dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.
s | net

S Net Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

government's net fiscal deficit means (1); PBoC's net indebtedness (1); private sector's net fiscal surplus (1); s nets fiscally (2).

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-07-29 17:00 EDT

James Montier does MMT

It seems that a lot of analysts have caught onto the MMT framework popularized by the late economist Wynne Godley and made topical in this downturn by Rob Parenteau of the Richebacher Letter...Now, it's James Montier's turn...He concluded: ``There is a danger the proposed fiscal tightening in the eurozone will lead to further deflation and economic collapse. The Spanish government faces what Mr Parenteau calls ``the paradox of public thrift'': the less it borrows, the more it will end up owing. It is unfortunate that it has taken a severe global recession to vindicate Prof Godley's macroeconomic analysis. If economic policymakers start to pay more attention to financial balances, they might forestall the next crisis. European politicians might also understand the potentially dreadful consequences of their new-found frugality.'' ...A downward shift in the government's net fiscal deficit means a downward shift in the private sector's net fiscal surplus -- totally doable except for this little thing called debt in places like Spain, the US, Ireland or the UK. Moreover, the savings rate is already incredibly low in countries like the U.S. and the U.K. If the government tries to pare its fiscal deficit, the result will not be less private sector savings to meet the lower public sector deficit, but rather lower aggregate demand and a larger deficit -- that's the paradox of thrift...

credit writedowns; James Montier; MMT.

Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST

What the PBoC cannot do with its reserves

...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.

PBoC cannot; reserves.