dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

co conspirators Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

knowing co-conspirator (1).

naked capitalism Sat 2010-07-24 16:34 EDT

Summer Rerun: ``Unwinding the Fraud for Bubbles''

This post first appeared on March 27, 2007. ...Telling the difference between the victims and the victimizers, the predators and the prey, and the fraudulent and the defrauded, is getting a lot harder when you have borrowers not required to make down payments able to lie about their incomes in order to buy a home the seller is overpricing in order to take an illegal kickback. The lender is getting defrauded, but the lender is the one who offered the zero-down stated-income program, delegated the drawing up of the legal documents and the final disbursement of funds to a fee-for-service settlement agent, and didn't do enough due diligence on the appraisal to see the inflation of the value. Legally, of course, there's a difference between lender as co-conspirator and lender as mark, utterly failing to exercise reasonable caution, but it's small comfort when the losses rack up. With tongue only partially in cheek, I'm about to suggest a third category of fraud: Fraud for Bubbles...My theory of the Fraud for Bubbles is, in a nutshell, that it isn't that lenders forgot that there are risks. It is that the miserable dynamic of unsound lending puffing up unsustainable real estate prices, which in turn kept supporting even more unsound lending, simply masked fraud problems sufficiently, and delayed the eventual ``feedback'' mechanisms sufficiently, that rampant fraud came to seem ``affordable.'' So many of the business practices that help fraud succeed--thinning backoffice staff, hiring untrained temps to replace retiring (and pricey) veterans, speeding up review processes, cutting back on due diligence sampling, accepting more and more copies, faxes, and phone calls instead of original ink-signed documents--threw off so much money that no one wanted to believe that the eventual cost of the fraud would eat it all up, and possibly more...

bubble; fraud; naked capitalism; summer reruns; unwinds.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-07-16 16:31 EDT

Debunking Michael Lewis' Subprime Short Hagiography

Lewis' tale is neat, plausible to a mass market audience fed a steady diet of subprime markets stupidity and greed, and incomplete in critical ways that render his account fundamentally misleading...The Big Short focuses on four clusters of subprime short sellers, all early to figure out this ``greatest trade ever'' and thus supposedly deserving of star treatment...The anchor is Steve Eisman...Lewis completely ignores the most vital player, the one who was on the other side of the subprime short bets...Who really was on the other side of the shorts' trades is the important question... ...these are the international equivalent of widows and orphans...Eisman is no noble outsider. He is a willing, knowing co-conspirator. Even worse, he and the other shorts Lewis lionizes didn't simply set off the global debt conflagration, they made the severity of the crisis vastly worse. So it wasn't just that these speculators were harmful, and Lewis gave them a free pass. He failed to clue in his readers that the actions of his chosen heroes drove the demand for the worst sort of mortgages and turned what would otherwise have been a ``contained'' problem into a systemic crisis. The subprime market would have died a much earlier, much less costly death absent the actions of the men Lewis celebrates. They didn't simply keep the market going well past its sell-by date, they were the moving force behind otherwise inexplicable, superheated demand for the very worst sort of mortgages...

Debunking Michael Lewis; naked capitalism; Subprime Short Hagiography.