Rajiv Sethi Mon 2010-09-20 10:04 EDT

An Extreme Version of a Routine Event

Rajiv

The flash crash of May 6 has generally been viewed as a pathological event, unprecedented in history and unlikely to be repeated in the foreseeable future...far from being a pathological event, the flash crash was simply a very extreme version of a relatively routine occurrence...the flash crash can provide us with insights into the more general dynamics of prices in speculative asset markets...The crash revealed with incredible clarity how (as James Tobin observed a long time ago) markets can satisfy information arbitrage efficiency while failing to satisfy fundamental valuation efficiency...Aside from scale and speed, one major difference between the flash crash and its more routine predecessors was the unprecedented cancellation of trades...this was a mistake: losses from trading provide the only mechanism that currently keeps the proliferation of destabilizing strategies in check...

extreme version; Rajiv Sethi; routine event.

naked capitalism Wed 2010-09-08 17:27 EDT

Economic consequences of speculative side bets -- The case of naked CDS

Yeon-Koo Che and Rajiv Sethi

...We argue that the existence of naked credit default swaps has significant effects on the terms of financing, the likelihood of default, and the size and composition of investment expenditures. And we identify three mechanisms through which these broader consequences of speculative side bets arise: collateral effects, rollover risk, and project choice...the existence of zero-sum side bets on default has major economic repercussions. These contracts induce investors who are optimistic about the future revenues of borrowers, and would therefore be natural purchasers of debt, to sell credit protection instead. This diverts their capital away from potential borrowers and channels it into collateral to support speculative positions. As a consequence, the marginal bond buyer is less optimistic about the borrower's prospects, and demands a higher interest rate in order to lend. This can result in an increased likelihood of default, and the emergence of self-fulfilling paths in which firms are unable to rollover their debt, even when such trajectories would not arise in the absence of credit derivatives. And it can influence the project choices of firms, leading not only to lower levels of investment overall but also in some cases to the selection of riskier ventures with lower expected returns...

Case; economic consequences; naked capitalism; Naked CDS; speculative side bets.

Tue 2010-08-03 14:34 EDT

Rajiv Sethi: The Economics of Hyman Minsky [2009-12-03]

There has been a resurgence of interest in the economic writings of Hyman Minsky over the past few years, and for good reason...Minsky's theoretical framework combines a cash-flow approach to investment with a theory of financial instability...expectations of financial tranquility are self-falsifying. Stability, as Minsky liked to put it, is itself destabilizing...An essential feature of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is that a long period of sustained stability gives rise to changes in financial practices which are not conducive to the persistence of stable growth...A sustained period of stability gives rise to optimistic expectations and a rise in speculative financing...if a large number of investments which are prompted by the availability of speculative finance are found to be inept, so that immediate cash flows are significantly lower than expected, then the need for short-term refinancing becomes acute while at the same time banks are less willing to roll over existing debt. A sharp rise in short-term interest rates occurs which can lead to present value reversals, a rush towards liquidity, a plunge in the prices of illiquid assets, both real and financial, and a corresponding drop in new investments...described as a credit crunch, a state of financial distress, or a financial crisis...

2009-12-03; economic; Hyman Minsky; Rajiv Sethi.

Rajiv Sethi Tue 2010-06-15 14:25 EDT

Defenders and Demonizers of Credit Default Swaps

Rajiv Sethi

The recent difficulties faced by Greece (and some other eurozone states) in rolling over their national debt has let some to blame hedge fund involvement in the market for credit default swaps...Leaving aside the question of whether naked CDS trading has been good or bad for Greece, it is worth asking whether there exist mechanisms through which such contracts can ever have destabilizing effects. I believe that they can, for reasons that Salmon and Jones would do well to consider...such contracts allow pessimists to leverage (much more so than they could if they were to short bonds instead). The resulting increase in the cost of borrowing, which will rise in tandem with higher CDS spreads, can make the difference between solvency and insolvency. And recognition of this process can tempt those who are not otherwise pessimistic to bet on default, as long as they are confident that enough of their peers will also do so. This clearly creates an incentive for coordinated manipulation...

Credit Default Swap; defending; demonic; Rajiv Sethi.

Wed 2010-06-09 18:56 EDT

Rajiv Sethi: The New Market Makers

...the SEC's preliminary report on the flash crash...led me to believe that most of this activity was caused by algorithmic trading strategies placing directional bets based on rapid responses to incoming market data. Two strategies in particular -- momentum ignition and order anticipation -- were explicitly mentioned as potentially destabilizing forces in the SEC's January Concept Release on Equity Market Structure. The SEC invited comments on the release, and dozens of these have been posted to date. There is one in particular, submitted by R.T. Leuchtkafer about three weeks before the crash, that I think is especially informative and analytically compelling...Leuchtkafer traces the history of recent changes in market microstructure and examines the resulting implications for the timing of liquidity demand and supply...The standard argument against increased regulation of the new market makers is that it would interfere with their ability to supply liquidity. Leuchtkafer argues, instead, that the strategies used by these firms cause them to demand liquidity at precisely those moments when liquidity is shortest supply...

New Market Makers; Rajiv Sethi.