naked capitalism Sun 2010-10-10 12:54 EDT

FUBAR Mortgage Behavior: Florida Banks Destroyed Notes; Others Never Transferred Them

...But to give readers the latest report of modern FUBAR, mortgage edition, let us continue with the sorry saga of ``Where's My Note?'' For the benefit of newbies, what everyone calls a mortgage actually has two components: the note, which is the borrower IOU, and the mortgage (in some states, it's called a deed of trust) which is the lien on the property. In 45 states, the mortgage is a mere accessory to the note; you must be the real party of interest in the note in order to foreclose. The pooling and servicing agreement, which governs who does what when in a mortgage securitization, requires the note to be endorsed (just like a check, signed by one party over to the next), showing the full chain of title...The endorsements also have to be wet ink; no electronic signatures permitted. I've had a lot of anecdotal evidence to support the idea that these procedures, which were created in the early days of mortgage securitizations, were simply not observed on a widespread, if not a universal basis...

Florida Banks Destroyed Notes; FUBAR Mortgage Behavior; naked capitalism; transfer.

Fri 2010-10-08 21:27 EDT

Bank of America Suspends Foreclosures in All States >> naked capitalism

Yves Smith

...The robo signing of affidavits was clearly done across all sorts of court actions. As we indicated, the bogus affidavits are used in all foreclosures in judicial states; they aver various things about the plaintiff's indebtedness, including the plaintiff's ownership of the debt that are integral to the process. Providing an improper affidavit is considered to be a fraud on the court...affidavit abuses are mere symptoms of much deeper problems with the mortgage securitizations. Why, pray tell, are law firms and servicers engaging in false representations and widespread document forgeries? It is because, as we have stressed, they made a botch of getting the notes (the borrower IOU) into the trusts, and simple fixes don't work, hence the need to create a phony document trail. The Bank of America suspension of foreclosures in all states appears to be a tacit admission that the problems are as pervasive as we have suggested...

America suspends foreclosures; bank; naked capitalism; state.

Minyanville Sat 2010-08-21 10:33 EDT

How Pimco Is Holding American Homeowners Hostage

David Stockman

...According to Bill Gross ...the American economy can be saved only through ``full nationalization'' of the mortgage finance system and a massive ``jubilee'' of debt forgiveness for millions of underwater homeowners...As overlord of the fixed-income finance market [Pacific Investment Management Co. (Pimco)] generates billions annually in effort-free profits from its trove of essentially riskless US Treasury securities and federally guaranteed housing paper. Now Pimco wants to swell Uncle Sam's supply of this no-brainer paper even further -- adding upward of $2 trillion per year of what would be ``government-issue'' mortgages...This final transformation of American taxpayers into indentured servants of HIDC (the Housing Investment & Debt Complex) has been underway for a long time, and is now unstoppable because all principled political opposition to Pimco-style crony capitalism has been extinguished...At the heart of the matter is the statist Big Lie trumpeting the alleged public welfare benefits of the home-ownership society and subsidized real estate finance...the congregates of the HIDC lobby -- homebuilders, mortgage bankers, real estate brokers, Wall Street securitizers, property appraisers and lawyers, landscapers and land speculators, home improvement retailers and the rest -- have gotten their fill at the Federal trough. But the most senseless gift -- the extra-fat risk-free spread on Freddie and Fannie paper -- went to the great enablers of the mortgage debt boom, that is, the mega-funds like Pimco...there isn't a shred of evidence that all of this largese serves any legitimate public purpose whatsoever, and plenty of evidence that the HIDC boom has been deeply destructive...there are upward of 15-20 million American households that can't afford their current mortgages or will be strongly disinclined to service them once housing prices take their next -- and unpreventable -- leg down. But Pimco's gold-coast socialism is exactly the wrong answer. Rather than having their mortgages modified or forgiven, these households should be foreclosed upon, and the sooner the better...

Holding American Homeowners Hostage; Minyanville; PIMCO.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Fri 2010-07-30 15:41 EDT

China Has Been Covertly Funding A Housing Bubble Five Times Larger Than That Of The US: 65 Million Vacant Homes Uncovered

...a report [Fitch] released today titled Informal Securitisation Increasingly Distorting Credit Data, uncovers that China has in fact been massively underrepresenting the actual amount of new loans in the first half of 2010, courtesy of precisely the kinds of securitization deals that blew up half of our own banking system... [moreover, Yi Xianrong,] an economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences noted estimates from electricity meter readings that there are about 64.5 million empty apartments and houses in urban areas of the country... China's banks are increasingly becoming more opaque in data presentation, which one can assume is due to their unwillingness to reveal the true state of affairs... [According to] Xianrong ``investment in the domestic property market has completely overturned China's traditional concepts of wealth management and investment and its price formation system'' [Chinese real estate bubble]

65; China; covert funding; dropped; housing bubble; long; survival rate; Time larger; Timeline; Vacant Homes Uncovered; zero; Zero Hedge.

Calculated Risk Thu 2010-05-06 13:59 EDT

96.5% of Mortgages Backed by Government entities in Q1

CalculatedRisk

...Government-related entities backed 96.5% of all home loans during the first quarter, up from 90% in 2009, according to Inside Mortgage Finance...The government-sponsored enterprises--Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae--now own or guarantee an overwhelming share of originations. At the same time, non-agency mortgage securitization and loans retained in lender portfolios have largely dried up...Without the government backed entities there would be almost no mortgage market.

5; 96; Calculated Risk; government entity; Mortgage Backed; Q1.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-02-05 11:06 EST

FDIC Proposes Tough-Minded Securitization Reforms; Industry Howls

...the FDIC presented a cogent and tough-minded plan for securtization reform at the American Securitization Forum...The driving element is that the FDIC is proposing to change the requirements for a securitization to be treated as a true sale, meaning that when the originator sells the mortgages to a securitization vehicle (say a trust), the investors in that vehicle cannot go back to the originator for recourse...The FDIC included various proposals to insure transparency for investors, including a requirement that all deals be arms length, to third party investors (no affiliates or insiders). They would exclude derivatives (excluding interest rate swaps) and would not permit re-securitizations...a clever effect of this proposal was that it solved the problem of ``what to do with rating agencies'' by making them irrelevant

FDIC Proposes Tough-Minded Securitization Reforms; Industry Howls; naked capitalism.

Wed 2010-02-03 19:45 EST

Bankruptcy Judge Invalidates Securitization Payment Structure >> HousingWire

A federal bankruptcy court judge in New York ruled earlier this week that long-held assumptions about payments owed to a counterparty in securitization deals cannot be enforced under US Bankruptcy Code, in a decision set to upend the securitization market. The decision was handed down by Judge James Peck, the judge overseeing the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy proceedings, who said that certain contractual provisions in a Lehman collateralized default obligation (CDO) are unenforceable under Chapter 11.

Bankruptcy Judge Invalidates Securitization Payment Structure; HousingWire.

zero hedge Wed 2009-11-25 10:10 EST

Shadow Banking Topology

A new paper by the IMF provides much needed insights into the nature of Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) conduits, which amounted to $1.2 trillion in June 2007, a subset of the broader Commercial Paper shadow asset class (which as Bill Dudley discussed a week ago, hit a peak of $2.3 trillion), and the product's role in funding imbalances (and maturity mismatch) at global banks courtesy of the shadow banking system. However, the most useful observation of the paper's addenda include insights into the global shadow banking system's holdings, as well as its changing composition over time, the collapse of the ABS securitization market whose reincarnation via TALF is critical for preventing the CRE market's implosion in 2012, and lastly a comprehensive overview of the entire shadow banking system...

Shadow Banking Topology; Zero Hedge.

The Big Picture Thu 2009-11-19 10:50 EST

Recent Developments in Mortgage Finance

John Krainer

As the U.S. housing market has moved from boom in the middle of the decade to bust over the past two years, the sources of mortgage funding have changed dramatically. The government-sponsored enterprises--Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae--now own or guarantee an overwhelming share of originations. At the same time, non-agency mortgage securitization and loans retained in lender portfolios have largely dried up.

Big Picture; Mortgage Finance; recent developments.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-10-27 12:45 EDT

More on Banks Engaging in Mortgage Fraud

Hoisted from comments: I am a lawyer who has been involved in corporate finance for over 25 years...the securitization industry 5-10 years ago made a collective choice to ignore the terms of contracts, state and local laws and legal convesntions developed over hundreds of years. Why? Because they could. Our legal system and conventions were built on the assumption that most businesses would choose to follow them. Instead, the securitization industry simply developed a cost/benefit approach to following the law and adhering to contracts. It worked quite well becaseu most individuals just aren't equipped to read and enforce their mortgage agreements or fully understand the law.

banking engage; mortgage fraud; naked capitalism.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-10-27 11:49 EDT

Wow, judges now nixing lenders' foreclosure claims entirely in court

Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns

Gretchen Morgenson: One surprising smackdown occurred on Oct. 9 in federal bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York. Ruling that a lender, PHH Mortgage, hadn't proved its claim to a delinquent borrower's home in White Plains, Judge Robert D. Drain wiped out a $461,263 mortgage debt on the property. Edward Harrison: I see this as a watershed case in jurisprudence surrounding mortgage-related bankruptcies and foreclosures. The reason this is huge is that it echoes the case in Kansas...what legal rights do lenders or their agents have in foreclosure in the new byzantine world of securitized mortgages. In the New York case the judge nixed the entire claim as the mortgagee could not prove it had legal claim to the mortgage note...PHH and MERS, the two lender agents in each cases, are not the actual owners of the mortgages. They are the agents of the mortgagees. This is why these cases have a lot to do with securitization.

court; foreclosure claims entirely; judge; naked capitalism; nixing lenders; Wow.

Calculated Risk Tue 2009-10-27 11:17 EDT

SF Fed: Recent Developments in Mortgage Finance

CalculatedRisk

From San Francisco Fed Senior Economist John Krainer: Recent Developments in Mortgage Finance As the U.S. housing market has moved from boom in the middle of the decade to bust over the past two years, the sources of mortgage funding have changed dramatically. The government-sponsored enterprises--Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae--now own or guarantee an overwhelming share of originations. At the same time, non-agency mortgage securitization and loans retained in lender portfolios have largely dried up.

Calculated Risk; Mortgage Finance; recent developments; SF Fed.

naked capitalism Fri 2009-10-23 09:20 EDT

Paul Volcker, Mervyn King, Glass Steagall, and the Real TBTF Problem

Paul Volcker wants to roll the clock back and restore Glass Steagall, the 1933 rule that separated commercial banking from investment banking, but Team Obama is politely ignoring him. Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, is giving a more strident version of the same message...I think Volcker is wrong, but not for reasons one might expect...The problem is that we have had a thirty year growth in securitization. A lot of activities that were once done strictly on bank balance sheets are merely originated by banks and are sold into capital markets...you could in theory go back to having much more on balance sheet intermediation (finance speak for ``dial the clock back 35 years and have banks keep pretty much all their loans''). Conceptually, that is a tidy solution, but it has a massive flaw: it would take a simply enormous amount of equity to provide enough equity to all those banks with their vastly bigger balance sheets. We're having enough trouble recapitalizing the banking system we have...I have yet to see anything even remotely approaching a realistic discussion of how to deal with too big too fail firms, and we have been at this for months. My knowledge of the industry is not fully current, but even so, the difficulties are far greater than I have seen acknowledged anywhere. That pretty much guarantees none of the proposals are serious, and nothing will be done on this front. That further implies the system will have to break down catastrophically before anything effective can be done. I really hope I am wrong on this one.

Glass Steagall; Mervyn King; naked capitalism; Paul Volcker; Real TBTF Problem.

zero hedge Fri 2009-10-23 09:05 EDT

Fitch Expects CMBS Loss Severity To Rise Markedly Next Year

As anyone who has spent even a day looking at securitization tranching or CDS trading will tell you, there are two critical components to any investment that involves risky fixed income: cumulative loss probability and loss severity...artificial delays in bringing the CRE market to fair value in terms of delinquencies and REOs going to foreclosures will simply result in much lower eventual recoveries...the temporary reprieves granted to many leveraged securities will come back to bite investors when defaults eventually pick up again, however with the result being loss rates which will be much higher than default expectations.

Fitch Expects CMBS Loss Severity; Rise Markedly; years; Zero Hedge.

The Baseline Scenario Thu 2009-10-08 16:52 EDT

The Problem with Securitization

James Kwak

The New York Times has a story on ``Paralysis in the Debt Markets'' which says, basically, that credit has dried up because of lack of demand for asset-backed securities. In English, that means that since no one wants to invest in securities that are made out of home mortgages, the people who originate mortgages have no place to sell the mortgages to, so they don't have any money to lend. And this is also true of commercial real estate, student loans, and so on. For example, ``A once-thriving private market in securities backed by home mortgages has collapsed, from $744 billion in 2005, at the peak of the housing boom, to $8 billion during the first half of this year.''...the private market may never recover. The boom in securitization was based on investors' willingness to believe what investment banks and credit rating agencies said about these securities.

Baseline Scenario; problem; securitizations.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

Thu 2009-09-17 09:31 EDT

Why capitalism fails - The Boston Globe

Stephen Mihm

Mainstream economics rediscovers Hyman Minsky; ``Instability,'' he wrote, ``is an inherent and inescapable flaw of capitalism.''...Minsky drew his own, far darker, lessons from Keynes's landmark writings, which dealt not only with the problem of unemployment, but with money and banking...Minsky argued that Keynes's collective work amounted to a powerful argument that capitalism was by its very nature unstable and prone to collapse. Far from trending toward some magical state of equilibrium, capitalism would inevitably do the opposite. It would lurch over a cliff...Minsky spent the last years of his life, in the early 1990s, warning of the dangers of securitization and other forms of financial innovation, but few economists listened. Nor did they pay attention to consumers' and companies' growing dependence on debt, and the growing use of leverage within the financial system... Minsky...argued for a ``bubble-up'' approach, sending money to the poor and unskilled first. The government - or what he liked to call ``Big Government'' - should become the ``employer of last resort,'' he said, offering a job to anyone who wanted one at a set minimum wage. It would be paid to workers who would supply child care, clean streets, and provide services that would give taxpayers a visible return on their dollars. In being available to everyone, it would be even more ambitious than the New Deal, sharply reducing the welfare rolls by guaranteeing a job for anyone who was able to work. Such a program would not only help the poor and unskilled, he believed, but would put a floor beneath everyone else's wages too, preventing salaries of more skilled workers from falling too precipitously, and sending benefits up the socioeconomic ladder.

Boston Globe; Capitalism Failed.

Thu 2009-07-30 00:00 EDT

Zero Hedge: The Exuberance Glut Or The Dollar-Euro Short Squeeze Race

-- David Roche ``the securitization of debt, and creation of derivatives amounted to a huge virtual printing press, primarily fueled by a massive increase in risk appetite which allowed for a huge expansion in the value of claims on financial assets and goods and services...the Fed has little to no control over this "printing press" at this point, which at last count was responsible for over 90% of the liquidity in the system''

Dollar-Euro Short Squeeze Race; Exuberance Glut; Zero Hedge.