China Financial Markets Thu 2010-03-04 08:47 EST

Stuck in neutral -- what Japan's rebalancing can teach us

Michael Pettis

...A few days ago I read a good article (``Stuck on Neutral'') about Japan [from] the Economist...about Japan's post-1989 rebalancing, ...discusses why, in spite of every attempt, Japan has not been able supposedly to rebalance the economy and achieve any real growth during the two lost decades after 1990. Private consumption never took off to drive economic growth...After many years of excess investment driving growth, Japan's rebalancing process, which occurred after corporate, bank and government debt levels prevented the investment party from continuing, locked the country into many years of slow growth because it had to grind through years of debt-fueled overinvestment...it doesn't matter what individual policies we take to boost consumption if these polices don't in the aggregate represent a real transfer of income to the household sector, as they did not in Japan...Japan's experience suggests one of the risks China faces...Chinese household consumption will undoubtedly rise as a share of Chinese GDP over the next decade or two, but the process nonetheless can be disappointing for growth. It depends on lots of other moving parts, most importantly perhaps the change in investment and the speed with which income is transferred to households. And the change in investment might depend on debt capacity constraints and the extent of earlier overinvestment.

China Financial Markets; Japan's rebalancing; neutral; stuck; teach.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:09 EST

The downfall of Washington Mutual - Puget Sound Business Journal (Seattle)

Kirsten Grind

WaMu suffered through not one but two bank runs in its final months. The first run was many times larger than the run that felled California lender IndyMac in July 2008, though neither shareholders nor the public knew about it. WaMu survived that run, and the second run was tapering off when regulators moved in and shut the bank, citing the run as the reason. In addition, WaMu's top executives, led by CEO Alan Fishman, were trying to sell the bank after federal regulators imposed a deadline, only to discover that they were being undermined by those same regulators, executives say. The government's plan to seize the bank, if it became known beforehand, would cause potential buyers to immediately cool their heels, because buying after a government takeover would be a lot cheaper than even the desperate private purchase deal that Fishman was seeking.

downfall; Puget Sound Business Journal; Seattle; Washington Mutual.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-11-03 20:12 EST

Nine More Banks Fail with CIT on Deck for a Packaged Bankruptcy While Gold Shines

Jesse

...The current state of economics is most remarkable for its arrogant complacency in the face of two failed bubbles, a near systemic failure, a pseudo-scientific perversion of mathematics exposed, and an incredible capacity for spin and self-delusion. The people wish to believe, and Wall Street and the government economists are all too willing to tell them whatever they wish to hear, for a variety of motives. And there is an army of salesmen and lobbyists and econo-whores touting this fraud around the clock...There are good reasons for this failure of American "monetary capitalism," and it has to do with an oversized financial sector and a surplus of white collar crime that both distort and drain the productive economy. The current approach is to pump money into a failed system without attempting to reform it, to fix its fundamental flaws, to make an honest accounting of the results. The result are serial bubbles and the foundation for long duration zombie economy with a grinding stagflation that may morph into a currency crisis and the fall and reissuance of the dollar, as we saw with the Russian rouble. It will stretch the political fabric of the US to the breaking point. This is how oligarchies and their empires fall.

banks failed; CIT; deck; gold shines; Jesse's Café Américain; packaged bankruptcies.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.