time to sell gold.

developed market governments; Guest Post; insolvent; naked capitalism; reasonable definition; Top Analyst Says.

naked capitalism Sun 2010-02-28 13:23 EST

Rogoff Foresees A Wave of Sovereign Debt Defaults

Kenneth Rogoff, former IMF chief economist warned that a series of sovereign debt defaults is likely to be in the offing...Rogoff is far from alone in seeing sovereign defaults as likely, but so far, the chorus of concern comes mainly from analysts and investors rather than well-known economists (Willem Buiter was notable exception in that regard). One correspondent said that one of his sources, with impeccable contacts, anticipates 12 sovereign debt defaults in the EU...

naked capitalism; Rogoff Foresees; sovereign debt Default; wave.

The Money Game Mon 2009-12-28 16:44 EST

Here's The Secret Reason We Eliminated The Bailout Caps On Fannie And Freddie (FNM, FRE)

On Christmas Eve, when the news was assured of getting no coverage whatsoever, The White House announced that it had eliminated the maximum bailout cap for Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie (FRE). As some observers have pointed out, all the move really did was formalize what everyone has figured for decades, that the two zombie GSEs were truly organs of the federal government, and that their debts would be backed up ad infinitum. So, why the move, and why then? Credit analyst Edwart Pinto shares his theories.

Bailout Caps; eliminate; Fannie; FNM; FRE; Freddie; Money game; s; secret reasons.

The IRA Analyst Sun 2009-12-13 09:11 EST

Three Strikes on Ben Bernanke: AIG, Goldman Sachs and BAC/TARP

The Institutional Risk Analyst

To us, the confirmation hearings last week before the Senate Banking Committee only reaffirm in our minds that Ben Bernanke does not deserve a second term as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

AIG; BAC/TARP; Ben Bernanke; Goldman Sachs; IRA Analyst; striking.

Fri 2009-10-23 08:30 EDT

How Moody's sold its ratings - and sold out investors | McClatchy

Kevin G. Hall

As the housing market collapsed in late 2007, Moody's Investors Service, whose investment ratings were widely trusted, responded by purging analysts and executives who warned of trouble and promoting those who helped Wall Street plunge the country into its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. A McClatchy investigation has found that Moody's punished executives who questioned why the company was risking its reputation by putting its profits ahead of providing trustworthy ratings for investment offerings. Instead, Moody's promoted executives who headed its "structured finance" division, which assisted Wall Street in packaging loans into securities for sale to investors. It also stacked its compliance department with the people who awarded the highest ratings to pools of mortgages that soon were downgraded to junk. Such products have another name now: "toxic assets."

Investors; McClatchy; Moody's Sold; rate; SOLD.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-10-22 19:59 EDT

Are the Fed, the Congress and the Primary Dealers an Alliance of Convenience?

...large flows of fiat paper dollars, I submit, explain the increasingly manic behavior of markets, investors and large banks over the past decade as true investment opportunities are increasingly outnumbered by speculation...

alliance; Congress; convenience; Fed; IRA Analyst; Primary Dealers.

The Big Picture Wed 2009-10-14 11:36 EDT

Andy Xie: Here We Go Again

Former Morgan Stanley Analyst Andy Xie explains why China is a potential bubble: [Consider] the US Savings and Loans crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The US Federal Reserve kept monetary policy loose to help the banking system. The dollar went into a prolonged bear market. During the descent, Asian economies that pegged their currencies to the dollar could increase money supply and lending without worrying about devaluation, but the money couldn't leave home due to the dollar's poor outlook, so it went into asset markets. When the dollar began to rebound in 1996, Asian economies came under tightening pressure that burst their asset bubbles. The collapsing asset prices triggered capital outflows that reinforced asset deflation. Asset deflation destroyed their banking systems. In short, the US banking crisis created the environment for a credit boom in Asia. When US banks recovered, Asian banks collapsed. Is China heading down the same path? There are many anecdotes to support the comparison. Property prices in Southeast Asia became higher than those in the US, but ``experts'' and government officials had stories to explain it, even though their per capita income was one-tenth that of the US. Their banks also commanded huge market capitalizations, as financial markets extended their growth ad infinitum. The same thing is happening in China today. When something seems too good to be true, it is. World trade -- the engine of global growth -- has collapsed. Employment is still contracting throughout the world. There are no realistic scenarios for the global economy to regain high and sustainable growth. China is an export-driven economy. Bank lending can support the economy for a short time, however, stocks are as expensive as during the heydays of the last bubble. Like all previous bubbles, this one, too, will burst.

Andy Xie; Big Picture; Go.

The IRA Analyst Mon 2009-09-21 17:23 EDT

Exposure at Default: As Banks Shrink, So Does the Economy

...before Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and the other G-20 finance ministers set about to raise capital levels, they need to understand that the earnings of the banking industry are going to be impaired for years as the cost of resolving failed banks is repaid. Restoring solvency is the first issue for many banks, then we can talk about increased capital and restrictions on risk taking equally. And as the banking industry shrinks defensively in order to conserve capital and fund liabilities impaired by realized losses, the credit available to the US economy also shrinks. You can't have economic growth without credit growth...Bottom line is that deflation is still the chief threat to the US economy, driven by a relentless contraction in bank and nonbank credit. Until we see a restoration of the market for nonbank finance and a sustained turn in the EAD of the large bank peer group, which accounts for almost 70% of the entire US industry balance sheet, we do not believe that any economic recovery will be meaningful in terms of jobs or asset prices.

Banks Shrink; default; economy; exposure; IRA Analyst.

THE PRAGMATIC CAPITALIST Sun 2009-09-20 12:29 EDT

CHINA WILL BE A BIGGER BUBBLE THAN JAPAN >> Most Recent Stories >> THE PRAGMATIC CAPITALIST

SocGen analysts Dylan Grice says the Chinese economy has many similarities to the Japanese economy before it imploded in the 90's...the real cause of Japan's deflation is probably more demographic than debt-related...Japan has been the first industrial economy to begin demographic contraction. Indeed, thanks to Deng Xiaoping's 1979 one child policy, China will soon face the same problem...Japan's experience also hints at what may be the future catalyst unleashing this frenzy: capital account liberalisation. Financial history is filled with financial liberalisations gone wrong and Japan's bubble can be traced directly to the removal of controls on international capital flows and banking in the early 1980s. Seeking a larger international role for the renminbi, China is now, albeit tentatively, embarking on a similar path. Full liberalisation, when it occurs, could be the starting gun for the biggest bubble the world has ever seen.

bigger bubble; China; Japan; pragmatic capitalists; recent story.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

The IRA Analyst Sun 2009-09-13 12:14 EDT

House Testimony: The Trouble With Models Starts With Subjectivity

...we have now many examples where a model or the pretense of a model was used as a vehicle for creating risk and hiding it. More important, however, is the role of financial models for creating opportunities for deliberate acts of securities fraud..the widespread use of [VaR] statistical models for risk management suggest that financial institutions are subject to occasional "Black Swans" in the form of risk events that cannot be anticipated...We don't actually believe there is such a thing as a "Black Swan."...leaders in finance and politics simply made the mistake of, again, believing in what were in fact flawed models...Or worse, our leaders in Washington and on Wall Street decided to be short sighted and not care about the inevitable debacle...We need to simply ensure that all of the financial instruments in our marketplace have an objective basis, including a visible, cash basis market that is visible to all market participants. If investors cannot price a security without reference to subjective models, then the security should be banned from the US markets as a matter of law and regulation. To do otherwise is to adopt deception as the public policy goal of the US when it comes to financial markets regulation.

House testimony; IRA Analyst; models starting; subject; Troubles.

The IRA Analyst Tue 2009-09-01 19:21 EDT

Q2 2009 Bank Stress Test Results: The Zombie Dance Party Rocks On

...the Fed and Treasury spent all the available liquidity propping up Wall Street's toxic asset waste pile and the banks that created it, so now Main Street employers and private investors, and the relatively smaller banks that support them both, must go begging for capital and liquidity in a market where government is the only player left

IRA Analyst; Q2 2009 Bank Stress Test Results; Zombie Dance Party Rocks.

The IRA Analyst Wed 2009-08-26 15:50 EDT

Washington Fiddles as Global Deflation Rages

The surprise facing Geithner, Bernanke et al is that by Q3, the true economic deterioration in many toxic assets will be clear for all to see. ``whatever relief that financial institutions and other residents of the hold-to-maturity world believe that they will receive through the modification of fair-value accounting and other official dispensation, they will lose through deteriorating economic fundamentals and falling cash flows supporting these assets as 2009 unfolds.''

Global Deflation Rages; IRA Analyst; Washington fiddles.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-07-30 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Kabuki on the Potomac: Reforming Credit Default Swaps and OTC Derivatives

-- he Masters of the Universe who run the largest Wall Street firms of have learned not a thing when it comes to credit default swaps ("CDS") and other types of high-risk financial engineering. Indeed, not only are the largest derivative dealers fighting efforts to reform the CDS and other derivative instruments that caused the AIG fiasco, but regulators like the Federal Reserve Board and US Treasury are working with the banks to ensure that a small group of dealers increase their monopoly over the business of over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives.''

Institutional Risk Analyst; IRA Analyst; Kabuki; OTC derivative; Potomac; Reforming Credit Default Swaps.

The IRA Analyst Fri 2009-07-24 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Mortgage Duration Risk: The Banks Are No Longer the Problem

``Washington has indeed fixed the solvency problems of the large zombie banks...by turning them into GSEs via FDIC guarantees on their debt.''

bank; Institutional Risk Analyst; IRA Analyst; longer; Mortgage Duration Risk; problem.

The IRA Analyst Tue 2009-06-16 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Zombie Update; Pento on Bernanke's Permanently Expanded Balance Sheet

``This zombie dance party ain't over. No sir.'' Michael Pento: ``Bernanke will be hard-pressed to substantially raise rates to combat inflation once consumer and wholesale prices begin to significantly increase.''

Bernanke's Permanently Expanded Balance Sheet; Institutional Risk Analyst; IRA Analyst; Pento; Zombie Update.

The IRA Analyst Tue 2009-06-16 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Can Citigroup Be Restructured Without an FDIC Resolution?

Citigroup; FDIC Resolution; Institutional Risk Analyst; IRA Analyst; restructuring.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-06-11 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Credit Default Swaps and Too Big to Fail or Unwind: Interview With Ed Kane

Credit Default Swaps and Too Big to Fail or Unwind: Interview With Ed Kane; ``The whole basis of policy making in Washington today is that the taxpayer is a sucker who does not know how to defend him or her self against this kind of regulatory gambling.''

big; Credit Default Swap; Ed Kane; fail; Institutional Risk Analyst; interview; IRA Analyst; unwinds.

The IRA Analyst Tue 2009-04-21 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Stress Test Zombies: Not Too Big To Fail? Tough Tootsies Little Banks!

2009-03-13; ``The Bernanke/Geithner approach to not dealing with the financial crisis amounts to a hideous public subsidy of the global transactional class, a transfer of wealth from American taxpayers to the institutional investors who hold the bonds and derivative obligations tied to the zombie banks, AIG and the GSEs. All of these companies will require continuing cash subsidies if they are not resolved in bankruptcy.''

bank; big; fail; Institutional Risk Analyst; IRA Analyst; Stress Test Zombies; Tough Tootsies.

Wed 2009-04-01 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Too Big to Bail: Lehman Brothers is the Model for Fixing the Zombie Banks

Why Lehman Brothers is the Model for Fixing the Zombie Banks

bailed; big; Fix; Institutional Risk Analyst; Lehman Brothers; model; zombie banks.

Wed 2009-04-01 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Can We Fix the Banks, Help Homeowners, and Rebuild the Mortgage Markets? Can Do.

Can We Fix the Banks, Help Homeowners, and Rebuild the Securitization Markets? No Problema

bank; Fix; help homeowners; Institutional Risk Analyst; mortgage markets; Rebuilding.

Tue 2009-02-24 00:00 EST

Jesse's Café Américain: How to Resolve the Mortgage Crisis

Jesse's Café Américain: How to Resolve the Mortgage Crisis; Chris Whalen, The Institutional Risk Analyst

Jesse's Café Américain; mortgage crisis; resolved.