dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

liabilities Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

7 trillion unfunded liability (1); asset-liability matches (1); career liability (3); CFC liabilities (1); Contingent liabilities (1); corresponding liability created (1); equity liabilities (1); excess liability (1); external liabilities denominated (1); financial liabilities 1 (1); fund liabilities impaired (1); future liabilities (1); government liabilities (1); issue liabilities denominated (1); liabilities denominated (2); liability contingency (1); limit liability (1); major bank liabilities (1); outsourcing regulatory liability (1); s liabilities (1); unlimited liabilities coming (1).

The Baseline Scenario Wed 2010-09-08 10:36 EDT

Irish Worries For The Global Economy

...Ireland's difficulties arose because of a massive property boom financed by cheap credit from Irish banks. Ireland's three main banks built up loans and investments by 2008 that were three times the size of the national economy; these big banks (relative to the economy) pushed the frontier in terms of reckless lending. The banks got the upside, and then came the global crash...Today roughly one-third of the loans on the balance sheets of major banks are nonperforming...The government responded to this with what are currently regarded as ``standard'' policies in Europe and America. It guaranteed all the liabilities of banks and began injecting government funds to keep these financial institutions afloat. It bought the most worthless assets from banks, paying them government bonds in return. Ministers have promised to recapitalize banks that need more capital. Despite or perhaps because of this therapy, financial markets are beginning to see Ireland as Europe's next Greece...Until very recently, Ireland was seen as Europe's poster child of prudent reforms...The ultimate result of Ireland's bank bailout exercise is obvious: one way or another, the government will have converted the liabilities of private banks into debts of the sovereign (that is, Irish taxpayers), yet the nation probably cannot afford these debts...The idea that Ireland, Greece or Portugal can cut spending and grow out of overvalued exchange rates with still large budget deficits, while servicing all their debts and building more debt, is proving -- not surprisingly -- wrong...

Baseline Scenario; global economy; Irish worries.

Mon 2010-08-16 13:54 EDT

Could The US Become Another Ireland? >> The Baseline Scenario

As Greece acts in an intransigent manner, refusing to act decisively despite deep fiscal difficulties, the financial markets look on Ireland all the more favorably. Ireland is seen as the poster child for prudent fiscal adjustment among the weaker eurozone countries...Ireland's perceived ``success'' is partly due to its draconian fiscal cuts...Ireland's difficulties arose because of a massive property boom financed by cheap credit from Irish banks...Today roughly 1/3 of the loans on the balance sheets of banks are non-performing or ``under surveillance''...The government...guaranteed all the liabilities of banks and then began injecting government funds...it is planning to buy the most worthless assets from banks and pay them government bonds in return. Ministers have also promised to recapitalize banks than need more capital. The ultimate result of this exercise is obvious: one way or another, the government will have converted the liabilities of private banks into debts of the sovereign (i.e., Irish taxpayers)...The government is gambling that GDP growth will recover to over 4% per year starting 2012 -- and they still plan further major expenditure cutting and revenue increasing measures each year until 2013...The latest round of bank bailouts (swapping bad debts for government bonds) dramatically exacerbates the fiscal problem...

Baseline Scenario; Becomes; Ireland.

Wed 2010-07-28 10:55 EDT

Economics: No, America lacks the necessary commitment to stimulus | The Economist

...the US today is suffering from a balance sheet recession, a very rare ailment which happens only after the bursting of a nationwide debt-financed asset price bubble. In this type of recession, the private sector is minimising debt instead of maximising profits because the collapse in asset prices left its balance sheets in a serious state of excess liability and in urgent need of repair...fiscal stimulus becomes indispensible in a balance sheet recession. Moreover, the stimulus must be maintained until private sector deleveraging is over...When the deficit hawks manage to remove the fiscal stimulus while the private sector is still deleveraging, the economy collapses and re-enters the deflationary spiral. That weakness, in turn, prompts another fiscal stimulus, only to see it removed again by the deficit hawks once the economy stabilises. This unfortunate cycle can go on for years if the experience of post-1990 Japan is any guide. The net result is that the economy remains in the doldrums for years, and many unemployed workers will never find jobs in what appears to be structural unemployment even though there is nothing structural about their predicament...

America lacked; economic; Economist; necessary commitments; stimulus.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-07-22 10:17 EDT

Do sovereign debt ratios matter?

...No aspect of history seems to repeat itself quite as regularly as financial history. The written history of financial crises dates back at least as far back as the reign of Tiberius, when we have very good accounts of Rome's 33 AD real estate crisis...we have only begun the period of sovereign default. The major global adjustments haven't yet taken place and until they do, we won't have seen the full consequences of the global crisis...there is no threshold debt level that indicates a country is in trouble. Many things matter when evaluating a country's creditworthiness...there are at least five important factors in determining the likelihood that a country will be suspend or renegotiate certain types of debt...With inverted debt, the value of liabilities is positively correlated with the value of assets, so that the debt burden and servicing costs decline in good times (when asset prices and earnings rise) and rise in bad times...Inverted debt structures leave a country extremely vulnerable to debt crises...

China Financial Markets; sovereign debt ratios matter.

Fri 2010-06-18 10:37 EDT

Monetary Economics Review

Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth, W. Godley and M. Lavoie, Palgrave/Macmillan, London, 2007...Acknowledging the existence of a complex institutional structure that includes households, firms, banks and governments (sometimes separated from the Central Bank), "our aspiration is to introduce a new way in which an understanding can be gained as to how these very complicated systems work as a whole"...the "new way" referred above is currently known as Stock-Flow Consistent modelling (SFC)...The main bid of Godley and Lavoie (G&L, from now on) is to show (successfully, one could note) that the SFC models make it necessary to fully articulate an accounting structure, avoiding "black holes", gaining in consistency, accuracy, and providing a common framework for the comparison of different models...one gets really convinced that it is the type of approach that makes it possible to analyse a great number of elements and complexities of the real world, as much as one wishes!...G&L adopt an institutional classification (households, firms, banks, government and the central bank). All the models presented in the book start with a "balance sheet" matrix, where all the assets and liabilities of each sector are described...

Monetary Economics Review.

Tue 2010-06-01 18:24 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirit of debate ... my reply Part 2

Today, I offer Part 2 of my responses to the comments raised in the debate so far...Modern monetary theory does not use the term ``money'' in the same way as the mainstream because it creates instant confusion. As Scott said ``Money is always someone's liability, so better to be precise about whose liabilities we are talking about than saying money.'' That is why we emphasis fully understanding the asset-liability matches that occur in monetary systems. And that leads you to realise that transactions between government and non-government create or destroy net financial assets denominated in the currency of issue whereas transactions within the non-government sector cannot create net financial positions...So modern monetary theorists prefer to concentrate on what is going on with balance sheets after certain flows have occured rather than narrowly defining some financial assets as money and others not...There is no doubt that the non-government institutions can increase credit. Some slack analysts call this an increase in money. But the accurate statement is that, as a matter of accounting it increases the (in Scott's words) ``the quantity of financial assets and financial liabilities 1 for 1 in the non-govt sector. So, with private credit, there is BY DEFINITION no NET increase in private sector financial assets created.'' Once we understand that and note that typically the non-government sector seeks to net save in the currency of issue then modern monetary theory tells you that the public sector must run a deficit to underwrite this desired net saving or else see an output gap widen...Who is in control is an interesting question. Clearly, the government cannot directly control the money supply which renders much of the analysis in mainstream macroeconomics textbooks as being irrelevant. The Monetarists via Milton Friedman persuaded central banks to adopt monetary targetting in the 1980s and it failed a few years later -- miserably...Then you might like to consider it from the other angle -- a government which accepts responsibility for full employment can ``finance'' the saving desires of the non-government sector by increasing its deficit up to the level warranted by the spending gap (left by the full employment non-government savings)...Orthodox macroeconomic theory struggles with the idea of involuntary unemployment and typically tries to fudge the explanation by appealing to market rigidities (typically nominal wage inflexibility). However, in general, the orthodox framework cannot convincingly explain systemic constraints that comprehensively negate individual volition. The modern monetary framework clearly explicates how involuntary unemployment arises. The private sector, in aggregate, may desire to spend less of the monetary unit of account than it earns. In this case, if this gap in spending is not met by government, then unemployment will occur. Nominal (or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless they somehow eliminate the private sector desire to net save and increase spending...to maintain high levels of employment and given that the public generally desire to hold some reserves of fiat money, the government balance will normally have to be in deficit...modern monetary theory demonstrates that if you want the non-government sector to net save...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply Part 2; Spirit.

Tue 2010-06-01 17:29 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirt of debate ... my reply

...Steve Keen and I agreed to foster a debate about where modern monetary theory sits with his work on debt-deflation. So yesterday his blog carried the following post, which included a 1000-odd word precis written by me describing what I see as the essential characteristics of modern monetary theory. The discussion is on-going on that site and I invite you to follow it if you are interested. Rather than comment on all the comments over on Steve's site, I decided to collate them here (in part) and help develop the understanding that way. That is what follows today... We distinguish the horizontal dimension (which entails all transactions between entities in the non-government sector) from the vertical dimension (which entails all transactions between the government and non-government sector)...A properly specified model will show you emphatically that the horizontal transactions between household, firms, banks and foreigners (which is the domain of circuit theory) have to net to zero even if asset portfolios are changing in composition. For every asset created there will be a corresponding liability created at the same time...you will make errors if there is not an explicit understanding that in an accounting (stock-flow) consistent sense all these transaction will net to zero. In adopting this understanding you might abstract from analysing the vertical transactions that introduced the high-powered money in the first place, but never deny its importance in setting the scene for the horizontal transactions to occur. I think the differences between Steve's models and modern monetary theory are two-fold. First, I do not think that Steve's model is stock-flow consistent across all sectors. By leaving out the government sector (even implicitly) essential insights are lost that would avoid conclusions that do not obey basic and accepted national accounting (and financial accounting) rules. This extends to how we define money. Second, I think Steve uses accounting in a different way to that which is broadly accepted. It might be that for mathematical nicety or otherwise this is the chosen strategy but you cannot then claim that your models are ground in the operational reality of the fiat monetary system we live in. I have no problem with abstract modelling. But modern monetary theory is firmly ground in the operational reality and is totally stock-flow consistent across all sectors. If we used the same definitions and rendered Steve's model stock-flow consistent in the same way as modern monetary theory then Steve's endogenous money circuits would come up with exactly the same results as the horizontal dimensions in modern monetary theory. His results might look a bit different in accounting terms but most of the message he wishes to portray about the dangers of Ponzi stages in the private debt accumulation process would still hold.

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply; spirt.

The Wall Street Examiner Sun 2010-05-09 09:55 EDT

Taking a Minsky Cruise on the Flow of Funds Datastream (part 1)

...Banks (who are, of course, owned by people, equity liabilities are not included in that data set) have always had a big lien on the country, but that lien has doubled (relative to GDP) since 1980. Households used to be a major source of finance in the country but as their distaste for debt faded along with memories of the depression they started to borrow more than they leant. Then, as restrictions to foreign capital inflows fell (how else to maintain a trade deficit without settling in specie) the Rest of the World became a significant source of funds. In 2001, The RoW overtook US Households as a source of funding and this trend has accelerated. Warren Buffett was wrong, we weren't going to become a sharecropper society, we already were one...

flowing; Funds Datastream; Minsky Cruise; Part 1; take; Wall Street Examiner.

zero hedge Fri 2010-04-23 20:02 EDT

How Lehman, With The Fed's Complicity, Created Another Illegal Precedent In Abusing The Primary Dealer Credit Facility

Five months ago, Zero Hedge observed the nuances of the Federal Reserve's Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and concluded that this artificial liquidity boosting construct was nothing more than yet another scam to allow banks to extract ever more money from taxpayers, with the complicit blessing of the Federal Reserve Board Of New York (as the original piece also provided an in-depth discussion of the triparty repo market which is now a parallel to the buzzword of the day in the form of Lehman's "Repo 105" off balance sheet contraption, it should serve as a useful refresher course to anyone who wishes to understand why while Repo 105 with its $50 billion in liability contingency may have been an issue, the true Repo market, with over $3 trillion of likely just as toxic assets, is where the real pain in the future will come from). The PDCF would allow assets of declining and even inexistent value to be pledged as collateral, thus making sure that taxpayer cash was funneled into sham institutions holding predominantly toxic assets, and whose viability was and is limited, yet still is backed by the Fed, which to this day continues to pour our money into them. Today, with a tip from the NYT's Eric Dash, we demonstrate just how grossly negligent the Federal Reserve was when it came to Lehman's abuse of the PDCF, and how the trail of slime of Lehman's increasingly obvious manipulation of its books goes to the very top of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and its then governor - a very much complicit Tim Geithner...

abuse; created; Fed's Complicity; Illegal Precedent; Lehman; Primary Dealers Credit Facility; Zero Hedge.

The Money Game Fri 2010-03-19 12:38 EDT

Kenneth Rogoff's Sovereign Debt Warnings Are So Wrong, It's Like He's Living In A Different Time Period

We've persistently taken the view that there is no economic doctrine, no magic number, which would imply a firm external constraint as far as public spending goes, when dealing with a sovereign government issuing debt its own floating rate, non-convertible currency. At some point, we may indeed have a resource constraint, or an inflation constraint, but not a national solvency issue. Yet the hysteria surrounding fiscal policy has moved from the realm of rational debate and metamorphosed into a matter of national theology...A sovereign government is never hostage to the dictates of financial capital because it no longer faces the external constraint that was always present under a gold standard regime. A nation that adopts its own floating rate currency can always afford to put unemployed domestic resources to work. Its government may issue liabilities denominated in its own currency (for interest rate maintenance reasons or to offer its savers an interest-bearing alternative to cash), and will service any debt it issues in its own currency...

different time periods; Kenneth Rogoff's Sovereign Debt Warnings; lively; Money game; wrong.

Fri 2010-02-12 21:32 EST

Priceless: How The Federal Reserve Bought The Economics Profession

The Federal Reserve, through its extensive network of consultants, visiting scholars, alumni and staff economists, so thoroughly dominates the field of economics that real criticism of the central bank has become a career liability for members of the profession, an investigation by the Huffington Post has found. This dominance helps explain how, even after the Fed failed to foresee the greatest economic collapse since the Great Depression, the central bank has largely escaped criticism from academic economists. In the Fed's thrall, the economists missed it, too...

economics profession; Federal Reserve bought; priceless.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-01-08 19:29 EST

Limiting the destruction wrought by irrational exuberance in a one-party state

I wanted to highlight a piece [Matt Taibbi] wrote yesterday called Fannie, Freddie, and the New Red and Blue. The crux of his argument is this: The partisan rhetoric is on full display in the dust-up over the unlimited liabilities coming from Fannie and Freddie thrust upon taxpayers on Christmas Eve. This rhetoric is not just beside the point, it is specifically designed to obscure the point, namely that both Democrats and Republicans, private industry and the government are culpable in the shambles our economic system has become...We effectively have a one-party system when it comes to investment in the present economic, power, and wealth structure.

destruction Wrought; irrational exuberance; limit; naked capitalism; party state.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Wed 2009-11-25 12:05 EST

What Is Inflation and How Does One Measure It?

...Inflation is a net expansion of money supply and credit, where credit is marked to market. Deflation is the opposite: a net contraction of money supply and credit, where credit is marked to market...Credit (and credit problems) dwarf monetary concerns at the present...I still expect the US to slip in and out of deflation and recession for years to come just as happened in Japan...banks aren't lending, consumer credit is contracting, credit writeoffs are likely to exceed monetary printing, and symptoms like treasury yields are in generally in agreement...To bail out the banks' poor bets on Dot-Com companies and Latin America in 2001-2002, Greenspan purposely ignited a credit bubble that led to the mother of all housing crashes. In response to the housing bust, the Fed refused to let failed banks go out of business and is attempting to force another credit bubble...However, this is the end of the line. Housing was the bubble of last resort, nothing can come close to the number of jobs created by the global housing bubble. Further attempts to reflate will do nothing but create a currency crisis, crash the economy, and add to future liabilities that cannot be paid back.

Inflation; measured; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-10-27 12:18 EDT

Guest Post: Capitalism, Socialism or Fascism?

What is the current American economy: capitalism, socialism or fascism? ...Nouriel Roubini writes ``We're essentially continuing a system where profits are privatized and...losses socialized.'' Nassim Nicholas Taleb says ``the government is socializing all these losses by transforming them into liabilities for your children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren.'' Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz calls it ``socialism for the rich'' ...leading journalist Robert Scheer writes: ``What is proposed is not the nationalization of private corporations but rather a corporate takeover of government. The marriage of highly concentrated corporate power with an authoritarian state that services the politico-economic elite at the expense of the people is more accurately referred to as ``financial fascism'''' ...Italian historian Gaetano Salvemini argued in 1936 that fascism makes taxpayers responsible to private enterprise, because ``the State pays for the blunders of private enterprise... Profit is private and individual. Loss is public and social'' ...one of the best definitions of fascism -- the one used by Mussolini -- is the ``merger of state and corporate power`` ...Nobel prize-winning economist George Akerlof co-wrote a paper in 1993 describing the causes of the S&L crisis and other financial meltdowns...[Looting is the] common thread [when] countries took on excessive foreign debt, governments had to bail out insolvent financial institutions, real estate prices increased dramatically and then fell, or new financial markets experienced a boom and bust...Our theoretical analysis shows that an economic underground can come to life if firms have an incentive to go broke for profit at society's expense (to loot) instead of to go for broke (to gamble on success). Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt obligations ...Whether we use the terminology regarding socialism-for-the-giants (''socialized losses''), of fascism (''public and social losses''), or of looting (''left the government holding the bag for their eventual and predictable losses''), it amounts to the exact same thing. [kleptocracy] Great comments, including Joseph: Three core ideas characterize the myth of our society: 1. Free market; 2. Capitalism; 3. Democracy. The conceptual error that people make is to think that they are compatible, or indeed represent aspect of the same thing. In fact they are all deeply antagonistic towards each other. It is the miracle of post-war society that we managed to hold them in balance for so long. That balance has now been destroyed. A simple example of the contradiction, and the one that the over-socialised right finds most confusing, is the contradiction between capitalism and the market. Capitalism is a system of ownership; the market is a system of distribution. The perfect world for the capitalist is one in which they are price setters in terms of the commodities they produce and labour they employ -- ie a state of monopoly. Each individual capitalist seeks the destruction of the market. What has occurred over the past year is not corruption; it is the triumph of capitalism. The market and democracy have been defeated. Not socialism, not fascism,...

capitalism; Fascism; Guest Post; naked capitalism; social.

Willem Buiter's Maverecon Sat 2009-10-10 13:13 EDT

I know I know nothing; but at least I know that

...Except for the important qualifier that the US dollar is a global reserve currency, and that the US government (and private sector) has most of its domestic and external liabilities denominated in US dollars, the pathologies of financial boom, bubble and bust in the US, the UK, Iceland, Ireland and Spain (and many of the Central and East European emerging market economies) track those of classical emerging market crises in South America, Asia and CEE in the 1990s, rather well. The emerging market analogy makes one less optimistic about a robust recovery, as typically, emerging markets whose financial sector was destroyed by a serious financial crisis took many years to recover their pre-crisis growth rates and often never recovered their pre-crisis GDP paths.

know; least; Willem Buiter's Maverecon.

The IRA Analyst Mon 2009-09-21 17:23 EDT

Exposure at Default: As Banks Shrink, So Does the Economy

...before Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and the other G-20 finance ministers set about to raise capital levels, they need to understand that the earnings of the banking industry are going to be impaired for years as the cost of resolving failed banks is repaid. Restoring solvency is the first issue for many banks, then we can talk about increased capital and restrictions on risk taking equally. And as the banking industry shrinks defensively in order to conserve capital and fund liabilities impaired by realized losses, the credit available to the US economy also shrinks. You can't have economic growth without credit growth...Bottom line is that deflation is still the chief threat to the US economy, driven by a relentless contraction in bank and nonbank credit. Until we see a restoration of the market for nonbank finance and a sustained turn in the EAD of the large bank peer group, which accounts for almost 70% of the entire US industry balance sheet, we do not believe that any economic recovery will be meaningful in terms of jobs or asset prices.

Banks Shrink; default; economy; exposure; IRA Analyst.

naked capitalism Sun 2009-09-20 10:17 EDT

Guest Post: Ambrose Evans-Pritchard & the City's hard EU choices

The City's political clout in Brussels is waning as the UK's financial industry model has gone from being the envy of the European peers to being a liability. Meanwhile, the EU will in the future probably be proposing new banking and financial services legislation that may be superficially marketed by decision-makers as striving to provide a clear cut with the existing Anglo-Saxon casino model. This guest post will discuss some of the fundamental choices that the City is facing, the most significant being whether or not to be advocating a UK withdrawal from the EU altogether.

Ambrose Evans Pritchard; City's hard EU choices; Guest Post; naked capitalism.

The Full Feed from HuffingtonPost.com Thu 2009-09-17 10:06 EDT

Priceless: How The Federal Reserve Bought The Economics Profession

The Federal Reserve, through its extensive network of consultants, visiting scholars, alumni and staff economists, so thoroughly dominates the field of economics that real criticism of the central bank has become a career liability for members of the profession, an investigation by the Huffington Post has found. This dominance helps explain how, even after the Fed failed to foresee the greatest economic collapse since the Great Depression, the central bank has largely escaped criticism from academic economists.

com; economics profession; Federal Reserve bought; full Feeds; HuffingtonPost; priceless.

naked capitalism Sun 2009-09-13 13:59 EDT

Why Economists Rarely Say Bad Things About the Fed

The Federal Reserve, through its extensive network of consultants, visiting scholars, alumni and staff economists, so thoroughly dominates the field of economics that real criticism of the central bank has become a career liability for members of the profession, an investigation by the Huffington Post has found...DownSouth comments ``The collusion between state and academe is the post-Enlightenment version of the old alliance that existed between church and state in the Ancien Régime. Academe currently fulfills the same function that the church did before, and that is to give the state the imprimatur of moral and intellectual legitimacy.''

Economists Rarely Say Bad Things; Fed; naked capitalism.

Bruce Krasting Sat 2009-09-12 12:10 EDT

SSTF Shocker - $6B August Deficit

The Social Security Trust Fund reported an August net deficit of $5.865 Billion. This is the largest monthly deficit in nineteen years...This deficit is now the seventh in the past twelve months. That pace has never been seen before...Social Security is the mother of all systemic risks. Even the debate on this topic brings risk. It will expose an additional $7 trillion unfunded liability. Another reason for holders of dollars to worry.

6B August Deficit; Bruce Krasting; SSTF Shocker.

Tue 2008-08-26 00:00 EDT

The End of the Beginning -- Developments in the Credit Crisis

The End of the Beginning - Developments in the Credit Crisis, by Satyajit Das (Prudent Bear); 2008-05-27; ``limited recognition of the massive de-leveraging of the global financial system that is under way.'' ``The banking systems ability to supply credit is significantly impaired and will remain so for the foreseeable future.'' ``Changes in financial markets will have a significant impact on many companies that now rely on financial engineering rather than real engineering'' Das proposes: ``holdings and values of risky assets held by banks and investment banks must be accurately determined...Risky assets must be valued on a hold-to-maturity basis...Mark-to-market accounting should be suspended...Capital levels should be set on a bank-by-bank basis by regulators...Capital requirements should be eased...government [should] guarantee of all major bank liabilities''

Begins; credit crisis; develop; ending.

Mon 2008-08-04 00:00 EDT

London Banker: What's up with the covered bond push?

"Whenever Henry Paulson at Treasury, Ben Bernanke at the Fed and Shiela Bair at FDIC agree on anything, American taxpayers should check for their wallets...When the troubled bank nonetheless fails, our golden circle creditors get the good collateral in an expedited release from FDIC under its new policy statement. The FDIC is left with all the toxic waste assets and liability for depositor insurance claims, with no prospect of recovery"

covered bond push; London Banker; s.

Mon 2008-07-07 00:00 EDT

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: The Outlook for Inflation and the Likelihood of $60 Oil - July 7, 2008

"government spending expansion, regardless of the form, will tend to raise the marginal utility of goods and services while lowering the marginal utility of government liabilities.", hence encouraging inflation

2008; 60 oil; Hussman Funds; Inflation; July 7; likelihood; outlook; weekly market comments.

Tue 2008-05-13 00:00 EDT

Interfluidity :: Counterparty of last resort?

Fed purchasing mortgage-backed securities; Will Fed have contingent liabilities, counterparty exposures?

counterparty; Interfluidity; resort.

Wed 2008-05-07 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: An Involuntary Transaction: Why BAC + CFC May Never Close

Involuntary Transaction or Why BAC+CFC May Never Close, by Institutional Risk Analytics; Reis and Flynn, False Security; historic resemblence to 1920s; BAC is unable to close the CFC transaction due to uncertainty regarding CFC liabilities; CFC debt holders urged to pull Chapter 7 bankruptcy trigger!

BAC; CFC; closed; Institutional Risk Analyst; Involuntary Transaction.

Fri 2007-11-09 00:00 EST

Calculated Risk: WaMu and The Rep War

by Tanta: "outsourcing regulatory liability to a third party bag-holder and doing business on a representation and warranty basis without pre-sale due diligence" are mortgage industry lynch-pins

Calculated Risk; Rep War; WaMu.