dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

stashed Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

stash away (1).

Fri 2010-04-09 08:08 EDT

charles hugh smith-The Contrarian Trade of the Decade: the U.S. Dollar

The majority of economic observers seem convinced that the dollar is doomed, and not in some distant future...But perhaps this thinking is wrong on virtually every important count...While the Federal Reserve successfully goosed money supply in their massive "quantitative easing" campaign, money supply is no longer expanding at a fast clip...It seems the money "created" by the Federal Reserve and lent to private banks at near-zero interest rates is simply sitting in the banks as reserves to offset their continuing horrendous losses. As a result, it is not flowing into the economy, and thus it cannot trigger inflation...Indeed, as has often been noted by Mish and others, this is what has happened in Japan for the past two decades: the central bank shovels money into private banks, who either engage in "carry trade" activities (borrowing at near-zero interest and then moving the money overseas to earn a decent yield elsewhere for easy profits) or they stash the funds to offset their ongoing losses in defaulted/impaired portfolios...

Charles Hugh Smith; Contrarian Trade; decades; U.S. dollar.

Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST

What the PBoC cannot do with its reserves

...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.

PBoC cannot; reserves.