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excesses | Risk | take
excessive risk | risk take

excessive risk-taking Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

The Guardian World News Wed 2009-11-25 10:31 EST

What was really behind the crash?

John Cassidy

In an exclusive extract from his new book, John Cassidy explains why the huge salaries of Wall Street bosses created a culture that helped trigger the financial crisis...In the wake of last year's crash, even some top bankers have conceded that Wall Street remuneration schemes lead to excessive risk-taking...But without direct government involvement, the effort to reform Wall Street compensation won't survive the next market upturn. For although the financial sector as a whole has an interest in controlling rampant short-termism and irresponsible risk-taking, individual firms have an incentive to hire away star traders from any rivals that have introduced pay limits. Compensation reforms, therefore, are bound to break down. In this case, as in many others, the only way to reach a socially desirable outcome is to enforce compliance. And the only body that can do that is the government.

Crash; Guardian World News; really.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

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