dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

incentives Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

Bear Gave JP Morgan Strong Incentives (2); cause due-diligence incentives (1); create incentives (2); deformed incentives (1); giving away massive incentives (1); incentive structure (1); Perverse incentives (1); poorly aligned incentives (1); private counterparty incentives (1); Rating Agencies Created Incentives (1); strong incentive (3).

Sat 2010-08-07 20:57 EDT

Medicare Trustees: Fund Now Viable till 2029 >> naked capitalism

Don't expect this updated assessment, that Medicare now is expected to be viable till 2029, to stem the expected push to gut Social Security and Medicare...the stresses on Medicare are due...almost solely [to] the rising health care cost projections...the US has grotesquely costly health care which produces no better results than that of other advanced economies. And the differences, in terms of rationing and queuing, are exaggerated. What are insurer denials of coverage for costly treatments if not rationing?...Obama, as with the banking industry, blew his opportunity to have a real impact on the underlying problems of health care that lead to high costs, including its fee for service model and perverse incentives.

2029; funds; Medicare trustees; naked capitalism; viable.

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-08-05 20:20 EDT

Do Deficits Matter? Foreign Lending to the Treasury

...a US current account deficit will be reflected in foreign accumulation of US Treasuries, held mostly by foreign central banks...While this is usually presented as foreign ``lending'' to ``finance'' the US budget deficit, one could just as well see the US current account deficit as the source of foreign current account surpluses that can be accumulated as treasuries...most public discussion ignores the fact that the Chinese desire to run a trade surplus with the US is linked to its desire to accumulate dollar assets...all of the following are linked...the willingness of Chinese to produce for export, the willingness of China to accumulate dollar-denominated assets, the shortfall of Chinese domestic demand that allows China to run a trade surplus, the willingness of Americans to buy foreign products, the (relatively) high level of US aggregate demand that results in a trade deficit, and the factors that result in a US government budget deficit...I am not arguing that the current situation will go on forever, although I do believe it will persist much longer than most commentators presume...there are strong incentives against the sort of simple, abrupt, and dramatic shifts often posited as likely scenarios...I expect that the complexity as well as the linkages among balance sheets ensure that transitions will be moderate and slow...

credit writedowns; deficits matter; foreign lending; Treasury.

New Deal 2.0 Fri 2010-07-16 18:50 EDT

Despite Foreign Debts, U.S. Has the Upper Hand

U.S. public debt as of July 8, 2010 was $ 13.192 trillion against a projected 2010 GDP of $14.743 trillion. As of April 2010, China held $900.2 billion of US Treasuries, surpassing Japan's holding of $795.5 billion. As of 2007, outstanding GSE (Government Sponsored Enterprises like Fanny Mae; Freddy Mac) debt securities (non-mortgage and those backed by mortgages) summed up to $7.37 trillion. Does this mean disaster for the US? ...the U.S., while vulnerable, is not critically over a barrel by massive foreign holdings of U.S. sovereign debt. The reason is because U.S. sovereign debts are all denominated in dollars, a fiat currency that the Federal Reserve can issue at will. The U.S. has no foreign debt in the strict sense of the term. It has domestic debt denominated in its own fiat currency held in large quantities by foreign governments. The U.S. is never in danger of defaulting on its sovereign debt because it can print all the dollars necessary to pay off foreign holders of its debt. There is also no incentive for the foreign holders of U.S. sovereign debt to push for repayment, as that will only cause the U.S. to print more dollars to cause the dollar to fall further in exchange rates... ...trade globalization through cross-border wage arbitrage also pushes down wages in the US and other advanced economies, causing insufficient consumer income to absorb rising global production. This is the main cause of the current financial crises which have made more severe by financial deregulation. But the root cause is global overcapacity due to low wages of workers who cannot afford to buy what they produce. The world economy is plagued with overcapacity as a result. It is not enough to merely focus on job creation. Jobs must pay wages high enough to eliminate overcapacity. Instead of a G20 coordination on fiscal austerity, there needs to be a G20 commitment to raise wages globally. [Henry C.K. Liu]

0; Foreign debt; new dealing 2; U.S.; upper hand.

Rajiv Sethi Tue 2010-06-15 14:25 EDT

Defenders and Demonizers of Credit Default Swaps

The recent difficulties faced by Greece (and some other eurozone states) in rolling over their national debt has let some to blame hedge fund involvement in the market for credit default swaps...Leaving aside the question of whether naked CDS trading has been good or bad for Greece, it is worth asking whether there exist mechanisms through which such contracts can ever have destabilizing effects. I believe that they can, for reasons that Salmon and Jones would do well to consider...such contracts allow pessimists to leverage (much more so than they could if they were to short bonds instead). The resulting increase in the cost of borrowing, which will rise in tandem with higher CDS spreads, can make the difference between solvency and insolvency. And recognition of this process can tempt those who are not otherwise pessimistic to bet on default, as long as they are confident that enough of their peers will also do so. This clearly creates an incentive for coordinated manipulation...

Credit Default Swap; defending; demonic; Rajiv Sethi.

New Economic Perspectives Mon 2010-05-24 10:52 EDT

The Coming European Debt Wars

Government debt in Greece is just the first in a series of European debt bombs that are set to explode. The mortgage debts in post-Soviet economies and Iceland are more explosive. Although these countries are not in the Eurozone, most of their debts are denominated in euros. Some 87% of Latvia's debts are in euros or other foreign currencies, and are owed mainly to Swedish banks, while Hungary and Romania owe euro-debts mainly to Austrian banks. So their government borrowing by non-euro members has been to support exchange rates to pay these private sector debts to foreign banks, not to finance a domestic budget deficit as in Greece...No one wants to accept the fact that debts that can't be paid, won't be. Someone must bear the cost as debts go into default or are written down, to be paid in sharply depreciated currencies...The question is, who will bear the loss?...There is growing recognition that the post-Soviet economies were structured from the start to benefit foreign interests, not local economies. For example, Latvian labor is taxed at over 50% (labor, employer, and social tax) -- so high as to make it noncompetitive, while property taxes are less than 1%, providing an incentive toward rampant speculation...Future relations between Old and New Europe will depend on the Eurozone's willingness to re-design the post-Soviet economies on more solvent lines -- with more productive credit and a less rentier-biased tax system that promotes employment rather than asset-price inflation that drives labor to emigrate...

Coming European Debt Wars; New Economic Perspectives.

The Guardian World News Wed 2009-11-25 10:31 EST

What was really behind the crash?

In an exclusive extract from his new book, John Cassidy explains why the huge salaries of Wall Street bosses created a culture that helped trigger the financial crisis...In the wake of last year's crash, even some top bankers have conceded that Wall Street remuneration schemes lead to excessive risk-taking...But without direct government involvement, the effort to reform Wall Street compensation won't survive the next market upturn. For although the financial sector as a whole has an interest in controlling rampant short-termism and irresponsible risk-taking, individual firms have an incentive to hire away star traders from any rivals that have introduced pay limits. Compensation reforms, therefore, are bound to break down. In this case, as in many others, the only way to reach a socially desirable outcome is to enforce compliance. And the only body that can do that is the government.

Crash; Guardian World News; really.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

Tue 2009-10-27 12:58 EDT

Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit by George Akerlof, Paul Romer

During the 1980s, a number of unusual financial crises occurred. In Chile, for example, the financial sector collapsed, leaving the government with responsibility for extensive foreign debts. In the United States, large numbers of government-insured savings and loans became insolvent - and the government picked up the tab. In Dallas, Texas, real estate prices and construction continued to boom even after vacancies had skyrocketed, and the suffered a dramatic collapse. Also in the United States, the junk bond market, which fueled the takeover wave, had a similar boom and bust. In this paper, we use simple theory and direct evidence to highlight a common thread that runs through these four episodes. The theory suggests that this common thread may be relevant to other cases in which countries took on excessive foreign debt, governments had to bail out insolvent financial institutions, real estate prices increased dramatically and then fell, or new financial markets experienced a boom and bust. We describe the evidence, however, only for the cases of financial crisis in Chile, the thrift crisis in the United States, Dallas real estate and thrifts, and junk bonds. Our theoretical analysis shows that an economic underground can come to life if firms have an incentive to go broke for profit at society's expense (to loot) instead of to go for broke (to gamble on success). Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt obligations.

bankruptcy; Economic Underworld; George Akerlof; Looting; Paul Romer; profits.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-10-27 12:18 EDT

Guest Post: Capitalism, Socialism or Fascism?

What is the current American economy: capitalism, socialism or fascism? ...Nouriel Roubini writes ``We're essentially continuing a system where profits are privatized and...losses socialized.'' Nassim Nicholas Taleb says ``the government is socializing all these losses by transforming them into liabilities for your children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren.'' Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz calls it ``socialism for the rich'' ...leading journalist Robert Scheer writes: ``What is proposed is not the nationalization of private corporations but rather a corporate takeover of government. The marriage of highly concentrated corporate power with an authoritarian state that services the politico-economic elite at the expense of the people is more accurately referred to as ``financial fascism'''' ...Italian historian Gaetano Salvemini argued in 1936 that fascism makes taxpayers responsible to private enterprise, because ``the State pays for the blunders of private enterprise... Profit is private and individual. Loss is public and social'' ...one of the best definitions of fascism -- the one used by Mussolini -- is the ``merger of state and corporate power`` ...Nobel prize-winning economist George Akerlof co-wrote a paper in 1993 describing the causes of the S&L crisis and other financial meltdowns...[Looting is the] common thread [when] countries took on excessive foreign debt, governments had to bail out insolvent financial institutions, real estate prices increased dramatically and then fell, or new financial markets experienced a boom and bust...Our theoretical analysis shows that an economic underground can come to life if firms have an incentive to go broke for profit at society's expense (to loot) instead of to go for broke (to gamble on success). Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt obligations ...Whether we use the terminology regarding socialism-for-the-giants (''socialized losses''), of fascism (''public and social losses''), or of looting (''left the government holding the bag for their eventual and predictable losses''), it amounts to the exact same thing. [kleptocracy] Great comments, including Joseph: Three core ideas characterize the myth of our society: 1. Free market; 2. Capitalism; 3. Democracy. The conceptual error that people make is to think that they are compatible, or indeed represent aspect of the same thing. In fact they are all deeply antagonistic towards each other. It is the miracle of post-war society that we managed to hold them in balance for so long. That balance has now been destroyed. A simple example of the contradiction, and the one that the over-socialised right finds most confusing, is the contradiction between capitalism and the market. Capitalism is a system of ownership; the market is a system of distribution. The perfect world for the capitalist is one in which they are price setters in terms of the commodities they produce and labour they employ -- ie a state of monopoly. Each individual capitalist seeks the destruction of the market. What has occurred over the past year is not corruption; it is the triumph of capitalism. The market and democracy have been defeated. Not socialism, not fascism,...

capitalism; Fascism; Guest Post; naked capitalism; social.

zero hedge Tue 2009-10-27 11:50 EDT

Freddie Mac Annualized Defaults Hit Record High At 7.3%, Even As Lending Increases Once Again

With the US government now having taken over the functions of such pristine subprime lenders as New Century, with the provision that it not only is not checking borrowers' credit scores, income potential, or other "facts" that the mortgage lenders at least pretended to care about, but also giving away massive incentives to promote housing bubble V2, it was only a matter of time before the taxpayer's balance sheet would start looking like an Angelo Mozilo wet dream. Today, Freddie Mac released its September Monthly Volume Summary and, as expected, it is beginning to look just like the subprime debacle is among us, only this time all of America is on the hook thanks to a brilliant Fed and the even more brilliant geniuses in D.C.

3; 7; Freddie Mac Annualized Defaults Hit Record High; lending increasingly; Zero Hedge.

The Baseline Scenario Mon 2009-10-12 09:41 EDT

Escape from Punchbowlism

When the Fed pumps money into the system to prevent deflation, the disincentive to holding cash/reserves is supposed to get money moving and thus restore the savings/investment equilibrium. In a sense, the goal is to decrease the incentive to use money as a store of value and therefore increase its use as a medium of exchange. Unfortunately, many conventional macroeconomists (unlike their brethren in the real-world finance schools) haven't admitted that this monetary stimulus ``leaks'' out of their models (which focus on closed domestic economies without moral hazard). Where does it go?

Baseline Scenario; escape; Punchbowl.

The Economic Populist - Speak Your Mind 2 Cents at a Time Sat 2009-10-10 12:53 EDT

Proposal: A New Mortgage Finance System

Our mortgage finance system is broken. It needs some serious restructuring or a complete overhaul. We can learn a lot about a new structure from the Danes. The Danish mortgage system is one of the oldest and most sophisticated housing finance markets in the world...Danish mortgage system is a pass-through system that allows mortgage borrowers to benefit from close to capital market financing conditions. In the Danish system, borrower/homeowner don't obtain a mortgage from a mortgage loan originator such as a bank or mortgage lender. They borrow from investors in a transparent and standardized bond market through a mortgage credit institution (MCI). MCI issues bonds in the bond market that match as much as possible the amount and maturity of the borrower's mortgage. The beauty of this system is that a mortgage is exactly matched and balanced with an actively traded bond. MCIs play the vital roles of advisors to the borrower/homeowner and bearer of the credit risk of the mortgage -- they remain ``on the hook'' in the event of delinquency or default. They are mortgage credit insurers. The MCI originator bears full responsibility for timely payments from the borrower/homeowner. So, MCI has an incentive to make sure borrower/homeowners obtain a mortgage loan that is affordable for that family. Meanwhile, bond investors worry about only interest rate risk, with complete insurance on the mortgage that backs the their bond investment. This makes for a highly efficient system.

economic populist; Mind 2 Cents; New Mortgage Finance System; proposed; speaking; Time.

Blog entry Sat 2009-09-19 13:28 EDT

The Angelides Commission: Tell America What Happened

Today the new Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, modeled after the New Deal-era Pecora Commission, begins its investigation into possible misconduct by the financial sector causing last year's market meltdown...We are pleased that the Financial Crisis Commission is coming together, under the leadership of chair Phil Angelides...the Commission should aspire to be the modern day version of the Senate Banking Hearings in the 1930s that came to be named after the chief counsel, Ferdinand Pecora...The Angelides Commission -- if it fearlessly lays out the facts, exposes the excesses, the deformed incentives, the frauds and crimes, that are at the root of the current crisis has the potential of playing a similar role to that of Pecora.

Angelides Commission; blog entry; happened; tell America.

Thu 2009-01-15 00:00 EST

Jesse's Café Américain: Too Big to Fail, Too Well-Connected to Jail: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit

Jesse's Café Américain: Too Big to Fail, Too Well-Connected to Jail: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit; ``Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt obligations.'' Akerlof and Romer; Yves Smith

bankruptcy; big; Economic Underworld; fail; jailed; Jesse's Café Américain; profits; well connections.

Fri 2008-11-07 00:00 EST

SSRN-Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit by George Akerlof, Paul Romer

(1994); ``Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt obligations.''

bankruptcy; Economic Underworld; George Akerlof; Paul Romer; profits; SSRN-Looting.

Tue 2008-08-26 00:00 EDT

The Credit Default Swap Market - Will It Unravel?

by Satyajit Das (Prudent Bear); 2008-03-04; "CDS contracts may create incentives for creditors to push troubled companies into bankruptcy"

credit default swaps market; unravelling.

Tue 2008-03-18 00:00 EDT

Dealbreaker - A Wall Street Tabloid - Business News Headlines and Financial Gossip - Why JP Morgan Did It Leverage Loans and Client Exposure To Shaky Financial Instruments Held By Bear Gave JP Morgan Strong Incentives To Rescue Bear's Portfolio

Dealbreaker - A Wall Street Tabloid - Business News Headlines and Financial Gossip - Why JP Morgan Did It Leverage Loans and Client Exposure To Shaky Financial Instruments Held By Bear Gave JP Morgan Strong Incentives To Rescue Bear's Portfolio, by John Carney

Bear Gave JP Morgan Strong Incentives; business news headlines; Client Exposure; Dealbreaker; Financial Gossip; JP Morgan; Leveraged Loans; Rescue Bear's Portfolio; Shaky Financial Instruments Held; Wall Street tabloid.

Fri 2007-11-16 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: Rating Agencies Created Incentives to Issue Paper More Profitable for Them to Rate

Einhorn on credit; rating agencies compromised; securitization flawed; charging too little for risk-bearing; rating agencies have privileged access to deal data; artificial securitization bias

issues papers; naked capitalism; profits; rate; Rating Agencies Created Incentives.