Rajiv Sethi Mon 2010-09-20 10:04 EDT

An Extreme Version of a Routine Event

Rajiv

The flash crash of May 6 has generally been viewed as a pathological event, unprecedented in history and unlikely to be repeated in the foreseeable future...far from being a pathological event, the flash crash was simply a very extreme version of a relatively routine occurrence...the flash crash can provide us with insights into the more general dynamics of prices in speculative asset markets...The crash revealed with incredible clarity how (as James Tobin observed a long time ago) markets can satisfy information arbitrage efficiency while failing to satisfy fundamental valuation efficiency...Aside from scale and speed, one major difference between the flash crash and its more routine predecessors was the unprecedented cancellation of trades...this was a mistake: losses from trading provide the only mechanism that currently keeps the proliferation of destabilizing strategies in check...

extreme version; Rajiv Sethi; routine event.

billy blog Mon 2010-09-20 09:39 EDT

The consolidated government -- treasury and central bank

...The notion of a consolidated government sector is a basic Modern Monetary Theory starting point and allows us to demonstrate the essential relationship between the government and non-government sectors whereby net financial assets enter and exit the economy without complicating the analysis unduly. This simplicity leads to many insights all of which remain valid as operational options when we add more detail to the model...the mainstream macroeconomics obsession with central bank independence is nothing more than an ideological attack on the capacity of government to produce full employment which also undermines our democratic rights...The vertical transactions which add to or drain the monetary base that I have outlined here are transactions between the government and the non-government sector... These transactions are thus unique -- they change net financial assets in the economy. All the transactions between private sector entities have no effect on the net financial assets in the economy at any point in time...

Billy Blog; central bank; consolidated government; Treasury.

Thu 2010-08-19 16:04 EDT

The AIG Bailout Scandal

William Greider

The government's $182 billion bailout of insurance giant AIG should be seen as the Rosetta Stone for understanding the financial crisis and its costly aftermath. The story of American International Group explains the larger catastrophe not because this was the biggest corporate bailout in history but because AIG's collapse and subsequent rescue involved nearly all the critical elements, including delusion and deception. These financial dealings are monstrously complicated, but this account focuses on something mere mortals can understand--moral confusion in high places, and the failure of governing institutions to fulfill their obligations to the public. Three governmental investigative bodies have now pored through the AIG wreckage and turned up disturbing facts--the House Committee on Oversight and Reform; the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which will make its report at year's end; and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), which issued its report on AIG in June. The five-member COP, chaired by Harvard professor Elizabeth Warren, has produced the most devastating and comprehensive account so far. Unanimously adopted by its bipartisan members, it provides alarming insights that should be fodder for the larger debate many citizens long to hear--why Washington rushed to forgive the very interests that produced this mess, while innocent others were made to suffer the consequences. The Congressional panel's critique helps explain why bankers and their Washington allies do not want Elizabeth Warren to chair the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau...

AIG bailout scandal.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-07-19 17:07 EDT

Is the SEC Settlement Really a Win for Goldman?

Tom Adams and Yves Smith

...Conventional wisdom in the financial media is that the settlement announced by the SEC over its lawsuit on a Goldman 2007 Abacus CDO is a home run for Goldman. But a closer reading suggests that Goldman's victory is qualified, and the enthusiastic press response is in large measure due to the firm's skillful manipulation of perceptions...it is hard to see how anything in the settlement, if affirmed, would be negative for private parties considering lawsuits against sellers of CDOs...we imagine potential CDO investors will be mightily encouraged that Goldman ended up returning the full amount of investment to the one true third party investor in the deal -- IKB...An investor considering bringing an action against a bank that sold them a CDO that failed (meaning virtually all 2006 and 2007 ``mezzanine'' CDOs) would probably be encouraged that a bank was required to pay such a large amount for making inaccurate statements about the true nature of the CDO...Plaintiffs who sue CDO sellers have good reason to be optimistic...The settlement thus tarnishes the popular myth that the subprime shorts were insightful outsiders who executed ``the greatest trade ever''...the SEC has demonstrated that investors in such a CDO can win a recovery as a result of such inaccurate statements.

Goldman; naked capitalism; SEC Settlement Really; Wins.

billy blog Mon 2010-06-14 18:13 EDT

The OECDs perverted view of fiscal policy

...the big neo-liberal economic organisations like the IMF and the OECD are trying to re-assert their intellectual authority on the policy debate again after being unable to provide any meaningful insights into the cause of the global crisis or its immediate remedies. They were relatively quiet in the early days of the crisis and the IMF even issued an apology, albeit a conditional one. It is clear that the policies the OECD and the IMF have promoted over the last decades have not helped those in poorer nations solve poverty and have also maintained persistently high levels of labour underutilisation across most advanced economies. It is also clear that the economic policies these agencies have been promoting for years were instrumental in creating the conditions that ultimately led to the collapse in 2007. Now they are emerging, unashamed, and touting even more destructive policy frameworks...

Billy Blog; fiscal policies; OECDs perverted view.

Tue 2010-06-01 17:29 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirt of debate ... my reply

Bill Mitchell

...Steve Keen and I agreed to foster a debate about where modern monetary theory sits with his work on debt-deflation. So yesterday his blog carried the following post, which included a 1000-odd word precis written by me describing what I see as the essential characteristics of modern monetary theory. The discussion is on-going on that site and I invite you to follow it if you are interested. Rather than comment on all the comments over on Steve's site, I decided to collate them here (in part) and help develop the understanding that way. That is what follows today... We distinguish the horizontal dimension (which entails all transactions between entities in the non-government sector) from the vertical dimension (which entails all transactions between the government and non-government sector)...A properly specified model will show you emphatically that the horizontal transactions between household, firms, banks and foreigners (which is the domain of circuit theory) have to net to zero even if asset portfolios are changing in composition. For every asset created there will be a corresponding liability created at the same time...you will make errors if there is not an explicit understanding that in an accounting (stock-flow) consistent sense all these transaction will net to zero. In adopting this understanding you might abstract from analysing the vertical transactions that introduced the high-powered money in the first place, but never deny its importance in setting the scene for the horizontal transactions to occur. I think the differences between Steve's models and modern monetary theory are two-fold. First, I do not think that Steve's model is stock-flow consistent across all sectors. By leaving out the government sector (even implicitly) essential insights are lost that would avoid conclusions that do not obey basic and accepted national accounting (and financial accounting) rules. This extends to how we define money. Second, I think Steve uses accounting in a different way to that which is broadly accepted. It might be that for mathematical nicety or otherwise this is the chosen strategy but you cannot then claim that your models are ground in the operational reality of the fiat monetary system we live in. I have no problem with abstract modelling. But modern monetary theory is firmly ground in the operational reality and is totally stock-flow consistent across all sectors. If we used the same definitions and rendered Steve's model stock-flow consistent in the same way as modern monetary theory then Steve's endogenous money circuits would come up with exactly the same results as the horizontal dimensions in modern monetary theory. His results might look a bit different in accounting terms but most of the message he wishes to portray about the dangers of Ponzi stages in the private debt accumulation process would still hold.

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply; spirt.

zero hedge Fri 2009-12-18 13:20 EST

Focusing On (And Profiting From) The Upcoming Chinese Financial Crisis

Today's piece of contrarian economic insight comes once again from the strategists at SocGen, this time Dylan Grice, whose piece entitled "Popular Delusions: China's looming financial crisis will provide the next buying opportunity" is somewhat self explanatory. Not surprisingly, Dylan, who quotes the NBER, focuses on the overabundance of cheap credit as the catalyst that will ultimately topple the economy. Mr. Grice's conclusion: buy if you must, but wait for the credit bubble pop.

focused; profits; Upcoming Chinese Financial Crisis; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Wed 2009-11-25 10:10 EST

Shadow Banking Topology

A new paper by the IMF provides much needed insights into the nature of Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) conduits, which amounted to $1.2 trillion in June 2007, a subset of the broader Commercial Paper shadow asset class (which as Bill Dudley discussed a week ago, hit a peak of $2.3 trillion), and the product's role in funding imbalances (and maturity mismatch) at global banks courtesy of the shadow banking system. However, the most useful observation of the paper's addenda include insights into the global shadow banking system's holdings, as well as its changing composition over time, the collapse of the ABS securitization market whose reincarnation via TALF is critical for preventing the CRE market's implosion in 2012, and lastly a comprehensive overview of the entire shadow banking system...

Shadow Banking Topology; Zero Hedge.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

naked capitalism Sun 2009-09-13 15:59 EDT

Another Lehman Mess: No One Can Run the Software

Lehman's global derivatives book included contracts with a notional face value of $39,000bn and deals with 8,000 different counterparties when it went bust. The derivatives business was actually split into multiple strands, backed up by between 20 and 30 different systems. Once it went bankrupt, the staff who supported these systems "evaporated"...The more time goes by, the less insight remains in terms of the people who staffed those systems...Many previously hidden costs of running a derivatives business, including technology support of multiple disjointed systems, can no longer be discounted.

Lehman Mess; naked capitalism; running; software.

Tue 2009-01-06 00:00 EST

Jesse's Café Américain: US Treasuries and our Horribly Distorted International Currency Exchange Mechanism

Jesse's Café Américain: US Treasuries and our Horribly Distorted International Currency Exchange Mechanism; ``The key to recovery is the median real hourly wage, not the further expansion of credit and the perpetuation of an economic system based on an inefficient drag on economic growth by percentage-taking banks and rent-seeking elites who add little or no productive value.''; James Grant: Insight: Return-free risk

Horribly Distorted International Currency Exchange Mechanism; Jesse's Café Américain; Treasury.