Sat 2010-09-25 11:02 EDT

Where is the World Economy Headed?

Michael Hudson

...financial maneuvering and debt leverage play the role that military conquest did in times past. Its aim is still to control land, basic infrastructure and the economic surplus -- and also to gain control of national savings, commercial banking and central bank policy...Indebted ``host economies'' are in a similar position to that of defeated countries. Their economic surplus is transferred abroad financially, while locally, debtors lose sovereignty over their own financial, economic and tax policy. Public infrastructure is sold off to foreign buyers, on credit and therefore paying interest and fees that are expensed as tax-deductible and paid to foreigners. The Washington Consensus applauds this pro-rentier policy. Its neoliberal ideology holds that the most efficient path to wealth is to shift economic planning out of the hands of government into those of bankers and money managers in charge of privatizing and financializing the economy. Almost without anyone noticing, this view is replacing the classical law of nations based on the idea of sovereignty over debt and financial policy, tariff and tax policy...Bankers in the North look upon any economic surplus -- real estate rent, corporate cash flow or even the government's taxing power or ability to sell off public enterprises -- as a source of revenue to pay interest on debts...The original liberals -- from Adam Smith and the Physiocrats through John Stuart Mill and even Winston Churchill -- urged that the tax system be based on the economic rent of land so as to keep down the price of housing (and hence labor's cost of living). The Progressive Era followed this principle by aiming to keep natural monopolies such as transportation, communication and even banks (or at least, free credit creation) in the public domain. But the post-1980 world has encouraged private owners to buy them on credit and extract economic rent, thereby shifting the tax burden onto labor, industry and agriculture -- while concentrating wealth, first on credit and then via the enormous recent public bailouts of this failed financial debt pyramiding and deregulation...At issue is the concept of free markets. Are they to be free from monopoly and special privilege, or free for the occupying financial invaders and speculators?...

World Economy Headed.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-09-20 19:10 EDT

American Businesses and Consumers are NOT Deleveraging ... They Are Going On One Last Binge

Everyone knows that the American consumer is deleveraging ... living more frugally, and paying down debt. Right?...Karl Denninger notes: ``From a peak in 2005 of $13.1 trillion in equity in residential real estate, that value has now diminished by approximately half to $6.67 trillion!Yet outstanding household debt has in fact increased from $11.7 trillion to $13.5 trillion today. Folks, those who claim that we have ``de-levered'' are lying. Not only has the consumer not de-levered but business is actually gearing up -- putting the lie to any claim that they have ``record cash.'' Well, yes, but they also have record debt, and instead of decreasing leverage levels they're adding to them'' ...the government has done everything it can to prevent deleveraging by the financial companies, and to re-lever up the economy to dizzying levels.

American businesses; Binge; consumer; deleveraging; Go; naked capitalism.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-09-17 18:52 EDT

Why Do We Keep Indulging the Fiction That Banks Are Private Enterprises?

... Big finance has an unlimited credit line with governments around the globe. ``Most subsidized industry in the world'' is inadequate to describe this relationship. Banks are now in the permanent role of looters, as described in the classic Akerlof/Romer paper. They run highly leveraged operations, extract compensation based on questionable accounting and officially-subsidized risk-taking, and dump their losses on the public at large...The usual narrative, ``privatized gains and socialized losses'' is insufficient to describe the dynamic at work. The banking industry falsely depicts markets, and by extension, its incumbents as a bastion of capitalism. The blatant manipulations of the equity markets shows that financial activity, which used to be recognized as valuable because it supported commercial activity, is whenever possible being subverted to industry rent-seeking. And worse, these activities are state supported...banks can no longer meaningfully be called private enterprises, yet no one in the media will challenge this fiction...

bank; fiction; Keep Indulging; naked capitalism; private enterprise.

Sat 2010-08-07 19:40 EDT

The biggest lie about U.S. companies

Brett Arends' ROI - MarketWatch

You may have heard recently that U.S. companies have emerged from the financial crisis in robust health, that they've paid down their debts, rebuilt their balance sheets and are sitting on growing piles of cash they are ready to invest in the economy...It's a crock...their debts have been rising, not falling. By some measures, they are now more leveraged than at any time since the Great Depression...gross domestic debts of nonfinancial corporations now amount to 50% of GDP. That's a postwar record...net leverage is nearly 50% of corporate net worth, a modern record...

biggest lie; U.S. companies.

PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM Thu 2010-08-05 19:52 EDT

REGARDING THOSE ``STRONG'' CORPORATE BALANCE SHEETS

TPC

Brett Arends had an excellent piece on MarketWatch yesterday regarding the true state of US corporations...the total debts of these companies has...skyrocketed...corporations are even worse off today (in terms of debt levels) than they were when the crisis began...It's not just the consumer and banking sectors that remain overly indebted and poorly positioned in the long-run. The period of de-leveraging (balance sheet recession) is likely far from over and the continuation of the private sector weakness likely to continue until the problem of debt is accepted and dealt with...Private sector demand for debt is likely to remain very tepid and this will exacerbate the risk of deflation and economic weakness.

corporate balance sheets; PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM; strong.

PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM Mon 2010-07-19 13:35 EDT

PROPERTY FALLS, MORTGAGES STAY THE SAME

TPC

While property prices have fallen 30% over the last two years mortgage debt remains larlgely unchanged from peak levels. Housing Story asks if the de-leveraging is a myth? ...The current evidence points to continued weakness in housing prices going forward...

mortgages stay; PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM; property fall.

Rajiv Sethi Tue 2010-06-15 14:25 EDT

Defenders and Demonizers of Credit Default Swaps

Rajiv Sethi

The recent difficulties faced by Greece (and some other eurozone states) in rolling over their national debt has let some to blame hedge fund involvement in the market for credit default swaps...Leaving aside the question of whether naked CDS trading has been good or bad for Greece, it is worth asking whether there exist mechanisms through which such contracts can ever have destabilizing effects. I believe that they can, for reasons that Salmon and Jones would do well to consider...such contracts allow pessimists to leverage (much more so than they could if they were to short bonds instead). The resulting increase in the cost of borrowing, which will rise in tandem with higher CDS spreads, can make the difference between solvency and insolvency. And recognition of this process can tempt those who are not otherwise pessimistic to bet on default, as long as they are confident that enough of their peers will also do so. This clearly creates an incentive for coordinated manipulation...

Credit Default Swap; defending; demonic; Rajiv Sethi.

Credit Writedowns Thu 2010-06-03 17:56 EDT

Guest Post: The 2004 Fed Transcripts: A Methodical, Diabolical Destruction of America's "Wealth"

Frederick Sheehan

The Federal Reserve releases transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings with a five-year lag (as required by law, the Fed would like to burn them). Transcripts for 2004 meetings were released on April 30, 2010...FOMC transcripts in 2004 confirm the Fed was afraid of markets...The FOMC seemed most concerned that higher rates might interfere with the carry trade. In the sad tale of The Financialization of the United States, the carry trade deserves a chapter...By 2004, the carry trade was a mammoth enterprise of hedge funds and banks. The too-big-to-fail banks were, by now, leveraging their own internally managed hedge funds, managing their own proprietary trading desks, and also lending to highly leveraged hedge funds. Leverage, and, the belief that access to rising levels of credit would never end, pushed up asset values on bank balance sheets -- whether real estate, bonds, stocks, or private-equity. This increased the banks' lending capacity which encouraged banks to lend more...Markets believed asset prices would only go up for many silly reasons. Belief in the Greenspan Put may have been the silliest but also the most influential...Federal Reserve Governor Donald Kohn...told his confreres that Federal Reserve policy was to distort asset prices. He also said this was deliberate and desirable. In other words, distorted asset prices were not an unfortunate consequence of such-and-such Fed policy. The Fed's goal was to distort asset prices...Consumer spending exceeded consumer income...This strategy of fixing asset prices at an artificially high rate to fool the American people into spending money they did not have was diabolical...The manipulation of markets and of the American people has grown worse under Bernanke's chairmanship...

2004 Fed Transcripts; America's; credit writedowns; Diabolical Destruction; Guest Post; Method; wealth.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2010-05-06 13:44 EDT

Control Frauds HyperInflate and Extend Bubbles Maximizing Damage - A Control Fraud at Work in the Silver Market Short Positions?

Jesse

Here is a working paper by William K. Black about 'control frauds' and how they relate to the most recent credit crisis in the United States, a breakdown of stewardship that has placed the rest of the world's financial sector at risk as well...``Control frauds'' are seemingly legitimate entities controlled by persons that use them as a fraud ``weapon.'' A single control fraud can cause greater losses than all other forms of property crime combined. This article addresses the role of control fraud in financial crises. Financial control frauds' primary weapon is accounting. Fraudulent lenders produce exceptional short-term ``profits'' through a four-part strategy: extreme growth (Ponzi), lending to uncreditworthy borrowers, extreme leverage, and minimal loss reserves...

Control Frauds HyperInflate; controls Fraud; Extend Bubbles Maximizing Damage; Jesse's Café Américain; Silver Market Short Positions; working.

Jesse's Café Américain Mon 2010-04-12 18:11 EDT

Most Wall Street Banks Using Lehman Style Accounting Trickery Enabled by the Fed to Hide Their Risk

Jesse

This analysis from the Wall Street Journal indicates that most of the big US Banks are engaging in the same kind of repo accounting at the end of the quarter that Lehman Brothers was doing to hide their financial instability until deteriorating credit conditions and liquidity problems made them precipitously collapse, as all ponzi schemes and financial frauds do when the truth becomes known. The basic exercise is to hold big leverage and dodgy debt, but swap it off your books with the Fed at the end of each quarter for a short period of time when you have to report your holdings...

Fed; hide; Jesse's Café Américain; Risk; Wall Street Banks Using Lehman Style Accounting Trickery Enabled.

Jesse's Café Américain Wed 2010-04-07 19:00 EDT

"How to Corner the Gold Market" By Janet Tavakoli

Jesse

Janet Tavakoli wrote an interesting essay that was just posted over at the Huffington Post called "How to Corner the Gold Market" which can be read in its entirety from her website here...What struck me as odd is that I just wrote a blog piece along similar lines on the same topic today, raising many of the same issues, but that is from the opposite perspective...there is little evidence that anyone is willing to take on the exchanges, even the big players, and try and force a corner or even a squeeze against what they perceive as mispricing, such as Soros and so many other big players did with the British Pound , and most recently other big hedge funds did with mispriced products from the latest bubble in the debt markets, and financial stocks...The piece I wrote today and reference above is about a situation in the precious metals markets which has the potential to become another serious problem for almost the same basic reasons as the debt markets in our most recent financial crisis: excessive leverage concentrated in a few TBTF institutions, lack of transparency, regulatory laxity, and a mispricing of risk...

corner; gold market; Janet Tavakoli; Jesse's Café Américain.

zero hedge Wed 2010-04-07 18:26 EDT

The Latest Gold Fraud Bombshell: Canada's Only Bullion Bank Gold Vault Is Practically Empty

Continuing on the trail of exposing what is rapidly becoming one of the largest frauds in commodity markets history is the most recent interview by Eric King with GATA's Adrian Douglas, Harvey Orgen (who recently testified before the CFTC hearing) and his son, Lenny, in which the two discuss their visit to the only bullion bank vault in Canada, that of ScotiaMocatta, located at 40 King Street West in Toronto, and find the vault is practically empty..."The game ends when the people who own all these paper obligations say enough and take physical delivery, and that's when the mess will occur."...It is funny that central bankers thought they could take the ponzi mentality of infinite dilution of all assets coupled with infinite debt issuance, as they have done to fiat money, and apply it to gold, in essence piling leverage upon leverage. They underestimated gold holders' willingness to be diluted into perpetuity - when the realization that gold owned is just 1% of what is physically deliverable, you will see the biggest bank run in history.

Bullion Bank Gold Vault; Canada's; Latest Gold Fraud Bombshell; practically empty; Zero Hedge.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2010-03-09 17:47 EST

Iceland Voters Reject Bank Bailouts in Crushing Electoral Defeat; Neo-Liberalism In Context

Jesse

...Iceland is a victim of the neo-liberal economic deregulation of the 1990's, in which a few bankers can buy the government, and rack up enormous profits for themselves in Ponzi like leverage, and then attempt to socialize the debt back to the people when their schemes collapse...

context; crushing electoral defeat; Iceland Voters Reject Bank Bailouts; Jesse's Café Américain; neo-liberalism.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-12-22 11:53 EST

``Basel III -- the OK, the Unfinished and the Ugly''

Richard Smith, who works for the London consultancy Cubematch whichspecialises in risk, collateral and change management

The BIS analysis of the 2007-09 banking crisis floats my boat. Here is their headline list of causes: excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage, diminutive and low quality capital bases, insufficient liquidity buffers at banks.

Basel III; naked capitalism; Ok; ugly; unfinished.

Mon 2009-12-21 18:24 EST

Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870-2008

Moritz Schularick, Alan M. Taylor

The crisis of 2008-09 has focused attention on money and credit fluctuations, financial crises, and policy responses. In this paper we study the behavior of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators over the long run based on a newly constructed historical dataset for 12 developed countries over the years 1870-2008, utilizing the data to study rare events associated with financial crisis episodes. We present new evidence that leverage in the financial sector has increased strongly in the second half of the twentieth century as shown by a decoupling of money and credit aggregates, and we also find a decline in safe assets on banks' balance sheets. We also show for the first time how monetary policy responses to financial crises have been more aggressive post-1945, but how despite these policies the output costs of crises have remained large. Importantly, we can also show that credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises...

1870-2008; Credit Booms Gone Bust; financial crises; leverage cycle; monetary policy.

Jesse's Café Américain Wed 2009-12-02 18:58 EST

The 38 Year Cycle in US Monetary History

Jesse

..the longer cycle of 38 years and some others, is that they involve what people call 'generational memory.' People as a group essentially forget the lessons of the past, and human nature being what it is, events based on bad judgement and reckless behaviour seem to recur at these intervals. If there was any 'tell' for the current crisis, it was the general overturning of the safeguards for the financial system that had been put in place in the aftermath of the financial panic of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed, culminating in the eventual overturn of Glass-Steagall and the ascendancy of extreme leverage using exotic, unregulated instruments. This is why we call this a generational change. This is no slump, no recession. And it is far from over. We are experiencing some major changes that are easily lost when one only looks at the day to day moves, listens to the description of events on the mainstream media, and of course, have a lack of memory, a knowledge of history, of things that have happened to their grandfathers and great grandfathers. The arrogant ignorance of so many still in place is a sure sign of greater chastisement to come, until the lessons of history are learned again, and the system is brought back into a sustainable balance.

38 Year Cycle; Jesse's Café Américain; monetary History.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

Tue 2009-10-27 13:03 EDT

`We still have the same disease' - The Globe and Mail

On anniversary of Lehman collapse, author of The Black Swan can say 'I told you so'...Nassim Nicholas Taleb: Central bankers have no clue. In the first place, the financial crisis was not a black swan. It was perfectly predictable. They ignored the phenomenal buildup in leverage since 1980. They acted like airline pilots who'd never heard of hurricanes. After finishing The Black Swan, I realized there was a cancer. The cancer was a huge buildup of risk-taking based on the lack of understanding of reality. The second problem is the hidden risk with new financial products. And the third is the interdependence among financial institutions.

disease; globe; mail.

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products Fri 2009-10-23 09:44 EDT

OTC Derivative Regulation Proposals ? Neat, Plausible and Wrong!

Satyajit Das

Proposals for over-the-counter (OTC) derivative regulations are consistent with H. L. Mencken?s proposition that: "there is always a well-known solution to every human problem--neat, plausible, and wrong." A central omission is the speculative use of derivatives. Industry lobbyists focus on the use of derivatives to hedge and manage risk promoting investment and capital formation. While derivatives can play this role, the primary use of derivatives now is manufacturing risk and creating leverage.

fears; financial products; loath; neat; OTC Derivative Regulation Proposals; plausible; Satyajit Das's Blog; wrong.

zero hedge Fri 2009-10-23 09:05 EDT

Fitch Expects CMBS Loss Severity To Rise Markedly Next Year

As anyone who has spent even a day looking at securitization tranching or CDS trading will tell you, there are two critical components to any investment that involves risky fixed income: cumulative loss probability and loss severity...artificial delays in bringing the CRE market to fair value in terms of delinquencies and REOs going to foreclosures will simply result in much lower eventual recoveries...the temporary reprieves granted to many leveraged securities will come back to bite investors when defaults eventually pick up again, however with the result being loss rates which will be much higher than default expectations.

Fitch Expects CMBS Loss Severity; Rise Markedly; years; Zero Hedge.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Fri 2009-10-23 08:47 EDT

Where The Hell Is The Outrage?

Michael Shedlock

The number of articles and opinions on Goldman Sachs earnings, bonuses, and influence pedaling over the past several days is quite stunning. Many have pointed out the problems; few have expressed outrage over what is happening in general, not just at Goldman Sachs... I am outraged and not just about Goldman Sachs, but about a process that allows, even encourages political pandering, by time and time again rewarding leveraged riverboat gamblers and failed institutions and at taxpayer expense...

hell; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; Outrage.

zero hedge Mon 2009-10-12 09:37 EDT

The 60% Plunge In Private Equity Deal Flow

If there is one sector that is really hurting despite the outperformance of all other asset classes (money being thrown at equities, bonds, and commodities without regard or prudence as Rosenberg has pointed out), it is private equity. Indeed, while credit has thawed in general, investors are still completely shutting out the 5x+ leverage transaction world: the bread and butter of the LBO business model. For a sober look at the desolation in the PE landscape, even as funds rush to raise more billions in dry equity powder which sits at banks collecting 1%, consider that YTD only $33 billion in 654 PE deals has been disclosed, a 60% drop from the 1,532 deals done through Q3 in 2008, and N/M when compared to the heady days of 2007....

60; plunge; Private Equity Deal Flow; Zero Hedge.

Jesse's Café Américain Sat 2009-10-10 11:52 EDT

Beta Monster: The Most Dangerous Banks In the World

Jesse

The most leveraged bank by far is the-investment-bank-which-must-not-be-named. It is followed by J.P. Morgan on a percentage basis, but JPM is far larger nominally than these charts indicate because of its much larger capital base. Its in the nature of the difference between a cardshark (GS) and a pawnshop (JPM). Or perhaps just the capital requirements of the short versus the long con. [Goldman Sachs astronomical credit exposure, trading revenue, derivatives exposure]

Beta Monsters; Dangerous Banks; Jesse's Café Américain; world.

Thu 2009-10-08 17:10 EDT

Recovering from Neoliberal Disaster - Why Iceland and Latvia Won't (and Can't) Pay

Michael Hudson

Can Iceland and Latvia pay the foreign debts run up by a fairly narrow layer of their population? The European Union and International Monetary Fund have told them to replace private debts with public obligations, and to pay by raising taxes, slashing public spending and obliging citizens to deplete their savings. Resentment is growing not only toward those who ran up these debts -- Iceland's bankrupt Kaupthing and Landsbanki with its Icesave accounts, and heavily debt-leveraged property owners and privatizers in the Baltics and Central Europe -- but also toward the neoliberal foreign advisors and creditors who pressured these governments to sell off the banks and public infrastructure to insiders. Support in Iceland for joining the EU has fallen to just over a third of the population, while Latvia's Harmony Center party, the first since independence to include a large segment of the Russian-speaking population, has gained a majority in Riga and is becoming the most popular national party. Popular protests in both countries have triggered rising political pressure to limit the debt burden to a reasonable ability to pay...

Iceland; Latvia; Neoliberal Disaster; pay; recover.

Thu 2009-09-17 09:31 EDT

Why capitalism fails - The Boston Globe

Stephen Mihm

Mainstream economics rediscovers Hyman Minsky; ``Instability,'' he wrote, ``is an inherent and inescapable flaw of capitalism.''...Minsky drew his own, far darker, lessons from Keynes's landmark writings, which dealt not only with the problem of unemployment, but with money and banking...Minsky argued that Keynes's collective work amounted to a powerful argument that capitalism was by its very nature unstable and prone to collapse. Far from trending toward some magical state of equilibrium, capitalism would inevitably do the opposite. It would lurch over a cliff...Minsky spent the last years of his life, in the early 1990s, warning of the dangers of securitization and other forms of financial innovation, but few economists listened. Nor did they pay attention to consumers' and companies' growing dependence on debt, and the growing use of leverage within the financial system... Minsky...argued for a ``bubble-up'' approach, sending money to the poor and unskilled first. The government - or what he liked to call ``Big Government'' - should become the ``employer of last resort,'' he said, offering a job to anyone who wanted one at a set minimum wage. It would be paid to workers who would supply child care, clean streets, and provide services that would give taxpayers a visible return on their dollars. In being available to everyone, it would be even more ambitious than the New Deal, sharply reducing the welfare rolls by guaranteeing a job for anyone who was able to work. Such a program would not only help the poor and unskilled, he believed, but would put a floor beneath everyone else's wages too, preventing salaries of more skilled workers from falling too precipitously, and sending benefits up the socioeconomic ladder.

Boston Globe; Capitalism Failed.

Tue 2009-04-21 00:00 EDT

Followup: Reserve Banking - The Market Ticker

defending fractional reserve lending; ``leverage limits prevent excessive expansion of credit without interfering with the intermediation function''; propose to set regulatory capital limits as the inverse of leverage; transparency of asset valuations

followup; Market Ticker; Reserve banks.