naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 16:10 EDT

Lehman: Regulators Chose to Deny, Extend and Pretend

The Lehman Examiner's report gives an unintentionally damning portrayal, both of the the structure of financial regulation in the US and how regulators failed to use the powers they had effectively...the authorities recognized Lehman had a large negative net worth. Yet rather than move decisively towards an unwind, they proceeded inertially. They urged Lehman CEO Dick Fuld to find a rescuer (who would invest in that garbage barge, particularly when Andrew Ross Sorkin's account makes clear that Fuld's moves were so obviously desperate and clumsy as to be certain to fail) and also promoted the notion of an LTCM-style ``share the pain'' resolution. Yet with the rest of the industry weak, and the magnitude of hole in Lehman's balance sheet a mystery, these courses of action had low odds of success from the outset (indeed, the ``Lehman weekend'' in which the authorities almost bulldozed through a deal, seemed designed to avoid sober analysis of how bad things were at the failing investment bank)...As much as the SEC did not cover itself with glory in this exercise, its lapses are somewhat comprehensible. By contrast, the Fed's are much harder to explain or excuse. And guess who is about to be given more oversight authority?

denied; extends; Lehman; naked capitalism; Pretends; Regulators Chose.

Fri 2010-02-12 21:31 EST

The Cash Committee: How Wall Street Wins On The Hill

Ryan Grim and Arthur Delaney

...In the fall of 2008, Democrats took the White House and expanded their congressional majorities as America struggled through a financial collapse wrought by years of deregulation. The public was furious. It seemed as if the banks and institutions that dragged the economy to the brink of disaster -- and were subsequently rescued by taxpayer funds -- would finally be forced to change their ways. But it's not happening. Financial regulation's long slog through Congress has left it riddled with loopholes, carved out at the request of the same industries that caused the mess in the first place. An outraged American public is proving no match for the mix of corporate money and influence that has been marshaled on behalf of the financial sector...

Cash Committee; Hill; Wall Street wins.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Tue 2009-09-22 16:22 EDT

Top Goldman Lobbyist Barred From Communicating With House's Financial Services Committee

In a rare example of testicular fortitude, Barney Frank has "banished" Goldman's Michael Pease from communicating with the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee. According to Reuters, the Goldmanite, and former committee staffer, has been "asked" not to interfere with the Congressional panel for a period of 12 months. According to Barney Frank aide Steven Adamske: "Mr. Paese left our offices in September 2008, and was not allowed to communicate with any committee members or staff for a period of one year due to normal ethics restrictions that apply to all House and Senate employees. Out of an abundance of caution due to the nature of financial regulation reform, the chairman has extended Mr. Paese's recusal for another year." Pease "was the committee's deputy staff director before he quit to work for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as a lobbyist. Goldman hired him in April.

communications; House's Financial Services Committee; Top Goldman Lobbyist Barred; Zero Hedge.

Rick Bookstaber Sun 2009-09-20 14:30 EDT

Regulation in Defense of Capitalism

Rick Bookstaber

Will regulation hobble capitalism? I think the opposite is true. Properly done -- and I think most of the financial regulation that is envisioned fits into this camp -- government regulation of the financial industry will move the industry closer to the capitalist ideal. By capitalism, I mean where those who take the risks and put up the money get the fruits of their labor. And, importantly, where those who take the risks and put up the money actually do take the risks, bearing the full costs of failure as well as success.

capitalism; defense; Regulators; Rick Bookstaber.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

Thu 2009-07-23 00:00 EDT

The Texas Observer > Commentary by James K. Galbraith -

The Texas Observer > Commentary by James K. Galbraith - Causes of the Crisis; ``The idea that capitalism...is inherently self-stabilizing'', former Texas Senator Phil Gramm, and ``abandonment of state responsibility for financial regulation''

commentary; James K. Galbraith; Texas Observer.