China Financial Markets Wed 2010-09-15 19:28 EDT

What do banking crises have to do with consumption?

Michael Pettis

For the next several years, as Keynes reminded us in the 1930s, savings is not going to be a virtue for the world economy. It is more likely to be a vice. In order to regain growth the world desperately needs less savings and more private consumption, but I think it is not going to get nearly enough to generate growth. Why? Because in all the major economies the banking systems are largely insolvent, or about to become so, and desperately need to rebuild capital...With all of the major economies facing banking crises, they must clean up the banks by forcing the household sector to pay the bill. This will put downward pressure on household disposable income and wealth for many years...For twenty years Japanese consumption growth has limped along [due to paying for] their banking crisis...Chinese consumption dropped from a very-low 45% of GDP ten years ago to an astonishing 36% last year just as -- no coincidence -- Chinese households were forced to clean up the last banking crisis...

bank crises; China Financial Markets; consumption.

China Financial Markets Tue 2010-08-03 14:48 EDT

The capital tsunami is a bigger threat than the nuclear option

...China's ``nuclear option'', which has generated a great deal of nervousness among investors and policy-making circles in the US, is a myth, and what the US should be much more concerned about is its diametric opposite -- a tsunami of capital flooding into the country...All the major capital exporting countries...are eager to maintain and even increase their capital exports. But the balance of payments must balance, and all that exported capital must be imported somewhere else...As net capital exporters try desperately to maintain or increase their capital exports, and deficit Europe sees net capital imports collapse, the only way the world can achieve balance without a sharp contraction in the capital-exporting countries is if US net capital imports surge. And at first they will surge. Foreigners...will buy more dollar assets, including USG bonds, than before...the US trade deficit will inexorably rise as Germany, Japan and China try to keep up their capital exports and as European capital imports drop...This tsunami will bring with it a corresponding surge in the US trade deficit and, with it, a rise in US unemployment. It will also force the US Treasury to increase the fiscal deficit as more of the jobs created by its spending leak abroad...in the past massive capital recycling has usually been very good for asset markets. Might we see a surge in the US asset markets, at least until next year when Congress starts getting tough on the trade deficit?...

bigger threat; capital tsunami; China Financial Markets; nuclear option.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-07-22 10:17 EDT

Do sovereign debt ratios matter?

Michael Pettis

...No aspect of history seems to repeat itself quite as regularly as financial history. The written history of financial crises dates back at least as far back as the reign of Tiberius, when we have very good accounts of Rome's 33 AD real estate crisis...we have only begun the period of sovereign default. The major global adjustments haven't yet taken place and until they do, we won't have seen the full consequences of the global crisis...there is no threshold debt level that indicates a country is in trouble. Many things matter when evaluating a country's creditworthiness...there are at least five important factors in determining the likelihood that a country will be suspend or renegotiate certain types of debt...With inverted debt, the value of liabilities is positively correlated with the value of assets, so that the debt burden and servicing costs decline in good times (when asset prices and earnings rise) and rise in bad times...Inverted debt structures leave a country extremely vulnerable to debt crises...

China Financial Markets; sovereign debt ratios matter.

China Financial Markets Tue 2010-04-20 09:17 EDT

Who will pay for China's bad loans?

Michael Pettis

...pessimists are starting to worry about excessive debt levels in China, about which they are very right to worry, and many are predicting a banking or financial collapse, which I think is much less likely. Optimists, on the other hand, are blithely discounting the problem of rising NPLs and insisting that they create little risk to Chinese growth. Their proof? A decade ago China had a huge surge in NPLs, the cleaning up of which was to cost China 40% of GDP and a possible banking collapse, and yet, they claim, nothing bad happened. The doomsayers were wrong, the last banking crisis was easily managed, and Chinese growth surged. But although I think the pessimists are wrong to expect a banking collapse, the optimists are nonetheless very mistaken, largely because they implicitly assumed away the cost of the bank recapitalization. In fact China paid a very high price for its banking crisis. The cost didn't come in the form of a banking collapse but rather in the form of a collapse in consumption growth as households were forced to pay for the enormous cleanup bill...

China Financial Markets; China's bad loans; pay.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-03-04 08:47 EST

Stuck in neutral -- what Japan's rebalancing can teach us

Michael Pettis

...A few days ago I read a good article (``Stuck on Neutral'') about Japan [from] the Economist...about Japan's post-1989 rebalancing, ...discusses why, in spite of every attempt, Japan has not been able supposedly to rebalance the economy and achieve any real growth during the two lost decades after 1990. Private consumption never took off to drive economic growth...After many years of excess investment driving growth, Japan's rebalancing process, which occurred after corporate, bank and government debt levels prevented the investment party from continuing, locked the country into many years of slow growth because it had to grind through years of debt-fueled overinvestment...it doesn't matter what individual policies we take to boost consumption if these polices don't in the aggregate represent a real transfer of income to the household sector, as they did not in Japan...Japan's experience suggests one of the risks China faces...Chinese household consumption will undoubtedly rise as a share of Chinese GDP over the next decade or two, but the process nonetheless can be disappointing for growth. It depends on lots of other moving parts, most importantly perhaps the change in investment and the speed with which income is transferred to households. And the change in investment might depend on debt capacity constraints and the extent of earlier overinvestment.

China Financial Markets; Japan's rebalancing; neutral; stuck; teach.