dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

excesses Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

building excess bank reserves (1); excess capital (1); excess credit (3); excess credit finding (1); excess Global capacity (1); excess internationally derived high powered money creation (1); excess investment driving growth (1); excess liability (1); excess liquidity (3); Excess liquidity game (1); excess liquidity inhibits risk pricing (1); excess reserves (19); excess savings (1); excess speculators (1); Excesses Leveraged (4); excessive accumulation (1); excessive debt (3); excessive debt levels (1); excessive foreign debts (2); excessive government debt obligations (1); excessive leverage concentrated (1); excessive risk-taking (2); excessive United States trade deficits (1); excessively cheap money (1); excessively dependent (1); exploding excess reserves (1); Extract Excessive Profits (1); financial excesses (1); greatest fixed investment excess (1); leverage limits prevent excessive expansion (1); magnify speculative excesses (1).

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Mon 2010-09-20 10:14 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Fictional Reserve Lending And The Myth Of Excess Reserves

...1) Lending comes first and what little reserves there are (if any) come later. 2) There really are no excess reserves. 3) Not only are there no excess reserves, there are essentially no reserves to speak of at all. Indeed, bank reserves are completely "fictional". 4) Banks are capital constrained not reserve constrained. 5) Banks aren't lending because there are few credit worthy borrowers worth the risk. ...concern that excess reserves will lead to lending and inflation is totally unfounded in theory and practice. Fractional Reserve Lending is really Fictional Reserve Lending. In practice, the major constraints to lending are insufficient capital and willingness of credit worthy borrowers to seek loans.

excess reserves; Fictional Reserve Lending; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; myth.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-09-10 18:46 EDT

Auerback: China is Still a Renegade Nation

...In response to Beijing's mind boggling increase in real credit in the first half of 2009,Chinese fixed investment in industrial tradables rose dramatically...By the second quarter of this year some -- but only some -- of this new capacity began to come on stream. Further production responses to this new round of Chinese overinvestment lie ahead...But because of the potential protectionist threat and the underlying fragility at the heart of China's capex boom (along with the corruption of its political class), the change in status might prove to be ephemeral, much as Japan's vaunted rise to number 2 ultimately gave way to a post-bubble morass...in July Chinese domestic demand may have gone negative in real terms. It was only a huge improvement in net trade that kept production growth significantly positive on a sequential basis...The fact that China has the greatest fixed investment excess ever suggests that, when it unwinds, there will be a nasty economic adjustment in China...

Auerback; China; naked capitalism; Renegade Nation.

Money Game Wed 2010-09-01 10:53 EDT

Why Ben Bernanke's Next Round Of Quantitative Easing Will Be Another Huge Flop

There is perhaps, no greater misunderstanding in the investment world today than the topic of quantitative easing [QE]. After all, it sounds so fancy, strange and complex. But in reality, it is quite a simple operation...The Fed simply electronically swaps an asset with the private sector. In most cases it swaps deposits with an interest bearing asset...The theory behind QE is that the Fed can reduce interest rates via asset purchases (which supposedly creates demand for debt) while also strengthening the bank balance sheet (which entices them to lend). Unfortunately, we've lived thru this scenario before and history shows us that neither is actually true. Banks are never reserve constrained and a private sector that is deeply indebted will not likely be enticed to borrow regardless of the rate of interest...The most glaring example of failed QE is in Japan in 2001. Richard Koo refers to this event as the ``greatest monetary non-event''...Since Ben Bernanke initiated his great monetarist gaffe in 2008 there has been almost no sign of a sustainable private sector recovery. Mr. Bernanke's new form of trickle down economics has surely fixed the banking sector (or at least bought some time), but the recovery ended there. ..The hyperventilating hyperinflationists and those investors calling for inevitable US default are now clinging to this QE story as their inflation or default thesis crumbles before their very eyes...With the government merely swapping assets they are not actually ``printing'' any new money. In fact, the government is now essentially stealing interest bearing assets from the private sector and replacing them with deposits...now that the banks are flush with excess reserves this policy response would in fact be deflationary - not inflationary...

Ben Bernanke's; Huge Flop; Money game; Quantitative Easing.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-08-06 19:34 EDT

Auerback: The Real Reason Banks Aren't Lending

...there is a widespread belief that government fiscal stimulus has run up against its ``limits'' on the grounds of ``fiscal sustainability'' and the need to retain ``the confidence of the markets''. Consequently, goes this line of reasoning, as private credit conditions improve the private sector must pick up the baton of growth where the public sector leaves off. If this proves insufficient, there is room for an expansion of monetary policy via ``quantitative easing``...The premise is that the central bank floods the banking system with excess reserves, which will then theoretically encourage the banks to lend more aggressively in order to chase a higher rate of return. Not only is the theory plain wrong, but the Fed's fixation on credit growth is curiously perverse, given the high prevailing levels of private debt...credit growth follows creditworthiness, which can only be achieved through sustaining job growth and incomes. That means embracing stimulatory fiscal policy, not ``credit-enhancing'' measures per se, such as quantitative easing, which will not work. QE is based on the erroneous belief that the banks need reserves before they can lend and that this process provides those reserves. But as Professor Scott Fullwiler has pointed out on numerous occasions, that is a major misrepresentation of the way the banking system actually operates...We would like to see the Obama Administration at least begin to make the case that fiscal stimulus, whether via tax cuts or direct public investment, is still required to generate more demand and employment...deficit cutting per se, devoid of any economic context, is not a legitimate goal of public policy for a sovereign nation. Deficits are (mostly) endogenously determined by the performance of the economy. They add to private sector income and to net financial wealth. They will come down as a matter of course when the economy begins to recover and as the automatic stabilizers work in reverse...

Auerback; Lends; naked capitalism; real reason Bank.

Wed 2010-07-28 10:55 EDT

Economics: No, America lacks the necessary commitment to stimulus | The Economist

...the US today is suffering from a balance sheet recession, a very rare ailment which happens only after the bursting of a nationwide debt-financed asset price bubble. In this type of recession, the private sector is minimising debt instead of maximising profits because the collapse in asset prices left its balance sheets in a serious state of excess liability and in urgent need of repair...fiscal stimulus becomes indispensible in a balance sheet recession. Moreover, the stimulus must be maintained until private sector deleveraging is over...When the deficit hawks manage to remove the fiscal stimulus while the private sector is still deleveraging, the economy collapses and re-enters the deflationary spiral. That weakness, in turn, prompts another fiscal stimulus, only to see it removed again by the deficit hawks once the economy stabilises. This unfortunate cycle can go on for years if the experience of post-1990 Japan is any guide. The net result is that the economy remains in the doldrums for years, and many unemployed workers will never find jobs in what appears to be structural unemployment even though there is nothing structural about their predicament...

America lacked; economic; Economist; necessary commitments; stimulus.

New Deal 2.0 Sun 2010-07-25 16:08 EDT

Marriner S. Eccles: Keynesian Evangelist Before Keynes

...From direct experience, [1930s Federal Reserve chairman Marriner S. Eccles] realized that bankers like himself, by doing what seemed sound on an individual basis, by calling in loans and refusing new lending in hard times, only contributed to the financial crisis. He saw from direct experience the evidence of market failure. He concluded that to get out of the depression, government intervention, something he had been taught was evil, was necessary to place purchasing power in the hands of the public. In the industrial age, the mal-distribution of income (which was hugely unequal) and the excessive savings for capital investment always lead to the masses exhausting their purchasing power, unable to sustain the benefits of mass production that such savings brought...By denying the masses necessary purchasing power, capital denies itself of the very demand that would justify its investment in new production. Credit can extend purchasing power but only until the credit runs out, which would soon occur without the support of adequate income...Eccles, who never attended university or studied economics formally, articulated his pragmatic conclusions in speeches a good three years before Keynes wrote his epoch-making The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936)....Eccles' transformation from a businessman, brought up to believe in survival of the fittest, to his belief in government spending on the neediest can teach us many lessons today...The solution is to start the money flowing again by directing it not toward those who already have a surplus, but to those who have not enough. Giving more money to those who already have too much would take more money out of circulation into idle savings and prolong the depression...Eccles promoted a limited war on poverty and unemployment, not on moral but on utilitarian grounds.

0; Keynes; Keynesian Evangelist; Marriner S. Eccles; new dealing 2.

Sat 2010-05-22 21:13 EDT

EconPapers: An Alternative View of Finance, Saving, Deficits, and Liquidity

This paper contrasts the orthodox approach with an alternative view on finance, saving, deficits, and liquidity. The conventional view on the cause of the current global financial crisis points first to excessive United States trade deficits that are supposed to have "soaked up" global savings. Worse, this policy was ultimately unsustainable because it was inevitable that lenders would stop the flow of dollars. Problems were compounded by the Federal Reserve's pursuit of a low-interest-rate policy, which involved pumping liquidity into the markets and thereby fueling a real estate boom. Finally, with the world awash in dollars, a run on the dollar caused it to collapse. The Fed (and then the Treasury) had to come to the rescue of U.S. banks, firms, and households. When asset prices plummeted, the financial crisis spread to much of the rest of the world. According to the conventional view, China, as the residual supplier of dollars, now holds the fate of the United States, and possibly the entire world, in its hands. Thus, it's necessary for the United States to begin living within its means, by balancing its current account and (eventually) eliminating its budget deficit. I challenge every aspect of this interpretation. Our nation operates with a sovereign currency, one that is issued by a sovereign government that operates with a flexible exchange rate. As such, the government does not really borrow, nor can foreigners be the source of dollars. Rather, it is the U.S. current account deficit that supplies the net dollar saving to the rest of the world, and the federal government budget deficit that supplies the net dollar saving to the nongovernment sector. Further, saving is never a source of finance; rather, private lending creates bank deposits to finance spending that generates income. Some of this income can be saved, so the second part of the saving decision concerns the form in which savings might be held--as liquid or illiquid assets. U.S. current account deficits and federal budget deficits are sustainable, so the United States does not need to adopt austerity, nor does it need to look to the rest of the world for salvation. Rather, it needs to look to domestic fiscal stimulus strategies to resolve the crisis, and to a larger future role for government in helping to stabilize the economy. [MMT]

alternative view; Deficit; EconPapers; finance; liquidity; save.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Tue 2010-05-18 16:29 EDT

Canaries in Coalmine: China, Asia, not Participating in Euro Bailout Lovefest; Beginnings of China Credit, Real Estate Bust

Is China a canary in the coalmine of an impending global slowdown, or is China simply overloved as a beacon of growth as it was in 2008? I think it's both. China's property and infrastructure bubbles are massive; that is for certain. Moreover, China's biggest export trading partner is Europe, just as Europe is headed for numerous austerity programs. While it's doubtful the European austerity programs bring deficits down to where they are supposed to be, those programs will for a while cause a decline in European spending along with much social unrest. Can China take a double whammy like this without overheating? I think not. And China will have to show things down, whether it wants to or not. ... The "China Story" that most of the world is in love with is nothing more than excess credit finding a home in malinvestments just as happened in the US.

Asia; Begins; canaries; China; China credit; coalminer; Euro Bailout Lovefest; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; participated; real estate bust.

naked capitalism Tue 2010-04-20 09:43 EDT

Satyajit Das: New & Old Greek Lessons

...Like many of the economically weaker EU members, Greece fudged the numbers to meet the qualifications for entry into the Euro. One example of this is the use of derivative transactions with Goldman Sachs to disguise the level of its real borrowing. Membership of the Euro also reduced the ability of Greece to manage its economy. It lost the ability to use its currency, via devaluations, to improve competitiveness and stimulate exports. It also lost the ability to set interest rates (now set by the European Central Bank (''ECB'')). It also cannot print its own currency to fund sovereign borrowing. Greece also has low levels of domestic saving...Greece's problems are probably incapable of solution and terminal. Temporary emergency funding may help meet immediate liquidity needs but do not solve fundamental problems of excessive debt and a weak economy...the optimal course of action for Greece may be to withdraw from the Euro, default on its debt (by re-denominating it in a re-introduced Drachma) and then undertake a program of necessary structural reform...The current debate misses the fact that the ``bailouts'' are mainly about rescuing foreign investors...

naked capitalism; new; Old Greek Lessons; Satyajit Das.

China Financial Markets Tue 2010-04-20 09:17 EDT

Who will pay for China's bad loans?

...pessimists are starting to worry about excessive debt levels in China, about which they are very right to worry, and many are predicting a banking or financial collapse, which I think is much less likely. Optimists, on the other hand, are blithely discounting the problem of rising NPLs and insisting that they create little risk to Chinese growth. Their proof? A decade ago China had a huge surge in NPLs, the cleaning up of which was to cost China 40% of GDP and a possible banking collapse, and yet, they claim, nothing bad happened. The doomsayers were wrong, the last banking crisis was easily managed, and Chinese growth surged. But although I think the pessimists are wrong to expect a banking collapse, the optimists are nonetheless very mistaken, largely because they implicitly assumed away the cost of the bank recapitalization. In fact China paid a very high price for its banking crisis. The cost didn't come in the form of a banking collapse but rather in the form of a collapse in consumption growth as households were forced to pay for the enormous cleanup bill...

China Financial Markets; China's bad loans; pay.

Jesse's Café Américain Wed 2010-04-07 19:00 EDT

"How to Corner the Gold Market" By Janet Tavakoli

Janet Tavakoli wrote an interesting essay that was just posted over at the Huffington Post called "How to Corner the Gold Market" which can be read in its entirety from her website here...What struck me as odd is that I just wrote a blog piece along similar lines on the same topic today, raising many of the same issues, but that is from the opposite perspective...there is little evidence that anyone is willing to take on the exchanges, even the big players, and try and force a corner or even a squeeze against what they perceive as mispricing, such as Soros and so many other big players did with the British Pound , and most recently other big hedge funds did with mispriced products from the latest bubble in the debt markets, and financial stocks...The piece I wrote today and reference above is about a situation in the precious metals markets which has the potential to become another serious problem for almost the same basic reasons as the debt markets in our most recent financial crisis: excessive leverage concentrated in a few TBTF institutions, lack of transparency, regulatory laxity, and a mispricing of risk...

corner; gold market; Janet Tavakoli; Jesse's Café Américain.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-04-01 19:57 EDT

Top ten reasons you know China has a financial bubble on its hands

Edward Chancellor, author of the seminal book on financial speculation and manias ``Devil Take The Hindmost,'' is now turning his eyes to China. He sees a number of red flags which point to excess in China...The trouble is that China today exhibits many of the characteristics of great speculative manias. The aim of this paper is to describe the common features of some of the great historical bubbles and outline China's current vulnerability...Is China in a bubble blow-off top like Japan post-Plaza accord? I say yes. I believe anyone who thinks this will not end badly is in for a rude awakening.

Financial bubble; handing; know China; naked capitalism; reasons; Top.

zero hedge Tue 2010-03-09 17:59 EST

Is The Federal Reserve Insolvent?

...For a refined analysis of what would happen in that moment of clarity when the world realizes the world's biggest bank is broke, we turn to a presentation by Chris Sims, given before Princeton University, titled "Fiscal/Monetary Coordination When The Anchor Cable Has Snapped."...discusses precisely the issues were are faced with today: namely a monetary policy that has run amok, seignorage, exploding excess reserves, the impact of these on "power money", and, in general, a Fed balance sheet that is increasingly reminiscent of a drunk, rapid and schizophrenic bull in a China store...the only way to deal with a mark-to-market of the Fed currently is to embrace monetization. It is no longer a question of semantics, of who promised what: it is the only mechanical way by which the Fed can dig itself out of a capital deficiency. With GSE delinquencies exploding, and with the Fed (and Congress) singlehandedly facilitating imprudent lender policy by allowing ever more borrowers to become deliquent without consequences, the MBS delinquency rate will likely hit 10% over the next 6-12 months. At that moment, someone will ask the Fed: "what is the true basis of your capital account?" And when the Fed is forced to justify a valid response, is when monetizaton will begin...

Federal Reserve Insolvent; Zero Hedge.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-03-04 08:47 EST

Stuck in neutral -- what Japan's rebalancing can teach us

...A few days ago I read a good article (``Stuck on Neutral'') about Japan [from] the Economist...about Japan's post-1989 rebalancing, ...discusses why, in spite of every attempt, Japan has not been able supposedly to rebalance the economy and achieve any real growth during the two lost decades after 1990. Private consumption never took off to drive economic growth...After many years of excess investment driving growth, Japan's rebalancing process, which occurred after corporate, bank and government debt levels prevented the investment party from continuing, locked the country into many years of slow growth because it had to grind through years of debt-fueled overinvestment...it doesn't matter what individual policies we take to boost consumption if these polices don't in the aggregate represent a real transfer of income to the household sector, as they did not in Japan...Japan's experience suggests one of the risks China faces...Chinese household consumption will undoubtedly rise as a share of Chinese GDP over the next decade or two, but the process nonetheless can be disappointing for growth. It depends on lots of other moving parts, most importantly perhaps the change in investment and the speed with which income is transferred to households. And the change in investment might depend on debt capacity constraints and the extent of earlier overinvestment.

China Financial Markets; Japan's rebalancing; neutral; stuck; teach.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard - Finance and business comments Thu 2010-01-07 19:00 EST

Global bear rally of 2009 will end as Japan's hyperinflation rips economy to pieces

The contraction of M3 money in the US and Europe over the last six months will slowly puncture economic recovery as 2010 unfolds, with the time-honoured lag of a year or so. Ben Bernanke will be caught off guard, just as he was in mid-2008 when the Fed drove straight through a red warning light with talk of imminent rate rises -- the final error that triggered the implosion of Lehman, AIG, and the Western banking system. As the great bear rally of 2009 runs into the greater Chinese Wall of excess global capacity, it will become clear that we are in the grip of a 21st Century Depression -- more akin to Japan's Lost Decade than the 1840s or 1930s, but nothing like the normal cycles of the post-War era. The surplus regions (China, Japan, Germania, Gulf ) have not increased demand enough to compensate for belt-tightening in the deficit bloc (Anglo-sphere, Club Med, East Europe), and fiscal adrenalin is already fading in Europe. The vast East-West imbalances that caused the credit crisis are no better a year later, and perhaps worse. Household debt as a share of GDP sits near record levels in two-fifths of the world economy. Our long purge has barely begun.

2009; Ambrose Evans Pritchard; Business Comment; ending; finance; Global Bear Rally; Japan's hyperinflation rips economy; pieces.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-12-22 11:53 EST

``Basel III -- the OK, the Unfinished and the Ugly''

The BIS analysis of the 2007-09 banking crisis floats my boat. Here is their headline list of causes: excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage, diminutive and low quality capital bases, insufficient liquidity buffers at banks.

Basel III; naked capitalism; Ok; ugly; unfinished.

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