Mon 2010-08-16 12:51 EDT

Nathan Lewis: Where's The Gold?

Nathan Lewis

...there are indications that the seller side of futures contracts (such as Deutsche Bank in April) are having a difficult time making good on their commitments. Second, the information reported by the Comex regarding physical inflows and outflows is looking more and more like a convenient fiction. Third, there is some doubt as to whether there is gold in inventory -- as there absolutely should be -- to match existing warehouse receipts. Fourth, the Comex warehouse is one of the most secure forms of gold investment in the world. If they can't be trusted, what does that say about ETFs, pooled accounts, futures, forwards, options, and all the other forms of "paper gold" out there? Fifth, if it becomes clearer that there is no physical supply to meet physical demand, the dollar price of gold could go much higher.

gold; Nathan Lewis; s.

naked capitalism Sat 2010-07-24 16:34 EDT

Summer Rerun: ``Unwinding the Fraud for Bubbles''

Tanta at Calculated Risk

This post first appeared on March 27, 2007. ...Telling the difference between the victims and the victimizers, the predators and the prey, and the fraudulent and the defrauded, is getting a lot harder when you have borrowers not required to make down payments able to lie about their incomes in order to buy a home the seller is overpricing in order to take an illegal kickback. The lender is getting defrauded, but the lender is the one who offered the zero-down stated-income program, delegated the drawing up of the legal documents and the final disbursement of funds to a fee-for-service settlement agent, and didn't do enough due diligence on the appraisal to see the inflation of the value. Legally, of course, there's a difference between lender as co-conspirator and lender as mark, utterly failing to exercise reasonable caution, but it's small comfort when the losses rack up. With tongue only partially in cheek, I'm about to suggest a third category of fraud: Fraud for Bubbles...My theory of the Fraud for Bubbles is, in a nutshell, that it isn't that lenders forgot that there are risks. It is that the miserable dynamic of unsound lending puffing up unsustainable real estate prices, which in turn kept supporting even more unsound lending, simply masked fraud problems sufficiently, and delayed the eventual ``feedback'' mechanisms sufficiently, that rampant fraud came to seem ``affordable.'' So many of the business practices that help fraud succeed--thinning backoffice staff, hiring untrained temps to replace retiring (and pricey) veterans, speeding up review processes, cutting back on due diligence sampling, accepting more and more copies, faxes, and phone calls instead of original ink-signed documents--threw off so much money that no one wanted to believe that the eventual cost of the fraud would eat it all up, and possibly more...

bubble; fraud; naked capitalism; summer reruns; unwinds.

Sat 2010-07-24 16:13 EDT

Disequilibria: A Constant State Of Instability >> The Shadow Banking System

RueTheDay

What we saw from mid-2007 through early-2009 was a run on the shadow banking system. There were two primary channels by which the shadow banking system operated: the Money Market/Commercial Paper Channel and the Repo Channel...we have largely unregulated [money market funds (MMMFs)] taking deposits (largely withdrawable on demand and usually checkable) and making the equivalent of loans, in other words, acting as banks. Except that the MMMFs were not subject to much in the way of prudential regulation beyond some broad parameters that dictated what investments they could buy, did not have access to FDIC deposit insurance, and did not have lender of last resort access to the Fed's discount window. They were a disaster waiting to happen...Repos also became a very popular mechanism for raising funds in the pre-crisis days, with MMMFs becoming large buyers of repos (lenders) and the broker dealers becoming both buyers and sellers (borrowers and lenders)...during the crisis...the classic maturity mismatch situation...concerns about the quality of commercial paper...triggered by the collapse of Lehman...Without the traditional protection of deposit insurance and lender of last resort financing by the Fed, it turned into a full blown panic...Any meaningful financial reform must bring the shadow banking system out of the shadows. It must be treated as banking, and its institutions regulated as banks...

constant state; Disequilibria; instability; Shadow banks Systems.

naked capitalism Mon 2010-07-19 17:07 EDT

Is the SEC Settlement Really a Win for Goldman?

Tom Adams and Yves Smith

...Conventional wisdom in the financial media is that the settlement announced by the SEC over its lawsuit on a Goldman 2007 Abacus CDO is a home run for Goldman. But a closer reading suggests that Goldman's victory is qualified, and the enthusiastic press response is in large measure due to the firm's skillful manipulation of perceptions...it is hard to see how anything in the settlement, if affirmed, would be negative for private parties considering lawsuits against sellers of CDOs...we imagine potential CDO investors will be mightily encouraged that Goldman ended up returning the full amount of investment to the one true third party investor in the deal -- IKB...An investor considering bringing an action against a bank that sold them a CDO that failed (meaning virtually all 2006 and 2007 ``mezzanine'' CDOs) would probably be encouraged that a bank was required to pay such a large amount for making inaccurate statements about the true nature of the CDO...Plaintiffs who sue CDO sellers have good reason to be optimistic...The settlement thus tarnishes the popular myth that the subprime shorts were insightful outsiders who executed ``the greatest trade ever''...the SEC has demonstrated that investors in such a CDO can win a recovery as a result of such inaccurate statements.

Goldman; naked capitalism; SEC Settlement Really; Wins.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-07-16 16:31 EDT

Debunking Michael Lewis' Subprime Short Hagiography

Lewis' tale is neat, plausible to a mass market audience fed a steady diet of subprime markets stupidity and greed, and incomplete in critical ways that render his account fundamentally misleading...The Big Short focuses on four clusters of subprime short sellers, all early to figure out this ``greatest trade ever'' and thus supposedly deserving of star treatment...The anchor is Steve Eisman...Lewis completely ignores the most vital player, the one who was on the other side of the subprime short bets...Who really was on the other side of the shorts' trades is the important question... ...these are the international equivalent of widows and orphans...Eisman is no noble outsider. He is a willing, knowing co-conspirator. Even worse, he and the other shorts Lewis lionizes didn't simply set off the global debt conflagration, they made the severity of the crisis vastly worse. So it wasn't just that these speculators were harmful, and Lewis gave them a free pass. He failed to clue in his readers that the actions of his chosen heroes drove the demand for the worst sort of mortgages and turned what would otherwise have been a ``contained'' problem into a systemic crisis. The subprime market would have died a much earlier, much less costly death absent the actions of the men Lewis celebrates. They didn't simply keep the market going well past its sell-by date, they were the moving force behind otherwise inexplicable, superheated demand for the very worst sort of mortgages...

Debunking Michael Lewis; naked capitalism; Subprime Short Hagiography.

Tue 2010-04-27 08:27 EDT

Web of Debt - COMPUTERIZED FRONT RUNNING: ANOTHER GOLDMAN-DOMINATED FRAUD

Ellen Brown

While the SEC is busy investigating Goldman Sachs, it might want to look into another Goldman-dominated fraud: computerized front running using high-frequency trading programs...Wall Street commentator Max Keiser...claims to have invented one of the most widely used programs for doing the rigging. Not that that's what he meant to invent. His patented program was designed to take the manipulation out of markets. It would do this by matching buyers with sellers automatically, eliminating ``front running'' -- brokers buying or selling ahead of large orders coming in from their clients. The computer program was intended to remove the conflict of interest that exists when brokers who match buyers with sellers are also selling from their own accounts. But the program fell into the wrong hands and became the prototype for automated trading programs that actually facilitate front running...Keiser and HSX co-founder Michael Burns applied for a patent for a ``computer-implemented securities trading system with a virtual specialist function'' in 1996, and U.S. patent no. 5960176 was awarded in 1999...The listing for Keiser's patent shows that it has been referenced by 132 others involving automated program trading or HFT...

Computerized Front Running; debt; Goldman-dominated fraud; Web.

Bruce Krasting Tue 2010-03-09 17:10 EST

Some Thoughts on Fannie's Horrible Year

Bruce Krasting

Fannie Mae released it's annual and 4th Q numbers after the close on Friday and during one hell of a messy snowstorm. FNM posted a loss of $16.3b for the quarter and $74.4b for the year. An unmitigated disaster. The timing of the release suggests that they were hoping that no one would notice how bad the last twelve months were. There was nothing particularly new in the most recent quarter, just more bad news. What is happening at Fannie is also happening at Freddie Mac and to a different extent at FHA. There are some trends that I think are worth noting...they have moved to restrict lending to better borrowers...all three of the D.C. mortgage lenders are pulling on the credit reins...It will be harder to get a mortgage in one month from today and even harder to get one six moths from today. For me the implications of this are very obvious. Broad RE values will have to go lower, high-end homes will suffer the most in percentage drops...the biggest seller of RE over the past 24 months in America has been the federal government...The vast majority of defaults come because borrowers are underwater. Falling RE prices are the number one contributor to the default cycle...

Bruce Krasting; Fannie's Horrible Year; thought.

naked capitalism Mon 2009-12-28 17:16 EST

Guest Post: Princeton Economist and Computer Scientists Show that Derivatives Are Inherently Vulnerable to Fraud

Washington's Blog

...the main default risk model for credit default swaps -- the ``Gaussian copula function'' -- was inherently flawed. Now, Princeton University economists and computer scientists have demonstrated that financial derivatives are also inherently vulnerable to fraudulent pricing. PhysOrg summarizes Princeton's findings: ...sellers of these investments could purposefully include pieces of bad risk that no buyer could detect even with the most powerful computers... the problem arises from asymmetric information between buyers and sellers, and goes against conventional wisdom in economic theory, which holds that derivatives reduce the negative effects of such unequal information.

Computer Scientists Show; derivative; fraud; Guest Post; inherently vulnerable; naked capitalism; Princeton economists.

zero hedge Thu 2009-12-17 10:37 EST

Is Selling US CDS A Risk-Free Way To Short The Dollar?

There has been much conjecture on whether using CDS is an effective way to hedge against US default risk. Many theoreticians, especially those of the post-March lows variety, have sprung up and are speculating that buying Credit Default Swaps on the US is ultimately a futile and pointless endeavor. The main argument: a US default would likely mean that interconnected dealers won't recognize contracts on a US default event, as they themselves will be out of business. Even if they continued to exist, like cockroaches in a postapocalyptic world, the collateral which backs derivatives is mostly US Treasurys: the same obligations that would end up being massively impaired...the US CDS seller syndicate could easily be one of the key sources of dollar short funding: with sellers pocketing euros and immediately going to market and selling dollars...a dollar-short unwind would probably have repercussions in the US CDS market. Not only would the dollar spike, but paradoxically US credit risk would probably widen dramatically...any unwind at the heart of the prevalent risk trade now: the massive dollar carry, would impact virtually every investment product, quite possibly in self-referential feedback loops. If correct, it merely shows how much more the Fed has at stake in keeping the dollar depressed than merely getting mom and pop to buy Amazon at $130/share. Losing control of the carry trade will be the systemic equivalent of allowing Lehman's book to be marked-to-market: a potentially complete collapse in systemic confidence, which would have such far ranging implications as the $300 trillion interest rate derivative market. And when sudden volatility reaches this product universe which is 6 times bigger than world GDP, the events from last year will seem like a dress rehearsal.

CDS; Dollar; Risk-Free Way; sell; short; Zero Hedge.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

John P. Hussman

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.

Jesse's Café Américain Mon 2009-10-26 09:51 EDT

Trend Change: Official Purchases from Central Banks Supporting Gold Price

Jesse

Starting in 1989, the world's Central Banks became steady net sellers of their gold reserves which had been accumulated over the years...And now for something completely different, it appears that the world's central banks may once again become net buyers of gold, after a twenty year campaign of selling gold from their vaults into the public markets, creating a steady downward pressure on the price of gold, that contributed to its long bear market.

Central Banks Supporting Gold Price; Jesse's Café Américain; officially Purchase; trend change.

Tue 2009-09-29 11:10 EDT

Steeling for a Currency Deal in Pittsburgh? - Up and Down Wall Street Daily - Barrons.com

RANDALL W. FORSYTH

An options play suggests somebody expects the G20 to hatch a scheme to stabilize currencies. Duct tape for the dollar?...Reports John F. Brady, futures expert at MF Global, there was a big seller of "volatility" in the euro versus the dollar Thursday...What's curious, Brady explains, is that vols on the euro already are low, so it's hard to see them going much lower...Which got me to wondering if the volatility seller was thinking the G20 would do something to force volatility lower -- that is, stabilize exchange rates...Notwithstanding the calls for a replacement of the dollar as the main reserve currency, gold isn't it, according to long-time market observer David P. Goldman,..."Even a rather wobbly reserve currency is better than gold," he writes as his alter ego, Spengler, whom he "channels" for Asia Times (www.atimes.com.) "Gold is far less liquid than U.S. Treasury securities, costly to store and insure, and above all more volatile in price...gold isn't an investment but an insurance policy against a breakdown of the function of the world financial system."

Barrons; com; currency deal; Pittsburgh; steel; Wall Street Daily.

Thu 2009-02-26 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: Toxic Assets: Sellers Holding Out for Government Deal?

government deal; naked capitalism; sellers holding; Toxic Assets.

Sun 2008-11-23 00:00 EST

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Citigroup Blames Short Sellers For Collapse

Citigroup Blames Short Sellers; Collapse; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

Wed 2008-08-13 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: NewSpeak Watch: What Does "Sale" Mean? (LBO Loan Edition)

seller-financed sales retain exposure to devalued assets

LBO Loan Edition; meaning; naked capitalism; NewSpeak Watch; sales.