Tue 2010-04-27 08:22 EDT

Anecdotal Economics: A Chicken in Every VAT

...The retail consumer is back, and she* is in the mood to shop, we reliably are told. The Census Bureau reported March 2010 Advance Retail and Food Service Sales improved 7.6 percent from a year ago, and for 1Q2010 are 5.5 percent above 1Q2009...So why do state sales tax revenues tell a different, disconnected story? In the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government's April 2010 State Revenue Report, which chronicles the woeful status of state tax collections, concludes that sales tax collections fell almost 9.0 percent in 2009, a statistically significant 2.8 percent more than the reported decline in retail and food service sales made up estimated by the Census Bureau...It's a significant disconnect between theory (Census Bureau) and reality (actual sales tax collections), much as the similar, significant disconnect between the Employment Situation reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (theory), which appears to be masking the true extent of unemployment in America with all those marginally attached and discouraged workers, and the meaningful decline in actual payroll tax withholdings (reality), as reported by the Treasury Department in its Daily Treasury Statements...

Anecdotal Economics; chickens; VAT.

THE PRAGMATIC CAPITALIST Wed 2010-04-07 18:22 EDT

THE ENRON BANKING SYSTEM

TPC

``Panics do not destroy capital -- they merely reveal the extent to which it has previously been destroyed by its betrayal in hopelessly unproductive works'' -- John Mills ...We should draw a distinct line in the sand between banks and diverse risk taking firms. There are always going to be Enron's in the economy, but why should we allow our entire banking sector to mirror Enron? Taking a 30,000 foot risk management view I say something must be done to ensure these banks can never do this again. Turn banks into true banks. Hedging and exotic business models are fine. Just don't commingle them under the same umbrella as a deposit taking ``bank''. With that, a few ideas come to mind: * Our banking system should be aligned with the goals of the nation to help ``grease'' the wheels of the economic growth engine of the United States. Banks should be more like utilities and less like hedge funds. Otherwise, banking becomes counter-productive and potentially destructive. * Banks should not be allowed to exact onerous fees on the public or enact a business model which is inherently dependent on driving their customers deeper and deeper into debt. This undermines the entire goal of productive economic growth. * ``Banks'' should be true lending institutions. Non-traditional banking operations and products such as CDS, ``off balance sheet'' finance, derivatives as collateral and such would be deemed illegal unless performed only by non banking/lending institutions (such as hedge funds) so as to insulate the public and true lending institutions from the risk taking, ``hedging'', and ``financial innovation'' of firms such as Lehman Brothers.

ENRON BANKING SYSTEM; pragmatic capitalists.

Bruce Krasting Tue 2010-03-09 17:10 EST

Some Thoughts on Fannie's Horrible Year

Bruce Krasting

Fannie Mae released it's annual and 4th Q numbers after the close on Friday and during one hell of a messy snowstorm. FNM posted a loss of $16.3b for the quarter and $74.4b for the year. An unmitigated disaster. The timing of the release suggests that they were hoping that no one would notice how bad the last twelve months were. There was nothing particularly new in the most recent quarter, just more bad news. What is happening at Fannie is also happening at Freddie Mac and to a different extent at FHA. There are some trends that I think are worth noting...they have moved to restrict lending to better borrowers...all three of the D.C. mortgage lenders are pulling on the credit reins...It will be harder to get a mortgage in one month from today and even harder to get one six moths from today. For me the implications of this are very obvious. Broad RE values will have to go lower, high-end homes will suffer the most in percentage drops...the biggest seller of RE over the past 24 months in America has been the federal government...The vast majority of defaults come because borrowers are underwater. Falling RE prices are the number one contributor to the default cycle...

Bruce Krasting; Fannie's Horrible Year; thought.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-03-04 08:47 EST

Stuck in neutral -- what Japan's rebalancing can teach us

Michael Pettis

...A few days ago I read a good article (``Stuck on Neutral'') about Japan [from] the Economist...about Japan's post-1989 rebalancing, ...discusses why, in spite of every attempt, Japan has not been able supposedly to rebalance the economy and achieve any real growth during the two lost decades after 1990. Private consumption never took off to drive economic growth...After many years of excess investment driving growth, Japan's rebalancing process, which occurred after corporate, bank and government debt levels prevented the investment party from continuing, locked the country into many years of slow growth because it had to grind through years of debt-fueled overinvestment...it doesn't matter what individual policies we take to boost consumption if these polices don't in the aggregate represent a real transfer of income to the household sector, as they did not in Japan...Japan's experience suggests one of the risks China faces...Chinese household consumption will undoubtedly rise as a share of Chinese GDP over the next decade or two, but the process nonetheless can be disappointing for growth. It depends on lots of other moving parts, most importantly perhaps the change in investment and the speed with which income is transferred to households. And the change in investment might depend on debt capacity constraints and the extent of earlier overinvestment.

China Financial Markets; Japan's rebalancing; neutral; stuck; teach.

Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST

What the PBoC cannot do with its reserves

Michael Pettis

...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.

PBoC cannot; reserves.

Thu 2010-01-07 20:04 EST

Hard times at the Washington Post

Dean Baker

The Washington Post is a newspaper with a proud legacy. It has done much important reporting over the years, most famously its coverage of the Watergate scandal that resulted in the resignation of Richard Nixon. Unfortunately, it seems to have abandoned its journalistic standards. In its last issue of the decade, it published as a news piece an article by the Peter Peterson Foundation-funded Fiscal Times. This compromised the Post's journalistic integrity to the extent that readers can no longer take it seriously.

hard times; Washington Post.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

John P. Hussman

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.

Thu 2009-10-22 14:25 EDT

Nieman Watchdog > Commentary > Where's the reporting on the fraud that led to the crash?

University of Texas economist and author James Galbraith believes the press has paid too little attention to investigating the ``criminal and felonious behavior'' involved in the economic crash of last year. ``The press as a whole used [Ponzi-schemer] Bernie Madoff as the emblem of wrongdoing, but compared to the wrongdoing in the housing sector, the Madoff scandal was small-bore,'' Galbraith told Nieman Watchdog in a recent interview. ``The press has tended a bit to treat this issue [mortgage related fraud] as a kind of boys-will-be-boys phenomenon. The press has not been aggressive in investigating this the way they should, to point out to readers the extent to which we're talking about fraud -- criminal, felonious behavior -- that will end up with people in the penitentiary.''

commentary; Crash; fraud; led; Nieman Watchdog; report; s.

naked capitalism Thu 2009-10-08 16:47 EDT

Latvia in Crisis; Threatens to Stiff Swedish Banks With Mini-Jubilee

Latvia and to a lesser extent Estonia and Lithuania had a massive and unsustainable current account deficit...Foreign benefactors have just put the choke collar on Latvia. The government was unable to roll over its debt this week...Sweden on Tuesday put pressure on the tiny Baltic nation to fulfill required spending cuts, threatening to withhold payments [from a] euro rescue loan put together by Nordic countries...But Latvia does not appear to be ready to accede to Sweden's demands. The immediate cause for concern is that Latvia will simultaneously devalue its currency and provide a mechanism for its consumers to partially default on mortgages held by foreign banks.

Crisis; Latvia; Mini-Jubilee; naked capitalism; Stiff Swedish Banks; threatens.

Mon 2008-12-15 00:00 EST

London Banker: Deflation has become inevitable

``The extent to which capital has been betrayed in the past quarter century under Bretton Woods II, bank deregulation and the Basle Capital Adequacy Accords is unrivalled in the history of fiat banking.''

becomes inevitably; deflation; London Banker.