dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

indebtedness Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

Iceland's increased indebtedness (1); PBoC's net indebtedness (1); plaintiff's indebtedness (1); ruinous indebtedness (1).

Fri 2010-10-08 21:27 EDT

Bank of America Suspends Foreclosures in All States >> naked capitalism

Yves Smith

...The robo signing of affidavits was clearly done across all sorts of court actions. As we indicated, the bogus affidavits are used in all foreclosures in judicial states; they aver various things about the plaintiff's indebtedness, including the plaintiff's ownership of the debt that are integral to the process. Providing an improper affidavit is considered to be a fraud on the court...affidavit abuses are mere symptoms of much deeper problems with the mortgage securitizations. Why, pray tell, are law firms and servicers engaging in false representations and widespread document forgeries? It is because, as we have stressed, they made a botch of getting the notes (the borrower IOU) into the trusts, and simple fixes don't work, hence the need to create a phony document trail. The Bank of America suspension of foreclosures in all states appears to be a tacit admission that the problems are as pervasive as we have suggested...

America suspends foreclosures; bank; naked capitalism; state.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-07-23 17:08 EDT

Deficits Do Matter, But Not the Way You Think

L. Randall Wray

In recent months, a form of mass hysteria has swept the country as fear of ``unsustainable'' budget deficits replaced the earlier concern about the financial crisis, job loss, and collapsing home prices. What is most troubling is that this shift in focus comes even as the government's stimulus package winds down and as its temporary hires for the census are let go. Worse, the economy is still -- likely -- years away from a full recovery. To be sure, at least some of the hysteria has been manufactured by Pete Peterson's well-funded public relations campaign, fronted by President Obama's National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform -- a group that supposedly draws members from across the political spectrum, yet are all committed to the belief that the current fiscal stance puts the nation on a path to ruinous indebtedness...[however] the notion of ``fiscal sustainability'' or ``solvency'' is not applicable to a sovereign government -- which cannot be forced into involuntary default on debts denominated in its own currency...If we can get beyond the fears of national insolvency then there are many issues that can be fruitfully discussed. While inflation will not be a problem for many years, price pressures could return some day. Impacts of exchange rate instability are important, at least for some nations. Unemployment is a chronic problem, even at business cycle peaks. Aging does raise serious questions about allocation of resources, especially medical care. Poverty and homelessness exist in the midst of relative abundance. Simply recognizing that our sovereign government cannot go bankrupt does not solve those problems, but it does make them easier to resolve...

Deficit; matter; naked capitalism; Think; way.

Mon 2010-04-05 15:16 EDT

Eleven lessons from Iceland

Thorvaldur Gylfason

Iceland's economic crisis has destroyed wealth equivalent to about seven times its GDP. The damage inflicted on foreign creditors, investors, and depositors amounts to about five times its GDP, while the asset losses thrust upon Icelandic residents account for the rest. These figures do not include the cost of Iceland's increased indebtedness. Iceland's gross public debt, domestic and foreign, is estimated to increase by more than 100% of GDP as a result of the collapse of the banks, or from 29% of GDP at the end of 2007 to 136% by the end of 2010. In 2009, the government spent almost as much on interest payments as on healthcare and social insurance, the single largest public expenditure item. The damage due to Iceland's tarnished reputation is harder to assess...the absence of checks and balances that had led to an unbalanced division of power between the strong executive branch and the much weaker legislative and judicial branches came to haunt the country when unscrupulous politicians put the new banks in the hands of reckless owners who then found themselves in a position to expand their balance sheets as if there were no tomorrow -- and no supervision. Politicians who privatise banks by delivering them on a silver plate to their friends are not very likely to subject the banks to stringent supervision or other such inconveniences...What can be done to reduce the likelihood of a repeat performance -- in Iceland and elsewhere?

Iceland; Lessons.

Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST

What the PBoC cannot do with its reserves

Michael Pettis

...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.

PBoC cannot; reserves.

Copyright © 2010 dimelab. All rights reserved.